



# NATO SFA COE

## 1st

# Lessons Learned

## Workshop



Report

**1<sup>st</sup> SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE LESSONS LEARNED WORKSHOP  
ESTABLISH THE NATO SFA LESSONS LEARNED  
COMMUNITIES OF INTEREST:  
SUPPORT NATO's HUMAN CAPITAL EFFORTS IN THE FIELD OF SFA**

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Report

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## **1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

### **a.Preface**

*"Your capacity to learn from your mistakes...  
is the key to your ultimate success and...  
Amy C. D'Amato"*

The 1<sup>st</sup> NATO SFA COE Lessons Learned Workshop took place on the 24<sup>th</sup> and 25<sup>th</sup> of September in Cesano di Roma, in the Italian Army Infantry School compound. It brought together key stakeholder experts from the Lessons Learned field to create and develop the NATO SFA LL Community of Interest, identify the needs of NATO Nations/Partners and International Organizations, regarding the implementation of SFA activities in operations.

The activity developed through different phases; starting from a general overview on Security Force Assistance doctrine, presenting SFA crosscutting projects running by Departments to browse the venue for future collaborations, contextualizing the SFA implementation by case studies illustration and capitalizing the effort in the syndicates work.

This format was met with many positive remarks and perceived as a fruitful and dynamic way to bring worthwhile suggestions to support a common design of the SFA Operator Profile and enhancing NATO's Human Capital efforts in the SFA domain.



*"takes and move on will be key  
and achievement."*

*an*



"The purpose of a Lessons Learned procedure is to learn efficiently from experience and to provide validated justifications for amending the existing way of doing things, to improve performance, both during the course of an operation and for subsequent operations. This requires lessons to be meaningful and for them to be brought to the attention of the appropriate authority able and responsible for dealing with them. It also requires the chain of command to have a clear understanding of how to prioritize lessons and how to staff them." – AJP-3(B) Allied Joint Doctrine for the Conduct of Operations.

Following this principle, the presentation of the case studies contextualizes the implementation of SFA in the operational environment, setting the condition for productive open discussion and the syndicates' work as well. Each lecture focused on different missions carried out by diverse organizations, pointing out gaps and challenges faced by Commanders and SFA operators.

The selected speakers underlined the noteworthy aspects of European Training Mission Somalia, Operation Inherent Resolve – Iraq - and Resolute Support Mission – Afghanistan -, providing a comprehensive excursus on the SFA operations effort.



## **2. EUROPEAN TRAINING MISSION SOMALIA**

### **a. Introduction**

The EUTM Somalia aims to strengthen the Somali federal defence institutions, by continuing to employ its three-pillar approach: training, mentoring and advising. In accordance with the Comprehensive Approach to Security (CAS) Strand 2A approach, EUTM Somalia ensures that its activities are tailored to the best interests of the Somali defence institutions and are coordinated with other international partners. During the 5<sup>th</sup> Mandate EUTM, Somalia focuses on increasing proficiency, effectiveness, credibility and accountability of the Somali defence sector to enable authorities to take over security responsibilities progressively. Key to this is EUTM Somalia's drive to support the development of a sustainable Somali-owned training system that provides the Somali National Army (SNA) with the policies, procedures, expertise and experience to manage their force generation. In particular, EUTM Somalia sees its most important task as developing the SNA General Staff through the provision of advising, mentoring and training. However, EUTM Somalia also supports the development of the MoD and continues to deliver tactical training. The Mission Commander relies explicitly on the Training Team and on the Advising Team to follow the lines of effort, supporting the Somali counterpart in different ways.



The Training Team (TT), in liaison with CAS Strand 2A partners, AMISOM (African Union Mission to Somalia), UNSOM (United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia), United States, Turkey and United Arab Emirates (UAE); plays an active role supporting the Somali military authorities in the design and development of a Somali owned training system. The TT primarily delivered collective training; in particular, it successfully instructed light infantry companies, combat engineer platoons and cadres of SNA trainers. It also provided mentoring of General Degabidan Training Centre Commander and their staff and advice to SNA headquarters training branch. As EUTM Somalia commences its 6<sup>th</sup> Mandate, it will increasingly prioritize the training of SNA instructors and will progressively shift its focus from direct tactical training delivery to mentoring of SNA staff. The Advisor Team (AT) is the 'main effort' of the Mission and is tasked to provide strategic and operational advice to the Somali MoD and SNA General Staff. The principal outcomes of this effort are the development and drafting of key-stone documents and policies, the encouragement of civilian oversight over the SNA, and the development of functioning staff branches through the provision of advice, mentoring and focused training following Somali needs.

## b . Considerations

EUTM Somalia Force Commander (2017-2018), provided his perspective on the SFA mission, in such a complicated environment.

“Somali case-study” triggered interesting questions and valuable insights, it brought out the following key points:

- The Somali Theatre of Operation is characterized by the presence of several actors committed to the Somali Defence Forces capacity building process. It profoundly affects the implementation of strategic advising at the Institutional level, hampering the coordination between EUTM and its counterpart.

- Somali Defence Forces resistance is to accept civilian oversight. Military leadership considers legal only the dependence from the President of the Republic, due to the assigned status during the Siad Barre Regime.

- The lack of retirement system causes a considerable number of old officers in comparison with the junior officers. This generates a hard resistance to changes so that the key positions covered by the old establishment are characterized by nepotism corruption. On the other hand, the emerging young officer class has a western education and is oriented to build up a new military organization.

- In accordance with its Mandate, EUTM Somalia cannot equip Somali armed forces, and it undermines the credibility of the EU commitment considering the multiple presences of other donors in the area. Subsequently, the capability of the other international players to provide infrastructures, vehicles and military equipment jeopardizes the effectiveness of the Mission.

- The personnel preparation is heterogeneous due to the combined nature of the Mission. **It would be useful to improve the co-ordination between EU and NATO, to relay on NATO tailored pre-deployment training for the Advisors, as the Joint Training Centre Developed for RSM.**

- The mission approach should be customized to the counterpart’s culture and tradition. Trainers and Advisors should work following the Somali “rules” to achieve the shared goals. For this reason, the Somali Defence Forces capacity building project should take in consideration different factors and conditions. Firstly, the planning phases should be conditions-based instead of time-based, because the Somali mindset is focused on “today” instead of “tomorrow”.





Consequently, the long-run plan may be misunderstood by the local security forces and probably ineffective. Furthermore, we cannot apply western methodologies to the counterpart because the imposition of a “foreign” method might not succeed in a long-term campaign. On the contrary, the key point would be the creation of a shared doctrine, made up by merging the western and Somali systems.

- EUTM Somalia identified drafting infantry procedure publications as a best practice. Notably, the Training Team adapted western\NATO doctrine to the Somali system, characterized by a former Warsaw Party setting and shortage of equipment and materials, to provide a valuable tool tailored to Somali Infantry Units requirements.

### **3. OPERATION INHERENT RESOLVE, IRAQ**

#### **a. Introduction**

“Operation Inherent Resolve” (OIR) is a US lead coalition operation made up of seventy-four countries. The Mission aims to defeat “Da’esh” as a military force on the battlefield in Iraq and Syria, following an operational narrative articulated in four phases: Phase I, Degrade: the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) conducts strikes against Da’esh to blunt their expansion into Iraq IOT reduce their combat effectiveness. During this phase, the CJTF provides Security Force Assistance to the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and, in a more limited role, assists partnered forces on the ground in Syria. Phase II, Counterattack: the CJTF supports the ISF and the partnered forces in Syria. During this phase, the CJTF conducts strikes against Da’esh fighters in support of the manoeuvre of partnered forces and shaping future battles, increasing pressure and maintaining the momentum of the ground forces. The CJTF continues the training, equipping, advising, and assisting partner forces, elevating the training to unit collective tasks, focused on combined arms manoeuvre, where appropriate. Phase III, Defeat: the CJTF conducts strikes in support of the decisive battles against Da’esh. ISF and partnered forces in Syria liberate the two capitals of the self-proclaimed


caliphate, Raqqah in Syria and Mosul in Iraq, and eliminate Da’esh’s physical means and psychological will to fight. After the liberation of Mosul and Raqqah, partnered forces clear remaining pockets of Da’esh resistance throughout both countries.

Phase IV, Support Stabilization: the CJTF provides security, planning, and required support to the Government of Iraq and appropriate authorities in Syria.





## CJTF CAMPAIGN DESIGN



Line of Effort 2: the CJTF enables sustainable military partner capacity in Iraq and Syria.

Line of Effort 3: the CJTF leverages the cohesive effects of the contributions of the contributing nations of the Coalition, by maximizing support of partnered forces.



### b. Considerations

Deputy Commander for Training (2017-2018), focused the attention on training Iraqi Defence Forces conceptualizing the main aspects concerning SFA implementation in such a complex environment. The General's experience highlighted multiple items, helpful in understanding the granularity of OIR to point out challenges and best practises sharable for other SFA operations.

Capacity building is not only a military effort but part of a more comprehensive approach which encompasses other agencies and ministerial bodies. Security Force Assistance provides a military contribution to Security Sector Reform and Stability & Reconstruction operations. For this reason, it must save its capability to interact with non-military entities to be effective.



The training delivery follows different lines of effort, engaging the local security forces at multiple levels through Institutional Training, Formal Training and Continuous Training. The first one seeks the preparation of the leadership, and it focuses on the Academies, military schools and study centres, provided by military teachers and professors. Institutional Training aims to prepare the future military establishment, so it is a crucial activity with strategic effects. Formal training is the specialized preparation carried out by military instructors inside Centralized Training Facilities, and its goal is to prepare the personnel employed in different Defence Forces branches. Continuous training enables local troops to conduct all range of operations, setting the conditions to maintain a tailored operational posture.

Besides, Mobile Training Teams (MTT) and Expeditionary Training Team (ETT) are the means used by the Coalition to pursue the lines of effort, namely the first deliver routinely training within the Joint Operational Area (JOA) and the second is employed on-demand accordingly with the counterpart's requirement.

Training activity cannot be considered a stand-alone effort in the SFA domain. The preparation of Iraqi forces in terms of Training and Education delivery must be nested in a Defence Capacity Building concept. It is necessary to engage all defence structures to have effective training, establishing a liaison with all the offices/branches inside and outside the educational process. The advising activity must support practically the training to influence all the defence bodies, setting the conditions for a sustainable harmonization, between training authority and command authority.

Planning and conducting training activities must be on track with the operational and logistical tempo. The Joint Operation Centre Iraq (JOC-I) plays a remarkable role as a coordination tool, in assisting Iraqi forces to facilitate the training delivery made up by the OIR Mobile Training Team and Expeditionary Training Team. It enables Iraqi armed forces to receive appropriate training support, which meets the operational requirements, overtaking the Iraqi organizational system barriers.

The multinational nature of the operation (seventy-four countries) implies challenges and opportunities. The difficulty of coordination, due to multiple national caveats and regulations, affects the unique effort in supporting Iraqi Forces. On the other hand, this kind of structure increases the training bid. Each country can offer its expertise on a given topic, providing instructors supported by their organizations. The follow-on identifies an improvement of the national commitment, in support of the educational process for the single Iraqi student, who is, in many cases, rewarded by attending courses abroad.

The inter-ministerial approach is a key factor to succeed in the capacity building process. The effective implementation of the Security Force Assistance passes through the involvement of associated ministries. The persistent issue of obtaining Visas from Host Nation points out a severe coordination gap between the Iraqi Government and OIR. It affects the Coalition capacity to provide the requested training on time, the long and complicated process often delays the arrival of the incoming personnel, so that the Expeditionary Training Team cannot be deployed and meet the local security forces requirements.

The topic of “Protection of Civilians” and “Law of Armed Conflict” is crucial in Security Force Assistance operations. Training Iraqi Forces must clearly underline the importance of International law-related items, to build up a credible and accountable “Military Tool”.

The Program of Instruction foresees lessons concerning the Protection of Civilian and Law of Armed Conflict, to create an organizational mindset, oriented to the willing acceptance of international law. The Iraqi Armed Forces leadership plays a paramount role in this “game”, the sensitization of the commanders at all levels is indeed a priority. Under this concern, vetting procedures are in place, especially for the Senior Officers, to assure an appropriate legal background for the military establishment. The creation of Armed Forces legally accountable and aligned with international law is undoubtedly a long-run process but must be wholly integrated into capacity building development.

## 4. NATO RESOLUTE SUPPORT MISSION IN AFGHANISTAN

### a. Introduction

Resolute Support is a NATO-led, non-combat mission to train, advise and assist the Afghan National Defence and Security Forces (ANDSF). It was launched on the 1<sup>st</sup> of January 2015, following the conclusion of the previous NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission, and the assumption of full security responsibility by the ANDSF. The Resolute Support Mission works closely with different elements of the Afghan Army, Police and Air Force.

The Resolute Support Mission consists of approximately 17,000 personnel from NATO and partner nations in Afghanistan with the central hub at Kabul and Bagram Airfield supporting four spokes. The spokes are formed by Train Advise Assist Commands (TAACs), which directly support four of the six Afghan National Army Corps. Train Advise and Assist Command - Capital replaces the former Regional Command Capital. TAAC East assists the 201<sup>st</sup> Corp from FOB Gamberi in Laghman, TAAC South assists the 205<sup>th</sup> Corp from Kandahar International Airport, TAAC West assists the 207th Corp in Herat, and TAAC North covers




the 209<sup>th</sup> Corps from Mazar-I -Sharif. The 203<sup>rd</sup> Corp, located in the south-eastern part of the country, sees advisers from time to time from TAAC East (one source describes this as "fly to advise"). TAAC South supports the 215<sup>th</sup> Corp in the south-west.

Training, Advising and Assisting focuses on developing the capacity of the Afghan Security Institutions (ASI) and ANDSF while upholding the North Atlantic Council Initiating Directive

(NID) stipulation of being a non-combat mission, not participating directly in counter-terrorism tasks. To summarize, through TAA, the advisor empowers the Afghans to take ownership of their systems and to identify critical gaps and friction points.

For that, it could be easy to understand that the activities of the trainers and advisors employed in the Mission are part of a complex system, a system further expanded by the presence of four distinct actors on the scenario (the International Community, the Afghan government, NATO and the US with Operation Freedom Sentinel), each with its own purpose and therefore with different goals to achieve.





## b.Considerations

The complex environment requires highly trained and skilled operators who perform crucial daily tasks. It is possible to summarize the primary duties related to the advisor's responsibility:

- TAA ANDSF
- observe, evaluate and report on the performance of their assigned functional area;
- communicate within their chain of command, functional Subject Matter Experts, and ANDSF counterparts to resolve problems and gain confidence;
- create a professional relationship based on capability and trust that inspires and influences the counterparts to effective action;
- understand the processes and systems associated with their functional area as well as their location in the Advisor network.

Among the tasks of trainers and advisors, there will also be the need to build a strong network of relationships with the Afghan counterpart to render collaborations more profitable and to better interact regarding the planning of joint activities.

Networking surely is one of the Adviser's mandatory task, because it represents the unique channel, to provide effective assistance.

The mission approach needs to be adaptive, starting from the planning of activities and the pursuit of achievable objectives (which may not even be in line with the initial objectives), coordinating the conduct training and advising operations with your command line even in light of the changes that may occur. The trainers and advisers employed will also have to possess strong social skills, relational and negotiation, having to be able to interface with an ethereal and varied spectrum of situations and staff belonging to the HN.





The syndicate work was the workshop's last phase, and all the attendees were divided into two groups, facilitated by two moderators, to use all the information gained during the event. Each syndicate was made up by twenty people, coordinated by a moderator, with one topic to cover, analyze and present in the subsequently entire section. They both focused on SFA Human Dimension and were able to identify numerous human-related factors that affect the SFA operator's capability and performance.

**Syndicate #1 focus area:** SFA operator's Recruitment and Selection.

After listening to the case studies and analyzing the available documents, addressing the myriad of issues with the SFA operator's capability from the human perspective, syndicate #1 identified and highlighted the following recommendations:

**NATO can formulate the job description:** NATO's inability to directly select the staff to be employed as trainers, mentors, advisors (which remains a national prerogative) emphasizes the possibility to formulate a common Job Description that can then be used by NATO and NATO partner countries. Also, the ability to draw on a well-selected and high motivated pool of staff would enable better results (by motivational and individual skills, previous experience in the field of SFA operations, pre-deployment training phase suited to operational needs).

**Options to increase SFA-personnel quality:** The selection and training of the current staff is a national prerogative, the working group formulated and brought attention to some proposals. One of the most interesting is the so-called "Red Flag Option".

It is nothing more than the possibility for the Reference Unit to be able to relieve advisors, trainers or mentors from the assignment who do not perform the assigned tasks effectively or that do not achieve satisfactory results in line with what's planned. This measure could also change the mindset of the staff employed, by optimizing work and allowing a better staff solution.

**Personnel service tracking specific skills:** In the staff training process, the focus should be on language skills and teaching techniques. Assuming that the staff employed has already particular technical expertise in the area in which they will have to work alongside the other party, two of the most essential areas in which the training activity of the staff involved will be focused on (to optimize the work and tend to maximize results) will be language (in addition to the English language). The working group also suggests knowledge of the local language and specific teaching techniques. **Track personnel with SFA experience:** the ability to "follow" the path of the SFA staff.

Placing it in a reference database would allow NATO and partners not to lose the expertise and the know-how gained. It would also enable, through continuous dialogue and sharing of experience, to improve and make as relevant as possible the process of training the new staff designated for SFA missions.

**Syndicate #2 focus area:** SFA operator's Education and Training.

Trying to summarize a common line that can be used and valid in both military and civilian communities to generate consolidated and detailed SFA operator's skill requirements, the syndicate #2 identified the following recommendations:

**Education considerations:** The need for a high degree and a senior academic preparation, especially for staff employed as advisors, that allows them to optimize work and interrelationship, especially with a high-level advisee.



The task particularity and the scope of use also require a high technical preparation in the area covered by the Adviser. This preparation, in addition to previous experience in the relevant field of work, could be implemented through Ad-Hoc courses at pre-existing NATO facilities (e.g. NATO School in Oberammergau) or a Centre of Excellence.

**Skills considerations:** The changing environment in which an operator for SFA operations could be employed makes the operator's ability to adapt and work in a dynamic environment crucial. It has been pointed out that competence and linguistic knowledge, not only concerning the main languages in use in the Area of Operations (English and French) but also and above all for the knowledge of the local language, are considered essential for the "closeness" needed by the other party to better achieve results during the training/mentoring/advising activity.

The use of an interpreter is another aspect considered to be of fundamental importance to the activity of SFA. The interpreter is not regarded as a mere translator, but he is also considered, in a concept now widely accepted, as a facilitator in the effects regarding the SFA staff activity through the local context knowledge. For this reason, the emphasis should be placed on preparatory activities for the use of an interpreter. Depending on the level of employment or the position employed within the Command structure, it highlights the need or possibility to attend courses, and therefore to implement, the leadership and negotiation skills, considered fundamental to the role.

**Competencies and Background considerations:** even for this Working Group, it is fundamental to have an in-depth technical knowledge of the subject in which one will be advising.





## Syndicate 2



Being a subject matter expert in the field is, therefore, a fundamental aspect for all those staffs who will work in SFA operations. Understanding how to work in an international context and how to fit into an international command, which presents dynamics and processes that are usually different from a national framework and an understanding of the planning process, not just daily activities but how these fit into a medium- to long-term schedule can make the preparation of SFA operators more complete.

**Knowledge considerations:** the SFA operator must also have knowledge related to the cultural and political situation of the HN to fit into an environment that could present difficulties and many “tricky” situations and to avoid misunderstanding or problems that could seriously compromise the SFA operator’s activity. The personnel working as trainers, mentors or advisors must have knowledge and practicality with the local technical-tactical procedures and especially the material of the local safety features that will be used during training or advising activities, without underestimating sound knowledge of International Law & Human Rights and Knowledge of NATO Protection of Civilian framework.

In conclusion, the syndicates’ outcomes (as presented above), may and should be considered as valuable information from the SFA Lessons Learned Community at large for the several corresponding work-strands ongoing in NATO currently, ranging from SFA interoperability and network established to SFA Operator’s focused studies and capability development issues. However, such outcomes would require significant further and in-depth analysis to indeed contribute to these work-strands.

## 6. CONCLUSIONS

NATO SFA COE LL workshop was the opportunity to bring together all the personnel involved in the Security Force Assistance domain and the Lessons Learned process, addressing the crucial topic of the implementation of SFA in operations. It was the suitable venue to establish the NATO SFA LL network and originate the process for sharing Observations (OBs), Best Practices (BPs), Lessons Identified (LI) and Lessons Learned (LL) in the SFA domain.

The attendees analyzed the experiences shared in the case-study section, understanding the operational context from different perspectives and in various Theatres of Operations. It shaped the conditions for the work in syndicates, that was the chance to actively interact and point out the initial considerations concerning training, education and selection of the SFA Operator.



By analyzing the operational context and the paramount importance of the human dimension, it is possible to catalyze the NATO and NATO partner effort on the preparation of the proper person assigned to operate alongside Local Security Forces. It is a crucial concept, focused on quality instead of quantity, which identifies human relationships as a “manoeuvre pivot” to succeed in SFA operations.

**“Quality for quantity”** might be considered the decisive condition to face the complexity of this operational environment, which must be supported by selected and trained personnel.



The creation of a tailored selection and recruitment process, based on mind frame, behavioural traits and professional background, would be strongly recommended. NATO Combined Joint State of Requirement (CJSOR) refers to national responsibility, for the selection of the personnel but should retain the possibility to select the job description for SFA operator-position. Red flag procedures and fixed standards certainly encourage the force provider to align with adequate personnel standards to meet the operational requirements.

We might also point out some rewarding outcomes, which could work as key milestones in a joint road-map to design the ideal SFA operators' profile:

- set common standards and procedures in the recruitment, selection and training of all the SFA operators;
- the importance of a comprehensive approach based on the area, where the SFA operator is deployed;
- share operational experiences, to create a common background;
- the importance of the cultural awareness, social aspect, political situations of the area where the advisors/mentors/trainers are going to perform their activities;

SFA activities are different in different areas of Operations, but a lot of common grounds can be found and would remain tightly intertwined. SFA is becoming a fundamental part of modern conflict prevention campaigns, sometimes leading to mutual benefits and support.

In this context, the NATO SFA COE could play a prominent role, by capitalizing the NATO double nature defining the “universal” SFA operator profile and preparation.



### **Colonel Franco MERLINO**

is an Officer of the Italian Army's Parachute Unit. He began his service at the Military Academy in 1987 with the 169<sup>th</sup> Course "Orgoglio".

Since 2016 he is the Director of the Security Force Assistance Centre of Excellence and has followed its creation as an International Body and its subsequent accreditation as a NATO Centre of Excellence.

### **Brigadier General Pietro ADDIS**

military career started attending firstly the Army NCO School in Viterbo in 1986 and later the Army Military Academy in Modena 1987 and the Officers School in Torino in 1989, where he completed his officer education in 1991. From July 2017 to July 2018 BG Addis has been the Mission Force Commander of the European Union Training Mission in Somalia. From the 7<sup>th</sup> of September 2018 BG Addis is the Commander of the Army NCO Academy in Viterbo, Italy.



### **Brigadier General Roberto VANNACCI**

graduated from the Army Military Academy in 1990 as infantry (parachutist) officer. From September 2017 till August 2018 Brigadier VANNACCI was appointed as Deputy Commanding General for Training of the Combined Joint Task Force - Operation Inherent Resolve Iraq.

Since November 2018 he serves as Chief of Staff of the Vittorio Veneto Division in Florence, Italy.



### Colonel Stefano NIGRI

attended the 164<sup>th</sup> Course “Volontà” in the Military Academy in the period 1982-1984 where he was commissioned as 2<sup>nd</sup> Lieutenant and the Military School of Application and Specialization in Turin in the period 1984-1986. In 2016, he has joined NATO HQs in Resolute Support Mission in Kabul-Afghanistan as ANA GSG5 Senior Advisor within DCOS OPS / CJ5 Branch for a 12 months mandate, under which he supported the Afghan Plans & Policy Directorate. Currently he is the Deputy Commander of the Medium Infantry Brigade, in Bari, Italy.

### LTC. Colonel Dëfrim HAXHIJA

was commissioned a Lieutenant of Infantry in 1994, after his graduation from Albanian Land Forces Military Academy “SKËNDERBEJ”.

Since July 2018 he is the Lessons Learned Branch Head of the NATO Security Force Assistance Centre of Excellence, in Rome, Italy.



### Maj. Matteo FRANCAVILLA

attended the 181<sup>st</sup> Course “Esempio” of the Military Academy in 1999-2001 and the School of Applied Military Studies in 2001-2004.

In 2014, after successfully attending the Staff Course, he was assigned to the Infantry school and after two years was appointed to the NATO SFA COE as LL Section Chief.



### **C.W.O. Stefano BARANOVICH**

joined the Italian Army in 2005. From 2007 to 2010 attended the 10<sup>th</sup> Warrant Officer Course “Dignità” in the Italian Warrant Officer Academy. At the end of the Course, he gained the rank of Warrant Officer. Since September 2016 he is employed in the NATO Security Force Assistance Centre of Excellence in Cesano di Roma as Cultural Awareness and GAP Analysis staff assistant..





# NATO SFA COE

## 1st

## Lessons Learned

# Workshop

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