

Security Force Assistance Quarterly



**Building Partner Capacity:
Removing the Blurred Lines in
Defense Policy Definitions**

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Approved for Public Release

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Cover Photo Credit:

SGT Rencherrybee Simangan, Logistics Advisor, Battalion Advisor Team 560, holds a 105mm round while a fuse is attached by a Soldier from the Philippine Army's 1st Brigade Combat Team, July 26, 2021 at Fort Magsaysay, Philippines during Salaknib '21. Salaknib is an annual, bilateral exercise sponsored by U.S. Army Pacific and hosted by the Philippine Army that contributes to and enhances U.S. and Philippine defense readiness and tactical interoperability while strengthening multinational relationships.

(Courtesy Photo 5th SFAB)

About JCISFA

JCISFA is a Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) controlled activity (CCA) that reports to the Joint Staff J7, Joint Force Development.

JCISFA supports the integration of Security Force Assistance (SFA) capabilities into the current and future Joint Force in order to advance joint warfighting capability. JCISFA's enduring purpose is:

1. As the Joint Force integrator for SFA, develop, disseminate, and institutionalize doctrine, training and education to enable the Joint Force to develop partner nations capability and capacity supporting U.S. national security objectives.
2. Support the operational planning and execution of SFA through guidance, strategy, and policy formulation.

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The purpose of this quarterly newsletter is to inform the SFA community of interest (Col), to highlight the greater Col efforts, and to foster Col interoperability. Sharing JCISFA's efforts will help inform the Col of the many ways JCISFA can be leveraged.

In addition to Chairman's Joint Lessons Learned Information System (JLLIS), this newsletter serves as a forum for the Col to submit Observations and Recommendations or other articles of interest regarding their respective SFA efforts. As a service to the Joint Force, this newsletter promotes dialogue among the SFA Col that finds itself dispersed across various countries, Interagency, Joint and Service organizations.

The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are those of the contributors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any other agency of the Federal Government.

Appearance of external hyperlinks does not constitute endorsement of content or imply recommendation for any commercial product found there.

Again, as this SFA newsletter encourages dialogue, it is part of an ongoing effort to more effectively "Communicate, Cooperate, and Coordinate" across the Joint Force with all SFA stakeholders. Please let us know if there are any topics of interest you would like to see in the future or to submit an article.

Submit to:

usarmy.leavenworth.CAC.mbx.jcisfa@mail.mil

1000—2000 words, for public release preferred

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From the Director's Desk

It is my pleasure to introduce the 22nd edition of the SFA Newsletter.

This edition shifts from the recent focus on US and coalition relationships by turning inward to some important programmatic points and topics that induce operational and strategic thought.

Every National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) affects SFA operations, so in this edition the U.S. Security Force Assistance Command and JCISFA again provide a snapshot of the available SFA and Security Cooperation authorities from the 2022 NDAA. Another article contrasts SFA with Foreign Internal Defense (FID). While views on this topic vary, it is important to maintain an open dialogue to ensure a common understanding of FID as it significantly affects SFA planning, execution, and assessment.

Finally, we turn to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's SFA Centre of Excellence to introduce how their recent book on Rule of Law and Good Governance may inform U.S. national ICB efforts. While NATO and the U.S. have slightly different views on SFA and its relation to stability, both benefit by their focus on ICB. This article enables that focus while also previewing an upcoming NATO book on strategic level advising.

As always, we welcome your feedback to the newsletter and invite you to join us in late March to discuss these articles and more during the Col update. We also welcome your thoughts, ideas, and article content for the June edition of the SFA Newsletter!

DALE K. SLADE
Colonel, U.S. Army
Director



The Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee directs questioning of nominees to DOD positions January 2021.

(Photo still from courtesy video Defense.gov)

What the 2022 National Defense Authorization Act Means to Security Force Assistance and the Joint Force

by Andrew K. Murray, JCISFA Military Analyst, Capt. Louis F. Glinzak, JCISFA Legal Advisor, and MAJ James P. Micciche, Security Forces Assistance Command, G5

Article Approved for Public Release by JS J7 PA

Overall Summary:

The 2022 NDAA indicates that our legislative bodies continue to recognize Security Cooperation (SC) and Security Force

Assistance (SFA) as vital instruments to further our national security objectives. The NDAA focuses on near-peer competition with Russia and China through a Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) strategic competition initiative. Of significance to the Joint Force, the NDAA directs the SECDEF, in coordination with the Secretary of State (SECSTATE), to develop and implement detailed security cooperation strategies within each Geographic Combatant Command (GCC) for Title 10 security cooperation programs and activities. In addition, the NDAA requires the commissioning of a study to identify lessons learned from Afghanistan for application to current and future security cooperation programs.

Key Components

The 2022 NDAA was signed into law on 27 Dec 2021 becoming Public Law Number 117-81. The previous 2021 NDAA provided a budget of \$738 billion, and in comparison the 2022 NDAA provides a total budget of \$767.8 billion. The DOD is allocated \$740 billion and \$27.8 billion is allocated to the Department of Energy (DoE). Several key increases are \$50 million more to the Ukraine, \$45.14 million more to EUCOM, and \$59.60 million more to AFRICOM. Of particular interest to the Joint Force is Title XII as it pertains to “assistance to foreign nations.” Title XII consists of sections 1201-1252 and covers matters related to assistance and training of foreign security forces. It also specifically focuses on the countries of Somalia, Afghanistan, Syria, Iran, Iraq, Russia and China.

Of note, the 2022 NDAA made no modifications to SC or SFA related authorities. The authorities particular to our



Congresswoman Jackie Speier, District 14, California, addresses a panel during a congressional delegation at Fort Hood, Texas, May 5, 2021. (U.S. Army photo by SGT Evan Ruchotzke)

community found in Title 10 United States Code (USC) 321 ~ 385 remain in place. The remainder of this article is organized so the reader can extract particular NDAA sections that are applicable to your organization. Please note the below sections are not exhaustive of all SFA related content within the NDAA.

Major SFA COI related NDAA Sections

Section 1206: SC Strategy for Geographic Combatant Commands (GCCs):

The Section requires the SECDEF, in coordination with the Secretary of State, to develop and implement an SC strategy for EUCOM, INDOPACOM, CENTCOM, AFRICOM, SOUTHCOM, and NORTHCOM. The initial report is due no later than 180 days from enactment of the NDAA, and subsequent reports are due annually from FY23 through FY27.

The Security Cooperation Strategy must include the following seven specified elements:

- (1) A discussion on how the strategy will support security interests in strategic competition with near-peer competitors; prioritize and build key capabilities of foreign security forces to enhance bilateral and multilateral interoperability, reduce transnational crime, and secure their own territory; and promote institutional capability in observance of law of armed conflict, human rights, rule of law, and civil control of the military.

- (2) Inter and Intra-GCC strategic objectives.
- (3) Lines of Effort and prioritization of foreign partners.
- (4) Authorities used for each line of effort.
- (5) A description of planned institutional capacity-building programs.
- (6) Overview of educational programs and institutions supporting the strategy.
- (7) Interagency coordination and de-confliction mechanisms.

Section 1206 attempts to create a more transparent and systematic strategy for legislative oversight committees and the executive branch to make appropriate funding and oversight decisions.

Section 1207: Report on Security Cooperation Programs:

This section requires the Comptroller General of the United States to produce a report on the compliance and effectiveness of required human rights training and provisions in Title 10, Chapter 16 authorized security cooperation programs. The Comptroller General has one year to produce this report.

What the 2022 NDAA Means to SFA Continued...

Section 1224 & 1225: SC/SFA Operations in Iraq:

The NDAA specifies security assistance for the Government of Iraq as well as prohibits transfers to the Badr organization and various other militias. The section also specifies a five year Security Assistance (SA) “roadmap” which emphasizes Security Assistance planning, defense institution building, and security sector reform.

Section 1232: Extension of Ukrainian Security Assistance Initiative:

This section extends the FY16 NDAA-authorized Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative into FY22 and provides \$300,000,000 in available FY22 funds.

Section 1233: Extension of Training Authority for Eastern European Security Forces in the Course of Multilateral Exercises:

Extends 1251 authority and funding through 31 December 2024.

Section 1241: Extension and Modification of Indo-Pacific Maritime Security Initiative (MSI):

Expands MSI authority to all countries within the INDOPACOM AOR, and provides \$50,000,000 of O&M Defense Wide funds per FY from FY22 through FY27 to MSI activities.

Section 1242: Extension and Modification of Pacific Deterrence Initiative (PDI):

Modifies the reporting, evaluation, and review processes for PDI funding.

Section 1252: Sense of Congress on Defense Alliances and Partnership in the Indo-Pacific Region:

Prioritizes bilateral relations with Japan, Republic of Korea, Australia, New Zealand, Philippines, Thailand, India, Taiwan, Singapore, Micronesia, Marshall Islands, and Palau.

It reinforces relationships with multilateral organizations such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations.

Section 1323: Study on certain security cooperation programs (e.g. Afghanistan):

This section requires a comprehensive review of security cooperation with recommended changes. DOD has 60 days to commission the study and two years to provide the report. The study must include the following tenets:

- Lessons learned from Afghanistan (including the metrics used).
- Identifying risks of rapid expansion/reduction of security cooperation activities.
- Establishing assessment metrics.
- Assessing levels of coordination between the DOD, allies, partners and the interagency.
- The effects of corruption on security cooperation.
- Cultural training and competency.
- Impediments to proper planning, assessment and project management.
- Shared knowledge/information with allies.
- Women’s Issues.

Following the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Afghanistan, this study is a component of congressionally driven security cooperation oversight and reform. The SFA COI should strive to have all relevant equities represented to inform this study.



U.S. representative William McClellan “Mac” Thornberry, 2018 chairman of the House Armed Services Committee (HASC), speaks with Rear Adm. Michael E. Boyle, commander, U.S. Naval Forces Korea (CNFK) and Republic of Korea (ROK) Navy Vice Adm. Jung, Jin-sup, commander, ROK Fleet.

(U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class William Carlisle, 30 Oct 2018)

Section 1332: Secretary of Defense Strategic Competition Initiative:

From FY 22 through FY 24, the SECDEF, in coordination with the SECSTATE, can fund up to \$20 million in each FY to support the below four specific activities enabling competition below the level of armed conflict.

- (1) Spend up to \$3,000,000 for foreign security personnel to participate in 321 (Training with Foreign Forces) authorized regional security cooperation programs or exercises.
- (2) Support Institutional Capacity Building (ICB) at departmental or ministerial levels authorized under section 332 (Defense Institutional Capacity Building).
- (3) Improving Irregular Warfare (IW) capabilities of U.S. and/or partner forces.
- (4) Expose, disproving, or deterring malign influence, disinformation, subversion, and coercion.

Note: The funding source is the current FY's Operation and Maintenance (O&M), Defense-wide budget, and applied funds can supplement existing sources allowing the Secretary of Defense to reprogram funding towards emerging requirements. Section 1332 cannot fund activities previously denied by Congress and requires the Secretary of Defense to present specific plans to Congress for use in SOUTHCOM and AFRICOM.

Section 1332 increases the flexibility of the DOD to resource and fund security cooperation activities to improve IW capabilities and to mitigate disinformation and malign influence. The Joint Force benefits from section 1332 allowing the Secretary of Defense to fund up to \$3,000,000 of partner force personnel expenses.

Section 1336: Security Assistance in Northern Triangle Countries:

Establishes three required reports to review security assistance activities in El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala. The Secretary of Defense report on security cooperation activities and the GAO report



Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III speaks with Sen. Jack Reed, Chairman, Senate Armed Services Committee and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Mark A. Milley after a congressional hearing regarding the DOD Defense Authorization Request for Fiscal Year 2022.

(DOD Photo by Chad J. McNeeley)

on end-use monitoring are due 30 June 2022. By 31 March 2022 the Secretary of Defense must commission a federally funded research and development center to produce a strategic evaluation of security cooperation with Northern Triangle countries (El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras) due to Congress by 30 June 2024.

Section 1337: Report on Human Rights Colombia:

This section requires the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Secretary of State, to produce a detailed summary of security cooperation relationships and activities between Colombia and the United States; to include their impact on human rights and rule of law. This report is due to Congress 180 days after enactment of the NDAA.

Conclusion:

Congress has increased funding toward SFA activities, and mandated detailed security cooperation strategies and a comprehensive review that could drive significant change. Competition remains at the forefront of our national strategy while prioritizing our near-peer competitors Russia and China. The NDAA also emphasizes that interoperability with allies and partners as well as interagency partners is key to successfully compete. This NDAA clearly mandates the Joint Force to continue planning, executing, and assessing activities that enable our allies and partners' security force capability and institutional development.



Team 5111, 1st Battalion, 5th Security Force Assistance Brigade, trained during Exercise Black Marlin with the Maldives National Force in Maafilaafishi, Maldives in March, 2021. (photo still from video by MAJ William Leasure, U.S. Army)

Building Partner Capacity: Removing the Blurred Lines in Defense Policy Definitions

by Robert Schafer, Security Force Assistance Analyst, Center for Army Lessons Learned

Article Approved for Public Release by Mission Command CoE PAO

The Problem statement

The failures to stabilize and build capacity in both Iraq and Afghanistan over the past two decades were numerous and will take several years to take into full account, but mainly these failures were the result of U.S. policymakers' failure to recognize or account for weak governance and a clear lack of resiliency in the host nation defense institutions, which had been habitually rife with corruption. Recent discussions within the irregular warfare community of interest indicates that these failures may have resulted, in part, from the improper use of security force assistance.¹ Security force assistance, as we know it today, however, did not shape as policy until 2010 and did not see substantial reform until late 2016.² Thus, the real question becomes two-part: prior to established security force assistance doctrine and policy, how did foreign internal defense help shape foreign security forces and their institutions and when did the definitions of both security force assistance and foreign internal defense become blurred?

Thus, the purpose of this article is to highlight the differences between security force assistance and

foreign internal defense so that the readers will recognize either activity as distinct when they see these activities properly employed. The differences between security force assistance and foreign internal defense are transparent, but they are subtle enough that to the casual observer these activities appear the same, when, in fact, they are not. In order to recognize these activities as distinct, one must understand how both activities nest within the broader umbrella of irregular warfare.

It's All About Understanding Irregular Warfare

Irregular warfare is defined as a struggle among state and non-state actors to influence populations and affect legitimacy.³ The nature of irregular warfare favors indirect and asymmetric approaches in order to erode an adversary's power, influence, and will. That said, irregular warfare can include any relevant Department of Defense (DOD) operation or activity, such as counterterrorism, unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, counterinsurgency, and stability operations that, in the context of irregular warfare,

involve establishing or re-establishing order in a fragile state or territory.⁴ Before, during, and after irregular and traditional warfare, various activities can occur that shape the information environment and serve to deter or prevent further armed conflict. These activities may include military engagement, security cooperation, deterrence activities, cyberspace operations, military information support operations, strategic communication, and civil military operations.

Security cooperation is a related activity that shapes the information environment and other population-focused arenas of competition and conflict because it also shapes operations that build partner capabilities and capacities while promoting regional stability (Figure 1).⁵ Nested within security cooperation programs and activities, is security force assistance, which is defined broadly as those DOD activities that support the development of the capacity and capability of foreign security forces and their supporting institutions.⁶ In late 2010, security force assistance redirected some activities and efforts to be conducted by, with, and through foreign security forces to assist host countries to defend effectively against external threats; contribute to coalition operations; or organize, train, equip, and advise another country's security forces or supporting institutions.⁷

Consider this example: The U.S. trains the Jamaica Defense Force (JDF) in disaster relief and humanitarian assistance, through the State Partnership Program. The JDF, over time, becomes the premier disaster response force in the Caribbean, often coming to the aid of their neighbors during hurricane season. The JDF builds upon its own capabilities and capacities and soon begins to train other countries' security forces in the Caribbean to build capacity in disaster response operations.⁸ In this example, the JDF has enabled itself, through security force assistance, to contribute to coalition operations, if requested, and, perhaps more importantly, to organize, train, equip, and advise another country's security force to mitigate external threats from hurricanes through disaster relief and humanitarian assistance activities.




Figure 1 Relationships within Irregular warfare

How Does Security Force Assistance relate to Foreign Internal Defense?

Current doctrine defines foreign internal defense as the participation by civilian agencies and military forces of a government or international organization in any of the programs or activities taken by a host nation government to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, violent extremism, terrorism, and other threats to its security.⁹ The focus of foreign internal defense operations is typically the root causes of instability within a society, or rather, the origin of *internal threats*, and requires a whole-of-government approach. It is worth discussing here that foreign internal defense is inherently a special operations core activity and special operations forces are the force of choice for foreign internal defense due to their extensive language capability, cultural training, advising skills, regional expertise, and access to other interagency assets.¹⁰

In competition, foreign internal defense operations are primarily aimed at developing and improving host nation ground force capabilities through ground force advisor operations in coordination with security assistance programs, often stipulated in a host nation's internal defense and development plan. That said, a principal U.S. activity for conducting foreign internal defense is the transfer



Chief Master Sergeant of the Air Force JoAnne S. Bass speaks to joint service members during a holiday visit at Nigerian Air Base 201, Agadez, December 21, 2021. (U.S. Air Force photo by Senior Airman Ericka A. Woolever)

of defense articles, such as weapon systems and related support items, to selected host nations, primarily through security assistance.¹¹ These activities, although we are calling it foreign internal defense here, seem to look a lot like what we are now calling building partner capacity. Yet, building partner capacity is inherent in both security force assistance and foreign internal defense and because of this nuance, the lines that once distinguished these activities, now become blurred.

What Does It Mean to Build Partner Capacity?

The National Defense Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 2017 (NDAA 2017) consolidated security sector assistance, security assistance, and security force assistance legislation under Title 10, Chapter 16 and called it Security Cooperation. It is under Chapter 16 where building the capacity of the partner force is its own authority under §333, Foreign Security Forces: Authority to Build Capacity. Generally speaking, §333 means that the Secretary of Defense is authorized to conduct or support a program to provide training and equipment to the national security forces of one or more foreign countries for the purpose of building the capacity of these forces to conduct operations such as counterterrorism; counter-weapons of mass destruction; counter-illicit drug trafficking, counter-transnational organized crime; maritime and border security; military intelligence; air domain awareness, operations or activities that contribute to an existing international coalition operation that is determined by the

Secretary of Defense to be in the national interest of the United States; and cyberspace security and defensive cyberspace operations.¹²

These operations, if one were to look at them closely, seem to address both internal threats as well as external threats. If providing defense articles, through security assistance, and training through security force assistance activities is the manner in which the U.S. now builds capacity within a partner nation, what does this mean for foreign internal defense? It seems a complicated relationship, but remember that foreign internal defense is a DOD activity that involves establishing or re-establishing order in a fragile state or territory; building partner capacity, such as advising foreign security forces on how to employ defense articles through security force assistance, is a security cooperation activity that often supports foreign internal defense. Thus, the relationship among these programs and activities is functional, not hierarchal.

The Path Forward

The future of security force assistance should not be in question as it is often about building partner capability and capacity in foreign security forces to address external threats. The discussion about the mixed results of security force assistance in both Iraq and Afghanistan should be examined closer for accuracy, because the threats to these countries were not from without, but rather from within. If we label violent, non-state militant

Definitions Matter Continued...

actors, such as the Taliban or the Islamic State, as insurgents, which they are, then the proper doctrine to address an insurgency would be through foreign internal defense, not security force assistance. Therefore, foreign internal defense not security force assistance must be the core of counterinsurgency doctrine.

The recent security cooperation reforms found within NDAA 2017 were pivotal to how the U.S. has adapted to the complexities of building partner capacity within foreign security forces, especially in those countries where no foreign security force had been established or vetted prior to armed conflict, but more reform is needed, such as advisor-specific authorities that are appropriate across the competition continuum. Despite the reforms initiated, the definitions used to describe both security force assistance and foreign internal defense are inadequate and require further clarity in doctrine and federal legislation. The irregular warfare operational environment is complex and will always require adaptation in order to gain advantage, build partner capacity, and deter adversaries. In order to maintain competition overmatch over our adversaries, the U.S. needs to continue to refine current security cooperation programs and activities, including its definitions, to be consistent with other irregular warfare activities, such as foreign internal defense, or even in other joint doctrine that describes traditional warfare in multiple domains.

References

1. <https://mwi.usma.edu/the-future-of-us-security-force-assistance>. The authors claim that, although most significant security force assistance ventures of the past twenty years, such as in Iraq and Afghanistan, have sowed doubts about its utility, it would be a mistake to look at these high-profile failures and conclude that security force assistance should play no future role in U.S. foreign policy.
2. 27 October 2010, the Department of Defense issued DODI 5000.68, Security Force Assistance, which instructed that it is policy that the Department of Defense shall develop and maintain the capability within Department of Defense general purpose forces, special operations forces, and the civilian expeditionary workforce to conduct security force assistance activities in support of U.S. policy and in coordination with the relevant U.S. Government departments or agencies. Furthermore, 23 December 2016, the National Defense Authorization Act of Fiscal year 2017

(Public Law 114-328) was released, with reforms that now captured all security cooperation legislation under Title 10, Chapter 16, *Security Cooperation*.

3. U.S. Department of Defense, *Summary of the Irregular warfare Annex to the National Defense Strategy*. (Washington D.C., December 2017), 2.
4. Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Department of Defense Directive 3000.07, *Irregular Warfare*. (Washington D.C., 28 August 2014), 1-2.
5. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-20, *Security Cooperation*. (Washington D.C., 23 May 2017), V-9.
6. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-20, *Security Cooperation*. (Washington D.C., 23 May 2017), GL-6.
7. Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Department of Defense Instruction 5000.68, *Security Force Assistance*. (Washington D.C., 27 October 2010), 2.
8. CALL 22-686, A Year in Jamaica: leveraging Partnerships through the State Partnership Program (February 2022). This article describes the partnership between the District of Columbia National Guard (DCNG) and the Jamaica Defense Force (JDF), which exemplifies the ability of the SPP to be an innovative, small-footprint tool that supports the security cooperation goals of the geographic combatant command, which in this case is SOUTHCOM and the U.S. Chief of Mission for the partner nation.
9. Joint Publication 3-22, *Foreign Internal Defense* (2018), 1-1.
10. It is because foreign internal defense (FID) is a special operations core activity that special operations forces may conduct FID operations unilaterally in the absence of any other military effort, support other ongoing military or civilian assistance efforts, or support the employment of conventional forces.
11. Ibid., IV-16.
12. Public Law 114-328, §333, (a) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9), *Foreign Security Forces: Authority to Build Capacity* (2016).

The views expressed are those of the author, not the Department of Defense or its elements. The content does not necessarily reflect the official U.S. Army position and does not change or supersede any information in other U.S. Army publications. Authors are responsible for the accuracy and source documentation of the material they provide.

The Dependence of Rule of Law and Good Governance on ICB

NATO & US Parallel Support to SFA and Stability

by Jeffrey S. King, JCISFA Military Analyst *ICW NATO SFA Centre of Excellence*

Article Approved for Public Release by NATO SFA CoE PAO

Mutually Supporting Partner Nation and International Organization Efforts. It is well known that the US is a key partner nation (PN) and driver within the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), but like many other NATO member nations, the US conducts its own initiatives in a number of important functional areas. Less common however, is when the US (or any NATO member) works on those national functional area initiatives in parallel with NATO, and in a way that is meaningful for the current joint and combined force.


There currently is such a parallel opportunity between NATO and the US, in the area of security force assistance (SFA) and its support to stability. The NATO and US views on SFA and stability are not perfectly congruent. The US views SFA as a tool that supports stability across the competition continuum, while NATO limits SFA primarily to fragile post-conflict environments requiring a return to stability. However, NATO and the US's SFA and stability constructs are close enough for both parties to intelligently work together. Working together can achieve faster and more impactful synergistic effects than if done sequentially. To help enable this, NATO has a Centre of Excellence for SFA while the US has an integrator and proponent for each. Institutional capacity building can greatly advance SFA and stability. This article touches on SFA and stability, primarily by introducing how some current NATO views on Rule of Law (RoL) and governance can impact institutional capacity building (ICB).

RoL and Good Governance in support of Stability.

In September 2021, the NATO SFA Centre of Excellence (CoE), located in Rome, Italy, published the book, *"Promoting the Rule of Law and Good Governance- SFA Implications in International Initiatives."* As the title implies, the book refers to SFA well over 200 times. An October 2021 JCISFA SFA newsletter article features the mutual support between SFA and stability in US doctrine

and practice. This mutual support manifests organizationally through JCISFA, as the joint SFA integrator, and the Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI), who is the US joint proponent for stability. The NATO SFA CoE book above, with 'SFA Implications' in its title, makes over 80 references to stability amongst its 10 chapters). This implies that NATO considers stability to be a significant SFA implication.

Authors from around the world share their thoughts on SFA and Stability Operations.
(Book cover courtesy of NATO SFA CoE)



The Dependence of Rule of Law Continued...

ICB as a Common Thread and Theme. While this book focuses on the SFA implications of RoL and Good Governance, and its resulting support to stability, the critical role of institutions and institutional capacity building (ICB) is a prominent thread and theme. The book makes well over 140 references to institutions. On the US side, through a National Defense Strategy implementation plan, JCISFA is conducting a Secretary of Defense (SECDEF)-directed task on behalf of the Joint Staff J7 which includes a study and associated model to help the Joint Force more effectively conduct SFA developmental activities to improve the institutional capacity of PNs in conjunction with CCMD campaigns and operations. Through the same implementation plan, the SECDEF charged PKSOI to make similar strides by developing a concept for defense support to stability (DSS). That concept arguably should include an effort to build and maintain strong PN institutions for sustained success.

As it is clear that both NATO and the US connect SFA to stability, both parties also recognize ICB as vital to both. Therefore, it benefits both the US and NATO to take a close look at the ICB implications of the NATO SFA CoE book, and as they apply to SFA and stability. The rest of this article will help enable this look. It provides a summary with key points from both the book and its 'book launch' event shortly after its publishing (along with the appropriate links for both). These summaries do not drill down into all ICB functional areas, but touch on key international RoL and good governance programs, and operations related to stability in which they have a prominent role. Legal institutions are obviously at the foundation of RoL and good governance, and contribute to stability, so of all ICB functional areas, they are perhaps the most prominent.

Book Summary. The aforementioned NATO SFA CoE book, *"Promoting the Rule of Law and Good Governance - SFA Implications in International Initiatives"*, is posted to the NATO SFA CoE website (the link is provided at the end of this section). A video link from the book launch event is provided at the bottom of the next section.

The book is structured with three main sections that analyze: 1) the strategic context of SFA operations, 2) cooperation between NATO and the European Union, and 3) importance of tailored legal training and the

development of international organization (IO) programs such as the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration, Building Integrity and Anti-corruption. The book provides a practical guide, organized by cross-cutting topics, to adopt a peacebuilding approach in fragile states. While peacebuilding in fragile states, training local partner nation (PN) forces can help them enforce international humanitarian law; aided by ICRC experience and IO programs developed by the United Nations and NATO.

The book consists of 10 chapters, each authored by practitioners affiliated with IOs that work in the articles' subject area. Each article takes an interdisciplinary approach that fuses the varied viewpoints of distinguished experts and peer reviewers. Each article identifies key elements for developing-building capacity and related activities in crisis zones.

The link directly below is to a portable document format (pdf) downloadable version of the book directly from the NATO SFA CoE website.

<https://www.nsfacoe.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/Promoting-the-Rule-of-Law-and-Good-Governance.-SFA-Implications-in-International-Initiatives..pdf>

[Quick Link to Book](#)

Lt. Col. Jeffrey Kain, commander, Task Force Manchu, talks to members from the Asayish and Coalition partners at Erbil Air Base, Iraq, Jan. 9, 2022. Coalition dinners build lasting relationships through shared experiences by demonstrating the ability to work together effectively. (U.S. Army Photo by SGT Matthew Marsilia)



[Quick Link to NATO SFA CoE Newsletter](#)



Ten articles by thirteen different authors address various topics in stability and security force assistance with partner nations. This book represents NATO's latest contribution to an ever growing body of knowledge in the field. (NATO SFA CoE Courtesy Photo)

Book Launch Summary. The book launch was a public event on 30 September, 2021, just days after the book's publishing. The following are some salient points from the book that were highlighted during the event.

- the radical change in the international landscape (operational environment) in recent years and the increasingly frequent rift between political, economic, social and geographic powers has had a profound effect on military requirements and resultant doctrine, structures and capabilities.
- SFA activities are not limited to training, but are part of an larger process that helps create the necessary conditions to transfer responsibility to local authorities in an orderly manner.
- Regarding an orderly transfer of responsibility, the existence of a consistent legal framework is an essential premise for a durable and stable environment in fragile states. The Cross-Cutting Topics analyzed in the book are essential to promote the RoL and to foster integrity, transparency and accountability; all of which contribute to host nation legitimacy.
- The collaboration between the primary appropriate IOs (for this subject) is essential to promote an interdisciplinary approach to SFA operations, and to identify the primary factors that contribute to building a consistent legal framework.

The following link provides a full video of the entire book launch event directly from the NATO SFA CoE

website. The link also includes separate videos from the following: Senior leaders' book introduction; videos for each of the books three sections, each containing a chapter summary from each author and a moderated panel discussion for each section.

<https://www.nsfacoe.org/video>

Way-Ahead – Informing the ICB Study-Model, Stability Concept and Related Efforts

As noted in the introduction, this book is full of references to ICB (beyond the legal framework) that will help inform the ongoing JCISFA-led study and subsequent model. Both the study and model are currently in the collection phase and will transition to the analysis phase in the spring of this year. As JCISFA continues work with PKSOI to help form a DSS concept, it will also identify the book's many contributions to stability with a DSS-conceptual context.

As JCISFA posts this book and article to a Joint Lessons Learned Information System (JLLIS) binder, it will invite the SFA and stability CoI to post observations, comments, and related products. As an example, the video link to the book will be added once complete.

The NATO SFA CoE is currently constructing a book on "Strategic-Level Advising". JCISFA will participate in its review and expects it to similarly help inform the ICB study, model, or the model's experimentation. Stay tuned as JCISFA will post this book in JLLIS once it is published in its effort to promote dialogue, increase the body of knowledge, and consistently improve SFA, Stability, and related fields.



Be sure to check out NATO SFA Centre of Excellence courses

NATO SFA Centre of Excellence has courses available. [Link to NATO SFA Courses \(click here\)](#)

ETOC Code: MCM-CM-25556 Security Force Assistance Operators Course

This course aims to improve the competency and the effectiveness of SFA operators working in current and future missions related to security capacity building.

ETOC Code: MCP-CM-36713 Institutional Adviser Course

The course contributes to meeting the need for sustained and standardized professional development of Allied and Partner military and civilian personnel to conduct stability activities. Advanced tenets of institutional advising are integrated into the course education curriculum.

Both courses are designed as a blended learning with on-line and in residence portions.



Security Force Assistance Operators Course

17th - 21st October 2022



Institutional Adviser Course

14th - 28th November 2022



JCISFA

Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance
Joint Staff | Army | Navy | Marines | Air Force

JCISFA Community has SFA courses available through Joint Knowledge Online (JKO). [Link to JCISFA SFA Courses \(click here\)](#)

Be sure to check out the courses in JCISFA's SFA JKO Series:

J3OP-US1398 SFA Considerations for Campaign Planning

This course offers ways to implement SFA as part of campaign planning, execution, and assessment. It is tailored for key leaders within organizations that plan and execute SC at the operational level.

J3OP-US1399: Building Allied and Partner Security Institutions – Advanced

The focus of this course is building allied and partner defense institutions through SFA with an emphasis on FSF functions, core processes, and SFA developmental tasks.



SFA Topics Online

We provide an RFI tool through the various JCISFA information sites as a means of direct communication and for ease of access to SFA subject matter experts.

The RFI tool can be used, not only to request more information about Security Force Assistance, but also to provide feedback and recommendations on content and improvements or even topic suggestions for future editions of the quarterly newsletter.

Just go to the Joint Staff Directorates J7 website (<https://jcs.mil>) and click the email link at the bottom, any of our social media sites, and finally we can be reached through the Chairman's Lessons Learned Information System (JLLIS).

JCISFA Social Media

JCISFA's presence on social media platforms, Facebook and Twitter, allows you to stay in touch with the latest JCISFA news. "Like" our Facebook page at <https://www.facebook.com/JCISFA>. You can also find us on milSuite at <https://www.milsuite.mil/>.

