

# Security Force Assistance Quarterly



## Recent Best Practices in Partner Assessments and Engagements

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*Cover Photo Credit:*

*Utilitiesman 3rd Class Gilbert Barahona, assigned to Naval Mobile Construction Battalion (NMCB) 11, vibrates concrete to achieve proper consolidation with a Georgian counterpart for the Railhead Project in Poti, Georgia, Oct. 13, 2022. NMCB-11 is forward-deployed to execute construction, humanitarian assistance, and theater security cooperation in the U.S. Naval Forces Europe and Seventh Fleet areas of operation.  
(U.S. Navy photo by Builder Constructionman Gabriella Coupe)*

## **Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance (JCISFA) Mission:**

JCISFA supports the integration of Security Force Assistance (SFA) activities into the current and future Joint Force to support Globally Integrated Operations. JCISFA enables the development of SFA doctrine, training, and education of the Joint Force to conduct partner nation capacity-building. JCISFA supports SFA-related strategy formulation, policy and guidance development and support to joint exercises.

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The purpose of this quarterly newsletter is to inform the SFA Community of Interest (Col), highlight the greater Col efforts, and foster Col interoperability. Sharing JCISFA's efforts will help inform the Col of the many ways JCISFA can be leveraged.

In addition to Chairman's Joint Lessons Learned Information System (JLLIS), this newsletter serves as a forum for the Col to submit Observations and Recommendations or other articles of interest regarding their respective SFA efforts. As a service to the Joint Force, this newsletter promotes dialogue among the SFA Col that is dispersed across various countries, Interagency, Joint and Service organizations.

Again, this SFA newsletter encourages dialogue. It is part of an ongoing effort to more effectively "Communicate, Cooperate, and Coordinate" across the Joint Force with all SFA stakeholders. Please let us know if you would like to submit an article or if there are any topics of interest for future editions.

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# From the Director's Desk

It's my pleasure to introduce the 26th edition of JCISFA's Quarterly SFA Newsletter.

This edition showcases our continued efforts to build and strengthen partnerships across the Security Cooperation Enterprise with analysis of contemporary observations, challenges, and best practices from SFA planners and practitioners.

This edition features two articles by US Air Force Air Advisors. The 571st Mobility Support Advisory Squadron discusses recent missions advising partners in South America and the 435th Contingency Response Support Squadron coauthors with JCISFA to provide salient principles for engaging partner nations based on recent experience advising the Ukrainian Air Force. The authors show why a 'one-size-fits-all' mindset doesn't work for SFA and highlight the importance of understanding partners' capabilities, experience, and needs for tactical advisors to have strategic effects.

Officers from JCISFA and US Army SFA Command analyze the latest National Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy, and National Defense Authorization Act. The authors highlight significant changes in policy and strategy with implications for the security cooperation enterprise.

The Center for Army Lessons Learned introduces their recently published Security Force Assistance Primer that seeks to address perceived knowledge gaps among SFA planners and practitioners, and to highlight existing shortfalls in policy, doctrine, and resourcing for SFA activities.

Defense Security Cooperation Agency partners with a JCISFA analyst using a case study on US assistance to Lebanon to highlight the importance of capability assessments and gap analysis when planning security cooperation activities.

A member of the British Army presents a wargaming tool from the UK's Outreach Group. The 'Integrity Game' features whole-of-government and multi-national considerations to achieve regional stability and is a useful addition to the security cooperation planner's toolkit.

As always, we welcome your feedback and invite you to join us virtually in March to discuss these articles and more during our quarterly SFA Forum. We also welcome your thoughts, ideas, and article submissions for future editions of the SFA Quarterly Newsletter.

JOSEPH E. (Ed) WILLIAMS  
Colonel, U.S. Army  
Director





SSgt. Chinna explains the significance of warehouse storage and inventory of hazardous chemicals.  
(U.S. Air Force Photo by TSgt. Bruno Carrerio courtesy of 571 MSAS)

# 571 MSAS Air Advisors: Tactical Actors on a Strategic

by Capt. Dylan A. Lenoir, Air Advisor

**T**he 2022 National Defense Strategy (NDS) sets forth how the US Military will face future threats to the US National security and to a stable and open international system.

To achieve these priorities, the NDS establishes three lines of efforts: integrated deterrence, campaigning, and building enduring advantage. The 571st Mobility Support Advisory Squadron (MSAS) focuses on integrated deterrence through Security Force Assistance with its primary area of responsibility being US Southern Command (Central America, the Caribbean, and South America).

The 571 MSAS is composed of approximately 70 competitively-selected Air Advisors from over 33 different Air Force Specialties. The main mission of

this unique unit is to provide Geographic Combatant Commanders with specially trained teams designed to Assess, Train, Advise, Assist, Accompany, and Equip partner nation air components. The 571 MSAS builds regional security through sustained engagement in order to deter adversaries, preserve stability, and support allies and partners, while supporting joint and inter-agency efforts addressing common security challenges.

Air Advisors at the MSAS tactical level implement ongoing Security Force Assistance (SFA) programs for the development of Partner Nation Foreign Security Forces. Air Advising may occur within the Security Assistance (SA) construct, such as conducting training as part of a Foreign Military Sales case-funded Mobile Training Team (MTT), or even by supporting global peacekeeping operations.



Members from Peru's Grupo 42 and 571 MSAS after a closing ceremony.  
(U.S. Air Force Photo by TSgt. Anthony Garcia courtesy of 571 MSAS)



Fiscal Year 2022 was the 571 MSAS's busiest Air Advising season yet since its inception in 2011: 25 MTT missions in 13 different countries. While each training event is unique and aims to accomplish different objectives, the MSAS maintains the highest level of standards assuring that each deployment meets commander and Partner Nation needs.

A typical MSAS MTT consists of a Mission Commander (officer in charge), Team Sergeant (senior enlisted member), and subject matter experts that range multiple specialties as dictated by the mission. The duration of these engagements varies based on requirements but typically is two to four weeks long. During this time Air Advisors accomplish their six core functions (Assess, Train, Advise, Assist, Accompany, and Equip) with partner nations but also create stronger alliances and build relationships that help ensure the United States' unrivaled network of allies and partners.

From 22 August to 8 September 2022, eight Air Advisors from the 571 MSAS advised members from La Fuerza Aerea Peruana (FAP) in a historic

visit to 'Base Aerea Coronel Francisco Secada Vignetta' Air Base in Peru. The objective was to assess, train, and develop members from Grupo Aereo Number 42 on supporting operations for their DHC-6 Twin Otter aircraft.

The purpose of this mission was to showcase Peruvian Armed Forces interoperability with the US Air Force and enhance Grupo N. 42's operational ability to conduct rapid response missions in the Amazon region.

This mission highlighted the first time Air Advisors from the US Air Force engaged with Peru's Air Force in Iquitos, Peru. Despite this being a first, the quick cohesion and bond that was established made it seem as if this was a routine visit.

During this 17-day engagement, MSAS Air Advisors trained 36 Peruvian officers and enlisted members on Aerial Port Operations, Cargo Load Planning, Supply, and Aircraft Maintenance through classroom instruction, hands-on training, and multiple exercises in order to sharpen the capabilities of the FAP for





Flight crew pose in front of the C-208 after flying a sortie.  
 From left to right: Capt Jara of la Fuerza Aerea Peruana (FAP), Lt Col Shea (571 MSAS),  
 Lt Col McClintock (571 MSAS), Capt Gomez (FAP).  
 (U.S. Air Force Photo by Technical Sgt. Gerame Vaden courtesy of 571 MSAS)

future real-world situations and global exercises. One of Grupo N.42's missions is Counter Threat Narcotics (CTN) in the *Valle de los Ríos Apurímac, Ene y Mantaro* (VRAEM) region. Grupo N. 42 utilize their aircraft to conduct Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) operations aimed at stemming the damaging flow of narcotics through this rural area of Peru.

Similar to Peru, Paraguay is another key South American partner nation. Strategically located in the heart of South America, Paraguay's waterways facilitate the transportation of goods with other Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR) countries. Paraguay is a smaller but influential nation when compared to its closest neighbors.

Unfortunately, Paraguay's location also makes it extremely vulnerable to illicit drug trafficking through its numerous porous river borders. Still, the US and Paraguay have a long history of cooperation and a strong partnership in efforts to combat illegal activity in the region.

The 571 MSAS completed its first-ever flying

engagement with a USSOUTHCOM Partner Nation at Silvio Pettrossi International Airport, Paraguay, from September 13-29 2022. Seven Air Advisors from the MSAS along with an augmentee from the 818 MSAS traveled to Paraguay to conduct flying training alongside Paraguayan Air Force pilots, career enlisted aviators, and maintainers.

A combination of 13 sorties totaling 28 flight hours was the highlight during the 2-week MTT. This training laid the groundwork to continue conducting these types of events in the future, not only in the USSOUTHCOM area of responsibility (AOR), but also across the international landscape in support of the SFA enterprise.

This initial engagement provided a great opportunity to test the aircrew's ability to communicate and train effectively and safely while serving as a testbed for future engagements with Partner Nations worldwide.

In addition to flying operations, maintenance Air Advisors validated an operational airworthiness

# 571 MSAS Air Advisors Continued...

assessment. This task confirmed the status of the aircraft to include the condition of Paraguayan maintenance facilities. Training and completion of scheduled maintenance was also further assessed.

The Paraguayans hosted a closing ceremony in which they expressed their gratitude and desire to conduct future flying operations alongside US forces.

Although the 571 MSAS is typically focused on USSOUTHCOM as its principal AOR, it is actively working in conjunction with the 818 MSAS and 36 Contingency Response Support Squadron to answer an emerging USINDOPACOM Air Advisor demand signal. Together, these US Air Force Air Advisor units are working to field competent Air Advisors to be

included in associated mission opportunities throughout this AOR. This will continue to enable partner nations to expand their capability and ensure continued relations with the US as the premier partner of choice.

**— SABER ES PODER —**

Article Approved for Public Release by JS J7 PAO

The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are those of the contributors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any other agency of the Federal Government.



From left to right: Capt Jara (FAP), Capt Bennett (818 MSAS); reviewing a checklist while flying a C-208 Caravan sortie.  
(U.S. Air Force Photo by Lt. Col. Robert Chance, courtesy of 571 MSAS)





Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III meets with Soldiers assigned to 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 1st Infantry Division and U.S. Army Europe and Africa's 7th Army Training Command supporting combined arms training of Ukrainian Armed Forces battalions in Grafenwoehr, Germany, Feb. 17, 2023. This week, the first Ukrainian battalion completed training on the M2 Bradley Fighting Vehicle, representing the continuation of a world-wide effort led by the U.S. and supported by more than 50 nations to help Ukraine defend itself from Russia's brutal and unprovoked war, which began nearly one year ago. (U.S. National Guard photo by Staff Sgt. Jordan Sivayavirojna)

# Recent Best Practices in Partner Assessments and Engagements

## Experience with Ukraine Yields Tips That Avoid Faulty Assumptions

by Jeffrey S. King, JCISFA Military Analyst and Master Sergeant Michael D. Jaeger, 435th Contingency Response Support Squadron Air Traffic Control Advisor

**W**e all make assumptions in life-in and outside of planning and conducting security force assistance (SFA).

We are often forced to make decisions and act on them with less than perfect information, or sometimes with very little to no reliable information at all. Assumptions are unavoidable and this article *does not* advocate attempting to totally avoid them.

### Avoiding Faulty Assumptions During SFA Planning and Execution

This article *does* advocate that when planning and executing SFA, practitioners should minimize

assumptions about partner nation (PN) security forces. Take great care to avoid assumptions as much as possible but when forced to make them, strengthen their validity with quality PN assessments. Quality PN assessments help ensure assumptions don't lead to poor or even disastrous results.

Quality PN assessments are not possible without corresponding PN engagements. Accordingly, JCISFA published several newsletter articles about PN assessment and engagement. Two of the more notable of these articles are noted at the end of this article (under 'Other Resources') and it might be worth referring to both articles while reading on here.

This article draws upon recent experiences with SFA planning and execution with Ukrainian Armed Forces



(UAF). JCISFA recently found that some US Forces do a great job consistently conducting quality two-way dialogue with the UAF. This quality dialogue appears to yield great results with the Ukrainian Army at the Grafenwöhr and Hohenfels Training Area (GTA and HTA, Germany). JCISFA plans to feature salient SFA points from this PN relationship in conjunction with the 7th Army Training Command and Joint Multi-National Training Group-Ukraine in the next newsletter.

The rest of this article adds best practice tips with similar lessons and insights drawn from the 435th Contingency Response Support Squadron's (CRSS) work with the Ukrainian Air Force. The 435th CRSS is at Ramstein Air Force Base, Germany and trains-advises PN air forces throughout the US Air Force Europe and Africa (USAFE-AF) area of responsibility (AOR). The 435th has an ongoing engagement with the Ukrainian Air Force, conducting two focused engagements in the summer of 2021 (pre-conflict) and the fall of 2022. Both engagements centered around developing knowledge of air traffic control (ATC) concepts; particularly during a contingency and in austere environments.



Members of the Ukrainian armed forces, left, inspect a light gun with U.S. Air Force Master Sgt. Michael Jaeger, 435th Contingency Response Support Squadron air traffic control air advisor, right, in the ATC tower during their visit to Ramstein Air Base, Germany, Aug. 5, 2021. (U.S. Air Force photo by Senior Airman John R. Wright)

In the first training engagement, the 435th provided basic fundamentals, while the more recent training engagement provided advanced ATC familiarization training. It focused on tactical-

level contingency operations and landing zone-safety officer fundamentals. This included details on airspace considerations to address before delivering aircraft, assets and supplies. The second engagement didn't require an interpreter making it more effective. This facilitated questions within the scope of training as well as on additional topics. An intended outcome is that the Ukrainian Air Force uses this training to refine tactics, techniques and procedures to be more effectively employed in combat. The entire engagement process also builds relationships and interoperability- two vital SFA by-products that are also part of security cooperation (SC).

What follows highlights and describes four salient principles regarding PN assessment and engagement, derived from the above multi-service sources:

- 'Avoid cookie cutters'- Estimate every PN individually by their own components
- 'Consider PN CNOC'- Capabilities, Needs, Outcomes, Challenges
- 'Tailor Using Bi-Lateral Tools'- Upgrade and Preserve PN capabilities and relationships
- 'Treat Cultural Context as a Constant'- 'It is all about Effectiveness'

Let us now explore each of these principles and their accompanying tips and tools in more detail. Upon reading, you will find that these principles are interconnect. They overlap by design and build on each other.

## **'Avoid cookie cutters'- Estimate every PN individually by their own components**

One of the worst assumptions that SFA planners and executors make is to assume that all PN's security forces are the same. The US often makes the mistake that 'transforming to the US way is the best way'. The 'US way' or model might (or might not) be best for the US, but that in no way means it will be the best way or model for the PN. Don't default to a US cookie cutter.

Similarly, the next PN security force is not the same as the previous one that US forces advised or assisted. History shows that Vietnamese security

forces are not the same as those in Korea, NATO, or in the Balkans. Afghanistan security forces are not the same as those in Iraq. The UAF are certainly not the same as any of the above and so it goes. Don't default to a convenient cookie cutter shaped like a previous effort.

PNs within Europe are not even the same. Assuming close similarity risks creating misunderstandings at the beginning of the PN relationship. Such misunderstandings form an incorrect azimuth that risk leading to miscommunication; both between the US and the PN, and within US SFA-conducting groups. The misunderstandings and miscommunications add on top of each other until we risk mission failure. At the very least they erode effectiveness.

**The US Army's 4th SFA Brigade (SFAB) does employ distinct advisor teams (ATs) to priority PNs as selected by US Army Europe-Africa (USAREUR-AF). This methodology does offer hope to reverse this trend of assuming close similarity, and tailor individual PN engagements and assessments appropriately.**

More specifically, underestimating a PN's capability can lead to detrimental consequences when conducting SFA. US and NATO trainers often underestimate UAF determination and desire to more rapidly progress to more complex capabilities (mainly regarding fire and maneuver with the Ukrainian Army). Of course, *overestimating* a PN capability (or will, or the root causes of such will) might be equally detrimental. Afghanistan might be a prime example of this. It is also important to consider that PN will and capability estimations understood well at the ground or base levels might not match those at higher echelons.

\*It is equally incumbent on US SFA practitioners to ensure common PN understanding internally (between echelons), as it is to optimize bi-lateral common understanding with the PN. Both are important and both require a sincere commitment from all involved parties.

**Component Approach: 'A Way'.** To make PN estimates easier to execute and coordinate, it might be wise to list some components (i.e., commonly relevant PN characteristics). Using a component breakdown approach may help avoid the pitfalls of assuming a US model or 'the last PN I worked with' faulty assumptions. It is worth noting however that a given PN *might have some or even many similarities* to the US or a past PN. Regardless, a component approach allows a discussion to determine results more objectively:

- Character of individuals: determination, will, motivation
- Training Level: can vary by type of skill, basic or specific functional area, leader skills, individual or collective by echelon, combined arms or joint (such as air-ground integration)
- Capabilities: this might sound generic, but capabilities, just like with our own National Guard and Reserve forces, might come from civilian occupations (past or present). Listen and watch while estimating and assessing; not from a closed-door room with US members only.
- Experience level: this is where context really matters. The UAF are in potentially existential conflict and have very unique experiences. Also, time is of the essence. *The UAF might best conduct select advanced training later on their own* (if force protection allows it).



Senior Airman Trent Sloat, 435th Contingency Response Wing air transportation journeyman, directs a forklift that is off loading a M777 howitzer from a C-17 Globemaster III in Eastern Europe, May 2, 2022.  
(U.S. Air Force photo by Staff Sgt. Shawn White)



**\*Tip.** ‘Don’t talk down’ to the PN, and talking down is easy to do without even realizing it. Some UAF have greater experience or more recent experience than the US (e.g., reacting to indirect fire). The same might be true with Air Traffic Control under certain austere conditions. The US might also learn from the PN, and this mutually leverages both parties, the relationship, and multi-national interoperability (MNI). Listen first and assess. Stick to what you know, and fill the PN’s blind spots, knowledge gaps or true needs, while at the same time filling some of your own. This methodology optimizes combined effectiveness.



Ukrainian military members listen to U.S. Air Force 603rd AOC airspace technicians at Ramstein Air Base, Germany, Sept. 15, 2022. Air advisors from the 435th Air Ground Operations Wing provided advanced air traffic control familiarization training to Ukrainian military members. The goal of the training was to build partner capacity and equip the Ukrainians with contingency training that they could use in their current, volatile state. (U.S. Air Force photo by Airman 1st Class Edgar Grimaldo)

## ‘Consider PN CNOC’- Capabilities, Needs, Outcomes, Challenges

‘CNOC’ is not an official acronym, but it is easy to pronounce and use in a way similar to conducting a SWOT (strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats) analysis. It might be useful to develop and display the four ‘CNOC elements’ in a quad chart like some routinely do for SWOT in the US Departments of State and Defense (DoS and DoD). When deciding what level of assistance to provide a PN in a SFA mission, it is important to look at the first three items together. Assess the existing capabilities against the country’s needed outcomes.

**Capabilities:** This might sound generic and redundant with the components in the above section, but in this context, take a more comprehensive look at PN capabilities. List them, with a focus on prioritizing them by which capabilities are most relevant to the desired PN role (in the case of Ukraine, their most current role of territorial defense, but over time this desired role might need to change).

**Needs:** Think of needs as requirements to fulfill the desired roles as described above. As in the previous section, the desired role should be bi-laterally determined. As in the 21st edition JCISFA article with WHINSEC, this should not be just ‘whatever the PN wants’, nor should it simply be roles the US unilaterally imposes on the PN. Ideally the desired PN role reflects the ‘concentric circle of common interests’ as taught in SC courses (ideally a commonly understood PN role might be present in an operational plan (OPLAN)).

**Outcomes:** The result when it all comes together. An accurate assessment of current capabilities compared against needs or requirements according to a desired role that is tied to an outcome. The resultant gap between current and desired capabilities should lead to a bi-laterally agreed upon plan (with a timeline) to close those gaps, with supporting plans to bi-laterally assess progress along the way. Some call this plan with timeline a ‘roadmap’ and when developing such a product, understand the PN’s current skillset, training level (see capabilities and training level in the above section), and the resources they have access to. When considering such resources, also consider the PN’s institutional capacity to provide their own resources over time. Any gaps in this capacity should inform an accompanying institutional capacity building plan.

**Challenges:** Last but not least, it is important to recognize the specific challenges that each PN faces; especially those not common in the ‘western world’. For the UAF, the obvious challenge is that they are facing a historical and existential threat from a ruthless enemy that does not value civilian life nor the lives of its own military members. Facing such an enemy might require an approach that accepts more

risk in training and that does not match methods in the western world. Effective SFA at least takes these factors into account. Other specific challenges include using artillery equipment from many different nations, with ammunition that might vary in caliber, and other more subtle nuances. The effects on training and operational techniques, re-supply, maintenance and repair are many. Reacting to indirect fire might be different, as might air traffic control techniques in austere conditions, and fighting an enemy while teaming with one's civil population.

\*These challenges might and probably will change over time, so perhaps the #1 attribute of the SFA operator and advisor, especially during crisis and conflict, is the required 'agile and adaptive mindset', to truly bring bi-lateral PN running estimates and assessments to the graduate level they deserve.



U.S. Air Force Airmen assigned to the 1st Communications Maintenance Squadron demonstrate fiber cable splicing for members of the Ukrainian armed forces during their visit to Kapaun Air Station, Germany, Aug. 4, 2021.  
(U.S. Air Force photo by Senior Airman John R. Wright)

## **'Tailor Using Bi-Lateral Tools'- Upgrade and Preserve PN capabilities and relationships**

When planning and executing SFA, it is also necessary to ensure that the delivered assistance is tailored to the PN's integrated country strategies and developed roadmaps. Note that this is *not* saying tailor to *our* US integrated country strategies (ICS), which are formal documents from

our DoS embassies. Surely consider US ICSs in SFA, but ultimately tailor SFA towards the PN's version of such a strategy. Of course we must consider US interests, but if the PN's strategy is neglected, SFA results will probably be short lived. The PN will probably not well sustain them (if at all), and when our presence diminishes or leaves altogether (as in the case of Afghanistan and other PNs), previous results are jeopardized.

Preferably develop a bi-lateral roadmap and maintain it bi-laterally. Use bi-lateral assessments of the roadmap to gauge and adjust PN progress and resultant US-coalition commitment. See the 'Other Resources' section at the end of this article for separate detailed positive examples between the US and Republic of Georgia and Mexico respectively.

Such flexibility and bi-lateral approaches and mindsets foster an open-minded view of SFA delivery not bound by static and predetermined unilateral approaches. Such deliverable means could include any combination of providing training materials, advisory services, or equipment. Regardless of the deliverables and means, it is important to ensure that the assistance provided is designed to enhance the country's military capabilities and not degrade them. This includes an end-state that does not destroy or damage-erode previous US relationships with the PN.

**\*Tip.** Consulting past US and PN individual and bi-lateral strategies and roadmaps helps ensure longer term PN buy-in and relationships, but the products themselves also automatically provide a form of continuity within US efforts. This alone is critical, as the rate at which US personnel change station is so rapid such that continuity is a chronic challenge. Embrace any tools that mitigate this challenge.

## **'Treat Cultural Context as a Constant' - It is all about Effectiveness'**

Last but certainly not least, it is very important to recognize the cultural context in which SFA missions execute. *Military culture* is a huge component of overall culture, but unfortunately we often limit our



focus to the more obvious and convenient areas of overall societal culture and customs. Military experience is part of overall context while assessing a PN. The UAF is facing a ruthless enemy that poses an existential threat. They have recent experience in conflict, face unique conditions, and feel the urgency of time in ways largely foreign to US and other NATO nations attempting to deliver SFA. To not understand, accept and adjust SFA delivery to account for this uniqueness is unwise and sure to erode effectiveness. Taken further, the UAF might view risk differently during training. This can include the willingness to risk casualties as a tradeoff for more realistic training that might reduce casualties later.

**\*Tip.** Military cultural understanding can flow both ways. For example, training at GTA and HTA might involve certain restrictions imposed by the host nation (Germany). The UAF might need to develop some of their own military cultural understanding. Restrictions limit realism. Sometimes accepting less than perfect solutions is necessary to optimize planning and training time, as well as SFA support. The overriding lesson here is to establish and maintain a healthy mutual dialogue on such matters to optimize effectiveness. However, the more the SFA provider and PN mutually accept the best result they can attain under the circumstances, the more effective the results.

Military culture can also evolve, and the UAF might be a prime example of this. As JCISFA's 25th edition (December 2022) pointed out in an article with the Canadian Armed Forces, select NATO nation engagement with the UAF over several years helped induce the UAF's divergence from a top-down command and control system. In fact, the UAF seems to now place more emphasis on developing squad, platoon and company level leadership than any other level. The flip side of this is that the old structural system provides battalion and even brigade size elements with little to no staff. Thus, it is hard to change structure and develop new command and control techniques both simultaneously and quickly. A continuing quality mutual dialogue between US SFA providers

and the UAF is the only way to successfully manage the mixture of such pressing changes under the current urgency of time. None of this emphasis on military culture suggests that it is not important to understand overall PN customs and norms. They are still important and understanding them *before*

**\*Recent observations show that with the Air Force and Army, the quality of dialogue between U.S. SFA providers and UAF is at levels not often seen. Although some of this might be due to the urgencies of crisis and conflict, it is worth a future deep dive into the details of this success and emerging best practice. A noble goal would be to apply enduring lessons from these successes, with context and conditions that can be applied to more steady-state SFA.**

engaging the PN is vital. This is still a critical part of understanding one's operating environment (OE). Achieving sufficient OE understanding is important to design the assistance in a way that is both respectful and effective. That said, military culture should be a focal point.

No amount of past experience, courses, classes, seminars, training and study *can substitute for the need to actively listen and exchange with the PN once SFA planning and execution has started*. The ability to listen, read and react to real-time realities with the PN is most important of all. The recent SFA experience with the UAF is proof of that.

**\*Tip.** Additionally, consider the country's capacity to absorb. We often overestimate this, but in the case with the UAF ability to conduct air traffic control in austere environments, react to fire, or fire and maneuver, we might be underestimating it. Astutely assess with open eyes objectively in either direction. Ask yourself, 'are we assessing correctly?'

### Recap and Way Ahead - Apply Success with the UAF to Steady-State SFA

This article expands upon principles from many good recent examples in which SFA planning and execution

# Partner Assessments and Engagements Continued...

with the UAF is working quite well. The common thread to this relative success is that some US Forces are doing a great job of ‘consistently listening to and communicating with the UAF’. This appears to be yielding great results with both the Ukrainian Army and Air Force. In essence, this two-way communication is assisting the US to maintain a more accurate and relevant PN assessment in real time, that avoids the faulty assumptions that erode effectiveness.



Army Sgt. Ryan Townsend, 841st Transportation Battalion operations hatch foreman, helps prepare a Bradley Fighting Vehicle for overseas transport Jan. 25, 2023, at the Transportation Core Dock in North Charleston, South Carolina. More than 60 Bradleys were shipped by U.S. Transportation Command as part of the U.S. military aid package to Ukraine. USTRANSCOM is a combatant command focused on projecting and sustaining military power at a time and place of the nation's choosing, advancing American interests around the globe.  
(U.S. Transportation Command photo by Oz Suguitan)

The following returns to the article's four overlapping PN assessment and engagement principles. With each are some suggestions to sustain and improve successes with the UAF, but also some final tips to apply these principles to SFA in other AORs and to steady-state operations (as well as crisis and conflict). Each SFA-providing nation and coalition should consider these principles and how to apply them to their own context and conditions:

- **‘Avoid cookie cutters’**- Estimate every PN individually using their own components: ‘Check your assumptions at the door’ regarding

how the PN might replicate the US or NATO forces. Follow the evidence, which might lead to some similarities for efficiency and MNI reasons. Consider a ‘component approach’ and the four suggested components (CNOG), but the key is to start with a list that is as objective as possible. Also consider that the PN might have some experiences and skills not only different to yours, but possibly better. Leverage these to improve that two-way dialogue and bolster trust.

- **‘Consider PN CNOG’**- Capabilities, Needs, Outcomes, Challenges: Consider making a quad chart, like a SWOT analysis, using the CNOG elements or make up your own. Regardless of what you call it, be flexible and adaptive to consider ‘challenges’ associated with the PN seeing things through a different cultural, historical, and experiential lens than yours. The PN might be adapting in real time, so account for that too.
- **‘Tailor Using Bi-Lateral Tools’**- Upgrade and Preserve PN capabilities and relationships: Find the PN's equivalent of an ICS, in whatever form that might be. Insist on a bi-lateral roadmap that accounts for that ICS-equivalent. Create regular touch points like with the Georgia and Mexico examples (see ‘Other Resources’) that establish and maintain the critical ‘quality mutual dialogue’ that we have observed between the US and UAF. Use the roadmap for internal US and coalition SFA continuity.
- **‘Cultural Context is a Constant’**- It is all about Effectiveness’: Don't neglect the more obvious cultural considerations. Study these ahead of time, but keep ‘military culture’ on the front of your dashboard. Over time, examine recent successful collaboration methods with the UAF and how to apply them to steady state SFA. Account for the PN's own desired and required changes, but don't be afraid to be brutally honest with the PN about *your own constraints* and how fast they can realistically transform. Open your mind to the possibility that PN absorption might exceed your estimations.



# Partner Assessments and Engagements Continued...

A prime intent or take-away for this article is that any U.S. combatant command (CCMD, including USEUCOM), can adapt and apply these principles, tips and tools *now*, to optimize the effectiveness of SFA outcomes with their most critical PNs, or *any* PN. More broadly, the MN SFA community can apply the same and compare notes on how best to conduct SFA bi-laterally and multi-laterally with each other. JCISFA invites all US CCMDs, most notably the USEUCOM and USINDOPACOM, and allies to consider how some of these article's insights and tips might be applied to steady-state SFA. The authors and others can provide further detail.

JCISFA will post this article to the Joint Lessons Learned Information System (JLLIS) and place it in its Ukraine binder. Another binder on PN engagement that includes some of the referenced articles might develop later. Through JLLIS and other media, to include JCISFA's SFA Forum, JCISFA will invite the SFA-related community of interest to post and discuss related observations, comments, and related products. This includes from and with SFA-providing allies working in OEs. Regardless of which AOR(s) you focused on, stay tuned as JCISFA posts this article and related products in JLLIS. Accordingly, feel free to join the 2d Quarter SFA forum, promote dialogue, increase the body of knowledge, and consistently improve SFA and related fields. Let's improve PN assessment and engagement in conflict, crisis, and steady state!

## Other Resources - Past SFA Quarterly Newsletter articles merging PN assessments with PN engagements

- Among the most notable of these is a 21st edition article (December 2021) with the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Assistance (WHINSEC). This article proposed that PN assessments, bi and multi-lateral engagements, and SFA planning skewed too far to 'just what the US wants' or 'only what the PN wants' and are both faulty. A real time, truly bi-lateral approach finds and maintains common interests and understanding.
- A 17th edition article (December 2020) with US European Command (USEUCOM) provided a solid example of such bi-lateral SFA planning with the Republic of Georgia through the Georgia Defense Readiness Program (GDRP). The article (and an accompanying presentation) describes how their bi-lateral roadmap was developed and maintained bi-laterally between the US and Republic of Georgia. It also describes how bi-lateral assessments of the roadmap gauged and adjusted GDRP progress and resultant types and levels of US commitment over time.
- US Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) also provides good examples of bi-lateral roadmaps and processes through its relationship with Mexico and the US-Mexico Bilateral Military Cooperation Roundtable process.

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The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are those of the contributors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any other agency of the Federal Government.



U.S. Marine Corps Cpl. Cooper Ulrich, a field artillery cannoneer with 1st Battalion, 11th Marine Regiment, 1st Marine Division, stows a tire in a crate for transportation on Camp Pendleton, California, April 20, 2022. The M777 howitzers and munitions are part of a Presidential Drawdown of security assistance to meet urgent Ukrainian needs. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Cpl. Mackenzie Binion)



Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III, Army Gen. Mark A. Milley, chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Mike McCord, Under Secretary of Defense (comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer, provide testimony at a House Armed Services Committee hearing on the fiscal 2023 defense budget request, 2118 Rayburn House Office Building, Washington, D.C. April 5, 2022. (DoD Photo by U.S. Air Force TSgt. Jack Sanders)

# Policy, Strategy & Partners:

## SFA Implications in the 2022 National Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy, and the 2023 National Defense Authorization Act

by MAJ Jacob Elders, JCISFA Military Analyst & MAJ James Micciche, Army SFAC G-5

**T**he White House and Department of Defense (DoD) released the updated National Security Strategy (NSS) and the National Defense Strategy (NDS) in October 2022. These documents serve as the “Ends” and “Ways” of the overall U.S. strategy by identifying vital national interests (ends) and describing how the instruments of national power will be employed to address challenges and achieve objectives (ways). Both documents view modern geopolitics through the lens of strategic competition, a contest between democratic and autocratic nations for international influence. Moreover, both strategies stress the importance of Allies and partners in campaigning to achieve integrated deterrence and prevail against contemporary strategic competitors.

In December 2022, Congress passed the James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2023. Through both funding and

authorities, the NDAA provides the resources (means) that operationalize America’s instruments of national power in support of national interests. The FY23 NDAA provides additional employment authorities and substantially increased funding for regional security cooperation (SC) programs, demonstrating legislative concurrence on the importance of Allies and partners in support of the America’s national security policy.

The following is a summary of aspects of the NSS, NDS and NDAA with implications for the SC and Security Force Assistance (SFA) Enterprise.

### 2022 National Security Strategy

The 2022 NSS shows a return to a foreign policy built primarily around the principles and concepts of liberalism in international relations theory. This is a marked departure from the 2017 NSS’ more realist



approach, and a return to the orthodox underlying principle of U.S. foreign policy since the fall of the USSR in 1991. The NSS emphasizes both working through and protecting/expanding the systems, structures, organizations, and alliances that maintain the current global order, and underscores the importance of incorporating Allies and partners across all defense activities.



German Minister of Defence Boris Pistorius, (left) U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III (middle) and Ukrainian Minister of Defence Oleksii Reznikov, (right) attend the Ukraine Defense Contact Group meeting at Ramstein Air Base, Germany, Jan. 20, 2023. The world leaders met to maintain close coordination between Allies and partners while continuously reviewing defense forces and making decisions regarding the movement of forces within Europe. (U.S. Air Force photo by Staff Sgt. Alexandra M. Longfellow)

With its emphasis on building, strengthening, and working through alliances and partnerships, the 2022 NSS highlights the significant role of SFA in national policy and strategy. SFA practitioners enable the Joint Force to “[use] and [apply] our power in combination with our Allies and partners who add significantly to our own strengths.”<sup>1</sup> Additionally, the NSS’ emphasis on both campaigning and integrated deterrence amplifies the need for Combatant Commands (CCMDs) to generate long-term SFA plans to maximize the effect of SFA across the competition continuum. SFA practitioners remain a major tool for the U.S. to maintain and improve its “unrivaled network of allies and partners [that] protects and advances our interests around the world—and is the envy of our adversaries.”<sup>2</sup>

## 2022 National Defense Strategy

The 2022 NDS is a self-proclaimed “call to action...to incorporate Allies and partners at every stage of defense planning.”<sup>3</sup> The NDS elevates the role and importance of Allies and partners in security strategy, calling them the strategy’s “center of gravity” and devoting an entire section on “anchoring our strategy in Allies and partners.” The emphasized role of Allies and partners is present in every section of the NDS as the document uses the term “partner(s)” 71 times and “Allies/Alliances” 66 times throughout its 32-pages.

The foundational concept of the 2022 NDS is integrated deterrence, “aligning [DoD] policies, investments, and activities to sustain and strengthen deterrence.”<sup>4</sup> Deterrence is achieved through the tailored combination of perception and integration of denial, resilience, and cost imposition strategies towards a specific actor within a given setting. The NDS links successful deterrence of regional and global threats to coalitions of interoperable Allies and partners. To build and strengthen U.S. interoperability with global partners, it directs the DoD to “reduce institutional barriers, including those that inhibit collective research and development, planning, interoperability, intelligence and information sharing, and export of key capabilities.”<sup>5</sup>



U.S. Soldiers of the 1st Infantry Division Artillery and the congressional delegation of the House Armed Services Committee visiting Forward Operating Site Adazi, Latvia, pose in front of an M109 Paladin, May 23, 2020. The 1st Infantry Division is among other units assigned to V Corps, America’s forward deployed corps in Europe that works alongside NATO allies and regional security partners to provide combat-credible forces. (U.S. Army National Guard photo by Sgt. Eliezer Meléndez)



Sen. Jack Reed, Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman, and U.S. Army Maj. Gen. Jeffery Broadwater, Deputy Commanding General of V Corps, gives his final remarks after a brief regarding the Army Prepositioned Stock facility under construction in Powidz, Poland, June 29, 2022. (U.S. Army photo by Specialist Justin Leva)

### James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023

Each year, the NDAA authorizes funding levels and authorities to the U.S. military and other critical defense priorities. The FY 2023 NDAA authorizes roughly \$816.7 billion for defense programs focused on America's vital national security priorities and directs DoD efforts to meet objectives outlined in the NSS/NDS. Several sections of this year's 4,400-page NDAA have implications that directly inform and enable for SC planning and execution.

At the federal and institutional level, the FY23 NDAA aligns with objectives and priorities in the NSS/NDS to reduce barriers to collaboration and information sharing, bolstering our network of capable mission partners. Section 1507 directs the alignment of DoD cyber and SC strategies by exploring enhanced training, coordination, and potential operational and intelligence-sharing partnerships to advance cyberspace SC with foreign partners. Section 1211 directs the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) to identify resource or authority gaps hindering efforts to bolster SC activities at the Counter-UAS University. The Act also authorizes a \$198.5 million increase in funding for institutional capacity building (ICB) through the Defense

Security Cooperation Agency's International Security Cooperation Programs (ISCP) account which primarily funds §333 and §332 activities designated as Significant Security Cooperation Initiatives. Finally, the NDAA amends §331 which authorizes SECDEF to provide logistical support to friendly foreign countries participating in operations that serve the U.S. interests. The amendment more than doubles the authorized expenditures from \$450 million to \$950 million annually. While there exists a logical linkage between this increase and U.S. support for Allies and partners aiding Ukraine, this amendment expands U.S. support for Allies and partners globally in current and future operations because §331 funds are regionally agnostic. It should be noted, however, that increased funding and authorities noted here and later are accompanied by further expanded oversight and reporting requirements to Congress for all DOD SC activities.



Ukrainian artillerymen load an M109 self-propelled howitzer during training at Grafenwoehr Training Area, May 12, 2022. Soldiers from the U.S. and Norway trained Armed Forces of Ukraine artillerymen on the howitzers as part of security assistance packages from their respective countries. (U.S. Army photo by Sgt Spencer Rhodes)

For Europe, this year's NDAA expresses America's ironclad commitment to NATO and emphasizes the importance of a unified response to Russia's unjust war in Ukraine and other shared security challenges. The NDAA authorizes the full FY23 budget request of \$4.2 billion for the European Deterrence Initiative to allow USEUCOM to further enhance U.S. force posturing in Europe and maintain a committed schedule of joint and



multinational exercises. Additionally, Section 1241 extends the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative (USAI) and authorizes \$800 million in USAI funding, a \$500 million increase from FY22 legislation. The USAI allows the federal government to fund production and procurement of defense articles for Ukraine through the defense industrial complex rather than by drawing directly from current U.S. stockpiles. The provision also allows U.S. forces to train militia groups under the authority of the Ukrainian government, potentially expanding the training audience for organizations like Joint Multinational Training Group - Ukraine and 7th Army Training Command.



Sri Lanka Navy Sub Lt. Sachini Jayawickrama, left, assists Able Seaman (Physical Training Instructor) Dulani Sakunthala don diving gear prior to underwater cutting training during Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT)/Marine Exercise (MAREX) Sri Lanka 2023 in Tricomalee, Jan. 24. CARAT/MAREX Sri Lanka is a bilateral exercise between Sri Lanka and the United States designed to promote regional security cooperation, practice humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, and strengthen maritime understanding, partnerships, and interoperability. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Brandon Parker)

The Indo-Pacific theater received the lion's share of DoD funding in this year's NDAA. Section 1254 extends the Pacific Deterrence Initiative (PDI) and authorizes \$12.5 billion, a sharp increase from \$7.1 billion in FY22 and nearly double the amount requested in the DoD's annual budget request. PDI funds do everything from building new

infrastructure to increasing the number of exercises and training events with U.S. Allies and partners in the Pacific. Section 1252 amends the FY16 NDAA by authorizing the use of Indo-Pacific Maritime Security Initiative (MSI) funds and authorities for U.S. Coast Guard activities to build partner nation capacity under §333. While MSI itself is not new, the amendment increases SC/SFA resources in the Pacific by authorizing the use of America's tailor-made coastal and littoral security forces. Other notable sections for USINDOPACOM include 1263 and 1264, which codify the U.S. policy to build and maintain the capacity to resist a fait accompli that would jeopardize the security of Taiwan and to improve readiness and interoperability. Finally, Section 1260 directs SECDEF to expand defense cooperation with India on emerging technologies and logistics to enhance interoperability.



TAIWAN STRAIT (Jan. 5, 2022) U.S. Navy Lt. j.g. Alec Pagach stands watch as Junior Officer of the Deck (JOOD) aboard the Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Chung-Hoon (DDG 93). Chung-Hoon, part of the Nimitz Carrier Strike Group, is currently underway in 7th Fleet conducting routine operations. 7th Fleet is the U.S. Navy's largest forward-deployed numbered fleet, and routinely interacts and operates with 35 maritime nations in preserving a free and open Indo-Pacific region. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Andre T. Richard)

This year's legislation also authorizes the Taiwan Enhanced Resilience Act of 2022 (TERA), which is designed to expand U.S. SC efforts with Taiwan.

Under TERA, Congress directs SECDEF and the Secretary of State to deepen the U.S. military's rapport and interoperability with Taiwan by expanding their inclusion in International Military Education and Training programs. TERA also adds Taiwan as a major non-NATO nation eligible to receive defense articles under Title 22, authorizes \$10 billion in grants for Taiwan to purchase U.S.-made military equipment, and authorizes the president to establish a regional contingency stockpile in Taiwan and drawdown of up to \$1 billion from DoD stocks to provide to Taiwan.

The NDAA addresses several SC programs beyond the priority theaters of Europe and the Indo-Pacific. Most notably, it provides a new SC authority for SOUTHCOM. Title 10, §335 authorizes SECDEF to cover certain expenses for developing foreign nations to attend Colombian-led training programs. The NDAA also authorizes \$10 million for AFRICOM to diversify its multilateral exercise locations. The Act also reauthorizes and extends programs like the Counter ISIS Train and Equip Fund for CENTCOM to continue providing defense articles to Iraq and Syria to combat insurgency and terrorism by violent extremist organizations.

As the U.S. enters this “decisive decade,” the centrality of America’s “unmatched network of Allies and partners” throughout these national strategic documents highlights the critical role of SC and SFA in America’s changing approach to modern military operations. Expanded authorities, increased funding, and explicit calls to enhance access, influence and interoperability with foreign partners signals a potential change in the tides for the SC/SFA Enterprise. It is incumbent on members of this community to proactively seek ways to implement this executive and legislative guidance to drive change, achieve objectives, and secure national interests.

## References and Notes

1. National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, DC: The White house, 2022), 7.
2. Ibid., 16.
3. National Defense Strategy of the United States of America, (Washington, DC: DOD, 2022), 14.
4. Ibid., 8.
5. Ibid., 14.

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The National Security Strategy (October 2022), 2022 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America, and the fiscal year 2023 National Defense Authorization Act.  
(Cover photos courtesy of the White House, DoD, and the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee)



# Security Force Assistance Primer: *What's the So-What?*

by Robert Schafer, Military Analyst, Center for Army Lessons Learned

**D**espite recent legislative changes to security cooperation programs and activities, there still exists a considerable gap in security force assistance knowledge among practitioners and planners. For most theater army planners, security force assistance (SFA) has been little more than planning around annual regional exercises with allies and partners. In 2020, the theater army planning dynamic shifted significantly with the regional alignment of the new Security Force Assistance Brigades (SFABs). The SFABs would show up unfunded and completely outside of a standard Program Objective Memorandum cycle and not only did planners not understand the full capabilities that the SFABs brought, the SFABs, in turn, had difficulty in explaining these capabilities to their theater Army planners. Moreover, the situation became ubiquitous and was not just confusing, it was also frustrating because what was observed was a general lack of specific SFA knowledge and how this knowledge could be leveraged to resource SFABs into theater army campaigning activities.

In response to this perceived knowledge gap, the Center for Army Lessons Learned published the *Security Force Assistance Primer* in November of 2022.<sup>1</sup> The Primer is a macro-to-micro literature review that collected all the recent doctrine and policies and then compared these documents for relevancy in a manner that is analogous to a professional discussion. The result is a 60-page handbook that thoroughly explains the relationships among the various national strategy documents with joint military doctrine as it relates to SFA writ-large. The Primer is the first of its kind in that it bridges the knowledge gap through the careful research of current national strategies, policies, laws, and military doctrine to find consensus on applicable authorities, for example, or to provide

quick access to specific SFA information that normally requires prior knowledge of its existence.

The Primer also reveals unintended shortfalls within current defense policies and doctrine, such as a lack of advising-centric authorities during competition, or how recent SFA reforms support foreign internal defense (FID). These two examples are specific findings resulting from the research that went into the Primer and undergo further examination in the next section. That said, the overarching purpose of the remainder of this article is not to detail what the Primer communicates, but to highlight those security force assistance topics that are so obvious that they are often overlooked.


## Security Force Assistance versus Foreign Internal Defense

FID and SFA are often conflated terms. On the one hand, FID is the participation by civilian agencies and military forces of a government or international organization in any of the programs or activities taken by a host nation government to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, violent extremism, terrorism, and other threats to its security.<sup>2</sup> Whereas, on the other hand, SFA is described as the set of Department of Defense (DoD) activities that support the development of the capabilities and capacity of foreign security forces and their supporting institutions, whether of an ally, partner, or an international organization, such as a regional security organization.<sup>3</sup> Yet, it is important to note that a FID program would typically be supported by DoD through routine security cooperation activities, such as SFA, as part of the Geographic Combatant Command's (GCC's) Combatant Command Campaign Plan.

FID programs or operations focus on internal threats, whereas SFA is often focused on building

# Security Force Assistance Primer Continued...

the capability or capacity of a host nation's security force to address external threats. SFA supports FID through the training of those foreign security forces that are charged with internal security and stability, such as the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). In the narrowest of terms, that small piece of FID that concerns itself with the training of its internal security force to counter an insurgency is SFA. The capability for the ISF to liberate Mosul from the Islamic State in 2016 as an end state is perhaps the strongest case study of the FID-SFA relationship.<sup>4</sup> FID programs are developed based on the existing security capability of the partner nation and often, developing a new capability for the partner nation is the preferred FID solution. However, FID programs may be used to develop an existing capability, whereas SFA activities are often better suited to build a sustainable capability from the ground up.



[23-02 \(703\) Security Force Assistance Primer.pdf](#)  
[Security Force Assistance Primer Article](#)

## New Advising-Centric Authorities

The Primer goes into significant detail about Title 10, Chapter 16 authorities, but does not offer any recommendations for the need for new authorities, or those authorities that need to be tailor-made for security force assistance advisors supporting theater campaigning efforts. Ongoing discussions from theater Army planners and security force assistance practitioners, to include commanders and their staffs, provide three recommendations concerning new advisor-centric authorities amplified here: 1) adding a combined interoperability category to §333; 2) modify §321's limitation clause from only with the military forces to security forces; and 3) create a Title 10, Chapter 16 specific SFA authority. Each recommendation enhances existing authorities and is further explored below:

1. Title 10, Chapter 16, §333 *Foreign Security Forces: Authority to Build Capacity* is the premier authority in which theater and theater armies develop greater capacity within partner nation foreign security forces and their institutions through material, training, and operational support across nine operational activities.<sup>5</sup> Four of the nine activities are Global war on Terror-era objectives and others focus on domains outside of the land domain. Expanding §333 to include combined interoperability capacity would enable GCCs to integrate security cooperation objectives with Department of State efforts and provide a dedicated authority to build interoperability with emerging allies and partners.

2. Title 10, Chapter 16, §321 *Training with Friendly Countries* is the primary authority theater army planners use when training with a friendly country's foreign security force, most often as part of a regional exercise that further promotes interoperability. Yet, §321 has limitations in its language that prevents U.S. forces from training with other non-military entities, such as civilian border police units. Expanding the aperture of who U.S. conventional forces can train with could increase the flexibility of §321 to establish access, presence, and influence. This is especially beneficial within nations that have internally focused security



# Security Force Assistance Primer Continued...

forces which are not part of the traditional military architecture. Expansion, however, requires careful coordination with the Department of State to prevent military overreach within integrated country strategies.

3. Congress could create a new Title 10, Chapter 16 specific SFA authority similar to §321 and §322, Special Operations Forces: Training with Friendly Foreign Forces. This recommendation supports the creation of a responsive SFA-specific authority and funding source that could provide the joint force with the ability to address strategic competition challenges by prioritizing both interoperability and capacity building with allies and partners.

These three recommendations are a sampling from recent conversations with stakeholders and although not all inclusive, do represent the belief among stakeholders that the Department of Defense needs changes to existing authorities.

## Conclusion

The Primer is not a catalogue; a catalogue will tell you what documents you should be reading, whereas the Primer informs you why you are reading a particular document. Yet, this article



Asayish training academy students demonstrate handcuffing and searching suspects during a culminating exercise with a Coalition Detention Capabilities Assessment Team (DCAT) in the al-Hasakah region, Syria, Dec. 22, 2022. The Coalition DCAT members advise, assist and enable Syrian Internal Security Forces to help equip the Asayish with skills needed to secure the region against ISIS. (U.S. Army Reserve photo by Sgt. 1st Class Nicholas J. De La Pena)

discussed a few issues revealed by, but not discussed in the Primer, which brings a value to the Primer not otherwise found in other SFA-related documents. Finally, the Primer is not a stand-alone planning document, but an essential reader cornerstone to every planner's and practitioner's professional library. The Primer is that source document that links many other SFA-related documents together in a relevant professional discourse about what SFA is and why it matters to U.S. national interests guiding foreign policy.

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## References

1. A PDF copy of the Security Force Assistance Primer can be obtained through the Joint Lessons Learned Information System (JLLIS) with the JLLIS ID of 176118.
2. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-22, Foreign Internal Defense. (Washington D.C., 17 August 2018), I-1.
3. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-20, Security Cooperation. (Washington D.C., 9 September 2022), II-3.
4. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-22, Foreign Internal Defense. (Washington D.C., 17 August 2018), I-21. See vignette on Enabling Iraqi Foreign Security Forces in Liberating Mosul.
5. The nine operational activities listed under §333 are:
  - 1) counterterrorism operations;
  - 2) counter-weapons of mass destruction operations;
  - 3) counter-illicit drug trafficking operations;
  - 4) counter-transnational organized crime operations;
  - 5) maritime and border security operations;
  - 6) military intelligence operations;
  - 7) air domain awareness operations;
  - 8) operations or activities that contribute to an existing international coalition operation that is determined by the Secretary of Defense to be in the national interest of the U.S.; and
  - 9) cyberspace security and defensive cyberspace operations.



U.S. Army Gen Joseph L. Votel, commander United States Central Command, and Gen Joseph Aoun, commander Lebanese Armed Forces, salute Lebanese service members during a welcoming ceremony June 6, 2017. Votel visited Lebanon and met with key leaders of the Lebanese government and military to reaffirm a shared commitment of stability and security in the region.

(Department of Defense photo by U.S. Air Force Tech. Sgt. Dana Flamer)

Making CENTCOM's top 5 priority list gave staying power to Lebanon's Title 10, Section 333 Light Attack Helicopter Security Cooperation Program.

## Building Partner Capacity with Title 10, Section 333 Programs or How to Fight Terrorists and Still Hold Down a Side Job

by Clayne T. Bradley, JCISFA Operations Analyst and Edward P. Donnelly, ISG with contributions  
and background from Jon G. Doering, Kenneth L. Ford, Elizabeth A. Horton, and Simon C. Liu, DSCA

**D**ShK heavy machine guns can kill, but the ground maxes out with a kill ratio of 1.

This makes low clouds and bad weather even worse. That problem faced the Lebanese Airforce during the counter ISIS campaign of 2017 “Dawn of Jurds” (Barrens). Enter Brigadier General Ziad Haykal the head of the Lebanese Air Force armed with one of the most effective tools of modern warfare, the white paper. Here begins a story of how to make the US DoD’s train and equip authority (Title 10, Section 333) work.

First, a partner nation must want it. So too must the United States Government and not just the Department of Defense. The white paper explained

the exact challenge the Lebanese Air Force faced in battling the Islamic State of Iraqi and Syria (ISIS) in language even non-air force personnel could understand. Fixed-wing aircraft did the job fine in good-to-average weather. However once low clouds rolled in, the ground and urban buildings with that maximum kill ratio gained the upper hand. Helicopters on the other hand can fly very, very, low and sneak in under a low cloud deck. The problem is flying a helicopter in and dropping something out over the side that can blow through a hard bunker to get at the soft terrorists inside requires getting in close enough for the bad guys to shoot back. Worse, in urban environments the bad guys often get off the first shot due to the complex terrain. Additionally, the risks of friendly fire and civilian casualties increase dramatically in built up areas.



Now that is a problem statement and not a simple one readily solved in a short period of time with off-the-shelf solutions. The partner nation's white paper explained all that.

## Enter U.S. Code Title 10, Section 333 Building Partner Capacity

For complex, deliberate solutions to shared partner nation and US security problems DoD's tool is often Section 333. Not for the fainthearted, this train and equip authority and the funding that comes with it brings a deliberate planning punch to a fight too often viewed through an urgent and crisis action planning lens. The Lebanese Air Force white paper sparked an all-too-rare deliberate approach. Lebanon then backed it up with on-record interviews in the US defense media making sure the challenge never faded from view.<sup>1</sup> Capability design documents followed addressing this specific challenge with analysis of needs and alternative solutions. Given the need for a very low flying platform, stand-off from ISIS heavy machine guns, and precision to avoid civilian casualties in urban environments the US Government and Lebanese team chose MD 530 "Little Birds" modified with precision rockets guided in by lasers as the top pick, the MD 530F+.<sup>2,3</sup>



An Afghan Air Force MD-530 February 18, 2018, at Kandahar Air Wing, Afghanistan. The MD-530 is a combat proven aircraft which was designed to operate in high altitudes and hot weather.

(U.S. Air Force photo by Staff Sgt. Jared J. Duhon)

Notice the rocket pod with its precision guided 70mm Hydras. This precision, stand-off capability is why partner nations often select "Little Birds" for very low altitude, light attack.



A Lebanese A-29 Super Tucano student pilot from the 81st Fighter Squadron, conducts the first "in-seat" training sortie, March 22, 2017, at Moody Air Force Base, Georgia. The program began in March 2017 and was designed to ensure the Lebanon Air Force receives the support and training needed to safely and effectively employ the A-29 Aircraft.

(U.S. Air Force photo by Tech. Sgt. Zachary Wolf)

This previous experience with the same precision, stand-off rockets used by the Lebanese Air Force's A-29 squadron and ground spotters prepared part of the foundation for MD 530F+ training and equipment efforts.

## It Helps to Start with Something

The basic building block of DoD's Title 10, Section 333 programs is the military unit. The Lebanese Air Force had a solid one, a helicopter squadron at times reduced to rolling explosives out the door onto bunkers. Not elegant and not precise, but innovative and brave given how close they had to fly to ISIS terrorists. It also came with some pilots, maintainers, and facilities. Will-to-fight was not a problem as after a hard day of fighting, squadron members sometimes rushed to their second jobs to support their families during economic hard times. Then they returned the next day to fight again (during the 2019 Lebanese economic crisis a professional's salary dipped to around \$100 a month). This was a unit that could make things happen. Likewise, for decades American companies built "Little Bird" or the "Killer Egg" helicopters to go where other aviation platforms could not, sneakily. Finally, the laser guided rockets were already coming off the rails of Lebanese A-29 Super Tucano low-to-medium altitude light attack aircraft, sometimes guided in by spotters on the ground.



A U.S. Army AH-6 Little Bird in support of Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron-1 (MAWTS-1) fires rockets during an exercise at Mt. Barrow, Chocolate Mountain Gunnery Range, Calif., April 7, 2016. Weapons and Tactics Instructor (WTI) course 2-16 is a seven week training event hosted by MAWTS-1 cadre, which emphasizes operational integration of the six functions of the Marine Corps aviation in support of a Marine Air Ground Task Force. MAWTS-1 provides standardized advanced tactical training and certification of unit instructor qualifications to support Marine Aviation Training and readiness and assists in developing and employing aviation weapons and tactics. (U.S. Marine Corps photograph by Lance Cpl. Jeremy L. Laboy, MAWTS-1 COMCAM/released)

Months of training, like that depicted above, operationalize capabilities turning them from showroom displays to reality.

## Stakeholders Buy-In

The U.S. Senate was skeptical, the House too. DoD's Section 333 programs may be deliberate train and equip programs, but deliberate sustainment programs they are not. All good things must come to an end and Section 333 programs end sooner than others. U.S. Congressional staffers and the sitting members of Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees know this. It is all fine and good to build partner capacity, but "so what" if it blows away once the program ends? The Lebanese Air Force prepared for that question with a sustainment plan of their own and passed it to the DoD's Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) who, when asked, handed it over to Congress. Once again, it helps to have a unit with long experience sustaining aviation equipment and training. While sustaining complex capabilities is never easy at least the challenges wouldn't come as a surprise. Sometimes Department of State Title 22, Foreign Military Financing (US grants) or Foreign Military

Sales (partner nation funded) might fill the sustainment gap, other times a partner nation might go all alone. In any case, the prepared and ready-to-go sustainment plan brought key decision makers in Congress on board.

## Assessing the Challenge

Naturally, plans come from somewhere. An Institute for Security Governance (ISG) team, working with the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) since 2014, learned the lesson from previous experience with §333 programs that the single most important determiner of program success or failure is conducting a thorough capability development assessment and gap analysis and then developing an implementation plan based upon those. Without that assessment and plan, developed early in the approval process, a §333 program is likely to deliver capabilities that cannot be properly employed or sustained for anything resembling their expected life cycles. Embassy personnel need not be capability development experts to create assessments and plans, but they can ask for help. The Geographic Combatant Commands and the Services can assist, technical experts from the Program Executive Offices can help, ISG can deploy advisory teams, and the Defense Security Cooperation University offers training courses. The LAF Air Force, with some help, conducted an excellent assessment and developed a plan, reflected in the white paper, that ensured the LAF had the institutional capability and capacity to absorb, employ, and sustain the MD 530s. This enabled smooth delivery of the helicopters, ensured the receiving Squadron gained operational status within six months, and provided the basis for assured resourcing into the foreseeable future.

## Inertia Doesn't Always Hurt

US Central Command (CENTCOM) made it a top five priority. The U.S. Embassy team and CENTCOM planners turned the key to make that happen. Closing the holes ISIS terrorists can scamper into for food, rest, rearming, and training appealed to the CENTCOM Commander and helped the US Embassy Team work the program up the priority ladder. In



short, the building partner capacity program matched up nicely with a Campaign objective.<sup>4</sup> Aligning DoD programs designed to support broader security with Combatant Command Campaign objectives is vital to making train and equip programs a priority. Once on the top of the list everyone knew the Commander wanted it. That made sure the effort didn't become just another flash in the pan. Once in the top list, it would take some explaining to remove it and no one wants to explain to a four-star general why something didn't happen. This gave staying power to the deliberate program that might otherwise vanish in an urgent, crisis action planning world. The Commander guaranteed to the DSCA, Congress, CENTCOM planners, and the Lebanese Air Force that attention wouldn't shift instantaneously to the next crisis.

## Into Monitoring

Once the initial baseline assessments and plans were done the hard work began. The appropriation that funds Section 333 program funding doesn't roll over from year-to-year like many Department of State (DoS) programs, so phasing everything is important. Year one place the equipment order, start training, and turn in the excess. Year two modify the bug smashing helicopters (their windshield is the weapon) with laser guided rockets to become bunker killers, continue training, and turn in the excess. Year three go operational and train with ground spotters, other aircraft, and turn in the excess. Painful re-planning came with the territory. Luckily someone had the idea to turn in bi-weekly reports. Not just any e-mail either because after all this was a CENTCOM top 5 priority. Pictures of each class, what training was accomplished<sup>5</sup>, pictures of equipment and its inspection on delivery all populated the bi-weekly. The bi-weekly identified gaps, proposed solutions, readdressed schedules to the point it became routine (well almost). In short, the team all contributed to the bi-weekly and before too long they found themselves monitoring the program and adjusting as needed. In short, they "backed into" effective monitoring via robust, regular reporting (with lots of pictures).

## Mission Creep

The bane of capability development programs both US and international, military or civilian is changing requirements. Like any good zombie movie expect at least a double threat. The creepers and the leapers. Creepers seem easy and simple, but they are relentless and never-ending. A little change here a little change there, until the whole project collapses under their sheer weight of numbers. Everyone runs out of ammo sometime and the baseball bat wrapped with barbed wire only lasts until your strength gives out. The leapers come fast and hard, often flying over the barricades in running leaps. They are spectacular and flashy.

"Hey, how about we add a mini-gun, those are soooo cool."

"What about forward looking infrared? Who doesn't want X-ray vision to pierce the fog of war."

The Capabilities Design Document was the main barricade against requirement growth derailing an entire program. A capabilities design documents lets project managers say,



A U.S. Army AH-6 Little Bird in support of Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron One (MAWTS-1) fires rockets at designated targets during an offensive air support exercise at Mt. Barrow, Chocolate Mountain Aerial Gunnery Range, Calif., April 5, 2016.  
(U.S. Marine Corps photograph by SSgt. Artur Shvartsberg, MAWTS-1 COMCAM/Released)

Notice the mini-gun on this version raining shell casings on the ground below. A really cool system, but not the capability initial assessments determined the Lebanese Air Force needed. A standard 7.62 mm machine gun in a pod would do the job.

“Yes, that would be easy, but no we have more important things to worry about.”

“Yes, that mini-gun is cool and everyone wants X-ray vision, but if wishes were fishes everyone would eat. Our job is in this capabilities design document.”

As stated in the white paper and capabilities design document airplanes were great in good weather, but once the ceilings drop in urban environments the second T (terrain) and the C (civil considerations) of METT-TC<sup>5</sup> demanded a specific solution. A solution that could sneak in below the weather, stay out of range of bad guys’ heavy machine guns, and still deliver precision destruction via medium-punch rockets that avoided friendly fire and civilian casualties. If a requirement didn’t do that then the answer became “no.” Mini-guns are super cool, but they don’t out-range DShK heavy machine guns or punch through most bunkers. Forward looking infrared (FLIR) is like X-ray vision, but a laser from another aircraft, or spotter on the ground can do the job without the added cost and repair burdens. The team wanted this to work when the main American effort walked away in a few years and with FLIR capability, ... well no.

The CENTCOM J-5 planners, Lebanon embassy team, and DSCA collaborated to build this barricade against both creepers and leapers. It was key in repelling multiple assaults, though a couple of times the barricades barely held. Nevertheless, vigorous



Vice Adm. Brad Cooper, commander of U.S. Naval Forces Central Command, U.S. Ambassador to Lebanon Dorothy Shea, and Lebanese Armed Forces, Head of Navy Capt. Haissam Dannaoui pose for a photo onboard Jounieh Naval Base Sept. 27 2021. (U.S. Navy Photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Anita Chebahtah)

waving of the capabilities design document did repel (or beat down) enough requirement zombies to keep the project on track and time (although, it did slip a year-thanks COVID).

## Do it Again

The Lebanese MH530F+ precision strike program succeeded.<sup>6,7</sup> It took upfront effort from the partner nation spearheading, the US Embassy Team on one flank, DSCA on the other, CENTCOM demanding everything stay on track and Congress funding, questioning, funding, questioning, ... you get the idea. DoD Section 333 Building Partner Capacity programs demand deliberate planning to include the right baseline assessments, endurance in monitoring, and evaluation. The best evaluations being photos from operations, not ribbon cutting ceremonies. Aligning tightly with a Geographic Combatant Command Campaign Plan which makes them a priority and grants a few years of staying power is a must. Having a sustainment plan ready to give to Congress answers many questions even before key committees ask them. Phasing the capability development effort overcomes some money roll-over problems while official capability design documents beat back both mission creep and leap. Clear messaging by the partner nation and embassy team via white papers, news articles, and on-record interviews help everyone from congressional staffers to industry personnel understand the mission and method-to-the-madness. In the end Lebanon became the only coalition partner in the Counter-ISIS campaign to operate “by” themselves with US support rather than requiring the US to operate “with” them or “through” them.<sup>8,9</sup> They also recovered and still hold 120 square kilometers of formerly held ISIS territory. Not bad for an Air Force whose personnel hold down side-jobs to support family.

## Article Approved for Public Release by JS J7 PAO

**The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are those of the contributors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any other agency of the Federal Government.**



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Dorothy C. Shea the U.S. Ambassador to Lebanon welcomes six MD-530F+ Light Attack Helicopters to the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) Air Force and celebrates training graduation on November 16, 2021. General Joseph Aoun, LAF Commander and Brigadier General Ziad Haykal, LAF Air Force Commander stand to the left of Ambassador Shea. (Photo courtesy of U.S. Embassy Beirut)

# Wargaming Tools Promoting Whole of Government, Multi-National SFA Integrity: Conflict Sensitivity Training for the 21st Century

by Captain Paul Howarth, Outreach Group, 11 (Security Force Assistance) Brigade, British Army

## The Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance (JCISFA) supports

joint SFA integration through many means. One of these is promoting whole of government and multi-national SFA that supports high-level intents such as stable national and regional environments. Such efforts involve working with other government agencies (OGA), non-government actors, and both North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and non-NATO allies and partners.

The US practices, supports and publishes on wargaming as one tool which can promote such intents. While recently visiting the United Kingdom's (UK's) Outreach Group, JCISFA observed the following 'Integrity Game' and played several rounds. This game from the UK provides another useful piece for the SFA toolkit.

Additionally, with its emphasis on stability and countering corruption, the game is potentially useful for stability and peacekeeping simulations such as those hosted by the NATO SFA Centre of Excellence and US Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute. It includes six-month deployments, which might help SFA brigades or similar units' pre-deployment preparation as it presents the stress of deployment with demand overload and operating outside of one's comfort zone. The game

explores the unintended consequences of military actions that might drive corruption, but promotes the notion that 'win-win' solutions are possible, with no concrete 'right or wrong answers'. Its inclusion of independent actors, local government officials and the civilian populace make it potentially useful to human terrain analysts and OGA such as the State Department or US Agency for International Development.

Gameplay occurs remotely or in person and is 'self-correcting' as it allows for improvement over multiple iterations. Players may rotate through roles in successive games and the game may be used as a continuity tool as one group 'inherits' a region from another. The following presents an outline of the game in more detail, directly from the UK Outreach Group, with observations, insights, and lessons from users to help anyone learn from the game and tailor it to suit their own purposes.

Figure 1. The Integrity board game with exemplar cards.





# Wargaming Tools Continued...

## Introduction

Outreach Group is in the process of moving to join the 11th Security Force Assistance Brigade; a hybrid unit with Regular, Reserve and Specialist Reserve personnel combining their energy and expertise to support UK, NATO and UN doctrine and activity. As part of its engagement across government and other partners, there has been a Regular secondment (attached) to the international nongovernment organization, Transparency International. In 2018 our secondee returned to the group and shared the latest Anti-Corruption Toolkit. One of the Specialist Reserves submitted a business case to the 'Failure Fund', an experimentation programme currently offered by the British Army, and his proposal to build a game around integrity and anti-corruption issues was accepted. This paper provides an outline of the game, its uses, and some feedback from users.

## Overview

The original aim was to explore the potential of gaming in providing training on Stabilisation Operations and conflict sensitivity, including Integrity and anti-corruption, human security, civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) and cultural considerations. Recognising that solely focusing on these might be somewhat formulaic, game designers extended the scope to cover a six months-long operational deployment, preceded by a pre-deployment phase.

This increased its relevance to the military, in particular helping participants understand why issues arise rather than offering a tick box exercise of studying issue X or Y without context. By subjecting participants to a pressured environment, the game helped them to better understand drivers of corruption and how military thinking and processes may unintentionally enable harmful second and third order effects.

Multiple teams wargame various Security Force Assistance and stabilisation approaches at the Interallied Confederation of Medical Reserve Officers (CIOMR) Conference in Athens last Summer. (Photo by Major Neeraj Shah, Royal Army Medical Corps)



# Wargaming Tools Continued...



Limited resources and time in the game environment force players at Cardiff University Officer Training Corps (UOTC) to weigh their options carefully.  
(Photo by Captain Paul Howarth, General Service Corps)

## Principles

Firstly, creators designed Integrity as a 'safe to fail' environment to practise decision-making and understand how unintended consequences arise. Participants are told that this is not a test, that creativity is encouraged, with little prohibited, so that players feel free to ask questions.

Secondly, the game is not zero sum. It should be possible for any and all participants to achieve success, whilst at the same time being held accountable for, and justifying, their actions. Those running the game are not there to judge but set the scene, ask and answer questions during the game, before facilitating the debrief.

Finally, the game encourages expectation management. Firstly, amongst the players, who will struggle to complete as many tasks as they'd hope, while also getting them to consider for whose benefit they deploy. Whether supporting Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief operations, setting the conditions for successful Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration activities, or training partner forces, the game reminds players that they are part of a much longer

process and that they are often setting the conditions on their deployment for the future success of the mission, perhaps at a distant time.

## Structure

The game is normally run with multiple regional teams under a Force Commander who sets the directions, holds regional teams to account and allocates resources. The size of the force is deliberately kept vague as the focus is on behaviours. Two metrics gauge success, the first being Force Reputation, the second, Regional Stability. Just introducing them in that order to teams tends to lead to reputation becoming a priority, particularly when teams realise how hard it is to improve stability in six months, it skews what they think about as a successful deployment.

In the first phase Integrity encourages players to consider how they would conduct bespoke (tailored) training, aligned to the staff functions. Though given briefings with limited information, players can gain a fuller picture of the situation if they expend some Pre-Deployment Training (PDT) tokens to 'buy' research and allow them to target their training, rather than accept handover notes on face value. This opportunity may be used to reward players for recalling earlier learning.

Teams members must debate and decide on actions to take in a tailored scenario. Actions may have an effect on the stability of the environment and reputation of the advising force.  
(Photo by Major Neeraj Shah, Royal Army Medical Corps)





# Wargaming Tools Continued...



Figure 2. Pre-deployment preparation options

In the second phase, the regional teams balance constraints of time and resources as they make progress on a range of tasks specific to their area of operations, drawing cards from four decks, which confirm the approach chosen and risk accepted; from 'A Proper Job' (the most thorough), through 'Being Pragmatic' (relying on PDT) and 'Playing it Safe' (looking busy) to the 'The Wild West', in which money is thrown at the problem. Each deck has a different mix of cards, detailing cost in time and resources, task progression and incidents, reflecting the amount of oversight in the process.

Teams achieve milestones and choose their response to incidents as they arise. Players deal with these using pre-deployment training (if it was correctly focused), mitigation cards based on the Anti-Corruption Toolkit or through expending time and resources to make things right. Occasionally players choose to accept the consequences of not dealing with incidents, which usually impact on

reputation and/or stability. Additional complexity comes from a large number of independent actors, including local government officials, media and the civilian population included in the game. Their role is to add to the pressure and stimulate roleplay through nuanced briefings, which emphasize differing perspectives to challenge (and occasionally mislead) military players.

The game represented the four thematic pillars of Outreach Group at the time, namely CIMIC\*, Human Security, Security Capacity Building and Stabilisation & Reconstruction.<sup>1</sup> It was important to represent these across the regions, with appropriate tasks, including some less relevant or urgent. The game often highlighted the military completing things they wanted to do, or were good at, rather than what was needed for stability and so it proved a valuable tool to engender discussion on how best to approach such operations.

The game concludes with a debrief phase, where players share their experience, gauge success and discuss priorities and alternative decisions, as well as feeding back on the game format itself.

## Delivery Consideration

Classrooms and drill halls have been the most

The Cardiff UOTC drill hall serves as a venue for 'Integrity' a security cooperation wargame tailorable to multiple environments.  
(Photo by Captain Paul Howarth, General Service Corps)





# Wargaming Tools Continued...

common venues and running the game through a slide deck is the most effective technique. It allows for the display of examples and also facilitates game pacing with a large audience. The original concept called for between 4-15 participants and 2-2 facilitators. It has been run with up to 50 players and usually with a lone instructor, due to staffing, although the more that can be provided, the deeper the discussions.

During Covid restrictions the Outreach Group delivered an 'Integrity-lite' activity, lacking some of the interaction between teams, but providing a good overview of principles and priming players for a face-to-face event. The Outreach Group is developing two format options. The first is to rotate teams around regions mid-game, so they inherit the work of others, although that may prove to be too disruptive and encourage people to blame predecessors rather than own their choices. The second and potentially more interesting, is to play the game sequentially, with one team going through the process of overview, briefing, PDT, deployment and debrief, followed by other teams in turn. Each time a team moves on though, they have to leave a player behind to teach their successors. I feel their desire to re-join teammates and avoid missing out may lead to hasty handovers and compound the consequences of poor decisions.

## Game Refinements

The game never runs the same way twice, with each set of players approaching the game in their own manner. This is in line with the original idea of a toolkit, so instructors may omit or add details as necessary.

Component-wise, the incident decks have a limited range of issues and tailoring to specific regional themes. Creators have already redesigned the boards twice for accessibility and a further redesign is in progress.


However, the vinyl game boards are sourced at a reasonable price from commercial printers and the initial game costs have provided excellent value for money, given the added value observed in training outcomes.

## Outcomes

One of the key design principles, exemplified in the working title 'Shades of Grey', is players realising that there is often no right answer, just what appears most suitable. If the Commander is not pro-active in exercising oversight, then they quickly found themselves making choices with crucial context lacking while time pressures making their job even more difficult.

In regional teams the (often self-imposed) requirement to achieve milestones meant that incidents are often blithely accepted. At a recent event, the collaboration between the teams was highly effective in identifying which incidents each regional team was best equipped to deal with, based on their PDT. Their collaboration and trading of incidents showed real creativity, but as a consequence it encouraged a cavalier attitude to completing tasks, accepting incidents too easily, which was brought out in the debrief.

Figure 3. The operations section of the board with lines of effort and milestones



# Wargaming Tools Continued...



Role players may shape the gaming environment and present players with challenges. Players then take action and allocate limited resources (or choose not to).

(Photo by Major Neeraj Shah, Royal Army Medical Corps)

One Force Commander became particularly invested during the game and despite success in the regions, spoke to me about their frustration with the Media role player, who had been very forceful in trying to meet and apparently over-stepped boundaries. Speaking with them later, that irritation moved to their Chief of Staff, who was tasked with arranging a meeting, but was too busy with other tasks. Several hours of reflection later, they finally told me that they were frustrated with themselves, for not being clear in their instructions, nor following up when the meeting hadn't happened. This lesson would have been less likely to be learned if given by the instructor though, rather than arrived at through reflection.

Another Force Commander used data from teams to calculate resources expended per milestone achieved as a metric for allocating further resources. Again, we debated the pros and cons of this in an environment where culture and context are often very different to home, with a range of opinions from the group.

Ultimately feedback is very positive, as players have a good deal of agency – they aren't forced into decisions and readily accept responsibility, as we work towards a more holistic understanding of deployments. Whilst the process of teaching the game is constantly being refined, the key principle that the game is as much about how you do things, as what you're doing, comes through strongly in

debriefs. Even more importantly, it not only encouraged discussions around gaming for training, but also for bringing out insights.

Most importantly, repeated use proves this game is a valuable tool to exercise commanders at all levels. While militaries are familiar with live exercising, this game is an exercise for the brain, forcing consideration of complex situations. All evidence to date agrees that it is better to think about these trade-offs far in advance of any deployment of boots on the ground and varied opportunities to practice decision analysis and consider honest success criteria should be actively sought and encouraged.

## Article Approved for Public Release by Commanding Officer, Outreach Group, British Army

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The views expressed in this article reflect those of the author, and do not represent the official views of the British Army.

Wargaming a security cooperation scenario beforehand allows military personnel to practice making difficult decisions involving trade-offs multiple times before facing similar decisions in a real world environment.

(Photo by Major Neeraj Shah, Royal Army Medical Corps)





# NATO SFA Centre of Excellence

## Courses and Publications

*NATO SFA Centre of Excellence has courses available. [Link to NATO SFA Courses \(click here\)](#)*

### **ETOC Code: MCP-CM-2556 Security Force Assistance Operators Course**

This course aims to improve the competency and the effectiveness of SFA operators working in current and future missions related to security capacity building.

### **ETOC Code: MCP-CM-36713 Institutional Adviser Course**

The NATO Security Force Assistance Centre of Excellence conducted the second iteration of the five-day NATO Institutional Advisor's Course (IAC) from 14 to 18 November 2022 in Rome, Italy. The IAC develops experienced advisors and operational level planners by using a systematic approach to create comprehensive solutions. This iteration of the course had students from Albania, France, Great Britain, Italy, Slovenia, and the United States. The course builds upon individual advisor skills by providing the students with concepts and tools to assess a partner's institutional capabilities, compare them with environmental factors, and construct a plan to resolve identified issues within the local context of the partner's culture and situation. This session was fortunate to have Major General Alberto Vezzoli from the Italian Army, who provided the class with a presentation on his experiences working with partner forces in Afghanistan, which reinforced the principles presented in the course. Both courses are designed as blended learning with on-line and in residence portions. The IAC is limited to 15 students and is next being offered 18-22 September 2023.







# JCISFA

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JCISFA Community has SFA courses available through Joint Knowledge Online (JKO). [Link to JCISFA SFA Courses \(click here\)](#)

## Available SFA JKO courses:

### J3OP-US1398 SFA Considerations for Campaign Planning

This course offers ways to implement SFA as part of campaign planning, execution, and assessment. It is tailored for key leaders within organizations that plan and execute SC at the operational level.

### J3OP-US1399: Building Allied and Partner Security Institutions – Advanced

The focus of this course is building allied and partner defense institutions through SFA with an emphasis on FSF functions, core processes, and SFA developmental tasks.



# SFA Topics Online

To communicate with our SFA subject matter experts, we provide ways to submit a request for information (RFI) through various JCISFA information sites.

You may use an RFI, not only to request more information about Security Force Assistance, but also to provide feedback and recommendations on content or suggest topics for future editions of this newsletter.

For email, go to our website through the Joint Staff (<https://www.jcs.mil/Directorates/J7-Joint-Force-Development/JCISFA>) and click the email link at the bottom. Via the web, use any of our social media sites or through the Chairman's Joint Lessons Learned Information System (JLLIS).

To join our Community of Interest on Microsoft Teams, open Teams, select the "Teams" button on the left, and type "J7JCISFA Col" in the "Join or create a team" field at the bottom. Someone from JCISFA will add you to the members.

## JCISFA Social Media

JCISFA's presence on social media platforms, Facebook and Twitter, allows you to stay in touch with the latest JCISFA news. "Like" our Facebook page at <https://www.facebook.com/JCISFA> and follow us on Twitter at <https://twitter.com/JCISFA>. You can also find us on milSuite at <https://www.milsuite.mil/>.

