

Security Force Assistance Quarterly

**Joint SFA Solutions to SFA Challenges:
SFA Enterprise Contributions in Support
of Strategic Competition**

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23rd Edition, June 2022



Approved for Public Release
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Cover Photo Credit:

Senior Airman Jansen Esteves, 436th Aerial Port Squadron special handler, verifies shipment information for supplies bound for Ukraine during a foreign military sales mission at Dover Air Force Base, Delaware, March 20, 2022. Since 2014 to date, the United States has committed more than \$5.4 billion in total assistance to Ukraine, including security and non-security assistance relationships.

(U.S. Air Force Photo by Staff Sgt. Marco A. Gomez)

Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance (JCISFA)

Mission:

JCISFA supports the integration of Security Force Assistance (SFA) activities into the current and future Joint Force to support Globally Integrated Operations. JCISFA enables the development of SFA doctrine, training, and education of the Joint Force to conduct partner nation capacity-building. JCISFA supports SFA-related strategy formulation, policy and guidance development and support to joint exercises.

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The purpose of this quarterly newsletter is to inform the SFA community of interest (Col), to highlight the greater Col efforts, and to foster Col interoperability. Sharing JCISFA's efforts will help inform the Col of the many ways JCISFA can be leveraged.

In addition to Chairman's Joint Lessons Learned Information System (JLLIS), this newsletter serves as a forum for the Col to submit Observations and Recommendations or other articles of interest regarding their respective SFA efforts. As a service to the Joint Force, this newsletter promotes dialogue among the SFA Col that finds itself dispersed across various countries, Interagency, Joint and Service organizations.

The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are those of the contributors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any other agency of the Federal Government.

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Again, as this SFA newsletter encourages dialogue, it is part of an ongoing effort to more effectively "Communicate, Cooperate, and Coordinate" across the Joint Force with all SFA stakeholders. Please let us know if there are any topics of interest you would like to see in the future or to submit an article.

Submit to:

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1000—2000 words, for public release preferred

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From the Director's Desk

It is my pleasure to introduce the 23rd edition of JCISFA's SFA Newsletter.

This edition details our outreach efforts across the SFA Community of Interest (Col) and includes subjects and features offering a wide variety of content. First, we revisit the 818th Mobility Support Advisory Squadron's (MSAS) persistent work with African partner nations. This article demonstrates how supporting institutional capacity building is critical to improving their partner's tactical aviation capabilities and highlights the 818th MSAS's bi-lateral efforts to improve sustainment capabilities at the institutional level. We hope that these lessons help SFA practitioners achieve similar results, regardless of Service.

Next, our feature article highlights a recently published SFA Study from the Army's SFA Proponent discussing how SFA supports security cooperation (SC) efforts across the Competition Continuum. The article focuses on joint solutions to some of the most relevant challenges in the areas of Information Advantage, Interoperability, and Liaison. However, all challenges might best be addressed through improved SFA integration with CCMD campaign and contingency planning.

Our final article also features work with a specific partner nation, but from a country team perspective. Though adapted from a 2018 article published in the Army Foreign Area Officer (FAO) newsletter, its principles remain relevant. Written by the Army attaché in Chile, the author argues for a flexible and integrated approach to country teams as they operate and coordinate with multiple organizations within the DoD. We hope this provides unique insights for Col members working on or with country teams, but also is valuable for any member striving to improve their organization's performance.

Finally, I highlight our inclusion of a "FAO Page" to the back of the newsletter. There you will find summaries of similar articles from the FAO community and how they relate to our Col. We've also added a Maneuver Support Center of Excellence page featuring SFA articles from the Protection Col and continue the NATO page and JKO courses listings from previous editions.

As always, we welcome your feedback and invite you to join us in June to discuss these articles and more during the Col update. We also welcome your thoughts, ideas, and article submissions for the September edition of the SFA Newsletter!

DALE K. SLADE
Colonel, U.S. Army
Director



Capt Magazzino, MSgt Marti, and TSgt Takahashi pose with Maj Mbaitorel, Lt Richard, and Lt Bonheur from the Chadian Air Force.
(Photo courtesy of MSgt Marti, 156 TAS Puerto Rico ANG)

Professional Advisors talk Logistics

by Lt Col Ryan McCaughan, Air Advisor

Article Approved for Public Release by 621st CRW PA

**“Amateurs talk strategy and tactics.
Professionals talk logistics and sustainability.”**

While the above, an often repeated and misquoted military maxim, may downplay those who focus on tactics

and strategy it offers a window into a fundamental truth of security force assistance. The truth is that while tactical activities tied to platforms are often the reason for U.S. engagement, the aviation capability of a partner will not advance without spending considerable time focused on logistics, sustainability, and the role of industry support to the partner nation air force. Specially trained Air Advisors are vital to seeing beyond tactical level requirements and they engage with higher level authorities to drive institutional change to promote growth and expand partner capabilities. Recent efforts by the 818th Mobility Support Advisory Squadron (MSAS) in the land-locked African nation of Chad perfectly illustrate this essential truth.

In recent years Chad has proven a valuable partner in North-Central Africa in the fight against violent extremist organizations in the Lake Chad Basin, most notably Boko Haram. Between 2015 and 2017 the security cooperation relationship with Chad was

primarily focused on border security and counterterrorism. In December of 2017, the first two Cessna C-208B light reconnaissance aircraft were delivered as part of a three-nation plan to train and equip Chad, Niger, and Cameroon to conduct combined, multi-lateral intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance operations. This package also included hangar facilities, communications gear, and associated aircrew, maintenance, and intelligence training. While the proposal to develop capability in these nations in concert appeared a reasonable approach, it neglected to account for organizational differences among partners, which resulted in disproportionate development of capabilities. In the years since, repeated delivery of episodic Mobile Training Teams (MTTs) have attempted to overcome these shortfalls.

Since 2017, the 818th MSAS conducted ten MTTs in Chad primarily focused on inflight C-208B aircrew training and maintenance. Successes of the unit's efforts include the Chadian development of codified flight standards and subsequent adoption throughout their Air Force. Additionally, maintenance and tactical-level organizational practices have significantly improved. Despite these successes, however, Chadian Airmen routinely faced challenges related to spare parts.

Fortunately, the 818th MSAS made a monumental breakthrough to overcome these challenges based on the strength of the relationship developed over repeated successful tactical engagements.

On an overcast New Jersey day in late October 2021, a mission departed Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst to fly alongside partners in Chad. Like previous MTTs, this mission consisted of maintenance training and aircrew exchange, but based on consistent reports of higher level supply chain issues, it also included a heavy emphasis on logistics. Upon arrival, the MSAS's logistics team conducted a series of interviews with personnel from every available level of the Chadian Air Force (CAF). The men and women at the CAF's tactical level confirmed that a problem existed and helped the team understand its depth, but did not know how it could be resolved. This emboldened the Air Advisors to seek a meeting with Colonel-equivalent CAF officers. At this higher echelon, the Colonels explained their responsibility to order parts, but that they are not responsible for payment. Frequently, they claimed, requisitions are cancelled and vendors are frustrated because the bills go unpaid. Worst of all, they do not receive the components they need to continue to safely operate their aircraft.

The Air Advisors then engaged with the heads of the CAF's financial department to discuss why this occurs. The team learned of a plan to develop an escrow account, holding Chadian national funds, with the company providing the spare parts, the U.S.-based *AfricAir*. Although this plan was agreed to in theory many months ago, for a multitude of reasons this plan stalled. The team acquired draft copies of the contract, which included not only the legally binding English version but also the translated French version, which hadn't been disseminated amongst the CAF financial department leadership. Alongside CAF leadership, the Air Advisors verified and advised corrections for several translation errors and International Commercial Term errors that existed in the contract and gained agreement from all parties on the revised document. Facilitating this dialogue between CAF leadership and U.S. industry greatly enhanced the partner's relationship with the company that will be vital to their effectiveness. In doing so, they developed trust that led to the CAF establishing the escrow account in which they have since deposited funds. The enduring supply issue driven by unclear funding and organizational

practices that has plagued the Chadian C-208B program has been resolved and this partner will be more effective as they conduct operations around the Lake Chad Basin.

In Chad, the 818th MSAS provided the repeatedly requested flying mission and tactical training activities. In most developing partner nations, episodic MTTs are focused on achieving a tactical effect, because they provide instant and visible feedback to the user and the leadership chain. What can a partner do now that they could not do before? The mark of a professional Air Advisor, however, is to appreciate the tactical effect and be able to provide training all the while searching for the deeper challenges, no matter how well they may hide themselves.

Lessons Learned:

- Tactical level activities may be the most obvious need, but are rarely the root cause. No amount of tactical training can overcome an institutional problem.
- Professional Air Advisors must be able to see beyond their specialty and diagnose broader problems within a partner nation air force.
- Effective advising requires engagement at every echelon. If there is no U.S. advisor above the tactical level, congratulations, it's you. The advisor must:
 - Communicate the problem to an interested U.S. stakeholder (security cooperation officer or higher headquarters via after action report).
 - Communicate with the higher echelon partner nation leadership that has the authority to make a necessary change.
- A relationship with industry is a critical element to an effective air force...advisors must facilitate that relationship.



Capt Magazzino (Logistics Readiness Air Advisor) and TSgt Takahashi (Supply Air Advisor) discuss the details of the C-208 maintenance contract with Maj Mbaitorel, Lt Richard and Lt Bonheur from the Chadian Air Force. (Photo by MSgt Marti, 156 TAS Puerto Rico ANG)



A U.S. Army paratrooper assigned to 1st Battalion, 503rd Parachute Infantry regiment coordinates drop zone security with a paratrooper from the Lithuanian-Polish-Ukrainian Brigade after conducting a joint airborne operation during Rapid Trident 21. (photo by Staff Sgt. John Yountz, U.S. Army)

Joint SFA Solutions to SFA Challenges: SFA Enterprise Contributions in Support of Strategic Competition

by Jeffrey S. King, JCISFA Military Analyst, Neil F. Sleevei, Army SFA Proponent, and
MAJ Jason A. Byrd, Army SFA Proponent

A rmy SFA Study Lends to Joint Solutions Supporting Strategic Competition

The Army SFA Proponent recently published an SFA study contending that the Army's nascent SFA Command and Brigades (SFACs and SFABs) are a significant part of the solution to address identified challenges, but not the entire solution. The Army SFA enterprise requires overarching or holistic solutions because much of SFA is conducted outside specialized SFA units. This is even more true at the joint level. The Service-level SFA community includes the Air Force's Mobility Support Advisory Squadrons (MSASs), the Marine Corps Advisory Companies (MCACs), and units amongst all Services that conduct SFA at home station and/or during expeditionary operations. While each Service requires a comprehensive and consistent look at its Service-level SFA challenges, at combatant command (CCMD) level, it's the joint collaboration of Service Component Commands (SCCs) and other unified action partners (UAPs) that will ultimately determine success in competition for the US and its coalition allies.

Article Approved for Public Release by Mission Command CoE PAO

Using a strategic competition context towards joint solutions with the aid of experiential examples, this article explores three key points and challenges (Information Advantage, Interoperability, Liaison) from the Army study and applies them under the umbrella of a fourth challenge (Operational Planning). The need for cohesive operational planning that includes SFA is a 'first among equals' as an overarching challenge that optimally should consider the other three challenges.

Strategic Competition in the Information Environment.

The US and its allies' main competitors threaten us in large part through their actions and global leverage in the information environment. Arguably, China and Russia (prior to actual conflict) compete harder in the information and economic elements of national power than in the diplomatic and military elements (DIME model). Technology has broadened the information environment to the point that the joint force cannot successfully counter this current (and growing) threat and gain information advantage without coordinated assistance from allies and partners.

The Army's 2021 SFAB INDOPACOM-Area of Responsibility (AOR) TTX highlighted a key insight that we must proactively counter enemy disinformation. The TTX clearly revealed that trying to counter such disinformation within a key partner nation's (PN's) armed forces and populace during the pressure of crisis is too late. SFABs and the joint SFA enterprise writ large must proactively combat disinformation through persistent engagement, while simultaneously developing information advantage operations capabilities with PNs. One viable course of action is to assist developing and leveraging PNs' associated supporting institutional capacity in this area. Working in conjunction with Department of State (DoS)-led country teams is a prudent means to develop such capacity. Capturing DoS initiatives to engage PN populaces from their Integrated Country Strategies (ICS) is a valid technique and development tool with the Chief of Mission's (ambassador's) support. This potential technique was discovered and integrated during the 2020 SFAB TTX, through which a key PN's ICS contained consistent outreach programs with the populace, to include rural areas. Another prime and persistent engagement tool to help combat disinformation, the State Partnership Program, is a must to consider. These state National Guard (Army and Air) organizations bring continuous years and decades-long relationships and engagements with key PNs.

Interoperability as a Key SFA Purpose. Building partner capability and capacity is inherent to SFA's definition and might help deter crisis and conflict while also shaping conditions to prevail should conflict become inevitable. The process of building such capability and capacity should also strengthen U.S. relationships with allies and key PNs who also help us deter and shape. Importantly, the end goal of such capability and capacity building should also include interoperability. Interoperability not only further strengthens our collective ability to deter conflict and preserve peace and prosperity, but it also builds coalitions capable of fighting together to win in conflicts that might require global integration. One way that interoperability helps achieve these effects is through increasing information advantage with the



A Colombian Marine alongside U.S. Marines with 3rd Force Reconnaissance company, 4th Marine division, drives a Belizean interdiction vessel during exercise Tradewinds 2022 (TW22), at Cocoyal outpost, Mexico, May 11, 2022. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Sgt. Matthew Teutsch)

mutual understanding that results from proper information sharing.

Joint and multi-national forces must not build interoperability in a vacuum. Consider interoperability while building capability (and capacity) to most effectively achieve it while applying developed capabilities together. Crucially, SFA plans should weave interoperability goals throughout. Combined exercises and operations (such as peacekeeping operations when applicable) should be used to test and improve interoperability. Interoperability need not and should not only involve multi-national security forces. It must also be built with joint, interagency (IA), and intergovernmental partners.

As with any capability, effective assessment, monitoring and evaluation (AM&E) can also be used to more efficiently build interoperability. To that end, interoperability should be woven into capability and capacity AM&E plans. The Army has a tool, (the Army Interoperability Measurement System, AIMS) that provides a structured means to measure interoperability. AIMS not only measures multi-national interoperability, but can also measure joint, IA and intergovernmental interoperability. The Marine Corps has reviewed AIMS, with a goal to produce a similar



U.S. Army Sgt. Alain Gilles, an infantryman assigned to 2nd Cavalry Regiment, helps a Romanian soldier during a Joint Live Fire Exercise in Babadag Training Area on May 4, 2022. (U.S. Army photo by Sgt. Devon Jones, 5th Mobile Public Affairs Detachment)

tool called the Interoperability Assessment Model (IAM). Service Component Commands (SSCs), as they assess their own interoperability, help themselves by considering these tools when designing AM&E plans with key partners. Similarly, joint forces should consider how these and other tools might be merged to improve AM&E at CCMD-level.

Liaison as a Common Joint SFA Role in Strategic Competition.

Army SFA activities (or roles) include advise, support, liaise and assess. The SFABs' (the Army's preeminent SFA organization) primary subordinate unit for employment is the advisor team. Per its name, its primary activity is 'advising' across the strategic continuum. However, the other activities are vitally important, to include liaison. In fact, as the strategic continuum moves from competition towards crisis or conflict, the advising role might decrease while the liaison role might dramatically increase. Further, SFAB follow-on forces help complete the liaison network, and with a clear common operational picture.

The SFAB liaison role in the strategic continuum was detailed in an SFAB multi-domain operations white paper and soon after appeared in the SFAB Organizational & Operations (O&O) concept (both published in 2020). The O&O concept describes the SFAB formation and how it operates, and both documents

explain how SFAB roles transition across the strategic continuum. The last two SFAB TTXs (2020 and 2021) positively tested the liaison role and found it relevant to overtly transition closer to that role as crisis and conflict is more imminent. The current SFABs' regional alignment and liaison role can greatly mitigate the challenges of time and distance as an "inside force" capability and increase adversary cost and risk. This is especially significant in more dispersed geographies across the globe.

This is not to say that the liaison role is restricted to impending crisis or conflict. Additionally, liaison is not limited to any one level of war. The persistent presence of Joint SFA forces provides increased liaison capacity to commanders at all levels throughout the strategic continuum. The Air Force's MSASs persistently engage with key PNs on the African continent and in the SOUTHCOM AOR. The Marine Corps' MCACs have a habitual regional alignment scheme, as well as recurrent expeditionary SFA activities. This persistent presence and liaison capacity (from multiple Services) also enhances information advantage and provides intelligence and situational awareness.

These roles do not have to be mutually exclusive, nor necessarily require full-time LNO teams that many SFA and other units can ill-afford to provide. In fact, liaison should be seen as somewhat inherent with advising. Advisor teams should always communicate with many parties (other advisors, the country team, relevant US government agencies, and coalition forces) to help prevent or resolve conflict. While helping build PN combat power, SFA practitioners can concurrently serve as force multipliers through liaison, and this can help shape the environment all the way to post-conflict operations.

SFA Integration with CCMD Campaigning and Contingency Planning. Frequently, SFA is viewed as “nice to do” or optional. Why is this? It is in part because theater-level planners are not aware of SFA’s ability to help set the theater and posture forces while enabling a better understanding of the operating environment (OE) through persistent contact with PNs. This was the case in Ukraine. As seen in the Ukraine, SFA should be viewed as an integrated part of strategic competition that includes crisis and conflict. If CCMD and SSC planning properly integrates SFA with this mindset, their plans will best posture the Joint Force for success no matter what SFA force structure or resources exist at any given point in time.

Great Power Competition provides CCMDs the opportunity to consider and plan for SFA to strengthen key PNs and allies. This should be an integral, not competing, ‘economy of force’ portion of campaign plans to help shape the OE to deter adversaries. Including SFA planning enables US and coalition forces to build options for joint force commanders preparing for crisis to ensure a position of advantage in conflict. Thus, operational plans containing contingency and conflict should identify the desired roles of key US and coalition PNs with sufficient specificity. Such specificity can then drive SFA efforts that develop matching PN capabilities with the appropriate capacity and desired interoperability. When tested, experimented and honed through combined training, exercises, and lower

intensity operations (e.g., regional peacekeeping operations), those capabilities help both the US and its partners deter enemies or win in conflict if necessary.

This integrated approach not only applies to all geographical CCMDs, but also includes functional ones such as Special Operations, SCCs, and all other enablers so that base plans consider SFA and security cooperation (SC). Subsequent SC workshops should then focus on results that confidently support the base operational plans. This can work properly only through consistent and iterative cross-communication, but must first start by base planners and operators (as well as SFA and SC planners) seeing SFA and SC as vital assets to integrate, and not as competing or optional assets.

The Way Ahead - Optimizing Joint Force SFA Effects

Now is the time to optimize Service-generated and Joint Force SFA effects. The crisis in Ukraine illustrates the high stakes. Recent events in Europe demonstrate that ‘catching up’ with SFA activities during a crisis is an uphill climb, and we certainly cannot always assume U.S. direct intervention and leadership in every critical crisis or conflict that arises worldwide.



Two U.S. Air Force F-35A Lightning II aircraft and two French Rafale aircraft break formation during flight over France, May 18, 2021, during Atlantic Trident 21. (U.S. Air Force photo by Staff Sgt. Alexander Cook)

Joint SFA Solutions to SFA Challenges Continued...

Every Service, SSC and CCMD must integrate SFA into their campaign plans. More capable and interoperable partners are a significant force multiplier. Improved campaign planning must also:

- First, not only understand and assess the OE and its threats, but also our PN and their mutually desired roles.
- From the above, proactively plan and choose the right PN and the time horizons, with roles that match true shaping, deterrence, crisis and conflict needs.
- Leverage SFA for posture planning and setting the theater.
- Include all Services, IA, other partners, and all available SFA and SC tools.

- At a minimum, consider the most critical challenges, among those being: the need to proactively compete in the information environment; manage interoperability in stride with capability and capacity development versus as a stand-alone result; develop liaison as a critical skill across the continuum.
- Ultimately determine and prioritize the most important SFA focus areas.

This improved process and focus will lead to much greater Joint Force SFA Solutions and success in current and future global competition.

The views expressed are those of the authors, not the Department of Defense or its elements. The content does not necessarily reflect the official U.S. Army position and does not change or supersede any information in other U.S. Army publications. Authors are responsible for the accuracy and source documentation of the material they provide.



America-class amphibious assault ship USS America (LHA 6), back, and Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) Hyūga-class helicopter destroyer JS Hyūga (DDH 181) transit the Philippine Sea, Jan. 22, 2022.
(U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Brett McMinoway)

One Team One Mission

Bridging the Defense Attaché-Security Cooperation Organizational Gap

by COL Charles (Chip) W. Nolan, Previous Army Attaché in Santiago Chile

Article Approved for Public Release by FAO Branch, HRC

Most are probably aware of ongoing efforts to analyze ways to improve DoD operations at US embassies around the world. Having served as the Army Mission Chief in Colombia (large embassy) and now as the Army Attaché in Chile (medium embassy), I have come to realize two things. First, every country and country team is different, which requires that we provide Senior Defense Officials/ Defense Attachés (SDO/DATTs) the flexibility to task organize as they see fit based on the mission requirements and resources on hand. Second, we would not be organized the way we are, with separate Defense Attaché Organizations (DAOs) and Security Cooperation Organizations (SCOs), if we started with a clean sheet of paper and performed a detailed mission analysis of our Foreign Area Officer (FAO) responsibilities down range.

Without reviewing the historic details of DoD activities at US embassies, we currently find two primary DoD organizations (DAOs and SCOs) on our country teams. Both have separate headquarters, policies, authorities and funding streams. Years ago the SDO/DATT concept was implemented to bring the activities of both organizations under the leadership of one officer. While this move instructed SDO/DATTs to improve efficiencies between the two offices, it fell short of maximizing the true potential of working as one united team. A simple mission analysis of the SDO/DATT's mission makes an excellent case for combining both into one office.

SDO/DATT Duties and Responsibilities

SDO/DATTs receive a letter of instruction from the Director of the Defense Attaché Service (DAS) outlining their duties and responsibilities. This letter highlights four primary missions:

- 1) **Inform** partner nation (PN) and US armed forces defense establishments to support decision-making.
- 2) **Partner** with PN military through effective security cooperation (SC) to meet mutual objectives.

3) **Represent** the Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, regional combatant commanders, Service chiefs, and the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) to the PN government.

4) **Advise**, assist and support the Ambassador and Country Team on military topics (both US and PN).

Historically, DAOs have had the lead for informing, representing and advising while SCOs have been primarily responsible for conducting SC. I would argue that *both* offices can, do and should support all four missions, albeit fulfilling different primary roles.

According to the Merriam-Webster dictionary, an attaché is a "technical expert on a country's diplomatic staff at a foreign capital." The Collins dictionary defines attaché as a person with "special duties on the diplomatic staff of an ambassador or minister to another country." According to these definitions, *both* DAOs and SCOs are attachés. Our technical expertise may be different, but we all support the same four missions.

The Team DoD Concept

Here in Chile, under the direction of our SDO/DATT, we have found that the "Team DoD" concept works best. This team pairs the SDO/DATT with a deputy (currently the Deputy SCO Chief) that manages the relationship and engagements with the PN Ministry of Defense and Joint Staff. Individual Service teams, led by the senior officer of that service (in our case, the attachés), work together to manage the relationship and engagements with each PN service (in our case the Army, Navy and Air Force).

The following organizational charts in the illustrations below highlight the paradigm shift from a DAO-SCO stove-piped organization (illustration 1) to a single "Team DoD" concept (illustration 2). Working together in Service teams provides several advantages to include the following:

One Team One Mission Continued...

Intel-Ops Fusion. Our experience in the Middle East since 9/11 has taught us the need to closely integrate these two functions to be truly successful. The same is true for FAOs as we inform senior leaders and conduct SC. Every Soldier is a sensor and every attaché can impact and shape our SC activities. In Team DoD Chile, we are fortunate in that both the Army Section Chief and the Army Attaché have DAO and SCO experience. This has allowed us to work closely together to benefit all four mission areas.

Senior Foreign Area Officer Experience. Army FAOs have the advantage here because they have the most developed FAO program amongst all the services. Army senior FAOs (O6s) have had multiple FAO assignments (to include down range) which well prepares them to think strategically and manage the service relationships with the PN. It makes little sense to leave engagement

strategy solely to a SCO FAO when there is a more experienced FAO in the DAO. In the end, both should work together to maximize progress in all four mission areas. In Team DoD Chile, I take the lead in managing the US Army-to-PN Army relationship and the engagement strategy as the senior Army FAO. The Army Section Chief in the SCO provides significant input into both, but has the operational focus of implementing the strategy by managing our many SC programs. I support his efforts by engaging our Chilean Army counterparts at the senior level, especially since they can be very rank conscious.

Flexibility. We have all experienced high operational tempo in both the DAO and the SCO. Combining both offices provides the SDO/DATT and Service team chiefs maximum flexibility to task organize and share the workload. In Team DoD Chile, our attaches sometimes





Illustration 2:
Proposed Organizational Construct



take the lead on specific SC activities. Our SCO personnel sometimes pitch in to cover representational duties. Looking long term, I see a time when we do not have “SCO officers” and “DAO Officers”...just FAOs trained to execute all four missions. This would provide SDO/DATTs and Service teams chiefs maximum flexibility in managing the Service relationships and assigning tasks.

As DoD Team Chile has moved to operate as one functional office, physical office space has not changed. There is still a “SCO Office” and a “DAO sensitive compartmented information facility,” but teamwork does not depend on sharing the same office space (although it can enhance it). The most important thing is that we communicate and function as a team.

Way Ahead

Change is needed and long overdue with respect to how FAOs conduct business down range. Substantial

efficiencies will require changes at the policy level and will take time. FAO training will also need to be reassessed so that FAOs are qualified from the start to execute all four missions. In the end, each service needs to have dedicated professionals that know: the culture; the language; how to speak “interagency” (that is a different language in and of itself!); and how to perform all four mission sets. All Services will have to buy into this concept for it to be truly successful.

Bottom Line. It is a good time to be a FAO. There is great interest at the senior levels to improve how FAOs operate within host nations. We can start moving in that direction now, before policies are rewritten, simply by tearing down traditional stove pipes and working together to accomplish our four primary FAO missions.

One team (office), one fight (mission)!



Foreign Area Officer Corner

SFA in Competition

In addition to the Chile Army Attaché article from a 2018 FAO Newsletter, this page offers two more SFA related products from the FAO Community.



First, from the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command's Director of the China Strategic Focus Group comes a view of the U.S.-China relationship.

In a recent (February 2022) edition of the FAO Newsletter, the front page features a senior FAO view on global competition, with links to a group of informative products that inform 'Whole of Government' competition as advocated in emerging joint concepts for competing.

The entire February 2022 Foreign Area Officer Newsletter can be found at the following milSuite Link:

[FAO Newsletter FEB22.pdf | milBook Home \(milsuite.mil\)](#)



Next, for those with an interest in AFRICOM, be sure to check out this article from a Foreign Area Officer looking at SFA in Africa.

**The Lesson of the Security Force Assistance Brigade in Africa:
Find the Authority to Compete and Win**

By Major Spencer D. Propst, U.S. Army

This article is a FAO Desk Officer look from the Africa Command's (AFRICOM's) Southern European Task Force (SETAF). It explores how the Army's 2d SFAB is currently working with partner nations on the African continent to help the U.S. successfully compete in all phases across that region.

The compete article (from a recent March-April 2022 Military Review edition) can be found and downloaded from the following Army University Press link.

[The Lesson of the Security Force Assistance Brigade in Africa \(army.mil\)](#)

Maneuver Support Corner

Protection as Functional Area SFA



The Army Protection Warfighting Function contains several elements that relate to SFA. The recently published (April 2022) Maneuver Support Center of Excellence (MSCoE) Inaugural Protection Bulletin highlights two.



First on page 21, is another Army 2d SFAB look (this time from Afghanistan) at insights as to how we should best advise Foreign Security Force Engineers. It includes this within context of working with NATO partners.

Second on page 30, is an JCISFA collaborative analysis with the Asia-Pacific Counter-Improvised Explosive Device Fusion Center (APCFC) and how they conduct Security Cooperation and SFA with regional partners on a daily basis. This work not only promotes security and stability as well as builds and maintains relationships, but its work with other government agencies (OGA) directly contributes to competition by countering and reducing current and emerging threats.

The complete bulletin's inaugural issue is available for download from DVIDS at:

<https://www.dvidshub.net/publication/1336/protection>

and the *Protection* webpage at:

[Protection Professional Bulletin :: FORT LEONARD WOOD \(army.mil\)](https://www.army.mil/protection)



Book Launch! July 11th in Rome - Italian Army Officers Club

“Insights on Strategic Advising for Security Force Assistance”

Be sure to check out NATO SFA Centre of Excellence courses

NATO SFA Centre of Excellence has courses available. [Link to NATO SFA Courses \(click here\)](#)

ETOC Code: MCM-CM-25556 Security Force Assistance Operators Course

This course aims to improve the competency and the effectiveness of SFA operators working in current and future missions related to security capacity building.

ETOC Code: MCP-CM-36713 Institutional Adviser Course

The course contributes to meeting the need for sustained and standardized professional development of Allied and Partner military and civilian personnel to conduct stability activities. Advanced tenets of institutional advising are integrated into the course education curriculum.

Both courses are designed as blended learning with on-line and in residence portions.



Security Force Assistance Operators Course

17th - 21st October 2022



Institutional Adviser Course

14th - 28th November 2022



JCISFA

Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance

Joint Staff | Army | Navy | Marines | Air Force | Space Force

JCISFA Community has SFA courses available through Joint Knowledge Online (JKO). [Link to JCISFA SFA Courses \(click here\)](#)

Be sure to check out the courses in JCISFA's SFA JKO Series:

J3OP-US1398 SFA Considerations for Campaign Planning

This course offers ways to implement SFA as part of campaign planning, execution, and assessment. It is tailored for key leaders within organizations that plan and execute SC at the operational level.

J3OP-US1399: Building Allied and Partner Security Institutions – Advanced

The focus of this course is building allied and partner defense institutions through SFA with an emphasis on FSF functions, core processes, and SFA developmental tasks.



SFA Topics Online

We provide away to submit request for information through the various JCISFA information sites as a means of direct communication and for ease of access to SFA subject matter experts.

An RFI can be used, not only to request more information about Security Force Assistance, but also to provide feedback and recommendations on content and improvements or even topic suggestions for future editions of the quarterly newsletter.

Just go to the Joint Staff Directorates J7 website (<https://www.jcs.mil>) and click the email link at the bottom, any of our social media sites, and finally we can be reached through the Chairman's Lessons Learned Information System (JLLIS).

JCISFA Social Media

JCISFA's presence on social media platforms, Facebook and Twitter, allows you to stay in touch with the latest JCISFA news. "Like" our Facebook page at <https://www.facebook.com/JCISFA> and follow us on Twitter at <https://twitter.com/JCISFA>. You can also find us on milSuite at <https://www.milsuite.mil/>.

