Security Force Assistance Quarterly

Playing the Inside Game: SFA's Role in Generating Multinational Interoperability within the Contact Layer

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Cover Photo Credit:
A U.S. Air Force aircrew, assigned to the 816th Expeditionary Airlift Squadron, fly a C-17 Globemaster III aircraft to deliver U.S. Soldiers, assigned to the 82nd Airborne Division, from Hamid Karzai International Airport, Afghanistan, to Ali Al Saleem Air Base Kuwait, Aug 30, 2021, as one of the final noncombatant evacuation operation missions out of Afghanistan. The Afghanistan NEO was the largest non-combatant evacuation operation ever conducted by the U.S. military.
(Still Photo from U.S. Air Force video by Senior Airman Brennen Lege)

The purpose of this newsletter is to provide a quarterly publication to inform the SFA community of interest (COI), to serve as a platform to highlight the greater COI efforts, and to foster interoperability within the COI. Sharing JCISFA's efforts will help inform the COI of the myriad of ways JCISFA can be leveraged.

In addition to Chairman's Lessons Learned Information System (JLLIS), this newsletter serves as a forum for the COI to submit Observations and Recommendations or other articles of interest regarding their respective SFA efforts. As a service to the Joint Force, this newsletter intends to promote dialogue among the SFA COI that finds itself dispersed across various countries, Interagency, Joint & Service organizations.

The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are those of the contributors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any other agency of the Federal Government.

As always, this newsletter intends to promote dialogue among the SFA COI and is part of an ongoing effort to more effectively "Communicate, Cooperate, and Coordinate" across the Joint Force with all SFA stakeholders. Please let us know if there are any topics of interest you would like to see in the future or to submit an article.

Submit to:

usarmy.leavenworth.CAC.mbx.jcisfa@mail.mil

1000—2000 words, for public release preferred

Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027

From the Director's Desk

It is my pleasure to introduce the 20th edition of the SFA Newsletter and I look forward to this newsletter acting as a bridge to our next community of interest (CoI) update in October.

This quarter's newsletter focuses on multi-national interoperability (MNI), a key SFA by-product, as the U.S. and its allies compete globally. I invite us all to review the Army SFA Command's view of MNI across its three dimensions (technical, procedural and human), and to think of how these dimensions apply in your Service and/or area of responsibility. It is also useful to consider how we measure and assess MNI, as a sub-set of partner nation assessment, across the article's five functional areas.

The previous SFA newsletter featured the Marine Corps Advisor Company (MCAC) and their unique skills in developing institutional capacity within allies and partners. This edition highlights the efforts of a JCISFA Mobile Training Team (MTT) that assisted the MCAC in further expanding its SFA planning capability. We invite any SFA community member to review this training and assess if they may also benefit from a similar MTT.

Lastly, this edition takes a side by side look at how SFA and Stability mutually support each other. The National Defense Strategy Irregular Warfare Annex Implementation Plan provides the CoI with an opportunity to leverage related tasks and to apply lessons learned to help progress SFA and Stability as part of whole of government efforts in competition. Additionally, we invite you to examine how JCISFA and the Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute are working to not only produce a study integrating SFA into institutional capacity building, but to also further develop the concept for defense support to stability.

Please provide us with your feedback on this newsletter and be prepared to discuss its topics with us at the October update and over the coming quarter! This is the Security Force Assistance CoI's Newsletter, so please bring your thoughts, ideas and article content for the December edition. I look forward to hearing from you!

DALE K. SLADE
Colonel, U.S. Army
Director

Playing the Inside Game: SFA's Role in Generating Multinational Interoperability within the Contact Layer

by MAJ James P. Micciche, (USA), Security Forces Assistance Command (SFAC), G5

Strategic Competitors have taken deliberate measures to deny the United States access to entire geographic regions critical to vital U.S. security Interests. Despite competitors' efforts to deny, delay, or restrict the deployment of combat forces, the Joint Force has the capability to mitigate this threat using Security Force Assistance (SFA) to build interoperability with partners and allies within a competitor's contact layer. SFA provides the Joint Force a critical capability to defeat strategic competitors' strategy of denial by establishing a proverbial "man on the inside."

The focused development and deployment of Anti Access Area Denial (A2AD) platforms by the United States' principle strategic competitors has ushered in an age where the defense is the strongest form of war, something unseen since the end of the First World War.[1] The reemphasis on strategic defense appears to be a major shift from the Joint Force's focus on maneuver centric warfare and expeditionary deployment of combat power.

The Joint Force is currently examining, innovating,

U.S. Army Staff Sgt. Ethan Pratt with Alpha Troop, 3rd Squadron, 2nd Security Forces Assistance Brigade, conducts live fire training with Senegalese soldiers at exercise African Lion 21 June 11, 2021, in Tan Tan, Morocco. African Lion 2021 is U.S. Africa Command's largest, premier, joint, annual exercise hosted by Morocco, Tunisia, and Senegal, 7-18 June. More than 7,000 participants from nine nations and NATO train together with a focus on enhancing readiness for U.S. and partner nation forces.

(U.S. Army National Guard photo by Spc. Brandon Malcolm)

and experimenting with both means and ways to mitigate, bypass, or disable adversarial A2AD bubbles that deny or restrict U.S. forces. Concurrently, the United States Government increasingly emphasizes the role of allies and partners within policy documents as is evident from the 2021 Interim National Security Strategic Guidance declaring, "We will reinvigorate and modernize our alliances and partnerships around the world."[2] The aforementioned goals are mutually supportive as allies and partners play a critical role in overcoming the strategic challenge adversarial A2AD presents.

Integration of allies and partners enables the Joint Force to overcome the largest strategic challenges inherent to operating within and against A2AD restricted areas: time and distance.[3] To mitigate standoff distance and decrease the time required to respond to antagonistic or hostile acts the Joint Force must make concerted efforts to build multinational interoperability with partners and allies within strategic competitors' A2AD zones. Doing so expands the inside forces available to penetrate A2AD zones before day 0 of any engagement, presents competitors multiple dilemmas, facilitates the long-range delivery of effects in contested regions, and enhances partner force survivability. Interoperability requires engagement between U.S. and partner forces. Security Force Assistance (SFA), which per JP 3-20, "includes activities to help contribute to multinational operations"[4] is a critical capability the Joint Force can use to build interoperability in competition, deter in crisis, and win in conflict.

What is Multinational Interoperability?

Army Regulation 34-1 defines interoperability as "the ability to act together coherently, effectively, and efficiently to achieve tactical, operational, and strategic objectives."[5] Multinational interoperability is a bidirectional construct in which the military forces from two or more nations mutually benefit by mitigating weaknesses and leveraging strengths through execution of combined operations. Building interoperability with partners and allies enables the Joint Force to conduct multinational operations across a wide range of military activities in conflict

and provides partner forces access to joint fires and effects. Concurrently, partners and allies that are interoperable with U.S. forces send clear messaging of their capabilities, increasing a strategic adversary's escalation costs in crisis and competition helping preserve the status quo.

Army Field Manual (FM) 3-22 discusses a purpose of security cooperation, which SFA is a major component of, as "send a compelling regional and often global strategic communication message of a commitment to threat interdiction."[6] Simply put as the Joint Force utilizes SFA to build interoperability with partners, it sends strategic messages to rivals, partners, and even neutral nations. Through this interoperability, partners and allies build confidence in leveraging a wide range of lethal and non-lethal effects. In turn, strategic competitors and malign actors face increased escalation costs when planning aggressive acts towards an interoperable U.S. partner or ally allowing the United States to achieving deterrence by denial effects. If that partner is located within a competitor's A2AD zone or deep fire area, then generating and demonstrating interoperability via SFA can produce punitive deterrent options as well.   Knowing partner nation ground forces are trained and have compatible equipment to call for fire from U.S. long range precision platforms makes their nation a far more dangerous target to an aggressor. Moreover, knowing there are practiced and proficient systems and processes to provide real-time targeting data to partner nation MLRS systems from U.S. ISR platforms potentially decreases the likelihood of future aggression outside contested regions. Knowledge of either of these capabilities forces strategic competitors such as Russia and the PRC to reevaluate the costs of an invasion, blockade, or other hostile action. In addition to building the partner force capabilities that enable interoperability, SFA allows advising teams to embed with partner forces in a liaison role greatly enhancing the aforementioned effects.

To achieve the tactical, operational, and strategic benefits derived from multinational operations the Joint Force must develop more than just relationships with partners and allies. Instead the Joint Force must deliberately build and enable interoperability across five functional areas as outlined by AR 34-1:

U.S. Army Staff Sgt. Marissa Vandenheuvel, Security Forces Assistance Brigade (SFAB) signal advisor, Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) and a member from the Armed Forces of Djibouti (FAD) Bataillon d'intervention rapide (BIR), go over radio operations in a Humvee at the BIR compound, Oct. 21, 2020. (U.S. Air Force photo by Tech. Sgt. Dana J. Cable)

- Communication and Information Systems

- Information Management

- Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance and Intelligence Fusion

- Digital Fires

- Sustainment

Creation of interoperable formations requires the Joint Force to take a comprehensive approach across three dimensions: technical, procedural, and human.[7] SFA provides the Joint Force a unique opportunity to generate interoperability across the depth and breadth of partners. It also provides Joint Force commanders the ability to leverage interoperable forces through liaison functions with an increased deterrent effect.

The Army has taken proactive steps to enhance the Joint Force's SFA capability by standing up the Security Force Assistance Command (SFAC) and regionally aligned Security Force Assistance Brigades (SFABs). The Army's SFA enterprise provides each Geographic Combatant Command (GCC) persistent force packages of 272 specially trained and selected Advisors task-organized into 20 Advising Teams to support Theater Security Cooperation Plans

(TSCP) including building and maintaining interoperability.

Technical Dimension: The Means

The technical dimension of interoperability is the most observable of the three and is closely associated with the resources or means to enable multinational forces to operate in unison. The most basic example is the standardization of NATO ammunition in the 1970s which allowed units to share Class V supplies across the alliance. A contemporary example is how SFAB advising teams utilize cutting edge technologies to integrate partners into complex communication networks producing a Common Operating Picture (COP) that supports multiple warfighting functions across a combined force from mission command to combined fires.

Despite emphasis on digital hardware and software solutions, the technical dimension requires training, familiarization, and integration of capabilities at regular intervals. Selling equipment to partners and allies through Foreign Military Sales or Foreign Military Financing alone will not achieve the desired effect of interoperability across platforms. Rather, it requires technically competent advisors conducting focused

4 SFAB Advisors and Spanish Army Soldiers train on a U.S. M777 howitzer and a Spanish Santa Barbara Sistemas 155/52 howitzer during Exercise Defender Europe 21 as part of a combined fires event.

(Photos provided by 4 SFAB PAO)

repetition-based training at regular intervals to assist partners in progressing from individual and crew based proficiency to integrated combined arms formations and eventually multinational exercises and operations. SFA is the Joint Force capability to build the capacity of partners to be interoperable with U.S. forces.

During EXERCISE DEFENDER EUROPE 21 Fires Advising Teams (FATs) from 4 SFAB worked alongside NATO and Ukrainian artillery units to improve how various cannon systems integrate fires using shared targeting data over a common operating picture and process. The end result was 19 cannons from six nations firing 2000 rounds based off common targeting procedures that were part of a larger theater effort demonstrating NATO's ability to rapidly deploy and deliver precision fires.[8] Using SFA to generate, improve, or exercise fires interoperability clearly demonstrates a capability for multiple nations to mass effects on a single target or distribute and prioritize multiple targets to the best possible firing position regardless of the unit calling for fire or the nation the cannon system belongs to.

In addition to ensuring tactical level platforms are interoperable with allies, SFA improves operational understanding by integrating partner forces into the overall Common Operational Picture (COP). SFABs integrate partner force Position Location Information (PLI) data into commonly accessed digital interfaces that enable visualization of multi-functional partner capability during the conduct of an operation. In this role, SFABs enable a shared COP between the partner and the U.S. through various mission command information systems with advisors as the digital entry point and broker of partner data. To refine and improve these capabilities SFABs are utilizing both their liaison capabilities and technical expertise to integrate partner forces attending or supporting Warfighting Exercises and Combat Training Center rotations to develop operational interoperability with key partners and allies.

SFA remains a primary tool to ensure nations not only exercise, integrate, and practice technical interoperability, but also a source of identifying and addressing DOTMLPF-P gaps that impede interoperability. Identifying and isolating these gaps leads to technical or procedural solutions solved in conjunction with a partner force. SFA activities can boost capacity to conduct internal analysis of US military capabilities and limitations to further drive capabilities requirements.

Procedural Dimension: The Ways

If one were to view the technical dimension as being a car then the procedural dimension is the road,

"ensuring that the Army achieves sufficient harmony in policies and doctrine that will enable it to operate effectively with UAP."[9] While SFA activities support the generation and maintenance of technical interoperability it is often SFA comprising the main effort in developing procedural interoperability with partners and allies. Advising, the core competency of SFA, differs from training due to the increased aperture beyond a single system, battle drill, or exercise and instead builds capacity across an entire partner force.

Across the globe SFABs have been working at the operational level with countless partners to generate procedural effects. From standing up a joint operations cell in Tunisia that integrates the three services of the Tunisian Armed Forces and enables enhanced Tunisian-NATO interoperability to developing combined operational concepts throughout the Indo Pacific, SFA remains a core component of developing interoperability in the procedural domain.

The overlap between the technical and procedural domains implies the need to advise partners and allies in creating structures that enable multinational interoperability with the Joint Force. The Security Assistance Training Management Organization (SATMO) has coordinated with 3 SFAB in the CENTCOM AOR to support the integration of recently purchased mortar systems into a partner nation's doctrine, training, and operations while concurrently building long term capacity and technical interoperability with U.S. forces and formations. SFABs build procedural interoperability beyond combat arms capabilities as Logistics Advisor Teams (LATs) work with partners globally to better integrate supply and transportation systems, a key element to opening theaters to the Joint Force. Additionally, Military Intelligence Augmentation Teams (MIAT) develop core geospatial competencies at a military intelligence schoolhouse on the African continent.

At the institutional level of warfare the Security Force Assistance Command (SFAC) has been working with the United Kingdom Specialized Infantry Group (UK SPIG) and the NATO SFA Center of Excellent (CoE) to help develop UK and NATO advising capabilities and doctrine.

Figure 1: An Example Common Operating Picture (COP)

Although in a nascent state building procedural interoperability in SFA across the 30 members of NATO ensures cohesive multinational operations between alliance partners and also the foreign forces they advise. If a crisis emerges or conflict occurs, the procedural interoperability generated from SFA activities enables allies and partners to operate in unison on day zero, an advantage very few in the Joint Force are capable of capturing.

Human Dimension: The Base

While much focus is placed on the technical and procedural dimensions of generating interoperability, war remains "chaotic, lethal, a fundamentally human endeavor"[10] despite the growing importance of technology. The human dimension is not as easily defined or visualized as its technical and procedural counterparts, but it serves as the foundational basis for success in those dimensions. SFA puts Soldiers from various nations in regular contact and builds rapport, trust, and confidence between formations and individuals. In 2021 SFAB Advisors worked alongside and with Soldiers from over 40 militaries. These advisor teams fostered relationships from privates and NCOs at the tactical level to strategic level leadership in multiple Ministries of Defense and Army Staffs. Some

engagements are periodic lasting only five days while others are persistent, evident by the reciprocal Field Grade Officer exchange between 1 SFAB and the Colombian Army Staff. Regardless of the level and length of an SFA activity, at its core Advising is built around an engagement between Soldiers and success is predicated on mastering the intangibles of the human domain.

In Conclusion

SFA presents a viable capability to address the transforming role of allies and partners in national security strategy while also decreasing the effects of adversary A2AD capability. SFA activities are the cornerstone for the Joint Force to build and maintain interoperability with allies and partners deep within adversarial A2AD zones mitigating the challenges of time and distance. Thus, enhancing deterrence in crisis and providing a more lethal combined force in conflict.

In a 2020 RAND report for the House Armed Service Committee (HASC) now Secretary of the Army Christine Wormuth stressed not only the importance of building and maintaining partnerships but the eminent role allies and partners will play in overcoming strategic challenges of the modern world. "Allies and partners will remain critically important in this changing landscape, but the United States needs to adapt and strengthen its network of alliances and partnerships to better position itself for this era of great-power competition."[11] SFA provides the Joint Force a critical tool that answers the Secretary's challenges. SFA strengthens partnerships, generates interoperability, and leverages interoperable force to deter in crisis and win in conflict even when faced with the strategic challenge of A2AD exclusion zones.

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U.S. Ambassador to Albania, Yuri Kim, coins two non-commissioned officers with the 4th Security Forces Advisory Brigade for their outstanding performance and contribution to DEFENDER-Europe, Tuesday, May 18, 2021.   (Photo by Sgt. Spencer Rhodes)

U.S. Marines of Marine Corps Advisor Company Alpha with JS J7 JCISFA facilitators conduct regional Security Force Assistance planning.

(Photo by LtCol Aaron Krudwig)

Security Force Assistance Planning: A JCISFA Facilitated Approach

by LtCol Aaron M. Krudwig, Chief, JCISFA Joint Force Support Division and Floyd W. Lucas, JCISFA Military Analyst

As the Joint Force integrator for Security Force Assistance (SFA), JCISFA develops, disseminates, and institutionalizes doctrine, training and education to enable the Joint Force to develop partner nation capacity and capability in support of U.S. national security objectives. Some of JCISFA's enduring objectives include a trained Joint Force that can apply SFA principles, strengthened relationships with key partners, and that JCISFA's efforts are widely coordinated.

At the request of Marine Corps Advisor Company Alpha (MCAC A), from 10-11 July 2021, four members from JCISFA traveled to Joint Base Anacostia-Bolling (JBAB) in Washington, DC, to provide training and assistance. Training included discussion forums built around understanding SFA principles, joint planning considerations, and U.S. authorities. To strengthen MCAC A's planning exercise, JCISFA provided advisory assistance to MCAC A's Marine Security Cooperation Teams (MSCTs). Each MSCT consists of approximately 20 Marines in the ranks of Col, LtCol, Maj, Capt, and SNCOs.

To achieve the event's overall purpose, the JCISFA MTT introduced the law, policy, and doctrine that govern the contemporary application of SFA as the developmental component of security cooperation (SC). The facilitators used formal and informal methods spread across two days to maximize learning. The first day was in class instruction and discussions followed by individual planning sessions the second day, which were led by each MCST's leadership with the JCISFA team providing advice on various topics.

Day 1: Key Insights and Discussion

Topic 1: Introduction to SFA

A key topic of discussion during the first block included how the Advisor observes progress through completion. For example, how does an Advisor encourage a foreign security force (FSF) counterpart to implement the Advisor's recommendations? This included ways to communicate and coordinate an Advisor's recommendations across one or more governance, executive, generating, or operating (G-EGO) functions of an FSF to enable decision-making at the appropriate levels (e.g., CCMD and or FSF as appropriate).

Topic 2: Strategic Direction and Guidance

Key topics for the MSCT members in the second block included authorities and programs they would use to plan, execute, and assess their missions. JCISFA's Legal Advisor outlined specific authorities, how they applied to the MSCTs' assigned or anticipated missions and provided an SC authorities matrix as a reference. With regards to SC programs the Defense Security Cooperation University (DSCU) publishes a handbook each fiscal year for all available SC programs and the legal authorization that enables a program. Of note, the handbook is a useful tool, but is not a substitute for consulting with an SC planner and/or a judge advocate.

Topic 3: CCMD Planning Considerations

During this block of discussion, leadership within MCAC A emphasized the need to clarify what organization would conduct FSF assessments (initial assessments) to inform MSCT planning efforts. MCAC A personnel requested practical real world examples when applying the principles and models in the block of discussion. For example, when discussing the G-EGO functions, the material presented a G-EGO mapping illustration of an actual partner nation – produced from readily available open source material. The mapping illustration was well-received and utilized in follow-on discussions.

Day 2: MSCT Planning (Exercise)

Each MCST conducted planning on their assigned or anticipated missions and briefed the results to the MCAC A leadership. JCISFA was able to observe and assist each planning session. Notably, the structure of MSCTs may provide Marine Corps Forces (MARFORs) and combatant commands (CCMDs) a unique capability to conduct FSF assessments and provide maritime advice to an array of FSF principals, process owners, and subject matter expert personnel in partner nation security forces. Given that each MSCT is led by an O-6, enabled by O-5s, O-4s, and SNCOs, the structure of an MSCT is markedly distinct to other Service headquarters established advisor teams.

Outcomes achieved from the JCISFA training and assistance visit:

• Strengthened MCAC A individual and team learning.

• Introduced a common body of knowledge to enable MSCTs to plan, execute, and assess SFA.

• Provided ways that MSCTs can coordinate and integrate SFA within the joint force (operationally and institutionally).

• Provided MSCTs with a common lexicon to use when engaging external stakeholders (strategic through tactical levels).

• Summarized and highlighted principles codified within the JP 3-20 Security Cooperation rewrite.

• Observed MCAC operations and obtained leadership perspectives.

• Gained insight into Marine Corps current events within the Security Cooperation community.

Units, organizations, or teams interested in this or other type of training assist should contact JCISFA at usarmy.leavenworth.CAC.mbx.jcisfa@mail.mil.

Service members with Joint Task Force-Haiti (JTF-Haiti) and members of U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) load humanitarian aid onto a MV-22 Osprey in Port-au-Prince, Haiti Aug. 28, 2021. JTF-Haiti and USAID delivered over 570,000 pounds of humanitarian aid since an earthquake struck the area on Aug. 14, 2021.
(U.S. Army photo by Staff Sgt. Timothy Clegg)

Tips & Tools to Mutually Support SFA and Stability
Irregular Warfare (IW) Implementation Plan Provides a Unique Opportunity
by Jeffrey S. King, JCISFA Military Analyst

Article Approved for Public Release by JS J7 PA

The IW Implementation Plan as a Bonding Umbrella: At last month's Joint Staff (JS) J7-hosted Joint Lessons Learned Working Group (JLLWG), JCISFA presented select portions of the Irregular Warfare Annex (to the National Defense Strategy, NDS) Implementation Plan (I-Plan). JCISFA displayed the I-Plan as a unifying umbrella that allows the Defense Department, in conjunction with its many partners, to institutionalize and operationalize IW from many diverse angles. Among others, lessons learned (L2) is a primary I-Plan objective that has the potential to help inform and fuse I-Plan tasks.

Focus on SFA and Stability IW Task Common Interests

Among the more than 100 I-Plan tasks, one task specifically focuses on creating a study that 'integrates Security Force Assistance (SFA) developmental activities into Institutional Capacity Building (ICB) programs.' Further it calls for a 'joint model to integrate allies and partner nations (PNs) into operations and campaigns-with the developed institutional capacity to lead multi-

national missions in support of them.'

A similar task calls to 'develop a defense support to stability (DSS) concept within adversarial competition and armed conflict' that must: 1) increase the resilience of pre-crisis, vulnerable populations; 2) prevent these populations exploitation by adversaries and national security threat actors; 3) transition back to competition in a newly framed security environment.

These two IW tasks (SFA-ICB and DSS) have many overlapping points that provide ripe opportunities for mutual support. Among those are:

• Both tasks support competition and the emerging Joint Concept for Competing (JCC).

• Both tasks must account for the PN and regional populace as critical parts of ongoing campaigns (which are also part of the I-Plan's L2 objective). SFA, ICB, and security cooperation (SC) are often aimed at helping PNs achieve internal and regional stability, and this should include PNs increasing the resilience of their populations to threat exploitation.

• Both tasks have the JS J5 and Combatant Commands (CCMDs) as Offices of Coordinating Responsibility and integration of both SFA-ICB and Stability at CCMD-level is critical.

• Both tasks will make recommendations to the IW Executive Steering Counsel to drive change towards institutionalizing and operationalizing IW and mitigate IW shortfalls. Thus, it behooves both efforts to efficiently present synergistic recommendations to optimize IW, then implement those improved recommendations through established processes.

• Joint Stability tasks generally correlate very highly with SFA and SC. SC itself *is* one of the six stability functions (that also focus on competition and crisis). Of the other five, security and civil control directly relate to SFA and ICB, while governance, essential services, and humanitarian assistance (HA) have ICB implications.

• Joint Publication 3-20 Security Cooperation, of which SFA and ICB are critical components, and JP 3-07 Stability mutually support each other and both are currently under significant revision.

The remainder of this article will focus on additional SFA and Stability common interests, as well as some tips and tools towards their mutual support:

First, a view of how Stability features in JP 3-20.

Second, a review of SFA-related products that also apply to Stability.

Stability Features in JP 3-20 Security Cooperation

The following are many examples where 'stability' or 'stabilization' appears in JP 3-20. Mainly taken from JP 3-20 Chapter 2 Relationships and Appendix B Security Force Assistance, these examples cross-walk SC and SFA to and from Stability, and display their mutual support.

1) SC builds upon the United States' strategic advantages. It fosters defense relationships with partner nations to advance US national security objectives, support US military campaign and contingency plans, promote stability, prevent conflicts, share burdens, and reduce the risk of having to employ US military forces in a conflict.

2) SC activities complement other US Government (USG) engagement activities and foreign programs by providing stability, mitigating drivers of conflict, and assuring key partners and allies.

3) SC activities often complement other USG foreign assistance to provide stability, help mitigate drivers of conflict, and assure key partners and allies.

4) *Stability*. Stabilization activities include military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment. Led by DOS, stabilization often depends on the following SC developmental activities.

A delegation of five Philippine Coast Guard flag officers led by Vice Admiral Eduardo Fabricante, Deputy Commandant for Administration, visited the 1st District, U. S. Coast Guard Base Boston and U.S. Coast Guard Sector Boston on Friday, May 21, 2021.

(U.S. Coast Guard photo by Petty Officer 3rd Class Ryan L. Noel)

• *Humanitarian Assistance (HA).*

Courtesy Photo CJTF HOA

Villagers from Gnabeni, Comoros, gather at a broken water cistern while civil affairs Petty Officer 1st Class Dennis Harris determines the necessary material required. The Maritime Civil Affairs Team will work together with the villagers to enable them to fix the water supply to the 6,000 person community.

• *Civil Military Operations (CMO).* CCMDs perform CMO using designated civil affairs or other military forces to establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces and indigenous populations and institutions. <u>CMO directly supports stability.</u>

• *Countering Threat Networks (CTN).* CCDRs employ SC activities to encourage and enable allies and partners to conduct CTN activities <u>that counter the human networks threatening the stability</u> of an operational area or theater.

• *Maritime Security Cooperation.* As a matter of policy, maritime security cooperation is SC conducted by one or more of the maritime services (e.g., USN, USMC, and United States Coast Guard [USCG]). Maritime SC increases coordination and integration across the three maritime services to provide CCDRs with more effective and efficient maritime force packages that increase the capability and capacity of PN maritime security forces and their supporting institutions, increase interoperability, <u>and strengthen regional and global stability.</u>

• *Bilateral or regional cooperation programs: awards and mementos (Title 10, USC, Section 313).* SecDef may present awards or mementos for PN forces to recognize superior noncombat achievements. SecDef can recognize PN forces that help deter aggression and coercion, build coalitions, and <u>promote regional stability</u>.

• *Support for Operations (Title 10, USC, Section 331).* SecDef, with the concurrence of SecState, may provide support to friendly foreign countries in the context of specifically designated operations. Under this authority, SecDef may provide support to military forces or, if it directly benefits Armed Forces of the United States, nonmilitary forces who are participating in a combined operation with US forces or in a military operation or stability activity that benefits the United States. For operations in which the United States is not participating, CCDRs plan, execute, and assess SFA to shape the operational environment (OE) and/or assist FSF <u>in defending against internal and external threats to security or stability</u> (i.e., supporting FID, COIN, or <u>other stabilization</u> activities).

An Iraqi Security Forces member inventories 20 divested vehicles for delivery to the Ninawa Operational Command West Protection Battalion at Al Asad Air Base, Iraq, on September 9, 2021. Through advising, assisting and equipping partner forces, Combined Joint Task Force-Operation Inherent Resolve enhances ISF capabilities to sustain the defeat of Daesh, providing stability to the Government of Iraq.
(U.S. Air Force photo by Master Sgt. Natasha Stannard)

5) For more information on resources that enable SFA and the application of developmental OTEBA activities, see JP 3-20 Security Cooperation Appendix A, "Security Cooperation Related Authorities and Programs" and JP 3-07 Stability.

6) The Department of the Army's Management Office-Stability and Security Cooperation (DAMO-SSC).

7) *SFA Imperatives.* The SFA imperatives help the joint force to produce FSF that are competent, capable, sustainable, committed, confident, and support the security of the PN and regional stability. Among these imperatives is *broad participation of women in peace and conflict resolution across the competition continuum.* Increasing the meaningful participation of women in peacekeeping and conflict prevention, as well as ensuring the human rights of women and girls are protected, is a key priority for the United States and critical to longer lasting security and stability.

SFA-Related Products with Stability Applications

Following are five additional tools as shared with the pilot Joint Stabilities Studies Course (JSSC, February 2021); in which SFA and SC support Stability Efforts.

1) Center for Army Lessons Learned Handbook (CALL HB) 15-02, "Leader's Guide To Team Building-Building Adaptive High-Performance Teams." This HB is applicable to a wide variety of situations and environments (such as planning, executing and assessing SFA, SC and Stabilization). It supports the education process to help guide diverse and disparate groups and teams work more effectively together. Potential teams this can apply to include Joint, Service, interagency (IA, Department of State (DOS), US Agency for International Development (USAID), Department of Defense (DOD)) and host nation (HN) partners etc.) It's of a manageable size (easy to read) and the bulk of the HB contains useful tips at the end. No longer in print (smaller number of hard copies available) but available in pdf format via

the CALL Restricted Website and Joint L2 Information

System (JLLIS) links.
https://call2.army.mil/

2) *Women, Peace and Security (WPS) Tri-Fold*. This product is an effective quick reference guide to assist WPS planning, execution and assessment into operations and campaigns at all levels. Per the 'SFA Imperatives' as referred to in JP 3-20 above, WPS considerations are vital to successful SFA, SC and Stabilization, and were specifically featured in the JSSC. The Tri-Fold includes: A) global WPS principles and their DOD equities; B) WPS legislation, strategy, and its IA Implementation Plans and assessment metrics; C) the DODs WPS Strategic Framework and Implementation Plan objectives. This tri-fold is available at the US Army War College (USAWC) WPS Website and SharePoint sites.
(https://www.armywarcollege.edu/wps and www.usarmywarcollege.sharepont.com/sites/wps).

DoD WPS Strategic Framework and Implementation Plan Objectives

OSD(P) & JOINT Staff

MILITARY SERVICES

COMBATANT COMMANDS

Defense Objective 1: Model & employ WPS

1.1: Improve coordination with DoD Personnel & Readiness efforts on diversity, equity, and inclusion

1.2: Integrate WPS principles throughout DoD guidance, mission areas, resources, and authorities

Defense Objective 2: Promote partner nation women's participation

2.1: Promote women's' meaningful participation with partner nations and strengthen partner nation security sector's recruitment and retention of women

Defense Objective 3: Ensure protection of partner nation civilians

3.1: Strengthen partner nation security sector commitment to human rights (IHL/IHRL)

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3) *JLLIS WPS Community of Practice (CoP).* This CoP is a JLLIS feature that enables easier info sharing within the DOD and between USG agencies (on WPS and related subjects). JLLIS is a long-term DOD L2 system of record repository that helps provide continuity through personnel transitions (as members rotate duty positions and change stations) to prevent information, ideas and initiatives from being lost. JLLIS includes other government agencies (OGA) and allows L2 documents and observations to endure over time for others to retrieve, use and build upon. This particular CoP was originated in 2016 by the Center for Army L2 (CALL). It contains WPS documents and products from Talisman Sabre '15, is now managed by Joint Staff (JS) J7 and the J5 Gender Advisor, contains various WPS implementation plans, and has Army University WPS representatives as contributors.
The JILLIS link is:
https://www.jllis.mil/apps/?do=cops.view&copid=3074.

4) *JCISFA Newsletter Article Featuring the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation (WHINSEC) and the Rule of Law (RoL).* RoL was another specific JSSC feature discussed in conjunction with Stability and its associated security sector assistance and reform (SSA/SSR) that support SC and SFA. WHINSEC mixes RoL and human rights (HRs) instruction and training with SC and SFA (they have memorandum of agreement with the 1st SFA Brigade (SFAB) at Fort Benning, Georgia and relationships with the neighboring 7th Special Forces Group. Their policing instruction includes RoL and a Deputy Commandant from a regional nation's police force (Panama). The article also includes their ties to other agencies and organizations, to include the Organization of American States, who partners with other nations and organizations in all CCMD areas of responsibility (AORs). The article is on Page 10 of the newsletter at the following link:
https://www.jllis.mil/apps/?do=lessons:lesson.view&doit=view&disp=lms&lmsid=224937

5) *Competition in 2035- Anticipating Chinese Exploitation of Operational Environments*.
This study, as the title implies, describes the Chinese threat in the operational environment as it relates to competition. It can be used as a tool to support Operational Design to support Stability, as it aids finding the 'root causes of division' when trying to provide or maintain stability. The study uses a Political, Military, Economic, Social, Infrastructure, Information, Physical Environment (PMESII-P) construct; which is conducive to a good whole of government (WoG) approach to counter competitive threats from a great power. It is far reaching (out to 2035) and comprehensive (covers every CCMD AOR outside of Northern Command focusing on a key PN (case study) that China exploits in each AOR). In addition to its CCMD AOR focus, the study contains an appendix that provides a 'Glossary of (24) Conditions' in *any OE* that might contribute to these 'root causes of division.' It can help any individual or group test their assumptions on a given OE to promote continuous interaction with a PN and OGA. The study can also help any group look to why certain things (that the USG and Coalition *want* to happen) are *not* happening (general cause and effect), and determine the 'need for change' leading to a problem statement. This Training and Doctrine Command G-2 product, sanctioned by the Army Irregular Warfare Proponent, can also be useful in table top exercises (TTXs) and supported studies that cover: A) Stability; B) the need to develop PN capability and capacity (SFA), to include WoG institutional capacity building (ICB); C) relationships and access - all towards winning in great power competition (GPC). This publically releasable product is available by request to JCISFA or the Army SFA Proponent (SFAP). There is a similar study for Russia and a report on Hong Kong, as well as a draft joint and IA tool to manage the 24 OE conditions (from the studies glossary) over time; that could also be used like a TTX gaming sheet.

Way Ahead

Current conditions provide several prime opportunities for tangible parallel and synergistic progress between SFA, SC, and Stability over the coming weeks and months:

• JCISFA is the Office of Primary Responsibility (OPR) for the I-Plan task integrating SFA activities into ICB. The Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI), as the joint stability proponent, is the OPR for the I-Plan task to develop a concept for DSS.

• The SFA-ICB task study will extend into the first half of Fiscal Year '22 (FY22), and the DSS report will work in parallel, to be published as the SFA-ICB model is starting development.

• The I-Plan L2 objective and its supporting tasks (JS J7-led) should help inform both of these tasks. PKSOI's spring semiannual L2 report will be focused on the DSS; as discussed at the JLLWG.

• JCISFA has started engaging CCMDs in support of the SFA-ICB task, and is part of the JS J7 Office of Coordinating Responsibility for the DSS task. Meanwhile, PKSOI has been in contact with two CCMDs on DSS. CCMD engagements on both tasks will continue.

• JP 3-20 Security Cooperation is out for world-wide O6-level staffing while JP 3-07 Stability is due to be published this fall. Both JPs should be promulgated and applied together in FY22; and in support of both the SFA-ICB and DSS I-Plan tasks.

• SFA and Stability related products and publications are available for order and access via JLLIS, other websites, and e-mail. These products, to include results from the JSSC TTX and JLLIS WPS CoP, should be applied to synergize SFA, SC and Stability.

JCISFA

Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance
Joint Staff | Army | Navy | Marines | Air Force

Be sure to check out the courses in JCISFA's newly developed SFA JKO Series:

J3OP-US1398 SFA Considerations for Campaign Planning (Available Now)

This course offers ways to implement SFA as part of campaign planning, execution, and assessment. It is tailored for key leaders within organizations that plan and execute SC at the operational level.

J3OP-US1399: Building Allied and Partner Security Institutions – Advanced (Available Now)

The focus of this course is building allied and partner defense institutions through SFA with an emphasis on FSF functions, core processes, and SFA developmental tasks.

SFA Topics Online

We provide an RFI tool through the various JCISFA information sites as a means of direct communication and for ease of access to SFA subject matter experts.

The RFI tool can be used, not only to request more information about Security Force Assistance, but also to provide feedback and recommendations on content and improvements or even topic suggestions for future editions of the quarterly newsletter.

Just go to the Joint Staff Directorates J7 website (https://jcs.mil) and click the email link at the bottom, any of our social media sites, and finally we can be reached through the Chairman's Lessons Learned Information System (JLLIS).

JCISFA Social Media

JCISFA's presence on social media platforms, Facebook and Twitter, allows you to stay in touch with the latest JCISFA news. "Like" our Facebook page at https://www.facebook.com/JCISFA and follow us on Twitter at https://twitter.com/JCISFA. You can also find us on milSuite at https://www.milsuite.mil/.

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