

Security Force Assistance Quarterly

Pride and Prejudice ... and... Precision-Guided Munitions

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Cover Photo Credit:

A pilot from the Brazilian Air Force prepares to fly during Green Flag-West 19-8 at Nellis Air Force Base, Las Vegas, Nevada, June 8, 2019. The Brazilians worked hand-in-hand with the 124th Fighter Wing, supporting the 116th Cavalry Brigade Combat Team's National Training Center rotation in Fort Irwin, California.

(U.S. Air National Guard Photo by Master Sgt. Joshua C. Allmaras)

Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance (JCISFA)

Mission:

JCISFA supports the integration of Security Force Assistance (SFA) activities into the current and future Joint Force to support Globally Integrated Operations. JCISFA enables the development of SFA doctrine, training, and education of the Joint Force to conduct partner nation capacity-building. JCISFA supports SFA-related strategy formulation, policy and guidance development and support to joint exercises.

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SFA Quarterly 24th Ed., SEP 2022

The purpose of this quarterly newsletter is to inform the SFA Community of Interest (Col), to highlight the greater Col efforts, and to foster Col interoperability. Sharing JCISFA's efforts will help inform the Col of the many ways JCISFA can be leveraged.

In addition to Chairman's Joint Lessons Learned Information System (JLLIS), this newsletter serves as a forum for the Col to submit Observations and Recommendations or other articles of interest regarding their respective SFA efforts. As a service to the Joint Force, this newsletter promotes dialogue among the SFA Col that finds itself dispersed across various countries, Interagency, Joint and Service organizations.

The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are those of the contributors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any other agency of the Federal Government.

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Again, as this SFA newsletter encourages dialogue, it is part of an ongoing effort to more effectively "Communicate, Cooperate, and Coordinate" across the Joint Force with all SFA stakeholders. Please let us know if there are any topics of interest you would like to see in the future or to submit an article.

Submit to:

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Preferred drafts of 1000—2000 words, written for public release

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From the Director's Desk

It's my pleasure to introduce the 24th edition of JCISFA's Quarterly SFA Newsletter.

This edition reflects our diverse outreach efforts across the SFA Community of Interest (Col) with a mixture of content, collaborating with both existing, and new teammates. It seems strategic competition, multi-domain operations (MDO), and the ability to work effectively with partner nations are SFA Col unifying interests.

The Army's SFA Proponent follows their general SFA concept article with a more specific description of how SFA can, and should, help integrate foreign security forces (FSF) into MDO. Developing multi-national interoperability, and related SFA assessments of FSF MDO capabilities, are both important parts of FSF integration.

The 81st Fighter Squadron shares lessons from their eight years dedicated to hosting and working with partner nation forces across the globe. They explain lessons associated with taking time to listen and understand the motivations and goals of the FSF you are trying to develop. Desire alone will not produce the precision-guided munitions' effects many partners seek, but a commitment to the supporting processes, many of them institutional, will likely determine success.

The NATO SFA Centre of Excellence offered JCISFA and the Col an opportunity to review strategic advising and its impacts from a diverse set of SFA practitioners across the globe. Among the many salient points published in an associated handbook and forum on this subject, is understanding one's operating environment, before and during employment, which proved critical to assessing and monitoring the most relevant indicators of success.

The Space Force is a new JCISFA partner, and they obviously expand critical operations in the space domain. They note how the COVID-19 pandemic exposed the importance of US capabilities in this area. It's equally critical to develop partner and ally capability in this domain to successfully compete through information and technology. The Space Force presents their Regional Space Advisor program as a key piece of this overall effort.

As always, we welcome your feedback and invite you to join us in early October to discuss these articles and more, during the Col forum. We also welcome your thoughts, ideas, and article submissions for the December edition of the SFA Quarterly Newsletter.

JOSEPH E. WILLIAMS
Colonel, U.S. Army
Director



Armed Forces of Ukraine Soldiers conduct drivers training on the M113 Armored Personnel Carrier as part of the maintenance course provided at Grafenwoehr Training Area, Germany, June 2, 2022. Instruction for the course is provided by the U.S. as part of a security assistance package. (U.S. Army photo by Sgt. Spencer Rhodes, 53rd Infantry Brigade Combat Team)

Security Force Assistance Enabling Foreign Security Forces Integration into Multi-Domain Operations

by COL Neil F. Sleevei, U.S. Army, Retired and MAJ Jason A. Byrd, Army SFA Proponent

The crisis in Ukraine establishes that Security Force Assistance (SFA) is now more important than ever.


Our competitors at every level seek informational, geopolitical, and geographic advantage to challenge the U.S. and our allies and partners across the globe. The Army effort to rapidly modernize and organize itself to fight these threats centers on the Multi-Domain Operations (MDO) Concept, but the United States Army cannot do this alone. Without the assistance of our allies and partners, victory is not assured. The Army Security Force Assistance Proponent recently published an Advisory Concept to highlight Security Force Assistance Operations enabling and integrating Foreign Security Forces into Multi-Domain Operations.

The Advisory Concept, *SFA Enabling FSF Integration into MDO*, describes how developing foreign security forces (FSF) capacity, capability, and enabling interoperability for multi-domain operations (MDO) may deter and if necessary, enable the defeat of increasingly sophisticated threats in the future operational environment (OE).

MDO is essential for *integrated deterrence*.¹ Recent events in Eastern Europe show that in the era of strategic competition, strategic necessity may demand security force assistance (SFA) become the primary effort both to deter U.S. adversaries prior to conflict, and to strengthen allies and partners before, during, and after, large scale combat operations. SFA is now more important than ever when preparing for future multinational operations. Competitors at every level leverage trends in science, technology, and the information environment to challenge the U.S. and its allies and partners across the globe.

This concept describes the key challenges, recommended solutions, and supporting capabilities required for Army SFA to enable MDO across the spectrum of conflict and against strategic competitors to accomplish campaign objectives and protect U.S. national interests. This advisory concept aligns with the 2022 National Defense Strategy² and will advance U.S. Army goals through integrated deterrence, campaigning, and actions that build enduring advantages at the operational and even strategic levels.

Figure 1. Security Force Assistance in Multi-Domain Operations Logic Map



The central idea of *SFA Enabling FSF Integration into MDO* is to provide a means for FSF to support achieving integrated deterrence during crisis and if needed, deliver combat power in conflict. SFA may be the preferred method for the Army as part of a multinational alliance, coalition, or partnership to enable FSF synchronization, and integration in MDO. Throughout the spectrum of conflict, SFA supports MDO capabilities. While units, teams, and elements conducting SFA may build FSF capacity and capability, enable interoperability, and improve access and influence, these efforts alone, or even collectively, do not necessarily ensure success in MDO. The Army may need SFA to enable FSF integration into MDO to optimize coalition force success. This concept serves as a basis for modernization actions for SFA in MDO. This concept also identifies implications for other supporting and enabling functions. It will inform development of other concepts, experimentation, capabilities development activities, and other future force modernization efforts to improve the MDO force.

Key Challenges

Our strategic competitors, leveraging emerging trends in science, technology, and the information environment, invested in strategies and capabilities to challenge the U.S. and remake the global order. For the foreseeable future, adversaries will continue to creatively combine conventional and non-conventional methods to achieve their objectives. They employ innovative approaches to contest U.S. and allies' interests in all domains, within the electromagnetic spectrum, and information environment. They often seek to attain their goals through ambiguous actions taken below the threshold of armed conflict.

The future operational environment (OE) described presents the Army with a difficult military challenge: How to develop a methodology, with associated capabilities, that enables the joint force to better synchronize with FSF while conducting globally integrated operations to achieve acceptable and sustainable outcomes.



A Soldier assigned to 1st Armor Brigade, 3rd Infantry Division, shares a laugh with an Armed Forces of Ukraine soldier during the drivers training portion of the M113 Armored Personnel Carrier maintenance course at Grafenwoehr Training Area, Germany, June 2, 2022. (U.S. Army photo by Sgt. Spencer Rhodes, 53rd IBCT)

For this Advisory Concept, the Army Security Force Assistance Proponent developed the following as our problem statement.

Problem Statement: *Given the complexity of the future OE, how does the Army leverage SFA to increase U.S. positional advantage across the spectrum of conflict to deter or defeat malign influences below the threshold of conflict, prevail in large-scale combat operations (LSCO) against capable peer threats, and continuously consolidate gains to reestablish integrated deterrence on terms favorable to U.S. interests?*

The response to the military challenge is the central idea of the *SFA Enabling FSF Integration into MDO* concept: Producing FSF combat power where required to be MDO capable, for example to work seamlessly in convergence across multiple domains with the Army and at the same time.

Recommended Solutions

SOLUTION SYNOPSIS: SFA facilitates MDO through organize, train, equip, build/rebuild, and advise along with support and liaison (OTEBA-SL) activities with FSF. SFA designs many of these activities to help FSF complement joint and Army forces' MDO capabilities. Situations may warrant SFA improving FSF capabilities to support MDO through the three tenets listed below.



U.S. Marines assigned to Marine Forces Special Operations Command (MARFAC) conduct a specialized training exercise with members of the Kenyan Army during a Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) in Isiolo, Kenya, July 1, 2022. The teams focused on honing basic skills such as basic marksmanship, small unit tactics, and mission planning.
(U.S. Air Force photo by Staff Sgt. Alysia Blake)

COMPONENTS OF THE SOLUTION: The SFA Enabling FSF in MDO Concept adapted the following solution elements from TRADOC Publication 525-3-1, The U.S. Army in MDO 2028.

The three solution components of this concept, using SFA, are to :

1. Broaden MDO calibrated force posture,
2. Increase multi-domain units and,
3. Expand MDO convergence.

All require concept validation which comes through experimentation. A testable hypothesis links to each. Experiments applying SFA within the MDO concept must directly trace to one or more of the hypotheses. Thus, experiments require attention to the interactions among the components and the results' relationship to mission effectiveness. For example, the proposition that "Calibrated Force Posture (by, with, through the multinational force)" will improve lethality and survivability in MDO during large scale combat operation (LSCO)" needs to be restated into a primary hypothesis. An example hypothesis might be: IF calibrated force posture (by, with, through the multinational force) occurs by integrating MDO-capable FSF units, THEN lethality and survivability in MDO will increase WHEN working in a LSCO context.

SFA synchronizing and integrating FSF into MDO to broaden the MDO-calibrated force posture to the needed extent is one component. This effort reduces the need for Army MDO units forward by substituting them with MDO-capable FSF. Improving calibrated force posture comes by substituting MDO-capable FSF to the extent needed for MDO and building partners' and allies' capacities and capabilities to defeat increasingly sophisticated Chinese and Russian-sponsored unconventional and information warfare. This includes more integrated warfighting functions, the electromagnetic spectrum, the information environment, and mission command.

Another component involves SFA building FSF capacity, capability, and enabling interoperability among more units already forward positioned, thus increasing multi-domain formations. Increasing multi-domain formations comes by, with, and through SFA building FSF capacity, capability, and enabling interoperability among more units already forward positioned, again, creating more MDO-capable FSF units. This action provides the joint force commander with options to surge more forces by echelon and position for multi-domain convergence.

Third, SFA enables FSF (if required) to contribute to MDO across all domains to optimize coalition effects and expands MDO convergence. These yield overmatch of the enemy in decisive spaces. This advisory concept solution provides functional multi-domain expertise and support in FSF's rapid integration and convergence in MDO.

Supporting Capabilities

What may be critical for future operations, however, is for FSF to have the capability to work cross-domain with the Army in multiple domains simultaneously. This requires multi-domain, rapid, and simultaneous operations across multiple warfighting functions. Such synchronization demands more than an incremental change from what SFA accomplishes today across the spectrum of conflict. SFA enabling FSF MDO needs more advanced SFA skills and abilities at a minimum.

MDO-enabled FSF may create opportunities to converge cross-domain capabilities with the joint force. Then when they or Army forces need more forward positioned MDO-capable partner forces, SFA provides the ideal means to build FSF capacity, capability, and enable interoperability. SFA improving FSF ability to implement, integrate with, or synchronize with MDO may improve overall multinational and inter-governmental coordination and unity of effort. MDO-capable forces, supported by SFA, can posture forces for long-term deterrence and reinforce to retain positional advantage. Additionally, MDO-enabling SFA activities may support regional engagement and shape the security environment through partner training and education. In the grander scheme of things, SFA, in situations where multinational operations warrant including some partner force MDO capabilities, provides opportunities for FSF to contribute more to MDO and unify the effort among joint and multinational force members.

For a capability to provide increasing value for military operations in today's ever complex operational environment it must apply across the Spectrum of Conflict.

Integrated Deterrence. To deter adversaries, SFA personnel accomplish the main tasks of advising, training, equipping, building/rebuilding, and liaising with FSF. The use of dedicated SFA forces and personnel provides economy of force options to the theater Army and geographic combatant command (GCC) by mitigating, to some extent, the need for brigade combat teams (BCTs) and special operating forces (SOF). Commanders can then use these very expensive units elsewhere. To integrate forces for deterrence, SFA facilitates the theater Army and the GCC in gaining improved situational understanding of the OE which in turn contributes to FSF interoperability and relationships. Additionally, SFA awareness and activities with FSF facilitates consolidation of critical capabilities, assets, and activities in theater.

With respect to information advantage, the pre-crisis period is an appropriate time for SFA to advise and train FSF to participate in coordinated efforts with

their own public affairs. Using partner nation information channels to maximize strategic messaging of SFA and FSF partnerships, key engagements, training, and success stories our allies and partners can discredit adversary disinformation campaigns.

Crisis. Based on their forward presence and standing relationships in an area of operations, SFA forces provide early and sustained indicators. These indicators increase situational understanding and even enable conflict type determination. Utilizing SFA liaison teams in competition and rapidly re-purposing them in crisis as FSF support teams gives commanders a capability to significantly increase FSF combat power.

Large-Scale Combat. During large-scale combat, SFA supports FSF with key enablers and capabilities while conducting liaison functions to ensure FSF synchronization with the joint force and Army. Additionally, SFA elements will advise on training, equipping, building/rebuilding, while liaising where possible within FSF supporting functions of governance, executive, generating, and operating (G-EGO). Advisors will assist and support FSF by employing key capabilities such as joint fires to create exploitable opportunities. Furthermore, large scale combat often generates a need to rapidly recruit and train FSF forces due to casualties or just



U.S. Army Staff Sgt. Jun Choh (left), 5th Security Force Assistance Brigade, conducts an after action review with a team of soldiers for their joint training rehearsal as part of Super Garuda Shield 2022 in Baturaja, Indonesia, Aug. 8, 2022. (U.S. Army photo by Spc. Andrew Mendoza, 206th Broadcast Operations Detachment)

to increase force size. SFA elements supply a capability to reconstitute, regenerate, or even grow FSF. Building or rebuilding to restore partner FSF capabilities provides a method to reduce security vulnerabilities and lower requirements for the joint force.

This concept requires continuous SFA assessments of FSF multi-domain capabilities. These assessments inform both initial and running estimates which commanders use in further preparation of the OE. Additionally, to enable MDO with allies and partners, SFA may require assessing FSF MDO capabilities and then adapting the joint campaign plan based on the continuous analysis of results of SFA efforts in relation to overall expectations.

In Conclusion

SFA positions the theater Army and GCC for success by supporting the actions of setting the theater. To integrate for better deterrence, SFA works closely with partner FSF and its supporting institutions (often through exercises) to improve capability, capacity, and to enable interoperability. To maintain influence with partner FSF, SFA provides continual activities in the form of OTEBA-SL that correspond to partners' security needs. These SFA efforts increase cultural understanding, trust, and rapport through relationships and sustained partner FSF engagement. If deterrence fails, the advantages SFA helps provide commanders plays a key role in achieving victory or re-establishing deterrence.

By further developing the capabilities described in this concept and adopting its operational approaches, the joint and multinational force will better prepare to address the dynamic security environment. Now and, in the future, the US military must conduct integrated campaigning both internally and with interorganizational partners across the spectrum of conflict to deter strategic competitors or prevail in combat.

Notes

1. Integrated Deterrence at Center of Upcoming National Defense Strategy, MARCH 4, 2022, | BY C. TODD LOPEZ, DOD

NEWS: Sasha Baker was sworn in as the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy on February 14, 2022. "At the core of the National Defense Strategy will be "integrated deterrence," which Baker said is a framework for working across warfighting domains, theaters, and the spectrum of conflict, in collaboration with all instruments of national power, as well as with U.S. allies and our partners. Integrated deterrence means integrated across domains, so conventional, nuclear, cyber, space, informational," "[It is also] integrated across theaters of competition and potential conflict [and] integrated across the spectrum of conflict from high intensity warfare to the gray zone." The concept in this case also means integration of all instruments of national power. Most importantly it means being "integrated across our allies and partners.

2. 2022 Fact Sheet, National Defense Strategy, 28 March 2022

White Paper Approved for Public Release by Mission Command PAO

Article Approved for Public Release by JS J7 PAO

The views expressed are those of the authors, not the Department of Defense or its elements. The content does not necessarily reflect the official U.S. Army position and does not change or supersede any information in other U.S. Army publications. Authors are responsible for the accuracy and source documentation of the material they provide.



U.S. Army Staff Sgt. Jun Choh (left), 5th Security Force Assistance Brigade, leads a team of TNI soldiers into the UH-60 Blackhawk helicopter for their joint training rehearsal as part of Super Garuda Shield 2022 in Baturaja, Indonesia, Aug. 8, 2022. Super Garuda Shield, a part of Operation Pathways and a longstanding annual, bilateral military exercise conducted between the U.S. military, Indonesia National Armed Forces, has now expanded to a multinational exercise encompassing 14 Nations. This exercise reinforces the U.S. commitments to our allies, and other regional partners reinforcing joint readiness, and the interoperability to fight and win together. (U.S. Army photo by Spc. Andrew Mendoza, 206th Broadcast Operations Detachment)



Squadron Photo of A-29 Super Tucanos and personnel from the Afghan and Nigerian Air Forces training with the 81 FS at Moody AFB, Georgia, 6 Nov 2020. (U.S. Air Force photo by Master Sgt. Daryl Knee)

Pride and Prejudice ...and... Precision-Guided Munitions

Stories from the 81st Fighter Squadron's tenure as the only conventional Air Advisor squadron working to create offensive precision strike capabilities with partner nations

by Lt Col "T-Rex" Grillos, Capt "FEMA" Hiester, MSgt "Arock" Wooley, and additional 81 FS personnel contributions as quoted

Having worked with a collection of partner nation air forces during its short re-incarnation as an Air Advisor squadron, personnel of 81 Fighter Squadron have a plethora of stories to tell about how pride & prejudice on both the partner nation and US side shaped the ability to affect the fight with precision-guided munitions (PGMs). Allies and enemies worldwide highly desire the ability to effectively deliver precision-guided munitions, but re-shaping partner nation processes from doctrine through tactics takes a deft blend of humility and professionalism from all personnel involved. Both institutional and personal buy-in are critical bridges crossing the gaps in capability and culture that separate a partner's desire to emulate US military effects from merely purchasing the munitions involved.

"Esse quam videri – To be, rather than to seem."

Nations typically take a great deal of pride in their air forces and often internally and externally message this via their demonstration teams, flyovers at parades, celebrations, and other highly visible events. To put it politely, the extremely visible shows regularly lead to highly exaggerated and lofty impressions about the true warfighting capability an Air Force possess. This prejudice prevents many nations from creating enduring military capabilities with the background logistics and training programs required to support them.

"Amateurs talk about strategy and tactics. Professionals talk about logistics and sustainability in warfare."

–Gen Robert Hill Barrow, USMC

During the height of the US daylight strategic bombing effort in WWII only 16% of all bombs fell within 1,000 feet of their intended impact point. Just 50 years later, the US Air Force underwent a

massive transformation in precision munitions delivery. Pilots during the air campaign of the Gulf War reliably targeted single vehicles with one bomb from 5 miles slant range. This didn't happen by accident. This USAF 1990s revolution in precision targeting and effects is a deliberate result of the US defense budget, private industry, research and development, operational test, and perhaps most importantly - *the capacity and will to train*.

"... They took everything I gave them and used it to build a training plan and even training records for their section... I returned the following year and I witnessed them instructing reoccurring pilot training. They not only had slides, notes, and demonstrations, they had open discussion amongst the room so the pilots could share feedback about their gear and experiences. I was so fulfilled to be able to witness such growth in such a short span of time."

**- MSgt Forrester, 81 FS Aircrew Flight Equipment
Air Advisor**

The year is 2015. A small cadre of Afghan personnel from multiple tribal and ethnic backgrounds return from A-29 light attack aircraft training in the United States. Many come from families with aviation roots dating back to the Soviet occupation, from a country where only a third of the populace is literate in Dari or Pashtu, yet they received aviation instruction exclusively in English. American Advisors from the Air Force, Army and Department of State embed to work "*shona ba shona*¹" with Afghan pilots, maintainers, bomb loaders and aircrew equipment specialists to build the strike capability



A two-ship formation of A-29 Super Tucanos fly over Kabul, Afghanistan during a mission on April 28, 2016.
(U.S. Air Force photo by Staff Sgt. Larry E. Reid Jr.)

of the Afghan Air Force (AAF).² The AAF trains in an extraordinarily short time to deliver bombs, rockets, and machine gun fire with enough accuracy to strike a single qalat (compound). Previously, the US never asked their military advising functions to accomplish such a feat. But in just a few short years the enemy was living in fear and dying tired trying to run from weapons built, loaded, and delivered by people who could have grown up next door to them.

"Advising one mission, I asked the flight lead why he ordered his wingman to abort an attack? 'The gathering I observed nearby did not make sense.' When I asked him to explain, he told me that the gathering was a funeral precession, and that during that time of day, no one would be gathering like that in that area for anything else. To coordinate a two-ship through dynamic targeting and self-approval authority and have the additional brainpower to bring in the cultural context of the moment was beyond impressive."

- Lt Col Ervin, 81 FS Instructor Pilot

With this level of precision available, one early mission is tasked mid-flight with delivering "warning shots" in the vicinity of a village sheltering known enemy combatants. Faced with a task never spoken about by the precision-focused USAF instructors, the AAF pilots fire a short burst across nearly an entire village from their wing mounted .50 caliber machine guns. Message traffic flies through the US chain of command and demands the Advisors conduct a tape review of the aircraft-recorded footage. With our prejudice towards precision and effects, the instructors of the 81 FS never discussed a "warning shot" ... it simply wasn't part of our vocabulary or allowed by our rules of engagement. But a superior officer ordered the young AAF fighter pilots to do something "right now" and a quick burst seemed the best answer. The relationship built between the USAF Advisors and AAF pilots allowed them to talk openly and honestly about what occurred. They knew we were loyal wingmen seeking to understand the situation rather than rushing to hasty judgement. The Air Advisors demonstrated humility to a chain of superior officers, admitted that this was not a topic covered during instruction, and worked with the AAF

Pride and Prejudice ... and ... PGMs Continued...

leadership and Ministry of Defense to quickly create rules of engagement for “warning shots.” From that point on, AAF pilots strictly confined “warning shots” to uninhabited areas near suspected enemy locations, with the stated intent to minimize harm to both civilians and livestock. Our Afghan partners specifically included language concerning animals in the rules based on their importance to individual and family livelihood.

“...They had finally organized their first Afghan Weapons Standardization where they ‘hired’ new individuals and trained them loading/unloading/building munitions and it was good. More manpower, skillfully trained with all the tools we gave them. Success seemed inevitable... I saw a complete buy in/ownership; a sense of national pride. When I left there not too long after that last stretch ...saw the news...”
– 81 FS Aircraft Weapons Air Advisor

When the stockpile of laser-guided weapons dwindled in the closing months of the fight, Afghan pilots used similar targeting for dropping unguided weapons at night because ground commanders demanded the effect of a bomb exploding with little regard for prioritizing effects or understanding of target priorities. The diving delivery required to drop unguided weapons with precision is nearly suicidal when attempted at night due to highly mountainous terrain that covers most of Afghanistan. The AAF pilots followed the intent



An Afghan air force A-29 Super Tucano flies over Afghanistan during a training mission April 6, 2016. Train, Advise, Assist Command-Air worked daily with the Afghan air force to help build a professional, sustainable and capable air force. (U.S. Air Force photo by Capt. Eydie Sakura)

established by the rules created for “warning shots” and did WWII-style level deliveries from medium altitude on uninhabited and isolated structures, often still striking within tens of meters from the intended target. This provided the loud noises and light shows that satisfied the ground generals’ demands. However, effect focused, precision targeting of personnel or equipment dwindled; it became pilots dropping bombs because “we told you to.” The prejudice of US government personnel assumed that pilots would simply refuse, but the consequences of disobeying even a poorly given order could be jail time... it had happened. So AAF leadership sent up formations with mixed loadouts. Pilots flew aircraft with both unguided and guided bombs at night and when ordered, dropped the unguided, inexpensive, “dumb” bombs to save face with higher authorities and preserved precision munitions for more critical targets.

“This is a dynamic environment, complicated by multiple levels of intertwined objects and tasks. Every day brought some new problem or new situation to figure out all while maintaining air superiority with our partner nation counterparts representing professionalism and determination to get the job done.”

**-TSgt Buynack, 81 FS Avionics Maintenance
Air Advisor**

Demands for showy demonstrations are not rare. In another program, on another continent, national leaders tasked newly trained A-29 personnel with performing a ceremony upon returning home. While their training prepared them to fly two aircraft in concert to provide precision effects, this demand required the largest possible formation to fly low over a crowd and “wow” the assembled dignitaries with low altitude aerobatics. Dignitaries view new aircraft as part of their country’s national pride and believe professional air forces highlight themselves with flight demonstrations. The paraphrased thinking was “the USAF has the Thunderbirds, the USN has the Blue Angels, so of course our expert pilots are now of the same caliber after training in the United States.” The training syllabus and previous discussions never contained this desired end state. They focused on

Pride and Prejudice ... and ... PGMs Continued...

precision effects and building towards night-time employment, with some limited low altitude flying used only for unguided weapons deliveries. With little time to finish the training in the 81 FS syllabus, we helped their lead pilot review safety considerations for flying a larger formation at low altitude for the ceremony and wished him luck. Unfortunately, there would be no in-country advising for them.

“They have a self-sufficient Air Force, so most of their questions were A-29 specific. They asked high level technical questions that forced me to do a lot of research in order to give detailed answers.”

- MSgt Manduriao, 81 FS Airframe and Powerplant Air Advisor

To employ precision-guided munitions, you need information. A lot of it. Sometimes, a sensor with a camera or Forward Looking InfraRed (FLIR) acquires much needed information. Other times any number of intelligence sources gather information including specific coordinates. Getting that information to a pilot flying hundreds of miles from base is a technical and logistical problem the USAF spent decades and millions of dollars iterating on. When Gen Goldfein was the Chief of Staff of the USAF, he routinely made statements like “sharing information is foundational to our success in the future.” Unfortunately, the US military’s ability to share information is often hampered by the exquisite, integrated, highly classified, and

expensive methods we use to keep our military communication secure from adversaries. During his tenure Gen Goldfein promoted the idea of Aerial Extensible Relay Over-the-horizon Network (AERONet) as a low-cost, Commercial Off The Shelf (COTS) datalink for sharing information with partner nations. The execution of an experiment devoted to that idea became the responsibility of 81 FS personnel.

“I’ve always been impressed with their ability to conduct Close Air Support (CAS) operations in a different language. English is the international language for CAS and partner nations who desire to be part of the international JTAC [Joint Terminal Attack Controller] MOA [Memorandum of Agreement] must conduct CAS training in English. In the past, my own prejudice led me to take a softer debrief approach with partner nation JTACs, believing they were already significantly challenged by controlling in a non-native language. I did them a disservice by not treating them equally to a native English speaker and ‘pulling some punches’. AERONet provided a giant leap in technology for the partner nation JTACs I worked with during CLAE [Continued Light Attack Experiment]. The digital common operating picture and data transfer capability significantly reduced the voice communication normally required to successfully accomplish a CAS mission. Partner nation JTACs who were struggling to complete a voice centric CAS mission easily adopted and thrived in a data centric mission.”

– MSgt Elek, 81 FS Tactical Air Control Party Air Advisor & JTAC



Maj “T-Rex” Grillos briefing Maj Gen Cornish, AFSOUTH Commander, along with AFSOUTH staff and Colombian Air Force DVs at Davis Monthan AFB, NM on the live video and real-time inputs being made from their location to the capstone flight of the Continued Light Attack Experiment in Avon Park, FL, 10 May 2021. (Photo courtesy of Maj John Lachiewicz, AFSOUTH Staff)

A full discussion of the Continued Light Attack Experiment (CLAE), truly an experiment on information sharing with PNs and not about AT-6E aircraft capabilities, is the subject of other articles... but the desired end state of our partners was precision targeting and effects via rapidly shared and updated information. The squadron’s air advisor cadre and participants from four partner nations (Colombia, Nigeria, Thailand, and Tunisia) developed and demonstrated Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs). Both USAF and partner personnel learned together how to use this COTS system to



Royal Thai Air Force Flying Officer Apisit Kitchoke, command and control lead, uses Airborne Extensible Relay Over-Horizon Network software to track a flight during experimentation at Moody Air Force Base, Georgia, April 13, 2022. The AERONet data link is a command and control network which expands the U.S. Air Force's ability to operate together with its allies and partners and provide complementary capabilities and forces. (U.S. Air Force photo by Airman 1st Class Courtney Sebastianelli)

effectively solve problems in targeting violent extremist organizations. The USAF advisors deliberately set aside their pride in the specific and combat-tested JPUB/JFIRE 3-09 methods of applying joints fires to focus on innovative co-development. The 81 FS personnel learned alongside partner personnel how to apply core tenants, the fundamental intent of answering the question “how do I kill just bad guys and not the good guys or nice folks nearby,” in novel ways with a different and developing system.

As the mission of the 81 FS evolved beyond Afghanistan and the A-29, the unit's air advisors

“From the respect for rank in their AF to their intense study habits and hands-on application, you could tell that they were here on a mission and were going to make their country, families, and peers proud.”

-TSgt Gadd, 81 FS Airframe and Powerplant Maintenance Air Advisor

collectively grasped the opportunity to examine our pride and prejudices across multiple subject areas. The squadron fostered a can-do attitude with air advisors from over a dozen career fields who volunteered to learn about things well beyond their specialty codes. They went diving into the intricacies of Foreign Military Sales and assisted various US Embassy Security Cooperation Offices (SCO) in multiple geographic combatant commands with the squadron's Subject Matter Experts (SME). Unit personnel traveled to five continents and worked in or with thirteen countries in the span of a single year during the middle of COVID restrictions.

The story is short. The USAF re-activated the 81st Fighter Squadron in 2014 as an Air Advisor Fighter Squadron and scheduled de-activation at the end of 2022. The personnel of the unit are justifiably proud of the work they have done, humbled by facing their own prejudices, and delighted to share their many stories from working closely with partnered personnel to achieve the unit's vision of:

Pride and Prejudice ... and ... PGMs Continued...

“Air Advisors providing a world-wide, institutional Air Combat Applications capability; countering competitors by building capacity in partner nations; maximizing resources with a permanent, persistent advisor cadre.”

Demonstrating humility and competency, recognizing the pride that nations have in their air forces, and advising on the myriad of ways partner nation air forces could gain PGM capability “had been the means of uniting them.”³

ATTACK!

Notes:

¹Dari - shoulder-to-shoulder

²A common misunderstanding assumes the Afghan Air Force functioned like a separate service. In fact, political shackles tied it to equal status with the six-to-seven geographically bound Afghan Army Corps. To accurately understand the situation, think “Afghan Air Corp.”

“We were given a tour of a brand-new base they had built in just [two] years and at a brief look it seemed to meet many, if not all, standards the US maintains. We were shown the different aircraft they used and how they used them all, they also let us know some of the short comings they dealt with, such as getting parts and engines [and we share the same issue]. The overall experience was eye opening and the Mexican Air Force put on a huge show to [not only] display the capabilities they have, but also what we could do to make them better and help both partners’ interest.”

- MSgt Wooley, 81 FS Aircraft Weapons Air Advisor

³ Pride & Prejudice by Jane Austin, final line

Article Approved for Public Release by JS J7 PAO



81 FS Instructor Pilot wearing the Nigerian A-29 program “gun patch” reflected in the window of a Brazilian A-29 four-ship flying over the Porto Vehlo, Brazil, 11 Dec 2021. (Photo courtesy of the authors)



Strategic Advising Insights and Security Force Assistance

Lessons and Best Practices Towards Future Improvement

by Jeffrey S. King, JCISFA Military Analyst with the NATO SFA Centre of Excellence

Creating the Space to Assess Strategic Advising and Security Force Assistance (SFA), NATO offers a strategic lens.

In the second handbook of a public release series, the NATO SFA Centre of Excellence (COE) published and presented “Insights on Strategic Advising for SFA” in an all-day live and virtual panel event in July. The COE invited the Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance (JCISFA) to peer review the Institutional Capacity Building (ICB) chapter of the handbook, and to participate directly in the panel event that released the book. Through the book and panel, the COE again ‘created the space’ for a diverse group of authors and practitioners to assess ‘the good, bad and ugly’ of SFA- this time through the lens of strategic advising. JCISFA actively participated in the series of discussions and follow-up actions over a two-day period. This article describes and expounds on some of the key points as they apply to the SFA Enterprise; across six primary and inter-related topic areas (sections) that correlate with the vast majority of the handbook’s chapters.



After the welcome by the Director, Col. Massimo Di Pietro, Lt. Gen. C.A. Lamanna took the floor and opened the debate by underlining the importance of strategic planning and paying greater attention to the primary causes of the crisis. (Photo courtesy of NATO SFA COE, 11 July 2022)

Key Insights and Takeaway Applications

Knowing the Operating Environment in conjunction with your Partner Nation. This insight pertains primarily to Chapter 1, ‘*Tools for promoting rule of law and good governance in crisis zones*’, and its related presentation by a former NATO senior officer who designed and implemented NATO’s Building Policy and Action Plan. Knowing the operating environment (OE) is critical before embarking on any advisor mission. This sounds like an obvious insight, but it takes time and helpful tools to know the OE as well as one should. ‘Hard to do’ things are often overlooked, or the idea is ‘I’ll just figure things out when I get there’.

Take the time, *make* the time to learn the OE as much as possible. Gather tools to stay abreast of the OE and your partner nation (PN) once deployed. The Ministry of Defense Advisor (MoDA) program under the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) provides an example of a process tool towards this goal. They devote three weeks of ‘basic’ ministerial-level advisor training, then another three weeks that focus squarely on the OE the advisor will deploy to. All advisor preparation training programs should devote some measure of time to learning the OE.

Feel free to download and browse through the handbook while reading the remainder of this article.

[Insights on Strategic Advising for Security Force Assistance](#)

See JCISFA’s Security Force Assistance Quarterly, 22d Edition, March 2022 for the article containing links to the first NATO SFA COE handbook launch and panel event from September 2021.

The NATO SFA COE will soon post a link containing a video of the book launch event on their website.



Team Dover Airmen load pallets of ammunition onto a C-17 Globemaster III bound for Ukraine during a security assistance mission at Dover Air Force Base, Delaware, Aug. 9, 2022. (U.S. Air Force photo by Airman 1st Class Cydney Lee)

This chapter also applies to PN ICB, measuring return on investment (RoI), and monitoring. For example, corruption ratings are publicly known. Ukraine and Afghanistan are among the countries with lagging ratings and indices on countering corruption. The United States (US) and donor nations have invested large sums of money there, which induces many questions;

- How effective will our (US and donor nations) money be if corruption is not effectively countered?
- How cognizant do we (US and donor nations) stay of PN's level of rule of law (RoL) and good governance? (See NATO SFA COE Handbook 1)
- As RoL and good governance require ICB, how well are we paying attention to Ukraine's ICB needs in this area? Are we investing enough into this form of ICB over time, past the recent urgency to provide rapid assistance?
- Do we have realistic goals in this area, are we aware of obstacles, and are goals developed 'jointly' with Ukraine (and other PN's)?
- Do we have a monitoring plan, how accurate is it, and are there repercussions if established metrics of results are not achieved?

Chapter 1 and part of the panel discussion described and discussed all of the above valid points and questions in some fashion. The presentation referred to Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) reports on corruption and lagging governance in Afghanistan and SIGAR is referenced later in this article with respect to monitoring. Though not presented at the panel, Chapter 2 provides additional tips on ministerial advising towards ICB. Chapter 1 and its presentation also highlights NATO's Building Integrity Policy and toolkit to effectively monitor and progress in this area both with donor nations and host PN's.

Mapping Tools and Methods to Maintain Good Running OE Assessments. There are many factors that determine the success or failure of ICB and other SFA efforts in a given PN or region, and of course not all of them are under our control. Thus, the better we understand these factors (both within and outside our control), the more effectively and efficiently we can identify, and then effectively account, manage and ultimately navigate through and around them. Many of these factors include actors (individuals and groups) along with their goals, motivations, relationships and means.

Chapter 3 was authored and presented by a consultant to the COE from Germany with vast experience working peacekeeping operations throughout Africa and in South America. The chapter and presentation focused on mapping and presented many mapping models as means to understand local context to better enable SFA and ICB. The article does not intend to advocate any particular mapping tool (e.g., by function, conflict, group size), but to emphasize that there is a menu of tools and it is wise to develop and/or use tools that allow a running assessment of the OE and the various actors within it.

There are various ways to categorize local actors, their actions and motivations. One salient point is that Chapter 3 uses the Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats (SWOT) analysis as an example. SWOT analysis appears to be an internationally accepted method, is rather simple



A U.S. Army Soldier assigned to Task Force Orion, 27th Infantry Brigade Combat Team, New York Army National Guard, wears the Combat Training Center-Yavoriv Advisor patch above the 27th IBCT patch during the Joint Multinational Training Group-Ukraine Transfer of Authority ceremony in Grafenwoehr, Germany, August 8, 2022. (U.S. National Guard photo by Sgt. Spencer Rhodes)

and effective, known by the business world, and commonly used by the US State Department when developing Integrated Country Strategies for a given PN.

Panel discussion referenced the Human Terrain Teams (HTTs) used by US Forces approximately 10 years ago as a means of gaining a better dynamic understanding of a PN OE and its various actors. The US and international community does not prominently use HTTs anymore, but there is interest and the Center for Army Lessons Learned has a past HTT handbook that is potentially available for wider release.

JCISFA and the Army Capability Manager-SFA Brigade (ACM-SFAB) used the US Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) G2 simulation called 'Athena' at the last two SFAB Area of Responsibility (AOR) Table-Top Exercises (TTXs). It is another potentially viable 'OE mapping tool' to monitor and assess various leaders, actors and groups as their mood, mindset, and goals changes with conditions (e.g., could be valuable for conflict mapping). However, Athena is not yet confirmed to adequately measure PN willingness.

Yet another potential product aiding mapping is a TRADOC G2 China study that includes case studies describing their influence on a PN in every AOR minus US Northern Command. It assesses influence across all Political, Military, Economic, Social, Informational, Intelligence-Physical and Technological (PMESII-PT) factors, but also lists 24 other factors (some less under human control such as climate change) that can impact friendly or adversary forces in any OE.

It is useful to exchange all of these tools and products with each other as much as security and handling guidelines allow. The China study is publicly releasable. It is helpful to exchange tools and products on OE factors and they might impact PN willingness to develop and even lead missions. There are models being developed trying to measure and assess willingness. Beyond willingness, JCISFA, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency and NATO communities individually and collectively can use these tools to better assess and subsequently plan and execute ICB or other SFA with PNs in any AOR.

Optimizing Advisor Training. Advisor Training is a common subject and much effort and dialogue is devoted to it. There seems to be a lack of synchronization and coordination between the many advisor training efforts and opinions on the subject. Perhaps a body should be appointed and convene to agree on a relatively small core of people to synthesis the content (and associated opinions) on these disparate efforts, to:

- 1) select the best of the best (identify best practices);
- 2) codify common factors and trends;
- 3) identify agreeable gaps and/or needs for improvement;
- 4) and prioritize the application and spread of best practices with solutions to resolve improvement issues and monitor progress.

'Optimizing' advisor training describes the enduring purpose of such an effort, and the lessons learned (LL) community could possibly take on this task.

Here are a few salient points and highlights from Chapter 4 of the handbook and the author's presentation of it (the author also served as the lead editor for the entire book). The author has been a leading figure in advisor and security assistance training for over 15 years with the US (to include the MoDA program and SIGAR), NATO and other organizations.

- Sections 6 and 7 of Chapter 4 list and describe several 'principles, skills and tools' for effective advisor training. Taken together, these three factors could be labeled 'Advisor Attributes' (although terms get mixed as Section 7 lists attributes as an example of an advisor tool). Advisor attributes are often talked about and codified, and some organizations (such as the US SFA Command (SFAC)) might invest great energy and focus on attributes during advisor recruitment, accessions, and training. However, the SFA Enterprise might benefit by agreeing to some framework for advisor attributes (perhaps with slight variances by type of advisor or advisor role). The SFA Enterprise could use this framework to more effectively and efficiently recruit, access, train, employ and retain advisors and advisor teams.
- As part of an overarching theme across the handbook, 'mapping' once again appears; this time as the most prominent example of advisor tools. Section 8.2 of Chapter 4 highlights the importance of understanding gender in advising (and the 'Women Peace and Security (WPS)' field is increasingly finding that effective gender support networks must better understand males in the populous as well as females).
- A final highlight in Section 10, is that a facilitator approach to advisor training might prove the most effective, as exemplified during the first day of the COE's Advisor Enhancement Seminar on the following day.

Capacity Building Planning Tips. Most small advisor effort and SFA planning and execution steps are iterative (e.g., running estimates, assessments etc.).



U.S. Soldiers and NATO Allies participate in the Command & General Staff Officers Course Common Core at Grafenwoehr, Germany, July 21, 2022.
(U.S. Army Photo by Cpl. Austin Riel)

Chapter 5 and its author described a program called Capability Building Activity (CBA) planning that more deliberately ties these steps together in a cycle with phases. Though much of CBA planning is related to commonly known aspects of Operational Design and forming Lines of Effort, there are several salient points from the chapter and its presentation worth noting.

- In conjunction with Phase 4 (Task Development) of the CBA planning model, performing activities well and even performing worthy activities still might not have enduring usefulness, if not tied to useful end states with clear measures of effectiveness (MoEs). Thus, planners must establish quality end states with accurate and relevant MoEs early in the planning process, and ideally in conjunction with the PN.
- Phase 5 addressed a recurring theme in the handbook- Assessments. Beyond emphasizing that assessments are important, the author emphasized the importance of *choosing what you decide to assess*. That which is chosen to assess is often what is later valued (ideally by senior leaders). This point relates to the vital point in Chapter 6 on choosing the right items to monitor. Conducting baseline assessments of the PN and *with* the PN are of course important and communicating with 'brutal honesty' to some PNs might present an obstacle (this can even be an obstacle within the US system).

- Phase 6 emphasizes that when reporting, bear in mind that ‘no plan survives (fully intact) initial contact’ with the OE (as in the tactical world with enemy forces). Thus, adaptation, flexibility and change management are key and if you have no advance plan to manage change, you likely will not stay close to on course over time.



A member of the 169th Cyber Protection Team and members of the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina conduct cyber adversarial exercises at the Pvt. Henry Costin Readiness Center in Laurel, Maryland, on June 29, 2022. (U.S. Army National Guard photo by Sgt. Tom Lamb)

Accurate Long-Term Monitoring, Evaluation and Reporting are Critical. Chapter 6 and its presentation are a very hard-hitting piece on Monitoring and Evaluating SFA. The most salient point of the chapter’s title is that it focuses on tracking success and failure. If one is not willing to also track (and evaluate and report) failure, regardless of the reasons, the results of such sub-standard reporting can lead to wider long-term mission failures.

The author worked for the SIGAR for quite some time. SIGAR is an independent organization that answers to no singular US Government (USG) agency and reports to the National Command Authority. SIGAR and the author generally pull no punches in pointing out SFA weaknesses in Afghanistan. SIGAR’s 2019 book titled, ‘Divided Responsibility’ asserted a weakness that there was a patchwork of programs but no one USG entity and person ultimately responsible for US and international developmental activity in Afghanistan.

The author boldly asserts that US commanders on the ground, often motivated by measuring their own success over a one-year period (inputs and outputs), missed the mark on overall outcomes (see Section 2 of this chapter). He further asserts in Section 3 that evaluations need to be independent, and perhaps most importantly as stated in Section 4, long term.

The stark example he gave from Afghanistan is that commanders reported decreases in the number of US airstrikes over time and associated increases in Afghan Air Force strikes. While these results might well have been accurate short-term successes, *they were not appropriate* long-term indicators and did not accurately predict Afghan ability after US withdrawal and without US direct support. Specifically, they failed to *compare Afghan airstrike numbers with US airstrike numbers over similar times periods*, and further, did not measure or value the number or quality of any Afghan-led strikes with limited or no US support. This failure to monitor and report the *right long-term metrics and indicators*, led to faulty conclusions and ultimate results upon withdrawal that can only be seen as avoidable surprises and adverse failures.

**Like others at this event, this author is committed to help avoid repeating the same kind of SFA mistakes from the Balkans, Afghanistan, and now Ukraine. JCISFA will continue collaboration with him and the group towards this common goal. JCISFA will take a lessons learned (L2) angle with the SIGAR L2 team- to include focusing on the issue of ‘divided responsibility’.*

Insights on Whole of Government SFA. The author from the State Department’s Political-Military (Pol-Mil) Affairs Bureau delivered a much-anticipated presentation on Chapter 7 of the handbook, “A USG Approach to Building Institutional Capacity through Strategic Advising.” Much anticipated as the content is central to JCISFA’s objectives to help integrate ICB and contribute to whole of government (WoG) competition. Accordingly, this is the chapter that the COE offered JCISFA to peer review. This chapter specifically helps inform JCISFA’s emerging SFA and

ICB study, model, and future experimentation as it pursues WoG SFA as well as ICB and competition. JCISFA helped the enterprise achieve a measure of WoG SFA through the last two SFAB TTXs (working with the State Department). However, hearing directly from the Pol-Mil Bureau through this handbook and panel as to how they tackle ICB, provides insight and leads to deeper lessons as to how the enterprise can better integrate SFA between the Department of State (DoS), the Department of Defense, and other government agencies.

- Like in other chapters, this author emphasized connecting capacity building with the donor and the PN early in the process. Nothing should really be developed, or attempted to be developed, in a vacuum. Section 3 of this chapter describes the heart of ICB as the key to sustainable security- much to the author's point in Chapter 6 that without longer term monitoring and reporting, we might be fooling ourselves as to predicting overall success and making quality decisions based on those predictions.
- The author addressed specific DoS programs, such as the Security Governance Initiative (SGI), which per footnote 187 has some roots in Presidential Policy Directive (PPD)-23 from the Obama administration in 2013. Section 4 continues that the SGI produced lessons that led to another program- the Global Defense Readiness Program (GDRP). The GDRP complements the MoDA program referenced in the Advisor Training section above.
- Much of the remainder of the chapter describes various facets of the GDRP. As noted in subsection 4.5.2 and Figure 1, the Country Action Plan (CAP) is a bi-lateral or multi-lateral tool that values close PN engagement at every step. The CAP very closely resembles what those in US European Command (EUCOM) accomplished with the Republic of Georgia (see 17th edition of JCISFA's SFA newsletter from December 2020 for an article on Georgia's program). The 'Roadmap to Success' portion of



Armed Forces of Ukraine soldiers work on the engine of an M109 self-propelled howitzer as part of a maintenance training course at Grafenwoehr Training Area, Germany, May 25, 2022. The training is provided by Norway and the US as part of their respective country's security assistance package. (U.S. Army photo by Spc. Nicko K. Bryant Jr., 7th Army Training Command Combat Camera)

Figure 1 closely resembles what was done in Georgia, as does sub-section 5.2 emphasis on maintaining partner engagement (JCISFA can provide this article and accompanying quarterly forum presentation).

- Other parts of Chapter 7 cross-reference well with other parts of the handbook:
 - 1) Preparing Advisors for Deployment in Sub-Section 4.4 and Building a Community of Strategic Advisors in Sub-Section 5.1 both relate to Chapter 4;
 - 2) Learning Through Data, Monitoring and Evaluation relates to many other parts of the handbook, but mostly notably to Chapter 6.

The chapter 7 author stated that the Pol-Mil Bureau collaborated with the US 2nd SFAB, through AFRICOM. As JCISFA becomes more closely involved at regional and country level (notably in the EUCOM and AFRICOM AORs), it welcomes the enterprise to closely review and learn from these relationships together. Additionally, JCISFA encourages the enterprise to join its continued collaboration with the Pol-Mil Bureau and other authors on this chapter's salient subjects and discuss how they mutually support each other.

Way-Ahead – Leveraging Handbook and Panel Content

JCISFA will post this handbook, the panel video-link, and this article to the Joint Lessons Learned Information System (JLLIS) and place it in an appropriate binder. Through JLLIS and other media, to include its 4th Quarter SFA Forum, JCISFA will invite the SFA-related community of interest (CoI) to post observations, comments, and related products. As discussion on this article's (and additional) topics develop, we may increase the potential for SFA-related issues to identify and resolve, as well as apply best practices to other OE conditions.

The orange boxes with italics above describe JCISFA's primary follow-up efforts and objectives. The vast majority of these follow-up items derived from side bar conversations in between presentations, group panel discussion, or collaboration immediately after the event or during the social mixer bridging into the following day's opening of the COE's Advisor Enhancement Seminar. Some members participated in both the Advisor Enhancement Seminar and handbook panel and are already part of application and follow-up action.

Among those are select members of the US 2d SFAB, 4th SFAB, and the 3d-353rd Advisor Training Battalion. International members include SFA practitioners from the United Kingdom and many parts of the NATO SFA COE. Some members will directly participate in African Lion 23 (that JCISFA will again participate in), and others are directly involved with EUCOM-AOR and Ukraine activities, ICW the SFAC and 3d-353rd who helps train the SFABs and others.

Many of these topics (e.g., Advisor Attributes and Advisor Training) cut across all geographical AORs. Regardless of which AOR(s) you might be focused on, stay tuned as JCISFA posts this article and related products in JLLIS. Accordingly, feel free to join the 4th Quarter SFA forum, and promote dialogue, increase the body of knowledge, and consistently improve SFA and its related fields.

Panel members offered consulting support and continuing collaboration in a unified effort to not repeat some of the same miscues and shortfalls from the Balkans and Afghanistan in Ukraine.

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The book presentation, moderated by the two co-editors, Major Ludovica Glorioso, Legal Advisor of the NATO SFA COE and Nadia Gerspacher, Senior Expert in the sector, was divided into two modules. During the first session, the authors presented their chapter and provided further insights for analysis; in the following session, the authors facilitated discussion on some issues relating to the processes of defining policies and advising programs in crisis areas. (Photo courtesy of NATO SFA COE, 11 Jul 2022)



United States Space Force and Security Force Assistance

Standing up the Regional Space Advisor Program

by Major Eric K. Wagner, United States Space Force

As the words “multi-domain operations” increase the vocabulary of truly “purple” joint warfighters and U.S. Space Guardians take their place at that table, the understanding of how pivotal space has become to modern warfare and protecting our way of life grows. The importance of space based technologies, and the physical space they operate in, should be readily apparent to everyone who lived through the COVID-19 pandemic. Video conferencing with work teammates and family, up to the minute news alerts and information, contactless payments for services, and front door delivery of goods produced far from your immediate neighborhood rely on assets in the space domain that support our economy and society. The pandemic crisis would have looked a lot different if we were living with the technology of the 1980’s; reading daily newspapers and mailing letters and checks.

Our future adversaries easily see American advantages created through satellite communications, GPS timing and positioning, and a host of other space based capabilities. They identify space assets as a source of national strength and a center of gravity supporting our national interests that must be protected. Protecting the space domain is what Guardians are organized to do, and many of the ways we do it include augmenting the capabilities of our land, sea, and air warfighting partners.

Recognizing the Department of Defense as a global pace setter in establishing and maintaining strong national defense capabilities, many other nations measure their own national space efforts against ours. These nations, with both developed and developing economies, certainly take notice of the DoD’s consolidation and improvement of space defense capabilities that come with the stand-up of both the Space Force as a Service and Space Command as a dedicated Combatant Command.

As the cost of entry to the space domain continues to decrease with technological advancement, more nations are choosing this route to enhance their own economies and societies. They’re starting to realize the need and burden to protect the space-based assets making this prosperity possible. Our global partners and allies now routinely approach Guardians for advice and input as they initiate similar reorganizations to stand up space units, cadre, and capability. Headquarters US Space Force (HQ USSF) created the Global Partnerships Directorate (S5P) in their planning staff as the focal point to support and integrate our allies and partners on this journey.

Security Force Assistance (SFA) is one of the primary means S5P is examining to meet the Service’s Title 10 Security Cooperation responsibilities to support the Combatant Commands. This often gets us some confused looks outside the joint warfighting community, particularly from those unfamiliar with Title 10 authorities and international cooperation activities. Confusion is certainly apparent among the



U.S. Army Gen. James Dickinson, U.S. Space Command commander, speaks with Lt. Gen. Stephane Mille, Chief of Joint Operations, French Armed Forces, April 8, 2022, at USSPACECOM headquarters at Peterson Space Force Base, Colo. While at USSPACECOM, Mille and Dickinson discussed cooperation programs and common goals between partner space-faring nations. USSPACECOM conducts operations in, from, and to space to deter conflict, and if necessary, defeat aggression, deliver space combat power for the Joint and Combined force, and defend U.S. vital interests. (U.S. Space Command photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class John Philip Wagner, Jr)

USSF and Security Force Assistance Continued...

many people accustomed to regarding SFA through a purely tactical lens, who can only picture “advisors” as those who engaged in roughly 20 years of combat in Afghanistan and Iraq. Others who understand the intent, purpose, and legislation behind Security Force Assistance programs, however, understand that SFA is unique in that it permits activities to support the capacity and capability development of foreign security forces at all levels – from the tactical to the ministerial. SFA authorizes the DoD to support national level efforts and reorganizations required for a foreign partner to meet our shared national security objectives. S5P’s interaction with foreign partners to date clearly shows us that not every nation is following the U.S. model to support and defend the space domain. It is not uncommon to see space support for foreign militaries originate and exist in a civilian space or intelligence agency. Thankfully, SFA allows the DoD to engage foreign partners with “whole of government” solutions and provides the Space Force multiple avenues to help them develop interoperable capabilities. SFA programs will be critical for the USSF as we engage foreign space institutions, at all levels of government, involved in protecting the space domain and providing space effects. This is especially true when working with their supporting non-military organizations. Indeed, for the USSF to meet our national security obligations as members of the joint force SFA is a must.




Trainers and Students of the Space Executive Course, May 2022, with the author 2nd from the right on the back row. The course educated senior leaders of the Royal Saudi Air Force in space operations as part of their initial efforts to become the Royal Saudi Air and Space Force. (Photo courtesy of the Author)

Now the question is: What will SFA look like for the United States Space Force?

Even though my primary career track is space operations, I am a rarity within the Space Force. My own professional experience taught me the value, and comprehensive impact, of SFA firsthand. Before my transfer to the USSF, I served over four years with special operations units, saw several combat deployments, and qualified as a Foreign Area Officer with duties at multiple Embassies. Consequently, the Space Force picked me to develop a framework for its recently authorized Regional Space Advisor (RSA) program. The RSA program will create a cadre of Guardians deliberately developed to enhance USSF capabilities, evolve and expand partnerships to strengthen relationships, secure common interests, and promote shared values in space.

There are already many existing positions in the USSF that deal with security cooperation; however, there is no reliable way of selecting space personnel with any type of security cooperation background prior to filling these positions and taskings. This is why we are currently tailoring the RSA program to train a small number of Guardians not only in applicable space programs and policies, but also in understanding political-military environments. Once the program further arms them with education in regional and cultural considerations, the advisors will assist the security forces and institutions of space faring allies and partners. RSAs will understand the Service’s obligations through the Theater Security Cooperation Process and support the Combatant Commands by performing the required security cooperation roles from project planning to execution. USSF will regionally align them with Combatant Commands to aid the RSAs in understanding their operating environments, and develop extensive knowledge of the foreign organizations and capabilities the Space Force will partner with in each geographic combatant command (GCC) area of responsibility. Most importantly, RSAs will understand and know the operational environment to a degree that is fundamental to security cooperation, and essential to SFA.



USSF and Security Force Assistance Continued...



U.S. Space Force Tech. Sgt. Alexander Hamilton (center), the lead range technician for 25th Space Range Squadron, in support of U.S. Space Command, sets up a communications satellite with his Australian counterparts July 15 at Lavarack Barracks in Queensland, Australia, during Exercise Talisman Sabre 21.
(U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Jen S. Martinez)

We expect RSAs to serve as subject matter experts that incorporate space into GCC Theater Security Cooperation Plans and ensure that partner nations can also fight in “multi-domain operations.” As the Service’s security cooperation professionals, they should be ideally suited to plan and execute SFA activities and incorporate this program as a line of effort when building interoperability with other nations. Unfortunately, the USSF is a very small organization so there will be no dedicated units to conduct SFA engagements. However, the USSF can achieve the goal of training a workforce in existing, key billets ready to answer TDY taskings supporting SFA activities.

This is where USSF also needs the help of the SFA community. As Joint warfighters who routinely address “whole of government” partners to build foreign capacity, you need to request the inclusion of space into your SFA activities. As other nations acknowledge and develop plans to address “multi-domain operations,” the SFA community can, and should, request USSF to support exercises and events that enable other nations to pursue similar models of force integration, and embrace the importance of protecting the space domain and space effects. While I know SFA community members are resourceful and can make the best of

it alone, it is always better to have specifically trained individuals to help out. The Global Partnerships Directorate (S5P) is currently your best place to start organizing that effort. As the RSA program stands up, the USSF will be able to respond to your needs by tasking small teams of specialized Guardian RSAs to support your exercises with space capabilities.

You can contact S5P at
hqsf.ussf.s5p@us.af.mil
to start the discussion.

Article Approved for Public Release by JS J7 PAO



The United Launch Alliance Delta IV rocket carrying the ninth Wideband Global Satellite Communication satellite is released from the Mobile Service Tower and is prepared for launch March 18, 2017, at Cape Canaveral Air Force Station, Fla. This mission is the 35th launch of the Delta IV since its inaugural launch in 2002. Painted on the rocket are tributes to the international partners, United Launch Alliance, and the official logo of the U.S. Air Force’s 70th anniversary.
(U.S. Air Force photo by Airman Holden S. Faul)



NATO SFA Centre of Excellence

Courses and Publications

NATO SFA Centre of Excellence has courses available. [Link to NATO SFA Courses \(click here\)](#)

ETOC Code: MCP-CM-2556 Security Force Assistance Operators Course

This course aims to improve the competency and the effectiveness of SFA operators working in current and future missions related to security capacity building.

ETOC Code: MCP-CM-36713 Institutional Adviser Course

The course contributes to meeting the need for sustained and standardized professional development of Allied and Partner military and civilian personnel to conduct stability activities. Advanced tenets of institutional advising are integrated into the course education curriculum.

Both courses are designed as blended learning with on-line and in residence portions.



Security Force Assistance Operators Course
3 - 7 October 2022
15 - 19 May 2023



Institutional Adviser Course
14-18 November 2022
18 - 22 September 2023



JCISFA

Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance

Joint Staff | Army | Navy | Marines | Air Force | Space Force

JCISFA Community has SFA courses available through Joint Knowledge Online (JKO). [Link to JCISFA SFA Courses \(click here\)](#)

Be sure to check out the courses in JCISFA's SFA JKO Series:

J3OP-US1398 SFA Considerations for Campaign Planning

This course offers ways to implement SFA as part of campaign planning, execution, and assessment. It is tailored for key leaders within organizations that plan and execute SC at the operational level.

J3OP-US1399: Building Allied and Partner Security Institutions – Advanced

The focus of this course is building allied and partner defense institutions through SFA with an emphasis on FSF functions, core processes, and SFA developmental tasks.



SFA Topics Online

To communicate with our SFA subject matter experts, we provide ways to submit a request for information (RFI) through various JCISFA information sites.


You may use an RFI, not only to request more information about Security Force Assistance, but also to provide feedback and recommendations on content or suggest topics for future editions of this newsletter.

For email, go to our website through the Joint Staff (<https://www.jcs.mil/Directorates/J7-Joint-Force-Development/JCISFA>) and click the email link at the bottom. Via the web, use any of our social media sites or through the Chairman's Joint Lessons Learned Information System (JLLIS).

To join our Community of Interest on Microsoft Teams, open Teams, select the "Teams" button on the left, and type "J7JCISFA Col" in the "Join or create a team" field at the bottom. Someone from JCISFA will add you to the members.

JCISFA Social Media

JCISFA's presence on social media platforms, Facebook and Twitter, allows you to stay in touch with the latest JCISFA news. "Like" our Facebook page at <https://www.facebook.com/JCISFA> and follow us on Twitter at <https://twitter.com/JCISFA>. You can also find us on milSuite at <https://www.milsuite.mil/>.



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