OUT THINKING
ON NATO 2022 STRATEGIC CONCEPT

**Edited by NATO Security Force Assistance Centre of Excellence
in collaboration with an international group of experts**

OCTOBER 2023

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LEGAL NOTICE

About The NATO Security Force Assistance Centre of Excellence

The NATO Security Force Assistance Centre of Excellence (NATO SFA COE) is a multinational entity accredited by NATO as a "Centre of Excellence" with Italy, Albania and Slovenia as Sponsoring Nations and Austria as Contributing Nation.

By virtue of its high potential deriving from multiple military and civilian professionals and the use of a holistic and multidisciplinary approach, the Centre is a hub of reference in the Security Force Assistance field at the national, international and NATO levels.

It provides expertise to contribute to the development and experimentation of concepts and doctrines, acquires and elaborates lessons learned and conducts educational and training activities for instructors, mentors and personnel belonging to other nations. This all contributes to the definition of development models' capacity in support of local forces in crisis zones in which there is a North Atlantic Council (NAC) approved NATO operation or mission.

To broaden its spectrum and benefit from different perspectives, the Centre also collaborates with universities, as well as other international civilian and military organisations to provide a unique capability to the Alliance and NATO Partners.

Foreword

It is with great pride that I have the honour to present the editorial project "Out Thinking on NATO Strategic Concept", a project that stems from a conference organised at the NATO Security Force Assistance Centre of Excellence (NATO SFACOE) on the 21st of July 2022, in cooperation with Confassociazioni Young World.

The aim of this study paper is to highlight some aspects of the NATO Strategic Concept 2022, a key document that defines the Alliance's security challenges and outlines the political and military tasks that NATO will undertake to address them.

Under the aegis of Lt Col SCIANNAMEA Michele (Doctrine Development & Standards Branch Head of the NATO SFA COE) as Project Supervisor, Maj PAUCIULO Gianpaolo (Doctrine Development & Standards Section Head) as Project Officer and Dr ALIMENA Francesco and Dr GIMBO Angelica and Dr BAILEY Alexandra Lara as members of internship programme of the NATO SFA COE, excellent contributions were collected and modulated from various authors, according to a structure based on 4 macro areas: Cooperation, Defence, Economy and Security.

Since the project involved the active participation of experts from all over the world, it has an international character and perfectly represents the values and spirit of cooperation of the NATO SFA COE, a joint and multinational entity that, since its accreditation by NATO in 2018, has focused on developing concepts, doctrine, education and training to promote stability and reconstruction efforts in crisis scenarios, becoming the focal point of Security Force Assistance for the Alliance.

This project emphasises the important link between the principles of Security Force Assistance and the NATO Strategic Concept 2022, reflecting the radical changes of recent years in the international landscape and the increasingly frequent rifts between political, economic, social and geographical powers have had a profound effect on military capabilities, structures and doctrines.

Through collaboration with all contributors to the present volume, we hope to encourage an interdisciplinary approach and productive discussion, aimed at identifying important key elements for capability development and related activities in the core areas of the project.

We hope that the resulting study paper, to considered as a living document, will be a useful tool in understanding the complexity of the current geopolitical and military framework at the international level and the challenges that await us in the areas of Cooperation, Defence, Economy and Security that need to be addressed multilaterally together with allied countries.

I am certain that this initiative, which has brought together the different points of view of distinguished experts and peer reviewers, to whom I owe my deepest gratitude, will contribute to the promotion and support of the 2022 Strategic Concept, which pursues NATO's three core tasks: deterrence and defence, crisis prevention and management, and cooperative security.

With esteem and gratitude,
Colonel Massimo Di Pietro

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Introduction of the study paper

Gabriele Natalizia

The study of International Relations has several aims, but its most important theoretical contribution is probably the identification of the so-called "regularities" occurring in the external realm. One such phenomenon is the tendency of alliances to dissolve after the defeat of the common enemy they were formed against. The frequency of this phenomenon has been attributed to the constraints that states encounter in cooperating within an anarchical system like the international one, especially in the absence of an immediate – and shared – threat to their survival (Walt, 1987; Cesa, 2007).

Although NATO represents a significant exception to this assumption, being one of the most enduring alliances in history, it does not mean that its survival has never been questioned (Colombo, 2001). The Atlantic Alliance has faced – and overcome – several crises in the 1990s and 2000s, in correspondence to some historical turning points. These events have fueled debates among the allies, the consequences of which are still visible in the final communications released at the end of each annual summit. Periodically, they have also driven NATO to formulate mid-term overall responses to the changing international strategic environment. These responses have taken the form of Strategic Concepts (SC) that, unlike the past, have become unclassified documents aimed at defining NATO's values, principles, tasks, priorities, and objectives, and communicating them to the citizens of member countries as well as to partner and rival powers.

For these reasons, the Strategic Concepts are generally considered as NATO's "grand strategy", to be understood as «the direction and use made of any or all among the total assets of a security community in support of its policy goals as decided by politics» (Gray, 2010, p. 45). However, it is important to note that a grand strategy is not a rule-book but «a set of concepts and arguments that need to be revisited regularly» (Posen, 2014, p. 2).

The Atlantic Alliance immediately demonstrated its adaptability to changing conditions after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union. While the presence of an enemy with formidable traits in 1949 had provided a decisive

incentive for overcoming sources of tension in transatlantic relations, its disappearance, in some ways, made it more challenging to uphold the commitments made in the past (Sarotte, 2021). However, the emergence of new sources of concern, such as the unpredictability of the German reunification process, the attempted coup in the USSR in 1991, and the outbreak of ethnic violence in Yugoslavia, allowed the allies to reaffirm the need for NATO as the most efficient means against any threat (Colombo, 2001). As a result, the Alliance redirected its focus to objectives that were considered secondary in the past, and found a modality of adaptation to the new context as expressed in the first post-Cold War Strategic Concept (NATO 1991).

The democratization of several former communist countries, the ethnic cleansing in the Balkan wars, and the early formulations of the so-called "humanitarian intervention" stimulated a new reflection, from which emerged the second Strategic Concept of the 1990s. This document explicitly enunciated the so-called "open door policy", affirmed the need to prevent imminent threats, included humanitarian emergencies among the main menaces to the Alliance's security, and ultimately extended its operational scope beyond the dictates of Articles 5 and 6 of the Washington Treaty [NATO 1999].

However, membership, objectives, and operational scope required a new reassessment in light of the long trail of blood that the jihadist phenomenon would leave behind, starting from September 11, 2001. The presence of an asymmetric threat, completely different from that of the past and capable of subsequently striking in Europe as well, led the member countries to establish new forms of external collaboration to counter terrorism and contribute to stabilizing failing states. At the same time, it convinced them to equip NATO with a rapid Response Force that could be deployed wherever necessary and, consequently, further extended the concept of out-of-area missions (Colombo 2022). This new phase was immortalized in the third post-Cold War Strategic Concept (NATO 2010).

Following the publication of NATO's seventh Strategic Concept, the security environment in the Euro-Atlantic area has experienced a sudden deterioration. This period has witnessed the retrenchment policies of the United States, which have coincided with the mounting revisionist policies the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China (Natalizia and Termine, 2023). In the same period,

challenges from the Southern Flank, particularly those posed by non-state actors like DAESH (Baldelli, 2023), alongside emerging threats from the cyber and space domains (Sguazzini, 2023), have become increasingly worrying. Additionally, the political equilibrium of the European continent has been altered by Brexit, the debate on strategic autonomy, and the American request for burden-sharing among allies (Mazziotti di Celso, 2023). The sum of these factors has once again put NATO to a stress test, perhaps the most intense since the end of the Cold War (Natalizia et al. 2022).

As a result, the publication of a new Strategic Concept has become an unavoidable step for the Alliance's path towards 2030. While the SC22 confirms some of the key elements of the SC10, such as the three core tasks and the importance of the transatlantic bond for shared security (NATO, 2010), it reflects a scenario that is radically different from the past. This transformation is concisely stated in the document, which reads «the Euro-Atlantic area is not at peace» (NATO, 2022, p. 3). Compared to the Cold War era, the heterogeneity of the current threats in terms of means and goals, as well as the wider spectrum of confrontation domains due to technological innovation, necessitate a thorough investigation of various areas, ranging from security and defense to the economy and cooperation, to understand NATO's perspective towards 2030. These points have been fully grasped by the group of experts that has worked on *Out Thinking on NATO 2022 Strategic Concept*, published by the NATO Security Force Assistance Centre of Excellence, by representing the core of its reflection.

After the preliminary insights of Benedetta Berti and Giuseppe Spatafora, who provide the reader with an overview of the present and future challenges facing NATO and unravel the 2022 Strategic Concept to present its most salient topics, the volume is subdivided into four areas of interest.

The first one focuses on security and begins by reflecting on the need to study the Atlantic Alliance's policies and goals in relation to the changes that have occurred in the strategic environment over the long term. Otherwise, the evolution of its stance over time, as effectively illustrated by Falchi and Di Costanzo, would be difficult to understand. The authors offer a historical perspective on the evolution of post-Cold War threats, concluding with the latest changes that have occurred in the strategic

environment. In light of this, Lilla Doucha introduces outer space operations as part of NATO's expanding effort to «prevent, detect, counter, and respond to the full spectrum of threats», as declared in the last Strategic Concept. She particularly emphasizes the role of this domain as a growing enabler and enhancer in NATO's deterrence and defense. On the other hand, Daniele Mancini clearly shows the shift from "security" to "securitization" that took shape with the end of the confrontation with the Soviet Union and the more nuanced aspects of great-power competition in the twenty-first century.

The second area of the volume focuses on the economy. Luca Frusone, on the one side, explains that NATO established a venture capital fund to support innovation and an innovation accelerator called DIANA, becoming aware of the disruptive potential of emerging technologies and the importance of maintaining technological supremacy to achieve success on the battlefield. Alessandro Fanetti, on the other hand, presents the challenges posed in the economic dimension by the BRICS+, a group of countries formed in the mid-2000s by Brazil, Russia, India, and China, and which has been reinvigorated since 2010 with the entry of South Africa and the development of further collaborations with other countries (+). According to the author, these powers repeatedly denounce the inadequacy of the unipolar system in the post-Cold War era and advocate for a shift towards multipolarity. After having introduced NATO's recognition of climate change as a significant challenge for security in the new Strategic Concept, Benedetta Ausili explores its impact on human and national security as well as on military operations.

As for the third area, cooperation, this portion of the volume begins with a contribution signed by Francesco Alimena, where the author analyzes the importance of multilateral cooperation at a historical moment characterized by geopolitical-economic instability and insecurity, as stated in the Strategic Concept 2022. In the following chapter, Guido Lenzi reflects on the complementarity between the EU Strategic Compass and the new NATO Strategic Concept in the face of the current challenges to Euro-Atlantic security, which allow the two organizations to engage together and with more flexibly in "out-of-area" missions. Then, Thorsten Geissler traces the history of multilateralism from its inception to the present day, discussing

its original expectations, failures, and successes. Furthermore, he also ponders the existence of other viable modalities for NATO to interact with non-member states.

Defence is at the core of the present study's fourth area of interest. Giorgio Lazio argues that naval forces offer significant opportunities in the prevention of conflicts and in the development of regional security and stability. For these reasons, according to the author, they can play a pivotal role in favoring mutual trust among allies by the exchange of information and the development of a growing interoperability. George Tzogopoulos, on the other hand, explains why Defense Capacity Building and Security Force Assistance (SFA) have become highly relevant. He emphasizes how multinational entities and think tanks like the SFA Centre of Excellence in Rome have become pillars for the implementation of the Alliance's comprehensive policy and discusses their role in the future of the Alliance, particularly in the aftermath of the Russian aggression of February 24, 2022. Moreover, Michele Pavan reflects on how NATO can prevent crises and provides the reader with an overview of the current and future challenges and opportunities weighing on security in the Euro-Atlantic area. In the following chapter, Axel Ringeisen, Thomas Haslinger, and Francesco Alimena present the outer space as essential for the Alliance's deterrence and defense, emphasizing its capability to provide secure communications, detect missile launches, and ensure effective command and control for NATO. In conclusion, Francesco Bruno and Andrea Franchini analyze and delve into the so-called "forgotten wars" through data, information, and graphs. They argue that these conflicts do not receive much attention from the media, which often only provide a partial overview of the full scenario, but they risk destabilizing the Mediterranean basin.

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NATO's 2022 Strategic Concept: Aware of the Present, Looking to the Future

Benedetta BERTI & Giuseppe SPATAFORA

Abstract

The purpose of the present contribution is to provide an overview of the way NATO is addressing present and future challenges, as presented in the 2022 Strategic Concept. NATO's new Strategic Concept comes at a critical juncture in the Alliance's history, as events such as Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine ushered in a new strategic environment of geopolitical instability .

The structure of the Strategic Concept is divided into two main sections: an analytical section assessing the Alliance's strategic environment and a prescriptive section describing the way the Alliance will move to address threats and challenges. In the Strategic Concept, ample space is devoted to the two main threats facing the Alliance, Russia and terrorism, as well as to the challenge posed by the People's Republic of China. The characteristics of the new security environment are strategic competition, pervasive instability and recurrent shocks. To ensure Allies' collective defence in the face of this security context, the Strategic Concept states that Allies will continue to fulfil NATO's three core tasks, while adapting them: deterrence and defence, crisis prevention and management, and cooperative security.

Keywords

1. Introduction

At the 2022 Madrid Summit, NATO Leaders adopted a new Strategic Concept for the Alliance. The Strategic Concept is NATO's most important guiding document, second only to the North Atlantic Treaty, NATO's founding document, signed in Washington on 4 April 1949. The Concept is an official document that outlines NATO's enduring purpose, core values and fundamental tasks; it reaffirms the enduring values that Allies share and that are at the foundation of the North Atlantic Treaty: individual liberty, democracy and the rule of law. It also further identifies the central features of the security environment, articulates how the Alliance intends to tackle its main threats and challenges, and provides guidelines for its future political and military adaptation.

The Strategic Concept agreed in Madrid is the eighth in NATO's history, and the fourth one in the so-called "post-Cold War era", following those adopted in 1991, 1999 and 2010. The 2022 Concept replaces the one agreed in Lisbon in 2010, which served NATO well for more than a decade. The 2022 Concept was negotiated and agreed by all 30 Allies, under the Secretary General's guidance. It therefore represents an expression of the Allies' collective political will.

NATO's new Strategic Concept comes at a critical juncture in the Alliance's history, as events such as Russia's war against Ukraine, usher in a new strategic environment which requires the adaptation of NATO's core tasks to continue fulfilling its key purpose: "to ensure our collective defence." To that end, the Strategic Concept stresses that NATO needs to be able to fulfil three core tasks: deterrence and defence, crisis prevention and management, and cooperative security. The promotion of good governance and integration of climate change, human security and the Women, Peace and Security agenda are identified as critical for NATO to fulfil all its three core tasks.

The Concept has two main parts: an analytical section assessing the Alliance's strategic environment, and a prescriptive section outlining how NATO should deal with the threats and challenges it faces now and in the immediate future.

2. The analysis: NATO's new strategic environment

The beginning of Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine represented an inflection point in the Alliance's history. At the same time, NATO's security environment had been deteriorating well before Russia's invasion in 2022.

NATO's 2010 Strategic Concept argued that "the Euro-Atlantic area is at peace and the threat of a conventional attack against NATO territory is low." In stark contrast, the 2022 Concept states that "The Euro-Atlantic area is *not* at peace." The Alliance's broader security environment is defined by multiple challenges and by three main trends: "Strategic competition, pervasive instability and recurrent shocks." Authoritarian actors are challenging Allies' interests, values, and democratic way of life. In this contested and unpredictable security landscape, NATO cannot discount the possibility of attacks against Allies' sovereignty and territorial integrity. Therefore, Allies have strongly reaffirmed their commitment to Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which states that "an armed attack on one or more of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack" and to defend each other from all threats, no matter where they stem from.

The 2022 Strategic concept clearly states that the Russian Federation represents "the most significant and direct threat" to the Allies' security. Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine has shattered peace in the Euro-Atlantic area and undermined the rules-based international order, turning back the clock to a world of wars of aggression and spheres of influence. Even before the 24th of February 2022, for years, Russia had adopted a pattern of destabilising behaviour in an attempt to undermine the rules-based international order, and challenge NATO Allies' and partners' security through a mix of conventional, cyber and hybrid means.

As a defensive Alliance, NATO does not pose a threat to Russia and for years, after the end of the Cold War, it sought to build bridges and cooperation with Moscow. Today, although NATO remains willing to maintain open channels of communication with Russia to manage and mitigate risk, as well as to prevent escalation, Russia can no longer be a partner for NATO. The 2022 Strategic Concept stresses that any change in the relationship between the Alliance and the Russian Federation depends on Russia halting its aggressive behaviour and fully complying with international law.

For the first time in NATO's history, the 2022 Strategic Concept also addressed the People's Republic of China. Beijing engages in coercive behaviour against neighbouring countries but also against nations in different parts of the world. China is rapidly expanding its nuclear arsenal, while being opaque about its military modernisation programme and its military-civil fusion strategy. While China is not NATO's military adversary, the 2022 Concept states that its "stated ambitions and

coercive policies challenge our interest, security and values." In particular, China seeks to control "key technological and industrial sectors, critical infrastructure, and strategic materials and supply chains." NATO does remain open to constructive engagement with China. At the same time, Allies will work together to address the systemic challenges posed by Beijing to Euro-Atlantic security.

The Strategic Concept also acknowledges that these two authoritarian actors, Russia and China, are assisting each other in challenging the rules-based international order, seeking to undermine multilateral institutions and norms, and promoting alternative models of authoritarian governance. As a result, NATO's security environment is further shaped by the shifting global geopolitical and geo-economic distribution of power and the resurgence of strategic competition. This competition is simultaneously playing out across the ideological, political, technological and military dimension. For an Alliance that is committed "to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations", authoritarian challenges to the rules-based international order are incredibly consequential.

The 2022 Strategic Concept also stresses that pre-existing threats and challenges have not disappeared. Terrorism is recognized as "the most direct asymmetric threat to the security of our citizens and to international peace and prosperity." The Strategic Concept analyses the evolution of terrorist tactics, capabilities and reach, exacerbated by the advent of new technologies. Pervasive instability is another key characteristic of NATO's security environment. In the Alliance's southern neighbourhood, the Middle East, North Africa and Sahel regions face "interconnected security, demographic, economic and political challenges," which are "aggravated by the impact of climate change, fragile institutions, health emergencies and food insecurity."

The Strategic Concept notes the role of emerging and disruptive technologies in changing the nature of warfare, generating both "opportunities and risks" for the Alliance. State and non-state actors alike resort more frequently to the use of hybrid tactics, including disinformation, economic coercion and cyber-attacks, with effects being felt in Allied countries, in the Alliance's broader neighbourhood, and globally. Cyberspace is "contested at all times," with hostile actors seeking to degrade Allies' cyber capabilities. Meanwhile, strategic adversaries invest in technologies that could impair NATO's access to space, an increasingly relevant operational domain.

Finally, the Concept refers to threats and challenges that have a global impact as well as a Euro-Atlantic one. Arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation regimes are regarded as fields under pressure. The erosion of this architecture contributes to the deterioration of NATO's broader security landscape. Last, but not least, climate change was recognised as "the defining challenge of our time": a crisis and threat multiplier, climate change fuels geostrategic competition, disrupts Allied societies, and can directly affect the way NATO forces operate.

3. The prescription: NATO's purpose and core tasks

The 2022 Strategic Concept is set to guide NATO's adaptation to allow them to navigate this changing security environment, based on the Alliance's values and the importance of the transatlantic bond between Europe and North America to Allied security.

The Concept reaffirms NATO's role as the organizing framework for the collective defence of Allies. It also stresses that NATO remains "the unique, essential and indispensable transatlantic forum" to consult on all matters related to individual and collective security. It is important to remember that NATO plays both a political and a military role. In stressing this dual role, the Strategic Concept restates the principles of the NATO 2030 Agenda, approved by NATO Leaders at the 2021 Brussels Summit, which provided concrete guidelines to strengthen NATO's political role and prepare it for a more competitive world.

The Strategic Concept underscores the key purpose and greatest responsibility of NATO: to ensure the "collective defence of Allies, against all threats and from all directions." To fulfil this purpose, the Concept restates and adapts NATO's three core tasks: deterrence and defence, crisis prevention and management, and cooperative security.

First, the Concept identifies NATO's core task of deterrence and defence as the backbone of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, the commitment that Allies undertake to defend each other against all threats. The Concept acknowledges the real progress made since 2014 to strengthen the Alliance's deterrence and defence posture, while also urging the continued bolstering of Allied presence, forces and capabilities, to credibly and sustainably deter and defend in all domains—air, land and sea, but also in space and cyberspace. The Alliance maintains, in other words, "a 360-degree approach to deterrence and defence."

At the Madrid Summit, Allies made a concrete decision to strengthen deterrence and defence, building on the adaptation undertaken since 2014 and on the further measures implemented since the beginning of Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine. From February 2022 onwards, NATO took rapid measures to activate its defence plans, deploy defensive forces in the eastern part of the Alliance, and establish four new multinational battlegroups in Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania and Slovakia, in addition to the existing battlegroups in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland, which had been in place since 2016. At the Summit, NATO Leaders decided to further enhance this Allied presence on the eastern flank up to brigade level, where and when required. Leaders also adopted a new NATO Force Model that will strengthen and modernise the NATO Force Structure and increase the number of high-readiness forces available to the Alliance. Allies also agreed to enhance collective defence exercises to ensure reinforcement of any Ally on short notice.

Countering terrorism is essential to NATO's deterrence and defence. This is why the Strategic Concept reaffirms NATO's role in fighting terrorism, in line with the Alliance's 360-degree approach to deterrence and defence. Allies will continue to deter and defend against terrorist groups based on a combination of prevention, protection and denial measures. Moreover, NATO will continue to enhance its cooperation with the international community, including the United Nations and the European Union, to "tackle the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism."

The new Strategic Concept describes Allies' commitment to "pursue a more robust, integrated and coherent approach to building national and Alliance-wide resilience against military and non-military threats and challenge." Making efforts to safeguard Allied societies is a national responsibility but it is also a collective commitment, rooted in Article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty, and it underpins all three core tasks. The Concept stresses the importance of boosting resilience and working towards mitigating strategic vulnerabilities and dependencies, with special efforts to ensure critically important reliable energy supply and sources.

The Concept also highlights the importance of ensuring the Alliance's technological edge and protecting against the malign use of emerging and disruptive technologies. To that end, NATO has been heavily investing in its own digital transformation, while adopting new initiatives to promote innovation. At the Madrid

Summit, Allied Leaders launched two initiatives: firstly, the Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic (DIANA), which brings together start-ups and academia to develop dual-use technologies; and secondly, the NATO Innovation Fund, the first multi-sovereign venture-capital fund. At the same time, the Alliance continues to work to monitor and protect against strategic adversaries' use of emerging and disruptive technologies through fostering Allied innovation systems, shaping standards and committing to principles of responsible use that reflect NATO's democratic values and human rights.

The Strategic Concept recognises that many of the challenges NATO faces—from climate change to terrorism, and from cyber threats to disinformation— are often global and require the Alliance to work with partners and maintain an international perspective. This is a fundamental component of NATO's second and third core tasks.

The Concept asserts that NATO's second core task is "crisis prevention and management," emphasising how prevention is "a sustainable way to contribute to stability and Allied security." NATO is committed to prevent and respond to crises when these have the potential to affect Euro-Atlantic security. A key tool in NATO's crisis prevention toolbox is training and capacity-building. This involves programmes that contribute to making partners more capable, more secure and better prepared to respond to crises, both at home and abroad. Allies are also committed to strengthening the resilience of partners against malign interference, destabilisation and aggression. The Alliance has decades' worth of accomplishments in building defence institutions and capacity with partners in their own neighbourhood and beyond. Looking to the future, NATO will build on the lessons learned over the past decades to deepen its expertise and capabilities.

As the Strategic Concept states, "human security, including the protection of civilians and civilian harm mitigation, is central to our approach to crisis prevention and management." NATO will continue to work with other international actors to tackle the root causes of pervasive instability, which often represent a "fertile ground for the proliferation of non-state armed groups" and the conditions fuelling forced displacement, human trafficking and irregular migration.

NATO's third task, cooperative security, stresses the importance of working with other countries to tackle shared challenges and invest in common security.

In this context, the Concept stresses the importance of NATO's open door policy—stated in Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty—affirming that NATO's door open remains open to any European country in a position to undertake the commitments and obligations of membership, and contribute to security in the Euro-Atlantic area. It underscores that the open door has represented a "historic success." Over the years, NATO's enlargement has strengthened the Alliance, ensured the security of millions of European citizens and contributed to peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area. NATO will also continue its practical support to advance the "Euro-Atlantic aspirations" of partners who are aspiring to become members of the Alliance: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia and Ukraine. The Strategic Concept reaffirms that the decision on membership is "taken by NATO Allies and no third party has a say in this process."

The Strategic Concept highlights how cooperation with NATO's partners makes the Alliance stronger and contributes to "stability beyond our borders." Central to the protection of the global commons, partnerships contribute to enhance NATO's resilience and support the rules-based international order. NATO will continue to strengthen ties with partners that "share the Alliance's values and interest in upholding the rules-based international order."

The Strategic Concept also places a premium on cooperation with international organisations, especially with the European Union. The Alliance recognises "the value of a stronger and more capable European defence that contributes positively to transatlantic and global security and is complementary to, and interoperable with NATO." NATO and the EU will therefore continue to expand their strategic partnership, strengthen political consultation and increase cooperation on issues of common interest.

The Concept also mentions the strategic importance of the Western Balkans and the Black Sea region, where NATO will continue to support partners, bolster their capabilities, and assist against "malign third-party interference and coercion." The Alliance will also continue to work with partners in regions of strategic interest, such as the Middle East and North Africa and the Sahel regions. Finally, the Concept states that "the Indo-Pacific is important to NATO," because security developments in that region have the potential to affect Euro-Atlantic security. Consequently, Allies will strengthen dialogue and cooperation with partners in the Indo-Pacific to tackle cross-regional challenges and shared security interests.

Finally, the Strategic Concept states NATO's ambition to "become the leading international organisation when it comes to understanding and adapting to the impact of climate change on security." The Alliance contributes to combating climate change by reducing greenhouse gas emissions, improving energy efficiency, investing in the transition to clean energy and leveraging green technologies.

4. A roadmap for the future

As "the most successful Alliance in the world" and the organizing framework for the collective defence of all Allies, NATO needed a new document to set the direction of travel for the Alliance to continue adapting to a world of rising strategic competition. With the 2022 Strategic Concept, NATO Allies agreed to a blueprint that guides the adaptation of the Alliance to meet present and future challenges to its security.

To ensure NATO's continued success, the Alliance has to take a number of actions. The Concept spells these out in its concluding section.

Firstly, it will be paramount to maintain transatlantic unity and cohesion in the face of complex security challenges. Allies will need to continue to stand together to defend "our security, values, and democratic way of life." This is true in all issue areas that affect Allied security, from continued support of Ukraine in their defence against Russian aggression, to sending a strong message of deterrence to potential adversaries and competitors, and to cooperation with partners to tackle all-encompassing challenges.

Secondly, the Strategic Concept states that political consultations will remain an essential tool in a more complex world of simultaneous threats and challenges. Allies should continue to deepen consultations within NATO "to address all matters that affect our security." NATO Allies also committed to reinforce consultations "when the security and stability of an Ally is threatened or when our fundamental values and principles are at risk."

Thirdly, it will be essential to ensure that Allies "share equitably responsibilities and risks" in a more complex and dangerous security environment. Here, the Concept reaffirms Allies' commitment to invest in defence and meet the commitments of the Defence Investment Pledge. It also stressed the need to build on these to ensure a continued upward trajectory when it comes to defence spending and NATO common funding. These commitments will make the Alliance better equipped, and resourced, to fulfil its role as the essential transatlantic forum for political consultation on security matters and to effectively address challenges and threats to the security of Allies.

SECURITY AREA

Security challenges in a hybrid world

Daniele MANCINI

Abstract

The world is experiencing a great transition, a gigantic power shift: no country, region or model is any longer able to prevail over the others, giving birth to a *hybrid system* in which coexist diverging visions.

A few years ago, *Foreign Affairs Magazine* issued an essay whose title was: "*What kind of world we are living in?* They proposed six worlds. Realist: geopolitics is here to stay; Liberal-globalist: any world order must be democratic and market oriented; Tribal-fundamentalist: terrorist and identity-oriented; Marxist: going back to plan-economy vis-à-vis failure of liberal-capitalism; Technological: techno-sciences are the answers to the new challenges; Ecological: the old clichés are over; the clear and present challenge is the environment.

The point of this writer: it is all of them at the same time and a lot more, since we are at the entrance gate of the future. This is the reason in this essay our world is called *hybrid*. Now is the time to interpret, connect, synthetize the fluid nature of our fast-changing planet, where gigantic forces are interacting, like tectonic plates colliding with each other, shaping the present and anticipating multiple, alternative futures where antithetical visions of modernity and values systems will compete.

Our planet is burning, and nature is suffocating while Homo Sapiens is picnicking on the edge of the abyss, anaesthetized by consumerism, indifferent to the crumbling of the commonwealth foundations. We experience a sense of vertigo: imagine a spinner swirling out of control, gaining momentum, and getting closer and closer to the edge of the table, risking at any moment to falling. This is not a rhetoric image, but the crude representation of our hybrid world.

Everything around us is shifting. Familiar values and landscapes, lasting for generations, are quickly dissolving. We walk in a *terra incognita*, which looks more to the XIX century than to the last part of the XX. An unknown land where the confrontation among great powers is becoming the new normality against the background of the agony

of multilateralism; where the challenges to the open societies and democracy are enormous; where the twin concepts of modernity and progress have been severely hurt by the Covid pandemic, leaving behind them a sense of fragility and vulnerability; where technology is becoming more and more pervasive; where interconnections and interdependencies among people, companies and states are growing despite de-globalization's sirens; where the protagonism of the individual personhood seems unstoppable.

History is like an open sea where waves follow one after the other. The Sixties started a Liberal Cycle- the *Age of rights*: triumph of democracy, border opening, globalization, internet, the inception of the EURO, multiculturalism. Now the flow is in reverse mode. Conservativism is taking over from liberalism: border closing, refuse of multiculturalism, stall of globalization, resurgence of nationalistic identities, populism, and protectionism. Change *vs.* continuity. The strengths of inertia and status quo are powerful but so the force of change. Honestly, none knows which ones will prevail.

Despite appearances, we must not become prey to a sense of despair. The Nobel laureate Ilya Prigogine remembered us: "*we cannot anticipate the future, but we can prepare it*". To do it, we must learn to read the world around us, to anticipate and govern the change because history has never a white page. We must be ready for the unthinkable because it will happen, as shown by the CV 19 pandemic and Russian invasion of Ukraine.

A colossal *U-turn* is undergoing, and none could stop it. We can only jump into uncharted waters and try to keep afloat. To do so, we need to identify *ad hoc* strategies, agents for change, values for a new *global agenda*. In short, "*look behind the line of the horizon*", as Jacques Attali used to say. Therefore, we should get rid of the clichés and parameters of the XX century, of the old-fashioned conventional wisdom, of the accumulated prejudices. We should avoid continuing interpreting the world with mono-dimensional lens, while it has become irreversibly multi-dimensional, multi-ethnic, multi-polar.

In an era when everybody believes that the answers are more important than the questions, a few believe the opposite: the correct questions originate the proper responses. At the same time, right before proposing solutions, we need to develop the appropriate analysis. With humility but also determination: no one is an expert on everything, from

international relations to AI, from nanotechnology to big data to genetics. No one is therefore capable of connecting all the dots and seeing the full picture, nobody can absorb all the latest scientific discoveries. But we must find a way to slow down the swirling of the spinner.

The thesis debated in this essay is that we should establish a different order of priorities vis-à-vis the multiple security issues disrupting the planet. Among them, those related to military issues and conflicts – present and potential – while alarming and potentially fatal, are neither the principal nor the most worrying. The Russian aggression against Ukraine and its will to redraft the European security architecture, the Chinese military threats to Taiwan and their quest for global supremacy, Taliban's takeover of Afghanistan, conflicts in Libya, Sudan, and Yemen, all are major blows to the international order, but they do not represent potentially devastating risks for the survival of humankind.

In 1993 The Economist magazine run this column: "*humanity would better do to carefully watch the skies*" (at the time the knowledge of asteroids was inadequate). They asked: "why has humankind been worried about nuclear war or nuclear accidents (Chernobyl had occurred a few years before) and not of disruptive volcanic eruptions, devastating earthquakes, impact of large asteroids, spreading of lethal viruses?" This led the Swedish philosopher Nick Bostrom to establish the "*Future for Humanity Institute*" at Oxford University, dealing with the so-called "*Existential risks*", those "*threatening the destruction of humanity's long-term potential*".

The Existential Risks are multiplying. Consider only the last twenty years: from a devastating Tsunami in Asia in 2004 to a nuclear incident at Fukushima, to a string of epidemics, such as Ebola, SARS, and now CORONAVIRUS pandemic, with its over 6 million casualties so far, to the rapidly deteriorating climate change, the widening gap between the have and have nots, the info-yes and info-not, the future of Strong Artificial Intelligence, rapid urbanization engulfing the megacities….

Geostrategy, today, is a much more complex Lego puzzle than it used to be, resulting of dozens of different variables. The threats of nuclear annihilation, nuclear proliferation and devastating wars remain real and a paramount cause of concern; but the clock is approaching midnight also for many other and not directly military-related challenges, to which we pay less attention, or consider "Acts of God". While nuclear

Armageddon might never materialize, the melting of the Polar ice caps will certainly happen within the lifespan of a couple of generations.

Keywords

Power Shift

Hybrid System

Age of rights

Geostrategy

Security Challenges in a Hybrid World

Age of Resilience

Global Agenda

Age of Divergence

Multilateralism

1. **The challenges are not ahead of us, they are here**

In this century, we are likely to change the world beyond recognition, for the better and for the worse.

In our age obesity kills more than famine: 1 billion people are oversize vs. 850 million underfed; robots are taking out of the market millions of jobs; more people commit suicide than are killed in wars; drugs addiction is more serious than traditional illnesses; more people die from old age than from infectious diseases. Acclaimed author Yuval Noah Harari stresses that sugar is more dangerous than gunpowder and Coca Cola and McDonalds are far more deadly than Al Qaeda.

If we consider, if not totally share, this provocative but effective view, we realize that we are rushing towards the *Great Unknown* without emergency brakes. Thus, we should alter the way we see the world around us, not to say we should reinterpret what we think of ourselves. In short: to think in ways we had never thought before. For geo-strategists and political analysts, for example, it would mean to expand their knowledge, to include other disciplines, such us – among others - philosophy, psychology, computer science, biology, bioengineering, information technology, etc.

Once upon a time the future was much simpler: the "*good old days*", when the Transatlantic bond was indisputable; Germanies were two; the Warsaw Pact was at the highest, the Soviet Union was still alive; North Korea and Pakistan weren't nuclear; Khomeini was still in Paris; the EU was composed by nine members; China has not yet gone skyrocket; South Africa lived in apartheid, nobody knew about climate change, there were no personal computers, cellular phones, internet. Where the San Francisco Declaration was signed by 50 States, humanity totalled 2,5 billion people, colonialism still suffocated the South of the world. It was the world where Lord Ismay, the first Secretary General of NATO, could say: "*the purpose of NATO is to keep the Soviet out, the Americans in and the Germans down*"; and where the UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold declared that the "*United Nations was not created to bring humanity to heaven, but to save it from hell*".

It was politically and geostrategically comfortable but a morally repugnant world, rightly destined to the dustbin of History…. Yet it was *manageable*, predictable in its strategies; with a conservative Soviet Union, a still silent South of the globe, a rural India

suffocated by bureaucracy, China still infested with President Mao gigantic portraits. Nuclear Armageddon was the only alternative to that world.

With the passing of the century, new challenges took the place of old ones: shifting balance of power, climate change and resource scarcity, flows of refugees, demographics and growing social disparities, rapid urbanization, cyberwars and terrorism, pandemic waves, soaring public deficit, hyper-inflation, populism, protectionism, de-globalization, unbelievable technological breakthrough, arm-twisting between democracy and autarchy, low-intensity local conflicts which automatically have global repercussions. Some, if not all, of these challenges are fatal and could impact the destiny of *Homo Sapiens.*

Human incapacity to come to terms with this reality is due to a *cognitive deficit*, an adaptative failure to understand a new environment and manage it. This induces apathy or anger. We feel like running on a *tapis-roulant*: going from nowhere to nowhere. When Lehman Brothers originated the near meltdown of the world financial system in 2008, or when the Covid pandemic hit, or when we witness to the liquefaction of the polar ices, we speak of a *black swan* event. Forgetting that signals were everywhere to be understood; forgetting the warnings launched, among many others, over fifty years ago, by Paul Ehrlich with" The *Population Bomb*", Rachel Carson with" The *Silent Spring*", not to speak of the "*Limits to Growth*" - a ground-breaking study challenging the conventional wisdom - warning that the economic growth could not continue indefinitely because of resource depletion and exponential population growth. The MIT study concluded: "*if the world's consumption patterns and population growth continued at the same high rates of the time, the earth would strike its limits within a century"*. Half of it already gone.

Confronted with colossal forces of disaggregation and aggregation, centripetal and centrifugal trends, a depressing and dangerous short-term vision has permeated our élites - our political and intellectual leaderships. Unable as they are to think ahead of time, they continue to study the Westphalia Peace, the Vienna Congress, the Versailles peace Treaty, the Chart of San Francisco, the Yalta agreement looking for inspiration: they seem reassuring to them, as they are unalterable. Incapable to perceive "*l'ésprit des temps*", they put aside dramatic decisions. How different the atmosphere today *vis-à-vis* the Seventies and Eighties, when the *Future Studies* were introduced, when it was fashionable to reason in terms of "*projecting the future*", as the *Club of Rome* used to do. We will not

get through this until we realize that the *eleventh hour* is here, that no individual, no nation – doesn't matter how powerful it is – could alone solve all the trans-borders mega issues confronting humanity, those sets of change enormous in impact, unprecedented in magnitude, unstoppable in development. They are trends of enormous power, which change forever the environment where they happen, altering the profile of the society where they get manifested.

The élites mistakenly believed that with the *End of History* and the triumph of liberal democracy (the notorious thesis proclaimed by Fukuyama) humanity was heading towards the Kantian *Perpetual Peace*. With the Cold War over, there was a general expectation that China and Russia would move inexorably into a post-war mentality, and merge into the Western political and economic system: it was the naïve but widespread hope for an era of global convergence. The driving idea was that in a globalized world, nations would have no choice but to liberalize if they wanted to compete and survive.

It didn't happen. According to author Robert Kagan, we are now back in a world of clashing national interests and ambitions, like the XIX century. The collaborative world of the *after the end of communist era* and of the *Western universal views* were a mirage that never materialized. The end of the illusions struck us like a bullet: History had only taken a pause, the river had made several twirls, but remained the same. The new normality is the *age of divergence*.

The Kosovo crisis and September 11, at the turn of the new century, were the first signs of a sinister shipwreck, heading to the deep crisis of the triple *Western Creed*: liberal democracy, free trade, and multilateralism. Shattered the illusion of the Kantian perpetual peace, the world was about to become, once again, Hobbesian.

This interpretation is realistic, reasonable, but also conventional. We *have already been there and known that.* It is time to think *out of the box* and to move on. According to a McKinsey and WEF analysis, our world's rapidity of change is 300 times broader than in the age of the First Industrial Revolution, and its impact is felt 3000 times more. We should at last realize the world is tri-dimensional and look not at the next year but at the next 20, 30, 50. A world where the Indo-Pacific region might well displace the Transatlantic centrality and where climate warming makes fertile North Canada and Siberia and risks to desertify the Mediterranean.

To take home the point of the urgent need to approach the hybrid world with the lens of *complexity* and using the *System Thinking methodology*, let us browse, without any claim of completeness, through reports edited by the United Nation Agencies, the World Bank, the IMF, the OCDE, BlackRock, WEF, Deloitte, McKinsey, the Credit Suisse.

Among the most relevant emerging megatrends, the following are worth considering, stressing that each one of them implies *multiple and dramatic security challenges*.

How to keep India and China outside of the *G-7* club, when they are the two most populous nations in the world, both nuclear, the second and the fifth largest economies on the planet, and South Korea has just passed Italy in the hierarchy of the ten most developed economies?

When climate change is being discussed, most observers consider the future of New York City or Venice, but few think to the Maldives, which is 30 cm above sea level; or to Muslim Bangladesh – 170 million people – whose inhabitants, in case of inundation, could only migrate to Hindu Bengal (an entirely new branch of International Right is to be urgently coined). Global warming will drive millions of people out of Sahel and push them to the shore of the Mediterranean, putting in jeopardy the lives and lifestyle and cultural identity of entire regions. At the COPS 27 held in Cairo in 2022, 1000 scientists issued a warning, saying that the commitment of 1.5% reduction of CO_2 emission by 2100, is no longer tenable.

Water, with data, is becoming the oil of the XXI century. Shortage is already the number one risk for the world stability, according to WEF. The Brahmaputra River, one of mightiest in the world, is being obstructed by innumerable dams, igniting potential wars among the several countries it flows past; the same happens to the Nile, between Egypt and Sudan. Floods in Pakistan, in 2022, hit over 33 million people, as much as the total population of Austria, Switzerland and Belgium.

By 2050 there will be a 60% increase in food demand. A dramatic struggle between the *have* and *have nots* is looming at the horizon: consider what impact had on developing countries a limited suspension of wheat exports from the Ukraine, caused by Russian aggression. In sharp contrast, every year more than one billion tons of food are destroyed.

Every second (3600 per hour) 4 births and 2 deaths are registered around the planet, which means that every year there are 82 million more living people. In 2022, the world population reached 8 billion, doubling in 40 years, and adding 1 billion in the last ten years: this increase is due exclusively to developing countries. On the other hand, what looms at the beginning of the next century is a demographic winter, with a dramatically rapid birth rate drop. The African population today totals 1.5 billion people, against less than 500 million Europeans; in 2050 it will be 2.5 billion, with 450.90% of people under 25 living in emerging countries.

10% of the world population lives below the absolute poverty line: increasing economic, social, and cultural inequalities are exploding *among* and *within* countries, fomenting populism, xenophobia, nativism. By 2050, 90% of the world's middle class will be in the Developing Countries.

Urbanization is an undervalued challenge: 56% of world population lives in cities, but it will be 70% by 2050. 1.5 million people move to cities every week. 9000 new cities must be built by 2050 - 4000 houses per hour. London grew by 7 times, between 1800 and now, but Dhaka, Kinshasa, and Lagos grew 40 times; Seoul went from 1 to 22, Cairo from 2.5 to 14. The Chinese city of Chongqing has 35 million inhabitants, and its municipality stretches over 30.000 square km (1/10 of the size of Italy). Imagine the problems for food and water supply, garbage disposal, not to mention the future potential pandemic-contrasting problems.

The future of the megacities is a troubling phenomenon, since globalization altered, in an irreversible way, the Nation-State concept and the social fabric. Author Saskia Sassen considers the so-called Global Cities essential nodes in the financially globalized economy: the fulcrum of innovation but also a magnet of inequalities, often segregating the wealthy and the poor. They host stock exchange/universities/large corporations/governmental Institutions/NGOs and are more interconnected among themselves than with the states they belong to. The global and geopolitical relevance of the "*C 40 Circuit*" has become particularly evident on climate change and mitigation management, since cities are both the problem and the solution for these challenges. In 1950 there were only 2 cities with more than 10 million inhabitants, today there are 21, and in 2050, there will be 50. In 2050, the population of the Federal District of Mexico

City will total half the Mexican population and will be more numerous than of all Australia. The District Tokyo-Osaka-Kyoto alone hosts 2/3 of the Japanese population.

Terrorism, perpetrated by violent non-State actors – independent of governments – is taking a thousand lives per year. It is composed by a variegated galaxy of criminal organizations, drugs cartels and insurgency movements. In Western countries it makes the headlines only when it hits our cities, but it is a widespread phenomenon in developing countries too. Terrorism is also being becoming digital. Cognitive warfare is becoming more and more relevant. Violent extremist political groups use cyberspace to promote cognitive-intelligence activities.

Armed conflicts are alarmingly growing. During the Cold War, the two Super-Powers managed to control their associates and client governments, but with the end of the bipolar world, conflicts have become *routine*. To name a few: Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, Somalia, Sudan, Myanmar, Libya, Pakistan, Yemen, Ethiopia.

The world economy in 2050 will be 30 times larger than it was in 1950 (but the Planet Earth remains only one…). In 1945 the USA produced 50% of global GDP, today 50% comes from the Global South. Four out of the first ten major economies in the world are Asian: China, Japan, India, Korea. In 2030 Germany will be the only European economy among the first 10. In 2000, 95% of the *Fortune Global 500* were in the West, in 2025, China alone will have more than the USA and EU combined. In 2025 the Chinese city of Tianjin will produce the same GDP as Sweden (625 billion $).

Robotization, leaving aside its technological and economic aspects, has immense and untested ethical implications. Homo Sapiens have always worked to make a living: "*you will earn your bread by the sweat of your brow*" (The Bible). What could happen when he will be side-lined by always increasingly intelligent and intrusive machines?

Once upon a time social divarication occurred between different generations. Now the divide also occurs inside the same generation. The political and social discourse concerns less and less so-called blue and white collars. Today the ground has shifted between the *infoyes* and the *infonot*. The first live in the so-called *infosphere*, the others are relegated to the side-lines: a scenario already imagined by Fritz Lang in *Metropolis,* Huxley in *Brave New World*, not to mention *Blade Runner.* Multiple humankinds in the making.

Addictions – drugs, alcohol, tobacco – are among the most dangerous threats of our age. Some of them publicly condemned, some others tolerated, some even advertised. They should not be taken lightly since they represent both an ethical issue and a heavy burden for State welfare schemes. Not to mention the related illnesses, in 2019, drugs use took 500,000 lives, tobacco 8.7 million and alcohol 2.4.

What about future pandemics? Most certainly the *CV 19* – with its 6 million casualties - will not be the last: since the 2000s already four have succeeded. Will we be prepared next time?

Data with Artificial Intelligence is the core of the Forth and Fifth Industrial Revolutions. While it is are so helpful to us, it also irreversibly penetrates our intimacy, violates our privacy. Where do we trace the *red line*? Technology is pervasive, it is all *around* us but soon it will be *inside* us: we are about to embark in an era where the separate evolution of man and machine will cease and we will enter the *age of co-evolution* with AI: real "self" with "virtual" self. "*What comes next*?", was discussed at the World Economic Forum, in Davos, in 2016: "*the 4th Industrial Revolution changes not only what we do, but also what we are, changing the nature of mankind*". Genetic manipulation and synthesis biology are redesigning the world, while civil society, parliaments and churches are always late in deliberating on these issues.

Potentially higher risks are associated with Artificial Intelligence which, accidentally or intentionally, could get out of hand. Nick Bostrom, at Oxford, sees tremendous opportunities in AI but also high risks, today under-evaluated. The developments of how AI will provide humankind with opportunities are inconceivable. But today are we sure that we shall be able to govern a "*super-intelligent structure*" after we create it? How much time will that super-intelligent AI take to outpace human intelligence? Once AI reaches humankind level of intelligence, all it would need is a "*small further step*" to "*take off exponentially*" giving birth to structures unreachable for humanity (a *singularity* event). In this spirit he co-signed an *Open Letter* with reputed scientists – such as astrophysicist Stephen Hawking – to warn governments.

Behind most of the threats, there are opportunities. Some of them are double-edged swords. Just take an example: people live longer lives. Who couldn't be happy? But, while the lengthening of life expectancy is good, it also increases pressure on resources and the environment.

The intellectual debate is overheated. Professor Martin Rees, the British Royal astronomer, in his "*the Final Century*", wrote that ours could be the last generation on the face of the Earth: humankind only has a 50% chance to reach the XXII century. In 2012, Sir John Beddington, the UK Government Chief Scientist, issued a report where he predicted that by the year 2030 the world would risk a "*perfect storm*", as the world's population grows, competition for food, water and energy will increase. James Lovelock, the author of the "*Gaia Theory*" (from the ancient name of "Mother Earth"), postulates that the Earth acts as a living organism which reacts to changes in its environment. He is pessimistic: though some sensibility about the environment is diffusing in governments and public opinion, it may be too late to prevent a global decline into a chaotic world. As the polar caps melt and the global temperature rises, we are fast approaching the point of no return. Sustainable development is no longer a viable option and the only option left to humankind is a sustainable retreat. According to Professor Stephen Pinker, teaching at Stanford, the idea of progress is not obsolete: life, health, prosperity, security, peace, knowledge, and happiness are all on the rise across the world, because of reason and science (see his brilliant book: "*Enlightenment now: the case for reason, science, humanism and progress*").

We can safely conclude that if the opportunities are multiplying, so are the risks: the security challenges are not *ahead of* us, they are *among us*. Nuclear Armageddon would happen in a flash. The above challenges would not, but their impact would be, at least, as devastating.

2. Since a new global order is not in sight, better to work on a global agenda

On our hybrid planet, the élites use Kerosene for travelling and ordinary people go on diesel - according to philosopher and sociologist Bauman - never crossing their respective paths. Different and often alternative cultural values and political and geo-strategic models, which are all competing for supremacy, are interacting and combating.

The cultural conformism of the establishment's guardians should be rejected: the genie burst out of the bottle, and it is impossible to close it inside again. If the old Liberal Order had not had its day, we wouldn't be here to ponder how to create a new one. One the most illustrious interpreters of the establishment, *Foreign Affairs Magazine*, calls the International Order a *shopping mall*, where you enter and pick up what you need, instead

of a club, where you have rules to be respected: shared values, responsibilities, obligations.

To this season, do not apply the several acclaimed theories proposed in the last decades, from the *Clash of Civilizations* (Samuel Huntington) to the *undisputed supremacy of the Liberal Model* (Francis Fukuyama), to the *Comeback of the Grand Powers* (Robert Kagan). We must be creative and unconventional, because we are living in one of those rare *Reset Moments*, where the impossible may become possible, and unexplored new avenues open. This has not always been the case in the aftermaths of great disrupting events: Vienna Congress and Versailles Peace were conservative (and vindictive), San Francisco Chart, the CECA and WTO were progressive and forthcoming but today they represent the ripe fruits of a different and bygone world: not replicable.

On a cold February 24, 2022, Russia decided to turn the tables and dismantle decades of East-West *détente*: the geopolitical seismograph is signalling shockwaves on an unprecedent scale after Moscow's invasion of Ukraine, which is putting in jeopardy the *triple framework* established in Europe after World War II: Yalta 1945, the 1975 CSCE Helsinki Accords, Berlin 1989. Particularly frightening is the Moscow's violation of all the articles of the *Declaration on Principles Guiding Relations between Participating States* signed in Helsinki: sovereign equality; respect for the rights inherent in sovereignty; refraining from the threat or use of force; inviolability of frontiers; territorial integrity of states; peaceful settlement of disputes; non-intervention in internal affairs; respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief; equal rights and self-determination of peoples; co-operation among States; fulfilment in good faith of obligations under international law. As a result, a new *Grand Scheme* of the European security architecture must see the light once the war is over. It will not be an easy endeavour and could not be limited to picking up the shattered pieces and gluing them together. But, while the Russian revanchism, irreversibly turned towards the past, is dangerous and is cause of deep concern, is with China, India, black Africa, the Global South, all oriented to the future, and with the trans-border megatrends not ideologically driven, that we shall mainly come to terms for the rest of the century.

Here comes again the old, and mostly unanswered, Leninist question: *What to do*? We may have, after all, a few utensils in our toolbox.

First, *understand one's own priorities*. The Greek philosopher Seneca wrote: "*it is no use to know where the wind blows if one does not know where to go*". It was true yesterday and stands true today, above all in times of Western crisis of identity: the landscape around us is no longer the one we shaped; thus, we do not know where to go and how to get there.

Second, *learn to think ahead of* time and of the competitors. History always punishes who is late: see what Gorbachev said in East Berlin to President Honecker.

Third, *watch carefully what is happening in places where sea-changes are occurring*. Understand the elements of discontinuity and rupture. Singapore and Dubai are becoming global cities, undermining the role of London and New York.

Forth, *identify the key global actors of the XXI century*. Most of them are non-institutional entities, such as NGOs, lobbies, transnational corporations, organized movements, megacities, empowered individuals, celebrities.

Fifth*: hold nerves under control*, since the only certainty of the *Hybrid Era* is that there is *no certainty* (Edgar Morin). Therefore, look at the *Longue Durée* (Fernand Braudel). It is not the first time that the *Decline of the West* is predicted: there is a well-established tradition, going back to Oswald Spengler and before. It is not written in the stone that the autocracies will overcome the democracies: disastrous post pandemic follow ups in China; astonishingly poor Russian handling of their aggression of Ukraine; Iranian brutal repression of protest movements, Taliban obscurantism, are all signs that authoritarian regimes, incapable of internal dialectic and self-correction, are far less efficient than democracies. Open societies are, by all standards, better than closed ones. History is an open book, filled with surprises, and each generation writes a page.

Sixth: it is imperative to become conscious that *the trans-border megatrends will not be solved by any nation alone*, no matter how powerful, be it the USA, China, the EU. And not even by a value system or a political-military alliance alone.

33 years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the end of the Cold War and the dream of President Bush Sr. and Secretary of State Baker 3rd of a *New World Order*, we still don't have a name for the historical period in which we live. The only thing we know for sure is that the *Liberal World Order*, born after World War II, was a Western-driven one, and is in deep crisis: values such as democracy, human rights, free circulation, religious and cultural pluralism are challenged. How do we react? We believe it would be sufficient

to replace the Old International Order with a "*2.0 Version*" (WTO, COPS, G-20 etc), based on the same paradigms and actors, just a little *expanded*. But it does not work that way. Today, the traditional geostrategic world stage – governments, military, intelligence, diplomacy, experts – is being coupled and often left behind by non-traditional actors. *More bottom up* than *top down*.

Above all, we should be honest with ourselves. Most of the models created by the West after the end of the Cold War have been unsuccessful: the *Western Universalism* - representing the view that the West incapsulates modernity and all the world - will turn to Western-style liberalism; the *American Unipolarism*, burnt in the terrorist attack to the Twin Towers in New York; the *Liberal Imperialism*, aiming at making the world Western-similar with democracy exporting; the *Fortress West*, isolating the West from the Rest of the world; the *World Cosmopolitanism*, based on the belief that the world cultures will converge, since for centuries, to be modern has meant to be Western.

The West has massively intruded on other civilizations, by force of arms, economic expansion, power of communication. Consumerism, Western brands, Hollywood movies, popular music have worldwide appeal, but it is skin-deep, it is a quick fix of modernity. To many people outside the West, our values are still alien, in many cases abhorrent: materialism ad individualism are rejected. Patterns of thought are deeply rooted in history, geography, religion and cannot be swapped at will. Japan, Taiwan, Korea, Eastern European countries are *modern*, and therefore we, in the West, believe they are *just like us*, Westerners. When we feel at home in a shopping mall in Singapore or we eat pizza in Delhi, we believe that all the world has become *Westernized* and shares our same values, those which we call universal. But it is a mistake: Japanese or Brazilians do not consider themselves Westerners, but *global,* so they do not feel assimilated to the West.

We need to respect diversity: the world is not going to become Western, nor a melting pot, like it or not: diversity and divergence are here to stay. To be accepted we must accept other's views. To try to impose Western values and lifestyles by force is illiberal and futile.

For two centuries the Nations of the *Global South* - from Iran to Japan, from China to Argentina, from Egypt to Mexico - have been bystanders in world history, objects and not subjects, reacting defencelessly to the surge of Western commerce, thought, and

power. That era is coming to an end. Asia – but not only - is returning to the centre stage it occupied for eighteen centuries before the rise of the West. Peoples and nations from the *Rest of the world* have absorbed and understood Western best practices in many areas, from free-market economics to the embrace of innovative science and technology, meritocracy, and the rule of law. And they have become innovative in their own way, creating new patterns of cooperation not seen in the West. Their rise is unstoppable.

The autocracies are not sitting on their hands. They are trying to forge an alternative Order to the Western one. China, Russia, Iran, Turkey, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, are at the forefront of this effort. They all seek a post-Western Order, making the world safe for autocracy. The Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov stated it clearly: *"for the first time in many years, a real competitive environment has emerged on the market of ideas between different value systems and development models and the good news is that the West is losing its monopoly on the globalization process"*. President Xi reiterated the idea: "*the East is rising; the West is declining*". They are demanding an Order based on distinct spheres of influence: they oppose not only unipolarity but also universality. For Russia and China, the making of a new world order is not simply a matter of raw power, it is also a battle of ideas: they insist that different cultural traditions and civilizations should be allowed to develop in different ways. But, while Russia aspires to be reintegrated as one of the world's great powers, China contemplates displacing the USA as the world's pre-eminent power.

This dispute shall not be solved overnight: it will go on for generations. And it is not sure the West will win the day: see the vote of condemnation of the Russian aggression to Ukraine at the UNGA, where the vast part of the Global South abstained.

We should be aware that to give birth to a New World Order, above all if global, is a daunting endeavour. The Chart of San Francisco was signed by 50 states, representing 2.5 billion inhabitants. Today, we live in a world composed by 200 states, 6000 nations, with hundreds of thousands of active NGOs, and with a population of 8 billion. History suggests that new governing systems emerge after seismic events, such as wars: the Peace of Westphalia was signed after the Thirty Years War and the Congress of Vienna gathered upon conclusion of the Napoleonic epopee; Peace of Versailles was concluded after the defeat of the Central Empires; the United Nations was established after the *debellatio* of Nazi-Fascism; the reunification of Europe occurred when the Berlin Wall fell and the

Soviet flag was lowered from the Kremlin (for President Putin "*the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the XX century"*). But this time, with nuclear nukes around, we cannot afford to run the risk, and, above all, time is running out.

As an innovative case study, we examine an essay wrote by the former Director of the Policy Planning at the State Department, Anne-Marie Slaughter with Princeton Professor Gordon LaForge, published in *Foreign Affairs Magazine* on March 2021: "*Opening up the Order*". A peculiar and far-sighted interpretation: give birth to a network of multilateralism, and the Liberal Order would be expanded vertically and horizontally. Not a collection of nation-states that communicate through government officials, nor a gang of NGOs, but a governance through a complex global web of governing networks. All the way up to the UNGA and G-7 and G-20 and down to "*Friday for Future"* and "*Black Lives Matter"* movements.

The authors question the "*Realpolitik back in vogue*" heading towards a re-edition of the Cold War and all the major geostrategic formulas today on the table in the Western circles: from the "*Great Power Comeback*" to the "*New Concert of Powers*", all incapable of tacking the "*hydra-headed*" problems of the XXI century. Their point: the best way to guarantee the world's prosperity and security would not be to limit it to democratic countries but to involve and expand the action and scope of the civil society at the global level (corporate, civil society, ONG, scientific actors, educational) and to have it working with the governments. XXI centuries' challenges - from cyberconflicts to pandemics, from climate change to social inequalities - cannot be addressed without mobilizing a new set of actors: existing institutions were built for a world of concentrated power, in which only a few powers called the shots. Therefore, the moment has come to make room for new categories of nonstate actors. This is not new: issues reserved only to national governments have been shifting inexorably to business and international organizations and non-governmental organizations. But now the movement accelerates: the geography of global economic power is shifting towards non-state actors.

The authors conclude their essay with a nice image: children learn to see the world divided into States, with borders. Growing, they realize that this is only one way to visualize the international system; satellite pictures of the world at night show clusters of lights, indicating the interconnectedness of humanity. Both images are important: the first portrays the state-based international order - visible, organized, demarcated. The latter

illustrates the webs of business, civil society organizations, foundations, universities, and many other actors.[1] The two exist side-by-side. The advantage of States Is that they are the depository of legitimacy of sovereign representation. The advantage of the civil society is that it is participatory, innovative, and effective.

In ordinary times, the history of humankind is like a movie in slow motion: you can normally anticipate the next frame. But now the scene radically changes, as if we were watching a new movie. We are in one of those extraordinary moments, a plastic moment in human history, where we cannot anticipate neither the next frame, nor the film's ending. Earlier we wrote of a *Reset Moment*. The present might be one of those. Therefore, it could be easier to speak of a *Global Agenda* instead of a *Global Order*: trans-border mega issues such as climate change, the aging of population, de-globalization, migratory flows, and tackling terrorism are not ideologically driven and could represent a common ground, favouring cooperation over confrontation among North and South, West and East.

3. Cold war 2.0 and security architectures

It is widely assumed that we are already immersed – or about to embark in – a nascent Cold War, call it the *2.0 Version*. According to this thesis, the present one is going to soon become global and lasting for generations: a multigenerational winter in the making.

There is a large consensus that *Cold War 2.0* could not be a replica of the first one, which was played inside the horizon of the same values. The two camps were ideological and political by-products of the same XIX and XX Century *humanism*. Thus, while the two systems were opposed, they knew each other intimately. This is the reason the confrontation never got out of control….

The well-known British journalist and author Timothy Garton Ash writes that we already live in a new Cold War climate: the CV 19 Pandemic only accelerated the antagonism. The historical analogies are always imperfect, but if the essence of Cold War is a worldwide multi-dimensional, long-term struggle between two superpowers - he writes - this is a new Cold War.

A reasonable position, but perhaps too simplified. In contrast to the 40-years-long U.S.-Soviet confrontation, which threw two great powers at each other throats,

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[1] www.foreignaffairs.com | How to Make the International Order More Inclusive

incapsulated into separate spheres, today's struggle is marked by a multidimensional relationship where China and the West are economically and financially linked as *Siamese Sisters* and where Russia is rediscussing the European security architecture born in Yalta. A symbiotic association of an economically powerful China, with world hyperpower ambitions, and a resource-rich Russia, aiming at chipping away the pillars of the U.S.-led global order, subverting its foundational institutions, international norms, and liberal ideals.

Certainly, the premise is not encouraging. The two camps are recruiting allies and drawing *grand strategies*. China launched its *Global Security Initiative* (GSI), a platform of principles inviting countries to resolve their disputes through dialogue, and respect one another's differences. Behind the pleasant sentiments is a deeper threat. The initiative might as well be called the *Autocrat's Manifesto,* as *the Atlantic Review* writes. Its principles and practices would usher in a global system that is friendlier to repressive regimes than the current order. The GSI is the latest evidence that the confrontation between the U.S. and China is escalating into a full-fledged contest for global primacy. Many world leaders would prefer to be free of the Western standards of human rights and democracy. In China's version of a world order, national leaders are allowed to do as they please within their own borders. The GSI thus has the potential to become the ideological backbone of an alternative, China-led system that brings together illiberal states in opposition to the Western institutions.

For its part, Russia launched its Organization *of the Treaty for Cooperative Security* (OTCS), comprising six former URSS countries. To oppose the Chinese move, the USA launched the QUAD and the AUKUS, as first pieces of a potential *NATO of the Indo-Pacific*, while, to contain Russia, the Western countries updated the *Strategic Concept* of NATO.

In synthesis: the world is risking precipitating in a spiral of confrontation, with a *vist*a on use of nuclear weapons. It is impossible to forecast now, exactly as it was impossible for Winston Churchill, to predict the future of his Iron Curtain, discussed at Westminster College in March 1946. But, if we trust our eyes, we should acknowledge that something like a Curtain is descending on us, from Mariupol, on the Black Sea, to the Taiwan Strait, being confronted and contained by a reinvigorated NATO - the *insurance policy* of the West - which has found again its *raison d'etre*.

Despite these pessimistic perspectives, the stakes are not as straightforward as they were during the first Cold War and an XXI century replica – what is positive or negative may not be inevitable.

This is where imagination and vision should play a role to negotiate a way out. Everyone has a lot to lose from a global confrontation. There is still a little time to find a *modus vivendi* to address the trans-border mega-issues we discussed earlier. No wars, not even Cold ones, are inevitable.

Let us consider – always as a case study - a proposal put forward in an essay from *Foreign Affairs Magazine* by scholars Richard Haag and Charles Kupchan, both members of the Council on Foreign Relations (March 2021, thus before the Russian invasion of the Ukraine). According to them, confrontation of great-powers regularly leads to major wars. Averting this outcome requires acknowledging that the Western-led liberal order that emerged from WWII cannot bring any more global stability: what is left of the *old order* does not guarantee neither stability nor cooperation. Multipolarism is good as an idea, but it is difficult to handle, above all when a rising power, China, challenges a declining power, the USA. President Biden's Administration's idea of building a grand coalition of Western and Asian democracies is the *Version "2.0"* replica of the Old Cold-War scheme: China leading the group of autocracies, with Russia as junior partner and the USA, with European and Asian democracies on the other side. In short: techno-democracies vs. techno-authoritarianism. A new bipolar system which would force the remaining powers to take side, either with the Democracies or with the autocracies. It a scheme which looks like the old Cold War, but in a world where the chains of values are global, and globalization is strong. On the top of that, in the Cold War the URSS was strong only militarily and ideologically, today China can compete with the West in all sectors.

As an alternative, the authors submit a new Concert *of Great Powers* like the 1815 Vienna Congress which guaranteed 50 years of peace in Europe. The said powers would be the USA, China, EU, India, Japan, Russia. All together they make up 70% of the world's GDP. This new group would be a more influential version of the "G-7", because of the presence of China and Russia but smaller than a "G-20", which is too big. It would ensure a strategic dialogue among powers, limiting unilateral decisions, and would ensure territorial stability.

The debate on a Cold War *2.0* will continue for years. Thus, let us focus for now on NATO's future.

During the intoxicating season of the heydays of globalization, it was assumed that modernity would decline alongside consumerism, pop-music, contraception and washing machines; that soft power was destined to replace hard power; that two countries hosting a McDonald outlet would never go to war with each other (Thomas Friedman); that rare-earth elements would be value more than oil; that aircraft carriers would be less important than microchips. That was dead wrong, and we are paying the price. The Russian military intervention in Ukraine and Chinese military exercises around Taiwan are urgent *wake-up calls*. Security still – and for a long time ahead – has a strong military connotation. The difference is that nowadays cruise missiles, bioengineering, bombs, aid to developing countries, nuclear capabilities and marathons for peace, all develop side by side. Hard power and soft power are solidifying in *Smart Power* (Joseph Nye).

Since its establishment, in 1949, NATO has evolved: it is a strong and purpose-oriented political-military alliance, based on shared, solid values and identity patrimony, and not only on changing conveniences. It survived 40 years of Cold War and 33 of *World Disorder*.

After the fall of the Berlin Wall, one could have thought that NATO would become obsolete for the manifest absence of enemies. This was not to be: in the *Era of Uncertainty* where a centre of gravity is missing, as well a clearly dominating power, and multilateralism is in agony, nuclear proliferation is a serious threat and climate change impacts security, NATO represents stability.

While new challenges – from cybersecurity, to terrorism, to asymmetrical conflicts – are surfacing and China and Russia have become not only competitors but serious rivals, NATO accomplishes a threefold mission: thermometer of the Transatlantic relations; barometer of the relations between the West and the Rest of the world; and military protective shield.

The Western security concept evolves, as shown by the NATO *Strategic Concept*, approved in Madrid in 2022. Beside the military dimension it also considers climate change, technological sovereignty, migrations, and social resiliency. The NATO of the future is being put in place: its original political-military regional dimension is flanked by the idea of global risk sharing, such as terrorism, cybersecurity, energy security, etc.

A significant leap forward since the global challenges remain unanswered, and security knows no borders.

The USA has made the Pacific the pivot of its strategy. China has embarked on the "R&BI": a tri-continental project that could give birth to an Eastern Hemisphere, opposite to the Western. Vis-à-vis Africa – where they have become the first investor and commercial partner - the Chinese are paying much more attention than the USA. The USA is pulling out of the Middle East, leaving the role of *referee* to Russia. Turkey is playing a *solo* role, being inside NATO but also courting and being courted by Russia.

The analysis that the Pacific counts more for the USA than the Atlantic, and that Russia is no longer an existential threat to the USA rests on the misjudgement that the competition between the USA and China remains confined to the Pacific. Instead, the most relevant geostrategic push of Beijing is Westward, aiming – see the "R&BI" – at pulling Europe closer to Asia and establishing China as the pre-eminent power in the world's richest and most populous region – Eurasia - relegating the USA to the role of a hemispheric power. Even before Putin's move to attack Ukraine, for the USA, quitting Europe would have meant delivering to Beijing its most important ambition: to decouple the USA and Europe. After the Russian aggressive posture to rediscuss, *manu militari*, the European security architecture, it would be unthinkable for years to come.

In a rapidly changing world, could NATO remain the organization it has been so far, though with a *plus*? If not, how could it change? Going *global*? But is it feasible, or even conceivable, to give birth to a *global NATO*, protecting all the interested countries of the world threatened by the same risks? In this regard we need objectivity, without dismissing the idea because of NATO's poor handling of the Afghanistan *affaire* and its tragic epilogue. We must recognize that NATO *out of area missions* have worked only on European territory, see Kosovo and now the political and military support to Ukraine.

It is highly unlikely that Russia and China, two revisionist powers, would ever share an American proposal to conceive a global security architecture, or that the Global South would do that. The same for Europe, once the centre of the world and now not used anymore to reason in terms of power and force projection, especially after the UK left the European Union.

Above all, a *Global NATO* would imply a *Global West*? This question recalls the other one: do universal values exist or are they only Western, exported at a global scale?

An increasingly confident and unapologetic China is carrying on an aggressive campaign to demonstrate that the USA and the West are the heir of the Atlantic slave trade, colonialism, and the Holocaust. Beijing presents its own set of values, which around the world are becoming "*more popular than the Western ones*" and insists that the American-led system does not represent "*the will of the international community*", said China's Foreign Minister Wang Yi.

Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, Libya, Central Africa and Hong Kong all demonstrate that the road to the global acceptance of universal values is an uphill one. The UN Resolution which condemns the Russian aggression to Ukraine and the massive abstention of key developing countries, as well as the modest results of the COPS 26 and 27 on climate change, show us that the problem persists: the West remains the West (the *golden billion*, Putin *dixit*) and the Rest remains the Rest. On the contrary, according to Freedom House, the perimeter of the democracies tends to shrink by the years. In 2018 *Foreign Affairs Magazine*, ran a piece: "*Is democracy dying*?" Their thesis: among the top 15 pro-capita GDP countries, two-thirds are not democratic and in 2030, dictatorships will be richer than democracies. Democracies are no longer able to guarantee to their citizens "*the best quality of life in the world*": the opulence showed in the movies "*Dallas*" did more to end the Cold War than the "Stars Wars" of President Reagan. They concluded that authoritarianism can guarantee prosperity and stability: in 1990, authoritarian regimes produced 12% global GDP, today 33%, in 2025 50%. In 2030 the West will only produce one third of global wealth.

We consider this unpleasant, but it means that for a large part of the world the market is more important than democracy, which might have been a parenthesis in the history of mankind.

Should we conclude that the idea of a *Global West* is unrealistic and even dangerous? *Yes, to this writer*. The West is unique, not universal, as affirmed by Professor Huntington. For him, culture is not consumption of material goods. The heart of culture involves language, religion, values, traditions. Drinking Coca Cola does not make a Russian think the American way. Throughout human history goods have always spread from a country to another without altering the culture of the recipient society. Though the West was the first civilization to "modernize" (industrialization, urbanization, spread of literacy, education, and wealth), this does not imply global Westernization. Indeed, many

of the West's most distinctive characteristics are premodern (such as Christianity). Japan, Taiwan, India and Iran have become modern without becoming Western societies. Much of the world is now becoming "*more modern and less Western*".

Considering the above, and thinking to expand NATO's security architecture, *mutatis mutandis* to the Indo-Pacific region could be a mistake. Democracies in the Indo-Pacific region have a totally different historical and cultural background and perspective of development. They are fervent supporters of the so-called *Asian Values* - a set of ideas where the principle of collectivism unifies people to create a pan-Asian identity - in contrast with the traditional Western values of individualism, democracy, market capitalism, and human rights, which are considered unsuitable for the region.

The growth of the *Rest* – China, India, Brazil, Nigeria, Indonesia, South Africa – is the story of our time. A story where the Us is pulling back from its global leadership, the EU remains politically peripherical at geostrategic level, and large developing countries have continued to surge, coupling their economic growth with pride, nationalism, and determination to shape their future. The Old Order, where the West was *magna pars*, and small European countries act as global heavyweights, cannot be sustained any longer if China and India are excluded from the first ranks of the global institutions.

The above does not mean that there couldn't be a cooperation-coordination between two Security architectures: one Transatlantic and one Indo-Pacific, with the USA playing the *pivot*. The first already well in place and updated with the New Strategic Concept, the last to be urgently elaborated among Asian democracies, since the region has four nuclear powers, a taste for history denial, explosive contrasts. It will take time and vision…

4. Conclusions

At first sight, the Sixties and the first twenty years of the XXI century do not have much in common.

The Sixties were an age of extreme contradictions. Overall, the decade was a good one, filled with achievements, diffused well-being and hope. When creating a family, going to church on Sunday, putting savings in the bank and sending children to university was all considered natural. "*The sky is no longer the limit*", a typical sentence which captured *l'ésprit du temps*. For better and worse. A progressive, liberal cycle initiated.

On the contrary, the last twenty years have been defaulting: the downward spiral of globalization, the explosion of nativism, populism, the arm-twisting between democracy and autocracy, social resentment, apathy, spreading *cancel culture* and drug consumption has taken the place of ideals. Future generations have a pretty good chance of living much worse off than their parents. No common agenda is left between the industrialized North and the developing South. A conservative, regressive cycle has started. The mantra of ultraliberalism and turbocapitalism has marked the time: "*bigger, stronger, faster*". As if it were possible to multiply the planet Earth. When grand ideals dissipate, their place is taken by frustration, wrote Zygmunt Bauman.

With all their differences, these two epochs share the idea that economic growth could go on endlessly and the progress be infinite. The Oil Shocks of the Seventies and now the pandemic and the Russian invasion of Ukraine strongly hit these ill-placed beliefs but did not throw them away.

This is wrong and unethical: a typical example of political myopia, individual selfishness, and greed. The rails of the future become uncertain and the myths of growth and progress as historical necessities are over: there is no more history locomotive taking us to a radiant future.

What humankind needs is a radical reframing of its priorities. A new and potent age is in sight, the *Age of Resilience* (Rifkin): from growth to development, from finance to ecology, from GDP to the Happiness Index, from geopolitics to the biosphere, from globalization to glocalization. We need to forge an alliance among key players of the world's society that understands the nature and the gravity of the challenges ahead: International Institutions and transnational corporations, academia and scientific community, civil society and engaged citizens.

Humankind is like a chain composed by countless rings: it works only if all the rings are welded together. None can save himself alone. Recognizing this small truth, understanding the magnitude of the challenges before us, should induce us to see the spinner swirling out of control and getting closer and closer to the edge of the table.

Shall we ever wake up from its dangerous sleepwalking? *"The answer is blowing in the wind"*, as the minstrel Bob Dylan has been singing since 1962.

Let us conclude with a thought perfectly suited for the energy and idealism of the young generations, who shall soon decide what to do with their destiny.

Astronaut Ellison Onizuka, who served as mission specialist aboard of Challenger space Shuttle in 1985 and perished in its explosion, wrote in a poignant "*Message to future generations*: …..*every generation has the obligation to free men's minds for a look at new worlds…to look out from a higher plateau then the last generation. Your vision is not limited by what your eye can see, but by what your mind can imagine. Many things that you take for granted were considered unrealistic dreams from previous generations. If you accept the past accomplishments as commonplace, then think of the new horizons that you can explore…"*

NATO 2022 Strategic Concept: current and future challenges "NATO's role in space, space's role in NATO"

Lilla DOUCHA

Abstract

This chapter introduces outer space operations as part of NATO's expanding effort to "prevent, detect, counter and respond to the full spectrum of threats" as declared in the new Strategic Concept. First, the history of the transatlantic Alliance's space activities is reviewed with an emphasis on the domain's strategic advancement in the past five decades. In light of the outer space's growing enabler and enhancer role in NATO's deterrence and defense, the threats to orbiting security providers are assessed by their potential to inflict significant impairment on NATO's core tasks. Then legal, normative, and military ways of addressing such violent encounters will be tested to highlight deterrence as a potential endeavor for addressing contemporary and future challenges in space.

Keywords

1. Introduction

As the new Strategic Concept notes, "maintaining secure use of and unfettered access to space and cyberspace are key to effective deterrence and defence."[2] The first reference of a strategic concept to outer space's role in the transatlantic Alliance's core tasks underlines that while in recent decades NATO's role increased in space, the outer space's strategic assessment also advanced in NATO. Although the organization does not possess and has no intention to acquire space capabilities of its own,[3] currently allies operate about 66% of orbiting satellites.[4] This vast growth of the number of Allied assets in orbit altered the symmetry of space-faring actors and increased NATO's exposure to malicious actions.

However, the formal recognition of space as an operational domain remained unmatched to the immense operational support and strategic advantage the Alliance derived from satellites until the watershed moment of the London Summit Declaration in 2019. In addition to highlighting the outer space's invaluable role in NATO's security, the document directed the attention of allies to the threats and challenges of operations beyond the atmosphere. The growing awareness that "the security of space assets will have a defining impact on future terrestrial conflicts"[5] was reflected in the upcoming years' resolutions, like the establishment of NATO's space center in Rammstein in 2020,[6] the extension to the Washington Treaty's collective defense clause to space in the Brussels Summit in 2021,[7] and the creation of the Space

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[2] North Atlantic Treaty Organization. "Strategic Concept." Jun. 29. 2022. https://www.nato.int/ nato_static_fl2014/ assets/pdf/2022/6/pdf/290622-strategic-concept.pdf

[3] North Atlantic Treaty Organization. "NATO's Approach to Space." North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Dec. 2. 2021. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_175419.htm Currently 8 secure communication satellites are affiliated to NATO N2YO.com. "Satellites by Countries and Organizations." N2YO.com. Jan 31.2023. https://www.n2yo.com/ satellites/?c=NATO&t=country

[4] N2YO.com. "Satellites by Countries and Organizations." N2YO.com. Jan. 28, 2023. https://www.n2yo.com/satellites/? c=&t=country

[5] Joint Air Power Competence Centre. "Collective Defence in the Space Domain." Viewpoints 34. 2022. https:// www.japcc.org/wp-content/uploads/JAPCC_J34_Art-10_screen.pdf

[6] North Atlantic Treaty Organization. "NATO Defence Ministers take decisions to strengthen our security." North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Oct. 23. 2020. https://www.nato.int/ cps/en/natohq/news_178962.htm

[7] North Atlantic Treaty Organization. "Brussels Summit Communiqué." North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Jun.14. 2021. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_185000.htm

Centre of Excellence in Toulouse in 2023.[8]

In addition to the units dedicated to space operations, the new domain appeared on the agenda of all NATO bodies as an effort to enhance the Alliance cross-domain responsiveness, deployability, and the integration of forces. Centre of Excellences, like the Security Force Assistance (SFA), are at the forefront of enhancing the Comprehensive Approach imperative to adapt NATO's toolbox for multi-domain deterrence and defense.

Without the aim to bring national activities under a joint command and control, NATO's initiatives for defending assets in the 5th operational domain are currently materializing in the development of a Strategic Space Situational Awareness System (3SAS), additional secure communication service procurement, and the creation of a data repository of spacefaring NATO nations.[9] These innovations aim to improve the detection of hazards, maneuverability satellites, and the reduction of asset vulnerability in an increasingly "congested, contested, and competitive" environment.[10]

2. Threatened security providers

By the time the Cold War finally ended, the Soviet Union had carried out only 20 antisatellite tests, while the American total was just 33."[11] This number spiked to 80 ASAT tests and 4 protagonist actors by 2021 while international cooperation gradually declined.[12] Although the growing tensions have not yet resulted any violent interstate encounters, power demonstrations[13] of the four major spacefaring state hallmark the

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[8] Chapeux, Thierry. "The New NATO Space Centre of Excellence." Joint Air Power Competence Centre. Aug. 2022. https://www.japcc.org/online-feature/the-new-nato-space-centre-of-excellence/

[9] North Atlantic Treaty Organization. "NATO and Luxembourg boost Alliance Space Situational Awareness." North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Jun. 14. 2021. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_185365.htm

[10] Harrison, Roger G. "Unpacking the Three C's: Congested, Competitive, and Contested Space." Astropolitics 11, no. 3 (2013): 123-131.

[11] Krepon, Michael. "Lost in Space: the Misguided Drive Toward Antisatellite Weapons." Foreign Affairs May/June 2001. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/space/2001-05-01/lost-space-misguided-drive-toward-antisatellite- weapons

[12] Secure World Foundation. "Anti-Satellite Weapons." https://swfound.org/media/207392/swf-asat-testing-infographic- may2022.pdf, the discontinuation of the ISS cooperation after the end of the station's life cycle

[13] Like the case of Kosmos 1408.

race for competitive edge in space militarization.[14] As stressed by the Strategic Concept, "strategic competitors and potential adversaries are investing in technologies that could restrict our access and freedom to operate in space, degrade our space capabilities, target our civilian and military infrastructure, impair our defence and harm our security".[15] Some of these threats have the potential to inflict significant damage on NATO's ability to deter and defend, therefore risks "that can impact the system's control, reliability, band-width availability, security, flexibility, or affordability" need to be carefully assessed.[16]

Existing counterspace technologies can be sorted into four categories based on the reversibility and nature of the attack:

	Reversible	**Non-reversible**
Non-Kinetic	Jamming Spoofing Meaconin	Electronic or cyber interferences degrading the control
Kinetic	Dazzling Rendezvous and proximity	Direct-ascent weapons Interception

Figue 1. Categorization of anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons

Non-kinetic, reversible actions aim to disable, deceive, disrupt, deny information and services without leaving traces of the perpetrator. The capabilities used for such attacks are easily attainable and do not require high-level technological sophistication. Jamming, the generation of noise disturbing the signal, spoofing, alias false signaling, and meacoining, the retransmission of signals constitute the most common reversible "soft kill" strategies. As these attempts focus on the deprivation of

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[14] Sevastopulo, Demetri and Kathrin Hille. "China tests new space capability with hypersonic missile." Oct. 16, 2021.
https://www.ft.com/content/ba0a3cde-719b-4040-93cb-a486e1f843fb
[15] North Atlantic Treaty Organization. "Strategic Concept." Jun. 29. 2022. https://www.nato.int/ nato_static_fl2014/ assets/pdf/2022/6/pdf/290622-strategic-concept.pdf
[16] Joint Air Power Competence Centre. "Collective Defence in the Space Domain." Viewpoints 34. 2022. https:// www.japcc.org/wp-content/uploads/JAPCC_J34_Art-10_screen.pdf

NATO from real-time information, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) satellites, and civilian communication satellites (SATCOM) tend to be the most lucrative targets.[17] Moreover, the up- and downlinks of positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT) satellites are also highly vulnerable for information disruption. Nevertheless, these attacks are considered the least harmful for the Alliance's assets as their impact is temporary, limited in scope, and the damage is often completely reversible.

Non-kinetic and non-reversible attacks, such as electronic and cyber interferences focus on permanently degrading the service provided by the satellite, and thereby account for significant concern for NATO. The impairment of control units by a breach of the asset's computer, or by an incoming directed energy beam causes irreversible damage and renders the satellite out of commission. Weather satellites, satellites of scientific use, and SATCOMs are particularly exposed to such assaults due to their operational altitude's proximity to the Earth's surface. Although their degradation would not directly impact allied security, the cost of replacing the dead satellite could trigger the owner nation to seek retaliation against the perpetrator.

Reversible kinetic interferences aim to shorten the lifetime of satellites without rendering the asset defunct. Dazzling, the abuse of optical components by directed energy weapons intends to blind ISR and PNT capabilities, while rendezvous and proximity operations (RPOs) coerce satellites to change their trajectory by altering their magnitude or velocity direction to avoid collision. Such maneuvers demand immense fuel consumption and force assets to either shorten, alter or abandon their mission. Such actions can result in significant loss of service, and consequently operational support with severe information reduction for the Alliance's command and control, blue-force tracking, missile detection, and battlefield positioning.

Non-reversible, kinetic attacks target the physical destruction or beyond repair

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[17] Military communication satellites are protected against cyber interferences, and equipped with anti-jamming capabilities.
Tillier, Louis. "Telecommunications for Defense." In Handbook of space security edited by Schrogl, Kai- Uwe, Peter L.
Hays, Jana Robinson, Denis Moura, and Christina Giannopapa. 581-594. Springer Reference, 2015.

degradation of satellites. Direct-ascent weapons are designed to crash into the targeted satellite, while pre-

positioned space mines reach the same effect of erosion by blasting assets into pieces. Interceptors operate by a different logic as they are capable of repositioning a satellite into a graveyard orbit and thereby dooming it for peril. Low density, high value satellites like assets of the satellite early warning systems (SEWS) , military satellite communication (MILSATCOM), and ISR are the most exposed to such detrimental assaults as they result in enormous disruption to missile warning, secure communication, emergency plan execution, and implementation of military operations. Moreover, the debris of destroyed satellites remain in orbit and start to pose indiscriminate threat of collision for every orbiting object. Due to this double-effect, non-reversible kinetic attacks have the highest potential to inflict damage on allied nations and NATO itself.

	Weather & sats of scientific use	SEWS	PNT	SATCOM	MILSATCOM	ISR
Non-kinetic, Reversible			X	X		X
Non-kinetic, Non-reversible	X			X		
Kinetic, Reversible			X			X
Kinetic, Non-reversible		X			X	X

Figure 2. Exposure of various satellites to attacks categorized according to reversibility and nature

The assessment of threats to NATO's security provider satellites highlighted that non- reversible attacks – kinetic or otherwise – pose the biggest challenge for the Alliance. Moreover, these assaults do not only rank the highest on potential for causing significant damage, but also on the number of asset types threatened. All listed types

of assets are exposed to non-reversible actions with the exception of PNT satellites. Such deviation occurs "as PNT satellites tend to be high-value but also high-density assets, the physical destruction of individual properties yields no additional gains for the adversary than temporarily disabling their services. Moreover, restricting the operational benefits they provide to NATO nations bears less risk of retaliation than the destruction of a satellite as the causes of non-functioning can be various and hardly attributed."[18]

As almost all satellites are lucrative targets for the Alliance's challengers, NATO is pressured to find adept responses to space threats. Legal and normative frameworks, or military solutions need to be weighted against their ability to minimize the vulnerabilities in space to determine the best course of action the Alliance can rely on to provide protection for its assets.

3. Reducing vulnerability

Back in the age of the first space race legal regulations were seen as a panacea for the peaceful use of outer space. But the heyday of United Nations treaties ruling actions of spacefaring nations was over just after five binding resolutions. Only one of these, the Outer Space Treaty (OST) is addressing international peace and security by prohibiting the deployment or stationing of "nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction."[19] "A major problem of the treaty, however, is its lack of enforcement mechanism and no defined threshold for what constitutes a violation that sometimes give way to infringements."[20] As OST fails to be the earnests for security, and attempts of the last decades failed to conclude a binding agreement on

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[18] Doucha Lilla. "NATO's Space Deterrence Dilemma." NATO Science and Technology Organization. 2022. https:// www.sto.nato.int/publications/STO%20Meeting%20Proceedings/STO-MP-SET-SCI-297/MP-SET-SCI-297-08.pdf

[19] United Nations General Assembly. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of
   Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies. Dec. 16, 1966.
   https://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ ourwork/spacelaw/treaties/ outerspacetreaty.html

[20] Ishola, Feyisola Ruth, Oluwabusola Fadipe, and Olaoluwa Colin Taiwo. "Legal Enforceability of International Space
   Laws: An Appraisal of 1967 Outer Space Treaty." New Space 9, no. 1 (2021): 33-37.

military uses of space, the legal framework alone is yet unsuitable to limit the vulnerability of NATO's assets.

Efforts to increase space security also extended to the establishment of norms of responsible behavior, however, their collision with major spacefaring nations ' interests prevented them from settling into practice. Unless the conflict of preferences is resolved, norms of behavior remain confined to the only area where unanimity could be achieved; the prevention of intentional space debris generation.

Due to the lack of alternatives, military solutions tend to be the only viable options for NATO to safeguard its satellites. Deterrence, the strategy of "discouraging the enemy from taking military action by posing for him a prospect of cost and risk outweighing his prospective gains" is a preferable nexus of abiding international law, refraining from debris creation, and lowering the risk of assault on allied satellites. This reliance on deterrence in space underlines that the fifth operational domain goes beyond its enhancer role noted in the Strategic Concept; "NATO's deterrence and defence posture is based on an appropriate mix of nuclear, conventional and missile defence capabilities, complemented by space and cyber capabilities."[21] As such, space became an operational enabler and a warfighting theatre necessitating NATO's core tasks, deterrence and defence to extend beyond the atmosphere.

4. Future endeavors

To navigate "the space race we are living in,"[22] NATO needs to be able to credibly deter aggressors from non-reversibly assaulting allied satellites. However, as currently only the United States, Germany, France, and Italy have capabilities to issue threats to potential attackers, NATO either needs to establish a strategy for implementing the concept of extended deterrence in space, or has to encourage allies with minor or no direct access to the outer space to invest into dual-use capabilities for self-defense

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[21] North Atlantic Treaty Organization. "Strategic Concept." Jun. 29. 2022. https://www.nato.int/ nato_static_fl2014/ assets/pdf/2022/6/pdf/290622-strategic-concept.pdf

[22] The Economist. "Starlink's performance in Ukraine has ignited a new space race." Jan. 5, 2023. https://www.economist.com/leaders/2023/01/05/starlinks-performance-in-ukraine-has-ignited-a-new-space-race?utm_medium=social-media.content.np&utm_source=linkedin&utm_campaign=editorial-social&utm_content=discovery.content

purposes. In any case, in the upcoming decades NATO's ability to deter aggression in space will play an essential role in ensuring "the collective defence and security of all Allies."[23]

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[23]North Atlantic Treaty Organization. "Strategic Concept." Jun. 29. 2022. https://www.nato.int/
nato_static_fl2014/
assets/pdf/2022/6/pdf/290622-strategic-concept.pdf

NATO Strategic Concepts' evolution: thematic and historic perspectives

By Stefano Falchi and Vladimir di Costanzo

Abstract

The purpose of this article is to analyze the evolution of NATO's Strategic Concept, a key Atlantic Alliance document that reaffirms NATO's values and purposes and provides a collective assessment of the security environment. It also guides NATO's strategic adaptation and guides its future political and military development.

This article aims to historically contextualize the strategic concepts to contribute to a greater understanding of the motivations and political conditions that led Alliance members to regularly revise and update the Strategic Concept. Since the end of the Cold War, it has been updated approximately every 10 years to account for changes in the global security environment and to ensure that the Alliance is prepared for the future.

This article is divided into two sections. The first part, describes NATO's comparison with the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact members. Emphasis is given to the transition from the doctrine of Massive Retaliation to that of Flexible Response and Escalation, followed by a content analysis of the early Strategic Concepts.

In the second section of the paper, the historical narrative is predominant, beginning with the fall of the Berlin Wall in '89 and of the Soviet Union in '91 and continuing to analyze the effects of the dissolution of the communist regime up to the latest version of NATO's strategic document presented between June 29 and 30, 2022 in Madrid.

The historical perspective offered the opportunity to recount both historical events and to highlight the evolution of contingent threats starting with terrorism, nuclear weapons management, piracy, security of citizens of NATO member countries, and hybrid threats such as infowar or cyber threats in the contemporary world.

The Concept also describes the security environment facing the Alliance, reaffirms our values and enunciates NATO's key purpose of ensuring our collective defense. It also defines NATO's three core tasks: deterrence and defense; crisis prevention and management; and cooperative security.

The article concludes by analyzing the innovations introduced by the latest Strategic Concept 2022, namely the environment as one of the alliance's main goals, as well as the comparison with other state entities such as China.

Keywords

1. Introduction

Since it was founded in 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization started ratifying a large number of documents containing its strategic objectives (NATO, 2022). These goals are contained in what is known as a "Strategic Concept" (SC). From the beginning, these were clearly heavily influenced by the early stages of the Cold War (Ringsmose and Rynning, 2009). Up until the dissolution of the Soviet Union, NATO Member States' main concern was the defense of their territory (Defense Committee, 1949). However, as it is well known, the Cold War cannot be taken as a coherent and homogenous period of time. Tension between the Eastern and Western Blocks rose and fell cyclically. The different leaders of the states involved had different views and adopted distinct policies in respect to each other. Naturally, NATO Strategic Concepts reflected these changes, as well as many other, more technical, considerations.

During the Cold War, four Strategic Concepts were ratified by NATO: in 1950, 1952, 1957, 1968. These documents show the evolution of the objectives of the Alliance, the economical and military means needed to reach them as well as the principles the goals are based on. Furthermore, they give insights on the political debate that took place between the different Member States (MSs hereon). For reference, in the first Strategic Concept of 1950 it is stated that "[…] *the parties to the Atlantic Treaty have declared: "They are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage, and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law*» (Defense Committee, 1949)." This point was made by explicitly referring to the Charter of the United Nations. The importance of such documents thus becomes self-evident: they represent an x-ray of NATO's intentions and, more generally, its *ethos*.

The focus of the first part of this paper is to explain NATO's shift from the Massive Retaliation doctrine to that of the Flexible Response and Escalation, with a brief introduction, explanation and contextualization of the first two Strategic Concept's content. The second part, from *The end of the Cold War* to the *Conclusions*, will analyze, through some historical events, the evolution of contingent threats such as terrorism, the management of nuclear arsenals, and the safety of NATO citizens in the contemporary world. Moreover, it will include the theme of the environmental threat and, therefore, the emergence of new security needs that have encouraged the alliance to be more open to partnerships, as well as to equip itself with tools suitable for operating on various levels.

2. History and content of the Strategic Concepts, up until 1957

The first Strategic Concept, published on 6 January 1950, was crucial to set NATO rules and intents (NATO, 2022), and it represents the first part of the Alliance's long-term project. During the decades of the Cold War, many military and political theories were debated and some of them became the basis for NATO practices. Albeit aiming at more goals, the first Strategic Concept had the function of determining how the Alliance would defend itself from possible USSR attacks and how it would deter them (Ringsmose and Rynning, 2009). Key ideas also included the standardization of the military for each MS and the proportion with which each member would contribute to the common defense (North Atlantic Defense Committee, 1949). This document was accompanied by two others, MC 14 (Military Committee) and DC 13 (Defense Committee). The Military Committee is responsible for giving strategic and military direction to the North Atlantic Council (NAC), the political body of NATO with decision-making power. Part of the MC is the Standing Group, which, as stated in MC 14, had the task of directing the Regional Groups in building their defense plans (Standing Group, 1950). This can be thought of as the bureaucratic implementation of the objectives set out in the Strategic Concept. Defense Committee 13, instead, contained the strategies set out by the Regional Groups in response to the directions received in MC 14 (Defense Committee, 1950). Altogether, these files contain all the information regarding NATO's strategic objectives and implementation capabilities. Regarding the Regional Groups, it must be said that they were deemed to be instrumental in reaching the organizational operationality to confront the USSR (NATO, 2022). There were three European Regional Groups and two that comprised the North American Continent. However, this organizational structure did not last much longer. In fact, the Korean war, which started in June 1950, posed a new challenge for NATO and so, the need to revisit the Alliance's military capabilities and structure emerged (NATO, 2022). This is why, in 1952, a new Strategic Concept was ratified. This Strategic Concept followed and consolidated a process that saw, among other things, the abolition of the European Regional Planning Groups, leaving just the US-Canada group and also the nomination of Eisenhower as Supreme Allied Commander Europe (North Atlantic Council, 1952). However, more emblematic of this change was the ratification of the Strategic Guidance of 1952: it stated that the main NATO aim was

|*"to ensure the defense of the NATO area and to destroy the will and capability of the Soviet Union and her satellites to wage war"* (North Atlantic Council, 1952). The Korean war also made evident the need for NATO to push its defenses to the east, even though this concept was only incapsulated later on (North Atlantic Council, 1952). Clearly, NATO's original expectations with regards to its military capacity were not met under its initially conceived structure. It is striking to think that in just two years, NATO leaders were able to rethink much of the Alliance composition to meet the needs of the time. The problems that the Korean war created pushed NATO to review its positions and change according to new principles. In fact, after these changes listed above took place, NATO still had to significantly improve the actual strength of its military. Without the necessary political will and economic power to do so, President of the United States Eisenhower started putting more emphasis on the role that nuclear warheads would have played in defending NATO territories. That is why, in 1954, NATO officially enshrined its new nuclear strategy in MC 48 (Military Committee, 1954).

3. The third Strategic Concept: Massive Retaliation

For the first time in its history, NATO had officially recognized the role played by nuclear weapons for its defense and, by 1957, the concept of nuclear massive retaliation arose as the key defensive strategy of NATO forces, enshrined in its third Strategic Concept (Military Committee, 1957). As introduced in the previous paragraph, NATO reached this decision after a varying process. The first assumption behind this strategy was the sincere acknowledgement that USSR conventional forces were too powerful for the European Countries to match them in a frontal confrontation (Machairas, 2013). This would have obliged the US to cover such shortage, which was considered as financially impossible (Witteried, 1972). That is why the most vocal advocator for massive retaliation was the US: NATO's decision to include massive retaliation as its main strategy was mainly driven by the necessities and goals of the US government, among which the cut of the federal budget was one of the key policy objectives. This was posed by Truman's successor D.D. Eisenhower (Wells, 1981). The second premise of this strategy was that complete deterrence could have been achieved by threatening full-scale nuclear annihilation in case of USSR invasion. As Secretary of State J.F. Dulles stated in 1954, "[…] *the way to deter aggression is for the free community to be willing and able*

to respond vigorously at places and with means of its own choosing" (Dulles, 1954). This means that NATO would enjoy the freedom of answering to USSR attacks in a non-proportional way. Common belief was, this would have been enough to make sure that the USSR would face enough losses to counterbalance any possible military or territorial gain, making war useless.

Nonetheless, massive retaliation also found supporters within the European continent, as its countries saw such a strategy as the only way to deter an eventual Soviet attack on their territory (Witteried, 1972). The belief that nuclear deterrence would suffice in defending Europe was strong enough among high NATO ranks that by 1954 the number of conventional divisions on European soil was already significantly lowered (McNamara, 1983). This shows that, although the concept of nuclear retaliation was included only in 1957, NATO leadership was already going in that direction following MC 48 (Military Committee, 1954) .

Still, Massive Retaliation as a concept has been controversial since the beginning of its implementation. Despite this, it did help the US to cut their military expenses (Wells, 1981). In fact, from the first presentation of the concept by Secretary of State Dulles to the actual implementation of it in the Security Council of 1957, things had already begun to change. By examining more accurately this third Strategic Concept, it can be found an anticipation of the next evolutionary step of NATO strategy. In fact, par. 14 reflects the Massive Retaliation approach, stating that "*in case of general war, therefore, NATO defense depends upon an immediate exploitation of our nuclear capability, whether or not the Soviets employ nuclear weapons"* (Military Committee, 1957) but in par. 19 it is affirmed that "[in case of limited attacks such as infiltrations, incursions…] *NATO must be prepared to deal immediately with such situations without necessarily having recourse to nuclear weapons"* (Military Committee, 1957). This resembles a step-back, considering how Massive Retaliation was first conceived. How can such a change be explained? This apparent shift was rooted in elaborate reasoning, and it will be discussed in the next paragraph.

4. The fourth Strategic Concept: a Shifting Paradigm and the Flexible Response approach

The early conception of Massive Retaliation had been heavily criticized, mainly because of its scarce flexibility and lack of intermediate responses in case of minor conflicts against the Soviets (Monaghan, 2022). However, other contingent reasons added up. First of all, over time the USSR had increased its nuclear capability up to a degree comparable to the US (NATO, 2022). This put an end not only to the US' nuclear monopoly, but shifted the entire world into a state of 'mutually assured destruction' (Rosenberg, 1983). This meant that the Massive Retaliation doctrine rested on D.D. Eisenhower's *certainty* of nuclear deterrence (Weber, 1992) and the established belief that it was the only way to ensure long-term national security without being drained financially (Machairas, 2013). However, D.D. Eisenhower's certainty was of little military value, as McNamara and many others pointed out repeatedly during the years: the main issue with Massive Retaliation was how it disproportionately focused on deterrence, without answering to the needs of defense in case of war (McNamara, 1983).[1] Moreover, the second Berlin Crisis (1958-1962) made it clear that the Soviets were able to threaten Western Allies (NATO, 2022) without fearing the use of nuclear weapons by the enemy. For this reason, even the concept of nuclear deterrence failed to meet its main goal. Given NATO's strategic posture, there was no spectrum of options available for the Alliance to choose from: it was either nuclear Armageddon or no answer (Wells, 1981) and, most importantly, defending European soil equaled to bomb its territory (Kugler, 1991).

It was for these reasons that one of the objectives of the incoming Kennedy administration was to change the doctrine of Massive Retaliation in favor of a new, more useful and adaptable one. In fact, already as a Senator, JKF highlighted how the deterrence power of Massive Retaliation was not sufficient (John F. Kennedy, 1958). If neither deterrence nor defence were sufficiently achieved, the use of nuclear weapons was severely impaired. The US feared that even their homeland security was at risk (Evans, 1964). The end of Massive Retaliation definitely came when military studies conducted by the Kennedy Administration showed that conventional forces disparity was less prohibitive than previously thought (McNamara, 1983), which in turn meant that

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[1] Even if this paper was published thirty years later the events described, McNamara had been critical of Massive Retaliation also back then. For further reference, see (Weber, 1992) and Evans GH, 'The New Military Strategy' (1964) 47 Current History 77

NATO could close this gap with a reasonable amount of resources. This knowledge, together with France's withdrawal from the Alliance, signified that a new Strategic Concept was needed, officializing the definitive shift to the doctrine of Flexible Response (Military Committee, 1967). The strategy, as the game-theorist and then Nobel Prize winner Thomas Schelling argued, meant that the US would have the capability to respond to any attack with a variety of military options, rather than relying solely on nuclear weapons. This made it possible for the US to respond to a Soviet attack with conventional forces, nuclear weapons, or a combination of both (Schelling, 1981).

As a doctrine, flexible response introduced a new concept that was logically inherent to the principle itself, i.e. that of escalation (Military Committee, 1967). In this way, the USSR could not predict with confidence how NATO would defend itself, making war more uncertain. Together, this implied that NATO could defend itself at the level of the attack and, if needed, escalate beyond it and even resort to nuclear weapons. This significant shift radically changed NATO's attitude to war, introducing new and unforeseeable variables to lead the enemy into insecurity.

5. The end of the Cold War

In 1985 Mikhail Gorbachev was elected general secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The difficult economic conditions in the country were clear to him: the recipe of proposing a collectivized and centralized economic plan, marginalizing private activity, had lost its impetus over time and had failed to guarantee Soviet citizens decent living standards. A particularly cited study by the British historian Robert. C. Allen highlights the increasingly negative trend of growth of the Soviet Union from an annual growth of 5.8% of the GPD from 1920 to 1940, declining over time to a meager 2.6% in 1975-1980 (Allen, 2001). Meanwhile, key indicators, such as productivity, collapsed too. The causes were manifold and known to the Soviet leader; examples of these were the excessive bureaucracy, the collectivization of agriculture and industry, as well as the systemic corruption of the Soviet system (Schmemann, 1985). Gorbachev attempted to propose a new economic recipe, symbolized with the words "Glasnost" (transparency) and "Perestrojka" (openness). However, the attempts to reform both the internal system and its approach to the foreign world, especially to the satellite countries with the Sinatra

Doctrine,[2] did not succeed in lifting the clay giant, and indeed aggravated the situation by offering. As the political scientist Beissinger states, this led to the possibility for nationalist of emerging forcefully and to violently show their opposition to Moscow (Beissinger, 2009). For instance, this was the case with Poland and the Catholic trade union Solidarnosc of Lech Walesa, which opposed Wojciech Jaruzelski (Nelsson and Nelsson, 2021). In Hungary, instead, Miklós Németh gave rise to a soft revolution supported by strong internal currents within the same government (Budapest Business Journal, 2020). This allowed the country to move towards a more democratic and liberal regime, tearing down the Iron Curtain with Austria (European Parliament, 2009), which led to the mass emigration of thousands of GDR citizens, encouraging the Germans to come together. Gorbachev, after having dismissed General Secretary of the German Socialist Unity Party of Germany Honecker and appointed as new party secretary Egon Krenz, initiated a process of internal reforms and opened up to visas and expatriation permits (McCartney, 1989). On the evening of 9 November 1989, after the announcement of the restoration of free movement between the two halves of Berlin, a large number of Berliners began to dismantle the wall. This last event would be very important for the growth of NATO, as the Secretary General of NATO Manfred Wörner expressed in London, 1990: «*the Cold War belongs to history. Our Alliance is moving from confrontation to cooperation. [...] Never before has Europe had such a tangible opportunity to overcome the cycle of war and peace that has so bedeviled its past*» (Wörner, 1990).

In other words, the Atlantic Alliance offered help to former opponents of the Warsaw Pact, by inviting them to Brussels to establish diplomatic ties. This new atmosphere of friendship and collaboration also gave a strong boost to the project of a united Germany. This project was realized after October 3, 1990, although not without shadows and misunderstandings. In fact, on December 20, 1991, the day of the inauguration of the NACC (North Atlantic Cooperation Council), created with the purpose of dialoguing with non-NATO countries, something rather unusual happened. The Russian Ambassador Afanassievky entered the meeting as a Soviet ambassador and exited it as a Russian Federation one, since, during the assembly, the Soviet Union had

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[2] The term "Sinatra Doctrine" refers to the approach adopted by President of the Soviet Union Gorbachev and his Minister of Foreign Affairs Gerasimov with regards to the degree of internal autonomy enjoyed by the other Member States of the Soviet Union. For further reference see (Buckley Jr., 2004).

legally ceased to exist (NATO, 1991a). Thus, the Atlantic alliance witnessed, in a fairly short period of time, the loss of its greatest ideological opponent as well as that of its twin agreement - the Warsaw Pact.

The changes that emerged in the mid-1980s had obvious impacts on NATO's '91 Strategic Concept: it was the first Strategic Concept to be made public. The second new feature was a major change of perspective. That is, together with the traditional protection of human rights and democracy of its members, regional and indirect threats such as economic, social and political difficulties, including ethnic rivalries and territorial disputes, were added (NATO, 1991b). This was because countries in Central and Eastern Europe were experiencing such turmoil. The third novelty concerned the way the threats were countered: cooperation and dialogue were added to the classic instruments of increase and development of military means. The main objective of the 1991 Strategic Concept was to control the nuclear arsenal and to prevent it from coming into possession of unstable groups or nations that could threaten the Atlantic Alliance.

On the evening of December 26, 1991, after the declaration of the dissolution of the Soviet Union, George H. W. Bush gave a speech on American TV. In this discourse he pointed out that the 40 years of the Cold War, animated by bitter confrontations between the Warsaw Pact and NATO, were over (*The New York Times*, 1991): Western values had won, Eastern Europe was free, although more unstable, and the fall of the communist regime had substantially marginalized the fear of a nuclear escalation. Nevertheless, this sudden change had posed new challenges to the Western world, and further escalated the long-standing issue with the Balkans. The most famous manifestation of the issue with the Balkans was in Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia is composed of a coalition of ethnic groups, peoples, religions and different cultures: a perfect mix to give life to a perpetually unstable area which saw alternating periods of relative calm, like under the dictatorship of Tito, and periods strong repression (Anderson, 1995). Yugoslavia's leader had succeeded in concealing the discontent of structurally precarious economic conditions. However, Yugoslavian peace ended at the outbreak of the 1990 Balkan war: the U.S.S.R. umbrella and the death of the dictator had liberated the ethnic forces in the area and this produced a "race to power" (Anderson, 1995). The first regional conflict occurred during the dissolution of the Soviet Union, on June 25, 1991. Croatia declared itself independent, but its new status was not recognized by the European Union

and the United States, nor by Yugoslavia itself, causing a short-lived conflict that ended on July 7 of the same year with the defeat of Yugoslavia and the global recognition of Croatia (Anderson, 1995).

Brian Anderson, member of the Australian Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, in the valuable paper "The collapse of Yugoslavia: background and summary", assumed that, in addition to problems of preparation of the Yugoslav army, the defeat could also have been caused by a possible acceptance of secession by Milosevic (Anderson, 1995). This independence was also the result of the UN diplomatic effort, that through UNPROFOR (United Nations Protection Force) sought to alleviate the problems of the local population and tried to stem a possible de-escalation. However, soon after, another conflict broke out in the area, i.e. the Serbo-Croatian conflict and, finally, there was the culmination of the Bosnian Serb war (1992-1995), which signed the failure of the containment policies.

Meanwhile, Western diplomacy, through the UN and NATO, sought through operations such as peace project proposed by Special Envoy Cyrus Vance Sr., as well as the use of the military threat, to put pressure on the area to encourage the belligerents to sit at the negotiating table. At this stage, the boundary separating UN and NATO military forces became more and more subtle. That is, NATO flanked the UN UNIPROFOR operations. According to Gregory L. Schulte, director of the Bosnia Task Force in Brussels under NATO's Secretary General, there were operations in which the Alliance participated as the main host, like the Operation Maritime Monitor, Operation Deny Flight and Operation Sky Monitor (Schulte, 1997). These operations were military surveillance activities for the embargo and respected the no-fly zones established by the UN in Resolution 836 of 1993. This collaboration was not without issues: despite the intervention of military forces, the peak of instability was not mitigated enough, so much so that NATO developed a plan to evacuate its soldiers and the UN's through the Operation Determined Effort. However, the trajectory changed as the important diplomatic work of the US Permanent Representative, Richard Holbrooke, bore fruit with the Dayton Agreement, which ended the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In 1998, a new ethnic conflict broke out and this time they confronted the Serbs against the Albanians. Four policemen were killed in an ambush by members of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), which prompted the Serb government to respond by sending out

police reinforcements and heavily armed paramilitary units to track down the assailants. Twenty civilians were shot by policemen who were moving through the area where the combatants were believed to be operating. Approximately 30,000 ethnic Albanians marched in Pristina to protest the killing (Hedges, 1998).

The situation, as usual, saw diplomatic intervention first - between Milosevic and the Contact Group.[3] The first diplomatic phase ended with a series of economic sanctions on the Serbs that would reveal to be largely ineffective (OCHA, 2000). A second major diplomatic effort took place thanks to US Ambassador to the UN, Richard Holbrooke. However, this attempt did not bring the expected result (Holbrooke, 1998). Parallel to the diplomatic negotiations, the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan and British Prime Minister Tony Blair warned Milosevic of a possible armed attack by NATO (Csongos, 1998). This possibility became real in 1998, when the Alliance gave the North Atlantic Council the opportunity to issue limited air attacks (NATO, 1998). These last two phases are embedded in the strategy known as "coercive diplomacy"[4] (Menotti *et al.*, 2000) and ended following the continuous massacres and deportations of Milosevic, with the announcement of Javier Solana, the NATO Secretary General, launching Operation Allied Force (NATO, 1999a). That is, a 78-day aerial bombing campaign that would end on June 9 1999, with the capitulation of Milosevic. The Balkans issue of course had repercussions on the NATO Strategic Concept, so much so that a few months before the attack, the alliance had equipped itself with a new strategic document at the Washington summit in April 1999 (NATO, 1999c).

The new document, in addition to consolidating the old goal of member security, through deterrence and greater sharing of choices between NATO member states and internal and external organizations, was expanded in different ways, adding new requirements to the previous strategic concept. From the Strategic Concept emerged the need for a different defense of the members (NATO, 1999b). Nuclear war was no longer the main threat, but nuclear arsenals were still a preoccupation, just as the need to prepare for regional and local conflicts was, which needed more flexibility to be handled by NATO. One example of this new direction undertaken by NATO was the introduction

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[3] The contact group is the name for an informal grouping of great powers that have a significant interest in policy developments in the Balkans. It was formed by United States, United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, and Russia.

[4] As explained in the Paper cited, «*the essence of coercive diplomacy is that a threat of force, to be credible, must be backed by real force if necessary*».

and implementation of the Combined Joint Task Force concept, which is still active today. In essence, it is a combined multinational military unit that can ensure rapid deployment to local areas. The first realization of this need was in the Balkans, in 1993. A second major change introduced by the strategic concept of 1999 concerned the principle of collective defense contained in Article 5,[5] which assumed a marginal dimension because the threats became hybrid and difficult to identify. Therefore, to counteract them, the strategy of prevention through strong deterrence and internal security was chosen. To tackle this new threat, both the Combined Joint Task Forces and the new global defense architecture that flanked NATO, the UN and the OSCE, as well as other important regional partners such as Russia, became to emerge.

6. New Threats

On September 11, 2001, the terrorist organization Al-Qaeda organized and concretized a fierce attack on the Twin Towers. This is, to this day, the only case where a member country invoked the application of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. In the proportional form dictated by the article, the Allies promptly organized a series of counterattack measures, as the only recently concluded "Operation Active Endeavour (Marina Militare, 2018). Thus, the threat of terrorism became one of the main concerns of NATO, accompanied by hybrid threats (Ritchie *et al.*, 2013). Despite this serious event, September 11 did not bring NATO members to revisit the strategic concept. The reasons can be found in the interesting dialogue between Lionel Ponsard, Deputy Head of the academic research branch at NATO Defense College in Rome, and David S. Yost, professor at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California - currently seconded to NATO Defense College in Rome as a senior researcher (Ponsard and Yost, 2005). In 2005, the two scholars questioned the possibility of revising the strategic document and Prof. Yost offered important reflections: to him, no update was planned because there

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[5] Article 5 states "[T]he Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.
Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security".

would not have been the necessary consensus since, presumably, the defensive structure was already suitable for members to respond to threats of terroristic nature. Indeed, NATO was well organized and the terrorist attacks recorded fell sharply over the years, until 2014 when there was a considerable increase (Ritchie *et al.*, 2013).   The penultimate evolution of the Strategic Concept takes place at the Lisbon Summit in Portugal in 2010. The summit materializes with a new strategic concept that aims to balance the demands of prevention and action in a multidimensional context (NATO, 2010). In the global arena, the main unstable relevant scenarios were Kosovo and Afghanistan. In both theaters, the partnerships signed with the Russians in the Balkans and with the Afghan government in the Asian country are decisive in order to avoid an increase of such instability. But the document is also important because it notes other key points. In fact, cyber-attacks and individual attacks by terrorists assume a greater importance. Overall, the document records NATO engagement on several fronts: from the control of weapons of mass destruction, both biochemical and nuclear, through the control and prevention of regional and local threats such as piracy and trafficking of weapons and drugs, up to the protection of citizens against physical and cyber threats. The latter increased significantly in the early 2000s. For example the violations of Citibank by the hacker Vladimir Levin, who allegedly violated thousands of credit cards causing damage of about 10 million dollars (Perunicic, 2020); or in 2004 the young German university student, Sven Jaschan, wrote one of the first self-replicating viruses, called Sasser Worm, causing about 500 million dollars of damage (Perunicic, 2020). Continuing the analysis of the strategic document, it is interesting to note that it also had the first reference to the environmental problem. This a multidimensional issue that has important implications in different areas; that is, the environmental issue is considered to constitute a threat itself. In other words, any environmental problem could be reflected on the quality of life of the citizens of the allied countries. Moreover, the environmental topic impacts the management of the alliance, looking for the optimal point between use of military means and their impact on the ecosystem. Finally, this could be a useful topic in a scenario of prevention and management of conflict. However, Michael L. Ross, Professor of California University's Political Science Department, in his study "What Do We Know about Natural Resources and Civil War?" detects a quite weak link between conflicts and natural resources, especially in its initial part (Ross, 2004).

In conclusion of the paragraph, the series of innovations introduced by the 2010 strategic concept along with an increasing capability to act in different levels of crises with both member and non-member states, created the need for military and doctrinal support. The 2010 strategic document lays the groundwork for future Security Force Assistance: forces designed to intervene through assistance and training programs toward local forces in crisis areas, so that local authorities could achieve, as soon as possible, the capability to independently provide their own security. The Security Force Assistance will find its own establishment with the Security Force Assistance Concept of 2014 (NATO SFA COE, 2017). Together with the centers of excellence they now compose one of the most important toolkits in the NATO security architecture, as they both ensure the Alliance's ability to act in international scenarios in a careful and knowledgeable manner (thanks also to the doctrinal support offered by the centers of excellence).

7. Back to the past

The security architecture to face local threats, based on local dialogue, will most likely find itself in crisis due to a changing world. Since the last summit in 2010, a long series of events had provoked a return to the past for NATO. In particular, at the Bayerischer Hof, which hosted the Munich Security Conference in the 2007, Russian President Putin presented to numerous diplomats a complaint about the vision of a unipolar world, as well as the expansion to eastern NATO borders with Georgia ('Vladimir Vladimirovich', 2007). Furthermore, he criticized the management of Iraq invasion by the United States. This speech marked a progressive but slow cooling of relations between Russia and the Western world. Although the speech provoked some irritation among diplomats, in 2011 NATO and Russia cooperated in a first anti-terrorist exercise called Vigilant Skies. Nonetheless, the subsequent events, namely the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the strong interference in Ukraine by Russia, drove Putin away from the Western world as well as the Atlantic Alliance. Today, with the Russian-Ukrainian war, Putin's words at the 2007 conference sound prophetic. Yet, in addition to a return of Russia as a major competitor, another identified threat is China, which has long become the world's second largest economy and is currently a highly developed and cutting-edge nation (IMF, 2022). China is one of the states under scrutiny for its weak fundamental rights protection: the Democracy index 2021 of Economist Intelligence shows a sharp deterioration of

democratic regimes globally (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2021). Specifically, according to the index, only 45.7% of the world's population live in a form of democracy, while Flawed Democracies and Authoritarian regimes have increased (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2021). The trend shows a strong stress on the validity of rights in relation to economic conditions, since authoritarian regimes such as China demonstrate that rights are disconnected from economic development. In other words, democracy may be no longer needed to achieve high living standards. These challenges have been recorded at the Brussels Summit in 2021, bringing awareness to the production of the latest evolution of the Concept Strategy (NATO, 2022). This open document, with an unusual statement by Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, highlights a more dangerous and competitive world. Such danger comes from asymmetric threats such as terrorism. This phenomenon is widely diversified due to the many independent organizations and unaffiliated terrorists that produce acts difficult to predict or manage. Once again, the Alliance reminds everyone of the issue of terrorism, as well as the management of weapons of mass destruction: a global problem that requires fruitful cooperation between supranational public security bodies such as Europol and the Interpol. But asymmetric threats are not over. In its broader definition, terrorism has negative effects even in the cyber world, through the violations of various nature and modes: examples of this multiplicity are DDoS attacks or viruses which are increasingly sophisticated, as in the case of Solar Winds (Center for Internet Security, 2021). NATO is responding to these threats collectively, solidifying the concept of prevention and once again calling for greater cooperation and implementation, both among members and with states outside the organization, such as China. The strategic document does not change much: indeed, in many ways, it seems to us as a return to the past. In fact, the optimistic and positive narrative of the past years has been substituted by a sense of instability, because today we live in, to use the words of the Secretary General, a more dangerous and competitive world.

8. Concluding remarks

Today NATO is a multidimensional organization with a fairly precise purpose: to protect its members and values. However, in the history of the Alliance, the ways in which this protection has been guaranteed has changed and adapted to the needs of the context.

These adjustments are to be found in the strategic documents, which turn out to be a historical summary of NATO's historical threats, as well as its attempts to respond to evolving security needs. Needs that have moved in different directions. If the past turns out to be valuable historical baggage, the future is based on the credibility of the Alliance in managing crisis scenarios. The latter tends to be represented by local threats, which is very different than during the cold war. In fact, that period of time saw the alliance confront the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union as global menaces. These changes have suggested the Alliance to be much more flexible, implementing important doctrinal changes: from Massive Retaliation, NATO moved forward the Flexible Response, almost as an anticipation of what the future would have brought to the Alliance. Simultaneously, NATO expanded strategic concepts such as deterrence and prevention. Later, it acknowledged terrorism and developed appropriate procedures and forces to operate in new crisis scenarios. Moreover, through time rose the concept of preventive management, with the aim of avoiding crises like armed conflicts through diplomatic actions. Sometimes, these have been accompanied by demonstrations of strength, like in Yugoslavia in 1995, or by the use of military presence for peacekeeping purposes. Therefore, it can be said without a doubt that the Alliance continues to adapt to the changing environment that surrounds it.

To enforce these modifications, the shared management with Partners and other Organizations has become key. In fact, NATO in its history has become a fundamental pillar of the architecture of world security, working alongside other organizations such as the UN, the OSCE, and also nations outside the alliance such as Russia or China. Finally, NATO also had to reflect on increasingly hybrid threats such as cyberwars, Infowars, and finally extremely political issues such as the environment. Today, the conflict between Russia and Ukraine has forced NATO to reflect deeply on issues that were thought to be relegated to history, especially the reality of war on European soil. Nonetheless, precisely because of the nature of the Strategic Documents, NATO can look back on itself to find answers. An uncertain and dangerous future can only be mitigated through a focused, multidimensional awareness of the world in which we live, and it seems that the Alliance, thanks to its resilience, diplomatic ability and its strong anchor to democratic values, has the prerequisites to cope with it and to ensure a further period of peace.

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ECONOMY AREA

The techno-industrial ramifications of the strategic concept. Challenges and opportunities

By Luca FRUSONE

Abstract

NATO is aware that disruptive technologies bring both opportunities and risks and can significantly alter the nature of conflicts. Maintaining technological primacy is essential to achieving success on the battlefield. Is the new Strategic Concept focused on these new challenges? The investment made by China and Russia in AI and hypersonic missiles could pose a severe threat to our values. The Alliance has identified different key technologies to pursue and invest in, including artificial intelligence, quantum technologies, hypersonic technology, and many more. To achieve these capabilities, NATO is searching for new ways to support the efforts of the Member States. Allied Leaders agreed to establish a venture capital fund to support innovation and an accelerator for innovation called DIANA. Moreover, the technological race is strictly linked with the hoarding of critical minerals and the production capacity of the increasingly requested semiconductors. Could it be the beginning of a perfect storm?

Keywords

1. The evolution of the Strategic Concept

The Strategic Concept that was approved in Madrid in 2022 refers not only to several new geopolitical challenges, which have evolved in interesting ways with respect to those envisaged more than a decade earlier, but also and especially to the fresh challenges posed by new technologies and the results of research by the defence industry.

The Strategic Concept of 2010 had already made reference to cyber-attacks, energy security and technologies that we would now define as disruptive, and considered how these factors could shape global security and thus affect NATO military planning and operations.

The new Strategic Concept looks afresh at these factors, broadens the scope and depth of analysis, and considers them also in the light of the activities of other players such as Russia and China. Unquestionably, a compelling reason for updating the Strategic Concept was the need to address the emergence of two new operational domains, namely space and cyberspace, the former of which was officially acknowledged at the Leaders Meeting of London in 2019, and the latter at the Warsaw Summit of 2016.

The extension of the scope of Article 5 to include the two domains was, on the one hand, a recognition of the strategic importance of associated assets such as satellites and databases and, on the other, an acknowledgement that the cyberspace domain is now "contested at all times" and therefore no longer as pacific as it once was. Further, it has become increasingly evident that new technologies are capable of placing constraints on our access to and freedom of action in the domain of space, thus posing a security risk.

But the real step change from the 2010 Strategic Concept is to be found in the prominence that the 2022 version gives to technological primacy, which is linked more specifically to success on the battlefield. New disruptive technologies do not merely "impact" NATO planning as in 2010; rather, because they have completely transformed how conflicts proceed, they have also become "key arenas of global competition."

Although the foregoing observations were not articulated in written form until 2022, they were already a matter of consolidated knowledge within NATO. Elasticity is intrinsic to a document such as the Strategic Concept, for it needs to outline a vision of the future while simultaneously seeking to crystallise concepts that have already been affirmed and established. The Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic (DIANA), a one-billion-euro initiative for the creation of a network of start-ups,

researchers and defence firms, is a case in point in as much as it was launched before the drafting of the latest Strategic Concept.

Another novel element in the Strategic Concept is its explicit referencing of Russia, which is identified as a direct threat owing not only to its unjustifiable aggression against Ukraine but also to its hostile actions in the cyber domain, the modernisation of its nuclear force and the expansion of its "novel and disruptive dual-capable delivery systems." The People's Republic of China (PRC) poses a different sort of challenge. While the Strategic Concept does not categorise the PRC as a threat, it is more robust than before in its assessment of what it describes as "the PRC's malicious hybrid and cyber operations and its confrontational rhetoric and disinformation."[1] The most important passage in the Strategic Concept relates to the PRC's efforts to "control key technological and industrial sectors, critical infrastructure, and strategic materials and supply chains." In conclusion, the Strategic Concept, in noting that the two new domains have become spheres of confrontation and contention where disruptive technologies can determine which party will prevail, underscores how the technological challenge is now more decisive than ever. Accordingly, the Strategic Concept also considers the extremely important strategic role of critical minerals and supply chains.

2. New disruptive technologies that supersede old axioms

Since its foundation, the Atlantic Alliance has been able to count on superior military power and a technological advantage that was only ever challenged by the Soviet Union of the Cold War era (and, even then, not in all fields). It was once thought that the fall of the Berlin Wall would widen the technological gap, but the rise of China and Russia's specialisation in certain areas have demonstrated the fallacy of this assumption. With the rise to power of Xi Jinping in 2012, the reform of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) accelerated significantly. As noted in successive white papers, the object of the PLA is to enhance its capacity to respond both to regional and to global challenges.

The PLA has placed much emphasis on boosting its missile capability and, in 2015, established a Rocket Force (PLARF) as an autonomous entity that marks an evolution of its Artillery Force. One measure of the scale of Chinese endeavours in this

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[1] www.act.nato.int

field is the fact that in 2019 the PLARF launched, for research and training purposes, more missiles than the rest of the world combined.

When it comes to hypersonic weapons (i.e. with speeds in excess of Mach 5), Russia is also a player. In reality, it is not speed that makes these systems innovative, for upon re-entry, any intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), being an exo-atmospheric vector, reaches the astounding speed of Mach 20 or thereabouts. Today's ICBMs carry multiple independently targeted re-entry vehicles (MIRV), each armed with a warhead. The salient feature of the new hypersonic systems and, especially, the Hypersonic Glide Vehicle (HGV) is not so much their speed as their ability to change trajectory. This ability complicates the task of defending against incoming ICBMs and MIRVs. Like a conventional re-entry vehicle, an HGV is launched on a rocket before being released. The difference is that whereas a conventional re-entry vehicle will follow its ballistic trajectory throughout the flight, an HGV boasts autonomous manoeuvring capabilities. This new capability requires a completely new approach to defending against an attack from a weapons system of this sort. While a classic ICBM warhead can be detected by radar at a distance of 5 000 km, an HGV cannot be detected until it is just 1 000 km away, which renders it almost impossible to defend against. Before releasing its "projectile," an HGV follows a trajectory quite different from the predictable path of a conventional ballistic missile. This technology could change the very nature of aerospace warfare and render the space domain even more important than it already is. To operate with the extreme precision and speed of which they are capable, these missiles still need to be guided towards their target using information that can only come from satellite constellations. For this reason, one paradoxical result of a broad-spectrum conflict is that space, the most recent domain and one that has hitherto been associated with peaceful coexistence, will be the first to feel the effects of an outbreak of hostilities. Ever since ancient times, it has been recognised that "what enables the... good general to strike and conquer, and achieve things beyond the reach of ordinary men, is foreknowledge."

Aside from its ramifications for the space domain, this new technology raises serious conceptual issues. Former US Undersecretary of Defense Michael Griffin has warned that the use in war time of hypersonic weapons, which cannot be intercepted using currently available means, could cause the United States to play the deterrence card and threaten or opt for nuclear escalation rather than allow enemies to achieve their war

objectives. The idea that the greatest global military power needs to play the nuclear card to respond to a conventional attack gives the measure of the disruptive effect of this technology. The purely defensive solutions that could work against these threats include electronic warfare systems and "directed-energy weapons" (DEW), but they both need time to degrade the electronic or physical integrity of a hypersonic weapon. A nuclear interceptor, however, may offer a higher degree of success. Delivering a greater blast than from a conventional explosion, a nuclear interceptor would not need to hit the missile directly or even get very close to it. For the time being, this option is not under consideration, nor is it possible to say whether it will ever be discussed, but it is clear that the proliferation of hypersonic missiles in the future will force a rethink of the concepts and technologies behind Allied anti-aircraft defences.

The cyber domain has seen perhaps even more innovations than space, and not only from a technological point of view. Countless other factors need to be considered in respect of this domain, ranging from - to mention just two - the management and control of big data to cybercrime. Given its transversal nature, cyberspace is increasingly a battleground for global players. Further, it is an arena susceptible to the proliferation of non-state actors who may play an important role as proxies in a cyberwar. Such actors, who are generically referred to as computer pirates, may thus take on the role of full-fledged electronic privateers. As happened with 15th-century privateers, hacker groups not formally affiliated with states could be provided with digital "letters of marque and reprisal" authorising them to attack competing countries without exposing the authorising state to the risk of counter-offensive. With specific reference to counter-offensives, it needs to be said that the extension of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty to include the two new domains could be problematic when applied to cyberspace, where the task of attributing culpability for an attack becomes extremely difficult if it was carried out by non-state actors. In addition to the problem of asymmetry between the actors, the new domain also complicates the principle and practice of deterrence. In the material world, the nuclear deterrent has always marked the extreme limit that must not be breached, but the cyber world lacks any equivalent boundaries. Furthermore, even a state such as North Korea can afford the costs and find the expertise for launching cyberattacks. Major global players such as NATO or the United States, on the other hand, find it difficult to enforce a serious policy of deterrence and must rely instead on conventional means such as arrest

warrants (most notoriously against the Sandworm group of hackers), but, generally, are severely limited in the sort of response they can make to attacks by proxy actors.

Compounding the effects of these conceptual innovations, which are destined to occupy our thoughts for some time to come, are new technologies that continue to shake up the virtual world. Artificial intelligence, which has just now made itself known to the consumer world, is a potential bonding agent for all technologies. Artificial intelligence already provides support for Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) missions, and perhaps one day soon it will render the human factor superfluous. Speculation about the future aside, artificial narrow intelligence (ANI) is already being deployed and already helping to improve human cognitive performance. Artificial general intelligence (AGI), which is on a par with human intelligence, has endless potential to enhance other disruptive technologies. Fully autonomous unmanned aerial vehicles or intelligent satellites with image analysis capabilities are just some examples of what AGI could do. Big data analysis requires an intelligence that is capable not just of extrapolating what is most useful from a vast trove of information but also of learning from its operations and thus optimising the final analysis. Modern facial recognition systems, such as that installed at Tel Aviv airport, are an example of this principle in action. Instructed through the input of certain parameters and information, with sensors trained to read body language, the system alerts its operators to the presence of potential terrorists. Whoever is operating the system is assisted by AI, big data and machine learning; if artificial intelligence becomes powerful enough, as it may, operators themselves might become unnecessary.

It goes without saying that there is a significant advantage to having better AI than one's adversaries. China knows this, which is why it is aiming for the "intelligentisation" of conflicts by 2030 by building an AI system that is exponentially more efficient at cloud computing and at running unmanned systems.

Yet the real battle might be about to be fought on another scale altogether: at the quantum level. Quantum computing may well mark the beginning of a new era.

According to Moore's law, the complexity of a chip, measured by the number of transistors it contains, doubles every 18 months. This leads to the periodic doubling of computational capabilities, as we have effectively seen in the rapid, relentless and unremitting advances made by computers since they first appeared. Quantum computers

(i.e. machines with quantum annealers) can run at ten thousand times the speed of a traditional computer. It is easy to see the potential of this, just as it is easy to overlook the risks that technology of this sort poses.

The story of the Enigma, the most famous encryption device in history, is pertinent here. Nazi Germany had great faith in the capacity of the Enigma encryption system to render its communications undecipherable and thereby give it an advantage over the enemy. The breaking of the Enigma code saved countless lives, and enabled the Allies to avoid German U-boats during D-day. Nowadays, encryption does not depend on the use of mechanical discs in an Enigma-like machine but is effected by means of very complicated algorithms. The asymmetric RSA algorithm is the standard on which data security systems and protocols are based today. Both a public and a private key are used to decrypt. It takes an extreme amount of conventional computation to decrypt a message without a private key, but quantum computers, because they use qubits instead of binary bits, run parallel calculations that can decrypt complicated algorithms in short order. It should be said that no quantum computers yet exist that are so sophisticated as to compromise the encryption standards we now use, but an increasing number of experts reckon that the current standards could be obsolete in 15 or 20 years.

Apart from the implications for encryption and the secrecy of communications, quantum computing is also becoming entwined with artificial intelligence. At the risk of oversimplification, we can say that machine learning and artificial intelligence involve the processing of huge amounts of data, so that the better a computer is at this task, the better its AI. A quantum computer can calculate faster than at traditional machine, handle randomness and simulate multiple AI systems at once. Meanwhile, an AI using such a setup may be able to generate new algorithms to correct quantum and logic errors and even improve our understanding of quantum mechanics.

So, to conclude this brief digression on the current state of some of the most important defence and security technologies, it is evident why the 2022 Strategic Concept particularly emphasises the technology race. Recent events in Ukraine have shown what even a small army, if technologically better equipped than the enemy, can do to what was considered the second strongest army in the world.

3. New technologies and the procurement of critical resources

Discussions concerning the new technologies and capabilities of China and Russia also need to touch upon non-strictly military aspects such as critical infrastructures. For some time now, Allies have been discussing not only the race for 5G but also other critical elements from the world of technology, notably semiconductor manufacturing and the procurement of the resources needed for their production, especially rare earths. Neither the space nor the cyber domain could exist without a material domain consisting of infrastructures based on minerals, whose supply is therefore critical. These critical minerals are so called because they are needed for the manufacture of high-tech products such as cell phones, hard drives, screens, LEDs, batteries and other commonly used devices. Even more importantly, they are vital for military applications such as guidance systems, lasers, sonar, radar and, indeed, almost every piece of military equipment imaginable. Even if only in trace amounts, these minerals are to be found in all technological devices. Since technological devices have become as essential as they are ubiquitous, many countries have announced plans to review or build production and supply chains. For example, the Biden administration has published a situation report with input from the Departments of Commerce, Energy, Defence, and Health on semiconductor and battery production, as well as on the procurement of rare earths.[1] The report points to a number of specific critical scarcities in a country, the USA, that otherwise has few competitors for the extent of its lands and the wealth of its subsoil. Yet the USA is completely deficient in, for example, tantalum, a metal used in the aerospace industry or as a component for munitions, and therefore needs to import 100% of supply. Tantalum is just one of 18 rare earth minerals that the United States needs to import.[1] It is worth bearing in mind, however, that some minerals are defined as critical not so much for their scarcity as for the complexities of the manufacturing processes that they entail and, indeed, may cease to be critical in the future if new production methods are developed. Aluminium serves as a good example of how definitions can change: now a commonplace material, it used to be costlier than silver because it was difficult to mine. When a method was found to extract the mineral from bauxite, paving the way to its widespread adoption and use, its cost dropped precipitously.

A sound reckoning of scarcity needs to factor in China, which, in addition to attentively managing the supply of minerals for its own industries, has also been operating

as an exporter of certain critical minerals. It is fair to say that, numerically speaking, Beijing, controlling more than 70% of the market, has managed to gain monopolistic power. The strategic relevance of critical minerals is encapsulated in the statistic that 78% of American imports of rare-earth compounds and metals come from China. When it comes to the transformation and processing of raw materials, China is the only country in the world running a fully closed cycle of production, from mining and extraction to manufacturing. An example of this is the production of neodymium-iron-boron (NdFeB) magnets, which are used in the medical and information technology fields and elsewhere. The magnets are produced almost exclusively by China thanks to a complete supply chain, running from extraction to the making of the final product. To compete, Australia, the United Kingdom and France would have to combine their natural resources and manufacturing capabilities.

One result has been the inversion of an assumption that has been in place for decades, namely that it is America and Europe that impose sanctions on other countries. In this case, China's market leadership has enabled it to sanction American companies that sell weaponry to Taiwan.

The foregoing observations are a cause of no small concern but, fortunately, it is now being discovered that the rare earths are not as rare as previously thought. Meanwhile, apart from the question of volume, the other critical areas of production consist of extraction and refining, and here the United States is working to make up for lost time. The question likewise concerns the European Union, which has issued an *Action Plan on Critical Raw Materials* that aims at lessening EU dependence on foreign countries for critical materials.

Apart from their application by the defence industry, rare earths are also very important for the new technologies that are needed for ecological transition. An electric car needs six times the mineral resources of a conventional car, and a wind farm needs nine times the mineral resources of a gas-fired thermal power plant. Seeing as energy supply is a strategic consideration that is inextricably bound up with questions of national security, the political debate in all Western countries, even if it chooses to ignore the matter of military systems and their needs, should nonetheless turn its attention to critical materials and their procurement.

Computer chips and their design are another story. Here the Western world, led by the United States, still carries enormous clout. Companies such as Nvidia, once known only to gamers, are now market leaders producing ever higher-performing GPUs. Other companies such as Applied Materials continue to invest in and innovate chip production methods. Chinese companies struggle to keep up, and, as noted above, narrowing that gap will be the real challenge for China over the next 10 years, with Taiwan lying across its path to success or failure.

Technological innovation has always been front and centre of discussions in NATO, but these more recent issues relating to supply chains, energy sources and critical minerals have hitherto not formed part of its core business. To respond to this new challenge, then, NATO will need to tap into that capacity for self-transformation that has enabled it to survive for more than seventy years.

Talking about transformation, possibilities arise from the two core tasks currently overshadowed by collective defence. Indeed, it is no secret that support to countries in crisis areas or in need of capacity building can lead to economic relationships based both on the newly re-established security framework and on the mutual trust between the host nation and NATO countries. For this reason, in the future, Security Force Assistance activities can play a vital role in strengthening and creating new partnerships that can go beyond the security sphere and embrace the economic aspect related to procuring critical minerals and sharing technologies.

SFA activities require a financial, political, and long-term commitment to develop and improve the capacity of the host nations but are excellent tools to keep in mind if we want to forge a better economic partnership with other countries, helping them and us strengthen collective resilience against new and old threats.

The strategic concept itself reminds us of how one of the goals of the alliance is to "strengthen political dialogue and cooperation with those who aim to join the Alliance, help strengthen their resilience against malign interference, build their capabilities, and enhance our practical support to advance their Euro-Atlantic aspirations"[2] and the support expressed with the SFA activities for those countries could be priceless.

In one respect at least, we have reached a good point, for, as they say, to deal with a problem one must first acknowledge that it exists, which the Strategic Concept clearly

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[2] www.act.nato.int

does: "We will work towards identifying and mitigating strategic vulnerabilities and dependencies, including with respect to our critical infrastructure, supply chains and health systems. We will enhance our energy security and invest in a stable and reliable energy supply, suppliers and sources."[3] The only way to achieve this is through careful forward planning because, as Eisenhower put it: "In preparing for battle I have always discovered that plans are useless, but planning is indispensable."

[3] www.act.nato.int

BRICS+: Towards a Global "Warsaw Pact" (and beyond) of the New Millennium?

Alessandro FANETTI

"The past is like a lamp placed at the entrance of the future."
Félicité Robert de La Mennais

Abstract

The *"NATO Strategic Concept – 2022"* is a fundamental Document of the Atlantic Alliance that, as well explained in its own Introduction, *"[...] It defines the Alliance's three core tasks: deterrence and defence; crisis prevention and management; and cooperative security [...]."*

Tasks to be performed in a world not at peace, with various regional and global Organisations undermining the role of the *"political West"* in the world.

The most significant of these is certainly the *"BRICS+"*.

With *BRICS+* is intended a set of countries (a *CLUB*) that share a basic idea: the unipolar international architecture that arose from the dissolution of the *USSR* is not adequate for the new millennium.

While at the birth of this "format" (in the mid-2000s) there were only four countries involved (Brazil, Russia, India and China), since 2010 it has been reinvigorated with the entry of South Africa (hence the name *BRICS*) and the development of further collaborations with other countries (+).

February 24, 2022 was then the turning point, as from that date onwards there has been a progressive "geopolitical polarization" with the consequent acceleration in the development of various Global Organizations.

One of the most significant is certainly the *BRICS+*, operating with multilevel, multi-sectoral and "multi-vector" cooperation and collaboration.

For example, in the economic sphere, with a commitment to greater use of the currencies of individual member States (and, in the future, probably a new common currency) with a view to a progressive "de-dollarization" of a meaningful part of the global economy.

But also in the area "security – defence" (the main focus of this paper), with progressive and continuous cooperation and collaboration among the various countries that make it up.

On this last point, however, a certain degree of homogeneity is still lacking, for example, such as that present in the *Atlantic Alliance* (and will certainly be lacking at least in the short - medium term), although it is discernible how this is one of the main objectives to be achieved in order to "count" more and more in the global geopolitical context (increasingly militarized).

Precisely on the issue of "security – defence" it is noteworthy that in this area, therefore, collaboration develops more at the level of cooperation between two or more member countries than at the level of *CLUB* as a whole.

To confirm this, below are two very significant points that show both the need and willingness to strengthen in this area, as well as the cooperation that already takes place among member countries:

- *BRICS* Joint Statement on "Strengthen *BRICS* Solidarity and Cooperation, Respond to New Features and Challenges in International Situation" – May 22, 2022": *"[...] 1. The Ministers of Foreign Affairs/International Relations of the Federative Republic of Brazil, the Russian Federation, the Republic of India, the People's Republic of China and the Republic of South Africa met on May 19, 2022 in virtual formatunder China's Chairship. They reiterated that the BRICS countries shall continue to enhance the framework of intra-BRICS cooperation under the three pillars: political and security, economic and financial, and cultural & people-to-people exchanges [...]."*[1]

- *"The South African National Defence Force (SANDF) will host a multinational maritime exercise with Russia and China over a 10-day period to strengthen the already flourishing relations between the three countries."*[2] – January 20, 2023 (exercises later held regularly).

The *BRICS+* is thus working toward increasing cooperation in the "security – defence" sphere, especially to ensure internal security and stability of the various countries, as well as increasing the interchange of armaments produced by *CLUB* members.

[1] http://brics2022.mfa.gov.cn/eng/hywj/ODMM/202205/t20220529_10694180.html.
[2] https://www.sanews.gov.za/south-africa/sandf-host-china-and-russia-multilateral-maritime-exercises.

And also opting for "intersections" with other "alternative" platforms (those competing with the "Political West") such as, for example, the *Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)*.

Goals and ambitions that were also confirmed to me at the *"International Municipal BRICS+ Forum"* on November 24 - 25, 2022 in St. Petersburg, which was attended by *BRICS* and many other official representatives of Asian, Latin American and African governments.

A continuous and progressive effort, therefore, both at the level of the Organization and among its individual member states, to "unhinge" the post – 1991 international geopolitical architecture and achieve a multipolar world.

Keywords

Unipolar World

Multipolar World

Collaboration

Cooperation

BRICS+: TOWARDS A GLOBAL "WARSAW PACT" (and beyond) OF THE NEW MILLENNIUM?

Intrnational Architecture

Political and Security Exchanges

Economic and Financial Exchanges

Cultural & People to People Exchanges

The acronym *BRICS+* refers to a group of countries that no longer recognise themselves in the unipolar world order that arose after the dissolution of the *USSR*.

A set of countries, a *CLUB*, that grows in the keen interest of more and more nations of the world and with increasing ties year by year, as the clash escalates between those who seek to defend the unipolar international architecture and those who instead try to "unhinge" it in favour of a multipolar world.

Interest of more and more countries led by governments unwilling to find (or have) funding and/or political – military support from the West.

The words of a senior Tunisian leader (April 2023), Mahmoud bin Mabrouk, are a clear example of this: *"[...] We will accept no dictates or interference in Tunisia's internal affairs. We are negotiating the terms, but we refuse to receive instructions and the EU's agenda. [...] The BRICS Nations are a political, economic and financial alternative that will enable Tunisia to open up to the new world [...]."*[3]

Obviously, in this context, the development of the conflict in Ukraine played a major role, having accelerated these global landslides.

In the words of Russian philosopher Aleksandr Gel'evič Dugin, a personality whose thinking is very close to what the Kremlin (and others) declares and promotes: *"The conflict in Ukraine is the world's "first multipolar war"".*[4]

Investigating the *"BRICS+ issue"*, it is necessary to state first of all how this acronym was not immediately born in this format and did not initially contemplate close collaborations between these countries. In fact, it arose simply as a "theoretical acronym" *"BRICs"* at the beginning of the new millennium thanks to Goldman Sachs and the publication entitled *"Building Better Global Economic BRICs"* [5], dealing exclusively with the economic sphere.

Over time, however, these countries [initially Brazil, Russia, India, China (*BRIC*) and since 2010 also South Africa (-*S*), followed by other nations that have started to participate in the Forums (+)] have developed an increasingly close and complex joint path, promoting multilevel, multi-sectoral and multi-vector cooperation and collaboration.

[3] https://english.aawsat.com/home/article/4262281/tunisia-plans-join-brics-nations.
[4] https://www.geopolitika.ru/it/article/aleksandr-dugin-lucraina-e-il-primo-conflitto-multipolare.
[5] https://www.goldmansachs.com/insights/archive/archive-pdfs/build-better-brics.pdf.

Cooperation and collaboration affects about 50% of the world's population and 25% of *GDP*, thus attracting the attention of the whole world and, of course, of all those long-standing "international structures".

If we look at the *IMF* tables on growth estimates for 2024, we understand the situation even more clearly:

- *Advanced Economies: 1.4%*
- *Emerging Market and Developing Economies: 4.2% (China 4.5%, India 6.3%, Russia 1.3% nonostante le sanzioni, Brazil 1.5%, South Africa 1.8%).*[6]

An interest that is absolutely justified, therefore, due to the ever-increasing weight of this Organisation in the global geopolitical context. An importance that is rightly recognised and emphasised at a "transversal level", being addressed (directly or indirectly), for example, both within the *"NATO Strategic Concept – 2022"* and within the *"Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation – 2023"*:

1) The following is taken from the first Document: *"[...] 6. The Euro-Atlantic area is not at peace. The Russian Federation has violated the norms and principles that contributed to a stable and predictable European security order. We cannot discount the possibility of an attack against Allies' sovereignty and territorial integrity. Strategic competition, pervasive instability and recurrent shocks define our broader security environment. The threats we face are global and interconnected. 7. Authoritarian actors challenge our interests, values and democratic way of life. They are investing in sophisticated conventional, nuclear and missile capabilities, with little transparency or regard for international norms and commitments. Strategic competitors test our resilience and seek to exploit the openness, interconnectedness and digitalisation of our nations. They interfere in our democratic processes and institutions and target the security of our citizens through hybrid tactics, both directly and through proxies. They conduct malicious activities in cyberspace and space, promote disinformation campaigns, instrumentalise migration, manipulate energy supplies and employ economic coercion. These actors are also at the forefront of a deliberate effort to undermine multilateral norms and institutions and promote authoritarian models of governance. 8.*

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[6] IMF, April 2023, World Economic Outlook.

The Russian Federation is the most significant and direct threat to Allies' security and to peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area. It seeks to establish spheres of influence and direct control through coercion, subversion, aggression and annexation. It uses conventional, cyber and hybrid means against us and our partners. Its coercive military posture, rhetoric and proven willingness to use force to pursue its political goals undermine the rules-based international order. The Russian Federation is modernising its nuclear forces and expanding its novel and disruptive dual-capable delivery systems, while employing coercive nuclear signalling. It aims to destabilise countries to our East and South. In the High North, its capability to disrupt Allied reinforcements and freedom of navigation across the North Atlantic is a strategic challenge to the Alliance. Moscow's military build-up, including in the Baltic, Black and Mediterranean Sea regions, along with its military integration with Belarus, challenge our security and interests [...]."

"[...] 13. The People's Republic of China's (PRC) stated ambitions and coercive policies challenge our interests, security and values. The PRC employs a broad range of political, economic and military tools to increase its global footprint and project power, while remaining opaque about its strategy, intentions and military build-up. The PRC's malicious hybrid and cyber operations and its confrontational rhetoric and disinformation target Allies and harm Alliance security. The PRC seeks to control key technological and industrial sectors, critical infrastructure, and strategic materials and supply chains. It uses its economic leverage to create strategic dependencies and enhance its influence. It strives to subvert the rules-based international order, including in the space, cyber and maritime domains. The deepening strategic partnership between the People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation and their mutually reinforcing attempts to undercut the rules-based international order run counter to our values and interests. 14. We remain open to constructive engagement with the PRC, including to build reciprocal transparency, with a view to safeguarding the Alliance's security interests. We will work together responsibly, as Allies, to address the systemic challenges posed by the PRC to Euro-Atlantic security and ensure NATO's enduring ability to guarantee the defence and security of Allies. We will boost our shared awareness, enhance our resilience and preparedness, and protect against the PRC's coercive tactics and efforts to divide the Alliance. We will stand up for our shared values and the rules-based international order, including freedom of navigation [...]."

"[...] 18. The erosion of the arms control, disarmament and non proliferation architecture has negatively impacted strategic stability. The Russian Federation's violations and selective implementation of its arms control obligations and commitments have contributed to the deterioration of the broader security landscape. The potential use of Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear materials or weapons against NATO by hostile state and non-state actors remains a threat to our security. Iran and North Korea continue to develop their nuclear and missile programmes. Syria, North Korea and the Russian Federation, along with non-state actors, have resorted to the use of chemical weapons. The PRC is rapidly expanding its nuclear arsenal and is developing increasingly sophisticated delivery systems, without increasing transparency or engaging in good faith in arms control or risk reduction [...]."[7]

2) The following is taken from the second Document: *"[...] 18. Russia is striving towards a system of international relations that would guarantee reliable security, preservation of its cultural and civilizational identity, and equal opportunities for the development for all states, regardless of their geographical location, size of territory, demographic, resource and military capacity, or political, economic and social structure. In order to meet these criteria, the system of international relations should be multipolar [...]."*

"[...] 4) enhance the capacity and international role of the interstate association of BRICS, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), the RIC (Russia, India, China) and other interstate associations and international organizations, as well as mechanisms with strong Russian participation; [...]."

"[...] 7) promoting the processes of regional and interregional economic integration that serve Russia's interests, first of all, within the Union State, EAEU, CIS, SCO, BRICS as well as with a view of shaping the Greater Eurasian Partnership; [...]."

"[...] 53. Russia will continue to build up a particularly privileged strategic partnership with the Republic of India with a view to enhance and expand cooperation in all areas on a mutually beneficial basis and place special emphasis on increasing the volume of

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[7] https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2022/6/pdf/290622-strategic-concept.pdf.

bilateral trade, strengthening investment and technological ties, and ensuring their resistance to destructive actions of unfriendly states and their alliances.
54. Russia seeks to transform Eurasia into a continental common space of peace, stability, mutual trust, development and prosperity [...]."[8]

The *BRICS+* Organisation's "ultimate" goal, therefore, is to change the post – 1991 unipolar international architecture by deepening the ties of those who no longer recognise themselves in the world that has emerged since the end of the *Cold War*.
And to achieve this goal, it operates in all fields: primarily economic, security – defence, political and cultural.[9]

As well as collaborating and "intersecting" as far as possible with other proposals that are not "in tune" with the "political West" and include countries interested in the *BRICS+* strategic objectives, such as the *"Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO)"*.[10]

While on the first point, the main and widely stated goal is to implement a progressive "de – dollarization" of a significant portion of the global economy through the wider use of the national currencies of the members (and in perspective also to have a "*BRICS+* currency")[11], but also using the *"New Development Bank"*, in this paper the "security – defence issue" is dealt with in more detail.

This is a decisive issue, especially in the context of an increasingly militarised global geopolitical landscape such as the one we are currently experiencing (and that we will also live at least in the near future), and one that is absolutely felt by the *BRICS+* members as well, as outlined, for example, in the "BRICS Joint Statement on *"Strengthen BRICS Solidarity and Cooperation, Respond to New Features and Challenges in International Situation"* – 22/05/2022": *"[...] 1. The Ministers of Foreign Affairs/International Relations of the Federative Republic of Brazil, the Russian Federation, the Republic of India, the People's Republic of China and the Republic of*

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[8] https://mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/official_documents/1860586/.
[9] Even resorting to actions that can be classifiable in the concept of "Hybrid Warfare", which is very current in the context of "Unipolarism vs Multipolarism".
[10] It includes, for example, the countries of Central Asia (with the exception of Turkmenistan). Also very attentive to economic and security – defence issues, having already promoted joint exercises and using primarily Russian military equipment.
[11] Read, among other things, the article entitled *"Russia, China and EU Are Pushing Towards De-Dollarization: Will India Follow?"* e presente a questo link: *https://infobrics.org/post/34255/.*

*South Africa met on 19 May 2022 in virtual format under China's Chairship. They reiterated that the BRICS countries shall continue to enhance the framework of intra-BRICS cooperation under the three pillars: **political and security**, economic and financial, and cultural & people-to-people exchanges [...]."*[12]

It must be emphasised first of all, however, that the level of homogeneity and interoperability of the *BRICS+* in this specific field is by no means comparable to other supranational entities such as *NATO* or the *CSTO* (and it is not foreseeable that such levels will be reached at least in the short – medium term).

Although recent years have seen a marked strengthening of collaboration and cooperation among members, interventions in this area are still mainly developed at the level of individual states or jointly between some *BRICS+* countries (rather than at the level of the Organisation as a whole).

What is still missing, for example, is a such as the *"NATO Military Committee"*, as well as clear and straightforward rules on any decisions to be taken and "fielded" in a concrete manner in this area.

Anyway, there is no doubt that the *BRICS+* are moving towards dual cooperation in this area (with a third, more general one), which is already present at the level of individual countries:

1) Commitment to ensure the security and internal stability of member countries, first of all those that are economically and militarily weaker (e.g. various African states), including through the presence of "foreign" security forces (as well as through the procurement of better – performing armaments) to protect the Government from coups d'état and various kinds of revolutions. A glaring example is Mali, which for years has seen the presence of Russian troops (especially the Wagner Group), who first supported the expulsion of the French (with their "Western influence") and then have been "propping up" the Country's new élite (first of all the Government and Armed Forces).

In this context, an increasing "military – technical coordination" can be expected, with the prospect of arriving at a common direction.

2) Strong impetus to buying and selling of armaments between member countries and broader agreements between them, including at the level of military cooperation (first

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[12] http://brics2022.mfa.gov.cn/eng/hywj/ODMM/202205/t20220529_10694180.html.

and foremost with joint exercises) is already the case Russia – Algeria, for example. This ensures similar standards in the "material and immaterial" capabilities of the Armed Forces of the various member states, making even a possible decision to change the "geopolitical spectrum" more difficult, as it would mean having to start from scratch also in the security and stability of the Nation. In essence, greater homogeneity and interoperability of the Armed Forces of the various countries, such as *NATO*. A road clearly taken and developing, as for example noted with the military exercises at the beginning of 2023 between Russia, China and South Africa.

3) As happens in Central Asia, "sharing out" tasks among the most important *BRICS+* countries, for instance with a primary commitment to security and defence by Russia and copious economic investments by China.

Some significant examples that clearly show the path taken by the member countries of this *CLUB* on the *"security – defence"* matter (and beyond), with the primary commitment aimed at achieving a "new world":

- Strong commitment to further enlarge this Organisation by the founding countries. To date, dozens of countries regularly participate in *BRICS+* initiatives, some of them of absolute importance in the regional and/or global context: Argentina, Iran, Kazakhstan, Indonesia, Senegal, Saudi Arabia, Nigeria, Thailand, Egypt, Algeria.

- None of the *BRICS* (and related) countries have imposed sanctions against the Russian Federation after 24 February 2022. This allowed them to continue with their business, both in the purely military field (such as Iran) and in the field of *"dual use"* products.

- The Russia – China *"Friendship without Limits"* also reverberates with great impetus on the *BRICS+*, as they are two of the driving powers of this Organisation: *"Since 2014, Russia and China have developed a strategic partnership, primarily due to enhanced military cooperation, including sales of advanced military equipment and an increasingly robust program of bilateral and multi-lateral military exercises."*[13] *"We* (China &

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[13]https://www.marshallcenter.org/en/publications/security-insights/emerging-strategic-partnership-trends-russia-china-military-cooperation-0.

Russia) *have very strong ties. They surpass the military – political alliances of the Cold War Era [...]. They are very stable."*[14]

- The *"technical – military"* exchanges between these countries are highly significant (although it should be emphasised that the United States of America is still the world's largest arms exporter, with a share of around 40% of the total and exports to more than 100 countries):

  ➢ Russia is the world's second largest exporter, with a share of about 20% of the total. Its first customer is India (about 30% of the total), followed by China (about 25%). Also very important, are sales to Algeria and Egypt (not coincidentally attributable to *BRICS+*). Without neglecting the business with Kazakhstan, Belarus, Iran, Turkey and Syria (among other countries). [15]

  ➢ China has been a net exporter of arms for a few years now, although not yet comparable to the US and Russia. About 75% of the total is exported to Asia and 20% to Africa. These exports are concentrated in Pakistan, Myanmar and Bangladesh in Asia, while on the African continent they remain mostly in the countries of the Mediterranean belt. All developing countries, therefore, and absolutely interested in the *BRICS* format.

  ➢ Argentina has been hosting a Chinese *"Space Exploration Base"* since 2014, effectively opening up to ever closer collaborations with Beijing. Collaborations with China and with countries interested in building a "new world", also reaffirmed in the expression of interest in officially joining the *BRICS* format and the increasingly strong cooperation with Brazil and its President, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, who in mid – April 2023 led former President Dilma Rousseff to head the *"New Development Bank"*.

  ➢ Iran and Saudi Arabia, two nations in the "*BRICS+* orbit", have recently entered a "New Era" in their relations, "coincidentally" thanks to decisive Chinese mediation. This is a more than significant change in the Middle

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[14]Chinese Defense Minister, Li Shangfu, meeting in Moscow the President of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin – 16/04/2023. (AFP).
[15]Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.

East geopolitical landscape and one that opens up innovative economic and security scenarios. The Iranian nuclear issue is a very important example (it is no coincidence that one of the first post – Agreement Saudi statements concerned the fact that any possible attack against Teheran will not see the active or passive participation of Saudi Arabia).

Of many of these issues I discussed with representatives of many *BRICS+* countries also at the *"International Municipal BRICS+ Forum"* held in St. Petersburg on 24 - 25 November 2022. [16]

In particular, alongside the founding countries, I could not help but notice the presence of many African delegates who, at my specific request, confirmed their participation as *"Official Representatives of the Government of their Country"*.

Representatives who expressed their intention to increase ties within this reality, progressively detaching themselves from Western ones.

First of all, economic ties but, given the ever-increasing geopolitical polarisation, also in the area of security – defence.

I was particularly impressed by the clarity of their words, even in front of a Western-born citizen who was unknown to them. Using words unrepeatable but clear in their meaning, they pointed out to me that their first goal is *"the end of Western neo-colonialism in Africa"* and that *"the BRICS+ model is what Africa needs"*.

Even when I asked what they thought of the Russian presence in Mali, the interlocutors confirmed their *"support for such a presence"*, even expressing the need to expand this garrison so as to expel the Western *"remnants"* from the Continent.

In conclusion, therefore, it is possible to write that the *BRICS+* is a format that is carving out a role for itself as the main antagonist to the "political West". More and more countries are interested in it and, in line with other proposals already on the table for years (e.g. the *"Belt and Road Initiative"*), its ultimate goal is to "unhinge" the unipolar world in favour of a multipolar one.

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[16] https://www.expoforum.ru/en/events/BRIKS-2022/.

In this regard, the concept expressed by Chinese President Xi Jinping to his Russian counterpart Vladimir Vladimirovič Putin during the State Visit to Russia in March 2023 leaves no doubt: *"Right now there are changes the likes of which we haven't seen for 100 years. And we are the ones driving these changes together [...]."*[17]

In this context, the commitment to security – defence is one of the key elements. But while this area is not yet fully developed at the *"CLUB level"* (as instead it happens for *NATO*), showing instead a stronger cohesion at the level of agreements between the individual member countries, it is however possible to see how the *BRICS+* is moving in a direction that provides for ever greater integration in this field as well.

And some of the words used by Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Viktorovič Lavrov during the meeting held in early April 2023 in Moscow between him and representatives of the *BRICS* countries in the Russian capital are the proof: *"[...] There was an in-depth exchange of views on developing and strengthening the strategic partnership within the framework of the association [...]. [...] A common desire was expressed to strengthen the international role of the BRICS [...]. [...] The meeting reaffirmed the commitment to a multipolar world order [...]. [...] The growing interest of a wide range of countries in cooperating with the BRICS was noted [...]."*[18]

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[17] https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/3/22/xi-tells-putin-of-changes-not-seen-for-100.
[18] Mid.ru.

The Climate-Security Nexus in the Field of Defence Capacity Building to conflict prevention

Benedetta AUSILI

Abstract

This article focuses on the recognition of climate change as a significant challenge for security, particularly within the new Strategic Concept adopted by NATO leaders in Madrid. It explores two main areas: the impact of climate change on human and national security, and its effects on military operations. While climate change has severe consequences for developing countries, such as mass migration and catastrophic events, it is not the sole cause of conflicts. Environmental changes interact with political and socio-economic factors, and weak governance and ineffective policies worsen societal vulnerability to climate-related damages. In military operations, climate change affects readiness and operability, and it can destabilize military strategies, providing opportunities for non-state actors to exploit grievances. In this context, the role of Security Force Assistance (SFA) Operators may be extremely important in building resilience and reducing environmental impact. Therefore, the article emphasizes that climate change poses direct threats to human and national security, amplifying existing vulnerabilities and destabilizing military operations. It stresses the urgency for implementing measures to mitigate the effects of climate change and foster cooperation between military and civil entities to adapt to a changing environment.

Keywords

Climate Security

Defence Capacity Building

Climate Change

Negative Effect of Climate Crisis

The Climate-Security Nexus in the Field of Defence Capacity Building to conflict prevention.

Economic Development

Environmental Changes

Sustainable Development Strategy

Natural Resources

*"Climate change is the single greatest threat to a sustainable future
but, at the same time, addressing the climate challenge presents
a golden opportunity to promote prosperity, security
and a brighter future for all."[1]*
Ban Ki-Moon.

1. Introduction

Heads of state and government from the thirty North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies gathered in Madrid on June 29, 2022, for the NATO Summit. Here, the leaders adopted a new Strategic Concept to provide updated guidelines for the Alliance to address new emerging threats. The new Strategic Concept has been drafted during a very peculiar time of unrest and uncertainty in the international arena, with much of it focused on the Russian Federation's military operation in Ukraine. However, the new guidelines also acknowledge a new type of threat, which is not related to the use of arms or armed forces. In particular, Climate Change is recognized in paragraph 19 of the document as "a defining challenge of our time, with a profound impact on Allied security".[2] Therefore, starting from this specific segment, this article examines two distinct pathways within the Climate-Security nexus. On the one hand, it investigates the impact of Climate Change on human and national security, with a particular emphasis on the devastating consequences it has on developing countries, including mass migration, the deterioration of livelihoods, and even more catastrophic events. On the other hand, it concentrates on how Climate Change affects military operations in the field, leading to substantial damage to military equipment and installations, as well as negatively impacting the health of troop personnel. Such effects will significantly influence the execution of SFA Operators and defense capacity-building activities on the ground, given their priorities of conflict prevention, training, and assisting local forces.

2. Development

Since the last century, climate change started to appear on the international political agenda thanks to the epistemic work carried out by the United Nations. Politicians and scholars have recognized the need to protect the global climate for future generations, setting targets and protocols agreed upon by states to reduce emissions and

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[1] The United Nations. "Secretary-General's remarks at Climate Leaders Summit", 11 April 2014, Washington, DC.
[2] NATO/OTAN. "Strategic Concept", Madrid, 2022, par.19.

strengthen resilience.[3] However, the concept of "Climate Security" and its recognition as a potential threat to states and individuals emerged later and is still relatively new. The nexus between climate change and security appeared in contemporary global politics only on April 17, 2007, when the United Nations Security Council held an innovative open ministerial debate on the relationship between energy, security, and climate.[4] The debate emphasized the need to reflect on the links between climate change and international security.[5] Two years later, in 2009, the United Nations General Assembly with Resolution A64/350, recognized climate change not as a direct threat but instead as a *threat multiplier*, as stated in the Strategic Concept, that amplifies and exacerbates existing vulnerabilities at the social, political, and economic level, affecting especially those societies that lack the capabilities to adapt to a changing climate. Indeed, developing countries, which are characterized by weak state governance, political corruption, clientelism, and economic underdevelopment, are the most affected. The next figure, taken from the resolution, highlights potential threat multipliers arising from the impacts of climate change and possible minimizers that must be addressed to reduce the risks.[6]

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[3] The United Nations. "Nations Reach Historic Agreement on Climate Change".
https://www.un.org/en/academic-impact/nations-reach-historic-agreement-climate-change
[4] The United Nations. "Security Council holds first-ever debate on the impact of climate change on peace, security, hearing over 50 speakers", UN Security Council press release SC/9000, April 17, 2007.
[5] Sindico, Francesco. "Climate change: A security (council) issue", Carbon & Climate L. Rev., 2007.
[6] The United Nations General Assembly. "Resolution A/64/350. Climate change and its possible security implications", September 11, 2009, p.6. https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/667264#record-files-collapse-header

Figure: UNGA 2009 RES A/64/350

The adverse effects of climate change, such as increasing temperatures, floods, droughts, rising sea levels, wildfires, and more frequent extreme weather events, are undermining security and the lives of millions of people worldwide. These impacts make states more *vulnerable* in terms of food, water, or energy security, worsen human health conditions, and may *undermine economic development*, increasing disparities and poverty, particularly in communities lacking cooperation and coordination strategies. However, the primary factor which increases the likelihood of climate change leading to conflict is the *lack of strong state governance* and *ineffective policies* to protect societies from climate-related damages, combined with the impacts on the *accessibility of natural resources* and basic needs. This situation leads people to migrate and leave their homelands in search of better conditions, but it also increases competition and rivalry for remaining lands, even at the international level. While there has been an increasing agreement among politicians regarding the relationship between climate change and security, there is still considerable debate among scholars due to the lack of strong empirical evidence suggesting that climate change is the sole cause of conflict. The existing literature is often criticized for oversimplifying complex relationships, and various intervening factors have been identified as contributing to the increased probability of conflicts arising from environmental changes.

In other words, "while climate change *can* contribute to violence and conflict, climate change is *not* the only cause".[7] For example, in the Sahel, where agriculture is the

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[7] Mobjörk, Malin, Florian Krampe, and Kheira Tarif. "SIPRI Policy Brief-PATHWAYS OF CLIMATE INSECURITY: GUIDANCE FOR POLICYMAKERS", 2020, p.1.

primary contributor to the country's GDP, farmers and herders are the most affected by climate change, which leads to the loss of their lands and jobs due to sudden droughts or floods. Although such climate events increase competition for remaining resources, the lack of infrastructure and inequitable distribution of land at the local level, which regulates private property rights, allows individuals to take up arms and trigger violence. [8] Climate-induced forced mass migration is another source of tension resulting from climate impacts. For instance, Tuareg and Woodaabe Fulani pastoralists in northern Niger have been affected by decreasing resource availability, which could no longer sustain their traditional livelihoods. Despite their attempts to adapt to changing circumstances, many have lost their herds or arable lands and migrated to urban and coastal areas in search of alternative solutions. [9] Urban areas, in particular, attract migrants by offering alternative job opportunities and access to basic needs; nevertheless, in African states, they may lack the technical capabilities to accommodate migrants, which may increase the likelihood of resource competition and intercommunal conflicts between different ethnic and religious groups. Research conducted in Africa indicates that climate change alone does not lead to conflict, but rather disputes generally occur in the receiving areas where other factors interact, such as the convergence of different ethnic and religious groups that results in clashes while defending their interests at the expense of others.[10] The preceding scenarios are only a few examples that display how climate change can intensify threats by putting more strain on already vulnerable areas, in conjunction with other political and socio-economic factors, and how it represents a significant threat to local communities if not readably tackled.

Upon analyzing paragraph 19 of the Strategic Concept, the second section reveals how climate change influences the way armed forces operate in the field, damages assets and infrastructures, and increasingly involves soldiers in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief due to more frequent natural disasters. Recent studies have identified three aspects of military effectiveness that are altered by climate change: readiness, operations,

[8] Brottem, Leif. "The Growing Complexity of Farmer-Herder Conflict in West and Central Africa", Africa Security Brief n.39, July 12, 2021.
https://africacenter.org/publication/growing-complexity-farmer-herder-conflict-west-central-africa/.
[9] Bob, Urmilla, and Salomé Bronkhorst. "Conflict-sensitive adaptation to climate change in Africa", Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag (BWV), 2014. pp.209-210.
[10] Madu, Ignatius A., and Cletus Famous Nwankwo. "Spatial pattern of climate change and farmer–herder conflict vulnerabilities in Nigeria", GeoJournal 86.6, 2021. pp. 1-2.

and strategy.[11] The military's *ability* to conduct operations instantly is impacted by climate change through changes to infrastructures and installations, such as reduced access to quality lands and water supplies and increased damage to energy facilities. Rising sea levels, for example, threaten installations and bases along coastlines and compromise space operations, as launch sites are frequently located near shores.[12] Desertification as well, may heat critical water infrastructures or cause mechanical equipment failure, necessitating more assistance and higher investments in the field. The *operability* of the military is also affected by climate change through altered and complicated missions, undermining supply chains and logistical capacity, and putting the military's physical health at risk. Lastly, climate change events destabilize military *strategy*, particularly in already vulnerable areas, leading to conflict escalation and creating environments susceptible to terrorist activities. This is particularly true for developing countries, where limited access to basic resources, damaged infrastructure, and mass migration challenge regional stability. Non-state actors and jihadist organizations take advantage of these vulnerabilities, leveraging local political and economic grievances to gain support and recruitment from people vulnerable to climate change and environmental degradation. Thus, governments and peacebuilders must distinguish between self-defence groups and armed organizations and address the underlying issue of society's need for self-defence that the state cannot provide to resolve the conflict. Indeed, most of the NATO and UN Peacekeeping Operations are carried out in African and Middle Eastern countries, where the armed forces face non-state actors and jihadist organizations. These groups take advantage of local vulnerabilities and the impact of climate change on people's livelihoods to recruit supporters, particularly among younger people who are migrating from rural areas. They also use environmental governance to fill gaps left by the state and to present themselves as protectors of vulnerable populations in order to gain control over local communities and meet their needs. For example, they may offer protection, mediation, and infrastructure to resolve conflicts over natural resources. In the article "Climate Change and Violent Conflict in West Africa," Kheira Tarif focuses on the region around Lake Chad in Central Africa,

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[11] Glavinov, Aleksandar, and Goran Kamchev. "The impact of climate change on military activities", Contemporary Macedonian Defence 16.31, 2016, pp. 67-78.
[12] NATO/OTAN. "Climate Change & Security Impact Assessment, The Secretary General's Report", 2022, pp. 5-8.

where the lack of cross-border governance and the shrinking of the lake's surface area has led local communities to resort to criminal activities to earn a living. Boko Haram and the Islamic State's West Africa Province (ISWAP) have exploited the political and economic grievances of these communities to recruit supporters by offering loans or salaries. However, these groups often promote criminal activities such as cattle theft, kidnapping, and drug and weapon trafficking as alternative solutions.[13] In some cases, they may also use the seizure of strategic infrastructure as a means of exerting leverage over populations and governments.[14] To this end, Peter Marsden current CEO of Concordis International, an NGO based in London which focuses on peacebuilding in developing countries, stated in a personal interview that when approaching jihadist organizations, military and peacebuilding operators should first and foremost view them as self-defense groups that provide relative stability and personal safety to societies. These groups take advantage of weak governance and existing vulnerabilities to offer protection in exchange for loyalty and payment, transitioning from self-protectors to protection racketeers. Failure to recognize this critical distinction and perceiving them solely as armed organizations to be countered with military force does not address the underlying issue, which is society's need for self-defense in the absence of state provision. This should be a crucial consideration for governments and peacebuilders conducting conflict analysis.[15]

In this given situation, Security Force Assistance (SFA) Operators have a significant role to play in both strengthening local forces' defensive capabilities through training and assisting, and in mentoring and mediating among locals and with their respective governments. The Allied Joint Doctrine for Security Force Assistance (SFA) (AJP-3.16) defines the role of SFA as "assisting a host nation (HN) in developing a sustainable capability that should enable its defense against threats to stability and security."[16] More specifically, SFA activities involve an overall commitment from different perspectives: from the political to the financial ones, to "improve HN capacity

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[13] Tarif, Kheira. "Climate Change and Violent Conflict in West Africa: Assessing the Evidence", SIPRI No. 2022/3, 2022, p.12.

[14] Glavinov, Aleksandar, *op-cit*., p.70.

[15] Ausili, Benedetta. "Climate Change as amplifier of existing crisis: case study: the Sahel region", LUMSA University, Rome, 2023, p.107.

[16] NATO/OTAN. "Allied Joint Doctrine for Security Force Assistance" (AJP 3-16), NATO Standardization Office (NSO), Edition A, Version 1, May 2016, p.17.

in terms of generating, organizing, training, enabling, advising, and mentoring (GOTEAM) activities"[17] The Section II of the AJP-3.16 lists the imperatives which are at the basis of any kind of SFA operations. Given that climate change amplifies existing vulnerabilities at the social, political, and economic levels, SFA Operators must have a thorough understanding of the environment in which they operate. They should identify critical infrastructures, past natural hazards, and any other triggers that may alter the field. The analysis of the climate security nexus should be included in their assessment to focus efforts on addressing the impact of climate change on national security and assist local populations in securing their territories. For instance, new resources and monitoring systems may be required to increase readiness, and cooperation with meteorological services on the ground is essential to predict potential risks. To this end, the PMESI-PT analysis[18] developed by the US Army is a useful tool in performing a comprehensive assessment of the region, as it also includes the physical environment as a key variable influencing military operations. Furthermore, as stated in the document, "the successful delivery of SFA requires trust between all parties involved". Indeed, any kind of intervention in an HN should be based on mutual support and respect between the armed forces and the local population. SFA Operators should behave in a credible and reliable manner so that the community recognizes their intervention as necessary and fair to receive their support. This is extremely important when dealing with local disputes. In the Sahel, for instance, conflicts between farmers and herders are one of the main tensions deriving from climate change impacts. Deteriorating livelihoods, shrinking arable land, and unexpected changes in pastoral mobility have worsened their coexistence in the region. This has led to a series of clashes to contend for the remaining land and natural resources, the illegal occupation of border corridors, and the expansion of agriculture at the expense of pasture.[19] Here, SFA Operators can play a key role in mediation, enhancing communication and dialogue among the population to resolve disputes. For example, when herders are forced to escape from climate-impacted areas and meet other groups who are reluctant to welcome them, a strategy to avoid the escalation of violence might be that of building communication systems to allow them to plan, organize and negotiate

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[17]Ivi.

[18] Headquarters Department of the Army. "Operational Environment and Army Learning", Washington, DC, 2014. https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/pdf/web/tc7_102.pdf

[19] Tesfaye, Beza. "Climate Change and Conflict in the Sahel", Council on Foreign Relations, Discussion Paper Series on Managing Global Disorder No. 11, November 2022. p.5-6.

their movement in advance and give more resilience to shocks. One way to achieve this is to introduce and put into practice novel approaches that seek to engage the military and their techniques in areas like training local forces and developing defense capacity, while also partnering with humanitarian organizations in the field. The goal should be to focus on mediation, communication strategies, and active listening to individuals, in order to foster cooperation and facilitate dialogue. For this reason, it is important that SFA operators are legitimate in the eyes of local governments and that their assistance to any state security provider complies with the law.

In situations where the government is unable to ensure security and is seen by the local population as lacking in protection, it is crucial for SFA missions to offer support and aid that aligns with the country's requirements, while also considering the needs of the local community. It is also important to establish communication and collaboration mechanisms over time that can facilitate the success of the mission. Furthermore, military activities, such as those carried out by aircraft, tanks, and ships, require a significant amount of energy generated from non-renewable fossil fuels. In light of this, several countries, alongside the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), are developing and implementing new measures to reduce the environmental impact caused by military operations. The United Kingdom, for example, has created a "*Sustainable Development Strategy"* as a sub-strategy of the "*Strategy for Defense 2011-2030"*. The document contains two key principles. The first principle is that "defence must be resilient to current and future environmental, social and economic threats (adaptation)". The second principle is that "defense must realise the positive and minimise the negative impacts that defence activities can have on the environment, people, and the economy in the UK and overseas (mitigation)."[20] The article sets out several goals, including reducing greenhouse gas emissions from defense infrastructure and business-related transport, increasing waste recovery, reducing water consumption, and adapting the estate to climate change. In June 2022, also NATO published an evaluation called "*Climate Change & Security Impact Assessment*" as a component of its ambitious "*Action Plan on Climate Change and Security"* (CCSAP). This plan was established at the Brussels Summit in 2021, which

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[20] Ministry of Defence. "Sustainable Development Strategy: A Sub-strategy of the Strategy for Defence", 2011–2030, p.1. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/27615/20110527SDStrategyPUBLISHED.pdf

involved leaders of state and governments from NATO member countries. They all recognized the importance of reducing greenhouse gas emissions to net zero by 2050 and ensuring that NATO operations are environmentally sustainable worldwide.

3. Final Remarks

To conclude, the present analysis has aimed to show that climate change directly endangers both individual and national security by exacerbating existing vulnerabilities and destabilizing military operations. Numerous lives across the globe are at risk from non-weapon-related factors, with certain societies more adversely impacted than others. Therefore, if climate change continues to worsen despite international endeavors, the consequences could be even more severe, affecting stable and advanced nations in the coming years. For this reason, it is crucial that military and civil entities implement new measures to mitigate the effects of climate change and strengthen cooperation to adapt to a changing environment.

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COOPERATION AREA

The coming of age of a political Europe

Guido LENZI

Abstract

The EU 'Strategic compass' supplements the new NATO 'Strategic concept' to the extent that it contributes declaredly to their "complementary, coherent and mutually reinforcing" role, in the face of the current challenges to the system of international relations in Europe and beyond. In other words, Europe's 'comprehensive security' role may usefully integrate America's own deterrence and defence tasks.

With respect to the conflict in Ukraine, the refusal of Moscow to consider it as an interlocutor has necessarily relegated Europe to the military sidelines, forcing it to take the lead from Washington's overall strategy. The political identity of the EU has nevertheless evolved substantially, reinforcing its foreign and security policy posture. Establishing it as a normative model, rather than an institutional political magnet.

More generally, in foreign and security matters, the 'variable geometries' and 'structured reinforced cooperations' established by the Lisbon Treaty of 2009 will allow the European Union and NATO to engage together more flexibly in 'out-of-area', further afield, contingencies.

Keywords

Issued almost simultaneously last spring, the EU 'Strategic Compass' and the new NATO "Strategic Concept" proved that, in the presence of renewed conflict in the continent, the agendas of the two pillars of the trans-Atlantic alliance remain very closely related. That, in other words, the European Union is rising politically and operationally to meet the serious, albeit different, challenges presented by Russia and China to the existing world order.

The NATO Concept states that its core tasks, besides collective defence, are crisis prevention and management, and "security cooperation with neighbours and more distant partners". It acknowledges that, alongside other threats such as terrorism, open conflicts, state fragility, and instability in the Middle East and Africa, Russia "has violated the norms and principles that contributed to a stable and predictable European security order"; and that "China's stated ambitions and coercive policies challenge our interests". The EU is described as a "unique and essential partner", with a "complementary, coherent and mutually reinforcing" role.

The European "Compass" indicates the scope of the 'strategic autonomy' the EU seeks to achieve, indicating that the Union should play a more active role in addressing non-military threats, through diplomatic means and economic sanctions, as well as reinforcing the capacity-building of regional actors. In other words, while the Alliance will continue to provide deterrence and defence, the EU should deal with the broader reach of 'comprehensive security'.

As the Berlin Wall fell, Europe had to prove the political vocation that has underpinned its integration process from its inception. When, in 1952, the ambitious project of a 'European Political Community' collapsed, Jean Monnet argued that its '*finalité politique*' would persist. Confirming the conviction held by Kant, then Benjamin Constant and Norman Angell that economic intercourse would pave the way for 'perpetual peace'.

It was only in 1989 that the European Community emerged from the American and Russian condominium that had constrained its political opportunities and ambitions. The disintegration of the Yugoslav Federation was the first security challenge to the European reintegration process. The enlargement to the new Eastern European applicants therefore became the institutional one.

The issue in fact then arose of whether to postpone institutional 'enlargement' until the 'deepening' of the internal decision-making mechanisms was provided for. A dilemma soon overcome, prioritizing the accession of the applicants: a different decision would have betrayed the original purpose of the integration. NATO led the way as, among the two emergencies that motivated the candidates, the Rooseveltian 'freedom for fear' had obviously to take precedence over the 'freedom from want'. The Soviet leader Gorbachev concurred with such a reordering of what he called 'the common European house'. Things however did not develop as expected.

Europe had also to prove its political mettle in the Western Balkans, as Washington decided that it did "not have a dog in this fight"; in Georgia, when the then President of the EU, Sarkozy, worked out an agreement that Moscow did not respect; in Libya, where France and the United Kingdom engineered the United Nations resolution authorizing the international intervention; and in Ukraine, where the Minsk agreements in 2014 an 2015 where produced by France and Germany. A series of initiatives where the most active members of the Union took the initiative on behalf of the Union. Involving Moscow all along.

To little avail, as President Putin decided to turn his back on Europe, claiming that Russia is a 'Euro-Asian nation' that does not consider the European Union as a valuable negotiating partner. An attitude that became quite transparent when, at the end of 2021, the Kremlin addressed to Washington and NATO, but not to the European Union, two draft Treaties for a legally binding "New European Security Architecture". The obvious purpose was to lure America back in the bipolar relationship that had ruled the Cold War, thereby bolstering its 'superpower' status. Two months later it decided to take a different path, in the pursuit of the same intention.

The conditions were restored for America to take the lead in deterring Russia, reinforcing sanctions against it, and providing economic and military support to Ukraine. With the European Union necessarily in tow, while not, as Russia claims, taking marching orders from Washington. Sterile were the repeated attempts at mediation by the European leaders Macron and Scholz, briefly accompanied by the then Italian Prime Minister Draghi. The purpose being to restore continental stabilization according to the principles of the Helsinki Final Act, that Europe had achieved in 1975, overcoming Kissinger's skepticism; that Brezhnev had signed, Gorbachev confirmed and now Putin ripped apart.

The political identity of the EU has nevertheless evolved over the years, following the fall of the Wall. The four 'European Security Strategies' made public in 1993, 1998, 2010 and last May, testify the evolution of the European foreign and security posture. The fact however remains that the EU "doesn't do wars" in their traditional sense, dealing rather with comprehensive security tasks. In a world in transition, no more only a single economic and social space but never the military power that would contradict its origins, Brussels should project the added value of its political and diplomatic influence. More as a normative model, than relying on its institutional magnetism: for both practical and political reasons, it should not be constrained in the obsession of further enlargements.

The Lisbon Treaty of 2009, 'on the functioning of the European Union', has provided the ways and means of separating the decision-making process in matters of foreign and security policy from those applicable to the economic matters. Allowing 'variable geometries' and 'structured reinforced cooperation' among countries willing to move forward, supported by the consensus of the others. Formulas of cooperation in security matters can be secured with 'third parties', outside the purview of the Lisbon Treaty: the Saint-Malo bilateral military agreement between Paris and London, for example, was established well before Brexit. A step in the same direction, again under the impulse of France, was the recent meeting of the forty-four members and applicants to the European Union, in a 'European Political Community' that will meet regularly for strategic and operational consultations.

America is withdrawing from the role of 'liberal hegemon', and of 'reluctant superpower', it has performed so far; but it remains the 'indispensable power' that Madeleine Albright had invoked, in order to hold together an ever more intricate international order. A century ago, Woodrow Wilson wanted to "make the world safe for democracy"'; during the second world war, Roosevelt claimed that America was "the arsenal of democracy". A nation rooted not, as elsewhere, on an ethnic identity, but instead on the ideals of the Enlightenment, will continue to be torn between the isolationism of its origins and the missionary instinct it developed during the last century. As Kissinger famously wrote in the 1970s, the trans-Atlantic relationship was always "troubled", as a result of its asymmetrical geopolitical and strategic components. A situation that needs not to persist, as both partners now need to engage 'out of area', beyond their respective institutional purview, in order to deal with the innumerable crises that affect their strategic interests.

The Importance of Multilateral Dialogue in the 21° Century

Thorsten GEISSLER

Abstract

"Multilateralism in crisis", "The failures of multilateralism", "The collapse of multilateralism": headlines like this could be found in many media over the last few years. Growing populism, nationalism and frustration with globalization and not least Russia´s aggression against Ukraine have raised doubts in many people whether multilateralism is still the rights answer to solve the problems of mankind. The article traces the history of multilateralism since its inception to the present day. Disappointed expectations and failures are as well described as successes. The question is raised whether multilateralism can be replaced by bilateral agreements and treaties between states and organizations or yet by unilateralism. Examples are used to show that the corresponding paths are not very promising. Global problems like climate change demand global answers, they can only be solved when all countries work together. Complex problems require complex solutions which can best be achieved through international cooperation. NATO and EU are flagships of multilateralism, they must keep proving to be fair partners for well-intentioned other countries. The accusation of arrogance that is repeatedly raised against the West in this context must be taken seriously, any paternalistic behaviour contradicts the spirit of multilateralism. NATO and EU must defend the values of peace, freedom, democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights but they will only be successful if they also find answers to problems like poverty and inequality among nations. Ultimately, there is no alternative to multilateralism, it remains the key to solving global problems.

Keywords

- Globalization
- International Agreements
- International Organizations
- International Legal order

The importance of Multilateral Dialogue in the 21st Century

- Multilateral Dialogues
- Multilateral Negotiations
- Multilateral Economic cooperation
- Multilateral Architecture

1. Introduction

Multilateralism is in a crisis; Russia is a member of numerous international organizations and has signed legally binding treaties that make its assault on Ukraine illegal. However, this did not stop Russia from starting a war against Ukraine, and yet the United Nations seem unable to stop it. After years of globalization protectionist measures, such as trade barriers and tariffs have been imposed again by many countries, the proliferation of nuclear arms has not been stopped by international agreements; states have become more reluctant to fund international organizations; and during the COVID crisis the WHO showed its limits and shortcomings, to give just a few examples. Is multilateralism collapsing and will, in the future, more and more states try to assert their national interests aggressively and unilaterally or by striking bilateral deals? Or will the insight prevail that global challenges can only be met by global answers based on multilateral cooperation and an international legal order that is respected by all nations? A look at the history of multilateralism, its achievements but also at alternatives to it could help us to answer this question.

There is no legal definition for multilateralism. In simple words, multilateralism is when multiple countries work together to pursue a common goal, to resolve common problems or to prevent (not only) military conflicts. Multilateral Cooperation serves global peace, at the same time it serves the own interests of the countries involved.

2. How and when multilateral cooperation started

The origins of multilateralism can be traced back to post-Renaissance Europe when states started to regulate international relations through the conclusion of treaties[1], often at the end of conflicts which had costs many lives and immense damage and which could have been avoided by peaceful settlement of conflicts before military action started. The 1848 Treaty of Westphalia, which ended the Thirty-Year War was the first pan-European peace settlement and can be seen as its origin. In the 19th century, world politics was dominated by a few powerful nations which pursued their national interests but also tried to maintain balance between themselves to prevent broad conflict.

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[1] www.europarl.europa.eu

From 1815 (after the Congress of Vienna) to 1914 the "Concert of Europe" - a period of evolving multilateralism - was instituted by regular conferences and congresses, with the objective to prevent or solve conflicts by agreeing on principles and rules. It worked (fairly) well until the early 1860s, when nationalism prevailed again. The Austro-Prussian war and the Franco- Prussian war were harbingers of the First World War, during which 17 million people lost their lives.

During the 19th century the first international organizations were founded. In 1815, some German states, France, the Netherlands, Belgium and Switzerland founded the Central Commission for the Navigation of the Rhine to increase their prosperity by guaranteeing a high level of security in navigation. A milestone was the constitution of the Permanent International Committee of the Red Cross in 1863. The development of the telegraph at the beginning of the 19th century changed communication, and after a few decades it had become clear that a framework which would standardize telegraphy equipment, set uniform operating instructions and lay down common tariff and accounting rules could not be created by bilateral or regional cooperation but that a comprehensive agreement was needed. In 1865 the French government hosted delegations from 20 European countries at the first International Telegraph Conference, which led to the foundation of the International Telegraph Union – the first international standards organization. In 1889 the Inter-Parliamentary Union was founded – the first international forum for multilateral dialogue and negotiations. Its main initial purpose was the arbitration of conflicts, therefore it played an important part in the setting up of the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague in 1899.

3. The failure of multilateral cooperation after the Great War

The First World War, with its millions of victims, led to the conviction that an intergovernmental organization was needed to maintain world peace. This idea had in fact already been proposed by Immanuel Kant in 1795 in his book "Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch". In June 1919, the Covenant of the League of Nations was signed as Part 1 of the Treaty of Versailles, with the Covenant´s main goals to prevent wars by collective security and disarmament and settle international disputes through negotiation and arbitration. It was founded by 42 states and had 58 members at its greatest

extent from September 1934 to February 1935. But the United States never joined it, Germany - which had been admitted in 1926 - left it in 1933 after Hitler came to power, and was followed by Italy, Japan, and Spain. But while the League of Nations had some successes in settling conflicts, especially in the twenties, it had already failed to achieve its main mission to maintain global peace when Germany started the Second World War in September 1939, and the Soviet Union was expelled from the organization in December 1939 after having invaded Finland. The League of Nations had effectively ceased functioning.

4. The lesson of World War II: Building an architecture for multilateral cooperation

Towards the end of 1942 at the latest, it became apparent that Germany would lose the war and the conviction started to prevail that after the end of World War II there could have been a stable global economic order as a condition to maintain peace in the future. It was only achievable by multilateral economic cooperation. In July 1944 delegates from all 44 Allied Nations gathered in Bretton Woods for a conference known as the United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference. Agreements were signed that led to the establishment of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (the IBRD and its concessional lending arm, the International Development Association are collectively, known as the World Bank). Its initial mission was to finance the reconstruction of European countries devastated by World War II, later it was extended to advance worldwide economic development and eradicate poverty. Another agreement was signed leading to the establishment of the International Monetary Fund with the mission "to foster global monetary cooperation, secure financial stability, facilitate international trade, promote high employment and sustainable economic growth and reduce world poverty". The USSR was an active participant in the conference and signed its Final Act, but never ratified its Articles of Agreement. A future East-West conflict loomed.

However, with so many countries in ruins, the world wanted peace. Already in the period between 1942 and 1945 47 national governments had signed the "Declaration by United Nations". From April to June 1945, the representatives of fifty countries gathered in San Francisco and drafted the United Nations Charter - this created a new international

organization which, it was hoped, would be able to facilitate the peaceful settlement of conflicts. From its beginning it was a two-class society, as five countries, (the US, the USSR, the UK, France and the Republic of China (on Taiwan), replaced by the People´s Republic of China in 1971) were granted a permanent seat in the UN Security Council with the right to veto. With equal representation of all member countries in the General Assembly, however, it was a step in the direction of multilateralism. In order to achieve the principal objectives of the UN – solve economic, social, cultural and humanitarian problems through international cooperation - specialized agencies of the UN were either founded or if they had existed before were put under the roof of the UN: the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the International Civil Aviation Organization (CAC), the International Fund for Agricultural Development (FAC), the International Labour Organization (ILO), the International Maritime Organization (IMO), the United Nations Children´s Fund (UNICEF), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the International Telecommunication Union, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNDC), the Universal Postal Union (UPU), the World Bank Group (WBG), the World Health Organization (WHO), the World Intellectual Property Organization (WHC), the World Meteorological Organization (WMC) and the World Tourism Organization (UNWTC) – an architecture of and for multilateralism.

This was not without consequences. Until May 27, 2016, 306 multilateral treaties were deposited with the UN Secretary-General, only 17 of them signed before 1945. Besides the founding statutes of the United Nations, they relate to the following topics: Pacific Settlements of International Disputes, Privileges and Immunities, Diplomatic and Consular Relations, Human Rights, Refugees and Stateless Persons, Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, Traffic in Persons, Obscene Publications, Health, International Trade and Development, Transport and Communications, Road Traffic, Transport by Rail, Water Transport, Multimodal Transport, Navigation, Economic Statistics, Educational and Cultural Matters, Declaration of Death of Missing Persons, Status of Women, Freedom of Information, Penal Matters, Commodities, Maintenance Obligations, Law of the Sea, Commercial Arbitration, Law of Treaties, Outer Space, Telecommunications, Disarmament, Environment, Fiscal Matters. It needs no mention that not all of these treaties and conventions were properly implemented by

all signatory states, but it is also a fact that an innumerable number of books would have to be written to list the positive and beneficial consequences of them for all mankind.

5. The East-West Conflict

However, the end of World War II was also the beginning of an East-West conflict which should last for more than four decades. It was marked by completely diverging views how an economy and a society should be organized as a whole. With the help of the Soviet Union, in all the East European countries in which there were Soviet troops, communist parties came to power; a socialist planned economy was introduced; the communist party had a power monopoly the societies were regimented; there were no free media; no freedom of speech; and any form of opposition was (sometimes brutally) suppressed. In the West, the national economies were organized as market economies, there were multi-party systems, governments were democratically elected, the rule of law was respected, human rights were guaranteed and the principle of pluralism permitted a multiplicity of ways of life.

Both power blocs organized multinational organizations. In 1949 the North Atlantic Treaty Organization was founded - an alliance for collective defence - with the United States, Belgium, Denmark, France, the UK, Iceland, Italy, Canada, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Norway and Portugal as initial members. NATO´s decision making process was multilateral from the beginning, in its main body – the North Atlantic Council - there is no voting, but consultations take place until a consensus is reached. However, depending on each nation's economic and military power, its member countries have greater or lesser influence. In 1957, France, Italy, Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg founded the European Economic Community, designed to create a common market among its members through the elimination of most trade barriers and the establishment of a common external trade policy. Most decisions in its bodies required unanimity – a truly multilateral form of decision-making.

In the East the Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Albania, Bulgaria and East Germany founded the Warsaw Pact in 1955 - a military alliance which was theoretically a multilateral organization, but in practice was

completely dominated by the Soviet Union. The same was true for the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON), a socialist economic organization, founded in 1949.

In 1961 the Non-Aligned Movement was founded to give countries a forum which were not formally aligned to either of the aforementioned power blocs with the objective to counterbalance the bi-polarized world during the Cold War. It was formally established in 1961 (based on the principles agreed on during the Bandung Conference in 1955) in Belgrade through an initiative of Yugoslav President Josip Broz Tito, Indian Prime Minister Jawarhalal Nehru, Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser, Ghanaian President Kwame Nkrumah, and Indonesian President Sukarno. It has always served as a forum for political dialogue and coordination and achieved major successes in the early 1960s in decolonization and opposition to racism, but later due to its heterogeneity (it currently has 120 member countries) it always had internal conflicts, and could therefore not become a strong political actor of its own. The same is true for the Commonwealth of Nations (originally created as the British Commonwealth of Nations at the 1926 Imperial Conference) which was constituted in 1949 by the London Declaration and currently consists of 56 member countries, the UK itself and former British colonies and territories.

Notwithstanding, multilateral dialogue did not only take place within these alliances. It was impossible "to solve" the East-West conflict, in which two antagonistic systems based on different ideologies faced each other, both with the military capacity to destroy the earth. This capability served as a deterrent, and despite conflicting interests, which were not only accompanied by harsh rhetoric but also resulted in severe clashes (Suez Crisis 1956, U-2 incident May 1960, Berlin Crisis 1961, Cuba Missile Crisis 1962) and even wars (Korea 1959-1953, Vietnam 1955-1975), the dialogue between the two sides did not break off. Multilateral dialogue and cooperation continued but it must not be overlooked that the world had become a bi-polar one, with the US and the USSR as antipodes and key-players. In July 1955 the Big Four Geneva Summit took place, with US President Eisenhower, the Prime Ministers of the USSR, the UK and France all participating. In September 1959, Soviet leader Nikolay Khrushchev visited the US for thirteen days; in May 1960, Eisenhower, Khrushchev, French President de Gaulle and British Prime Minister MacMillan met for a summit in Paris; US President Kennedy and Khrushchev met in Vienna in June 1961; in June 1963 the US and the USSR agreed to

establish a direct communications link, or "hotline" between the two governments for use in a crisis; and US President Johnson and Soviet Premier Kosygin met in 1967. The US, the USSR and other countries also concluded international agreements: in 1959, the Antarctic Treaty internationalized and demilitarized the Antarctic continent; in 1963 the Limited Test Ban Treaty outlawed nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and underwater; in 1967, the Treaty on Peaceful uses of Outer Spaces; in 1967, the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) started between the US and the USSR; and in 1968, the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty was signed by sixty-two nations.

6. The Era of Détente

These negotiations and further (partially bi-lateral) agreements laid the ground for an "era of détente", which lasted until the end of the 1970s. Both blocs were facing large economic impacts, due to the military spending and arms race, and wanted to ease geopolitical relations. In 1970, the Soviet Union and the Federal Republic of Germany signed the Treaty of Moscow, in which both sides expressed their ambition for a normalisation of their relations; renounced the use of force and recognized the post-war borders; and in the same year the Federal Republic of Germany and Poland committed themselves to nonviolence and accepted the existing borders in the Treaty of Warsaw. In 1971, sixty-three nations signed the Nuclear Weapons Ban on Seabed; the US, the USSR, the UK and France signed the Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin; and the US and the USSR signed an Agreement to Reduce the Risk of Nuclear War. In 1972, the two German States normalized their relations in a "Basic Treaty", and the US normalized their relations with the People´s Republic of China. In the same and the following two years, US President Nixon and Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev met several times and signed numerous treaties and agreements: the Agreement to Reduce Risk of Nuclear War, the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, and the Strategic Arms Limitations Treaty (SALT) interim agreement as the most important. In summer 1975, after two years of negotiations, 33 European States, the US and Canada signed the Helsinki Final Act: a comprehensive agreement aimed at guaranteeing the peaceful resolution of conflicts, as well as closer cooperation. This was controversial in the US, where some of its provisions were seen as a recognition of some of the USSR´s territorial gains after World War II. However, it

widely welcomed in Europe because it reduced tensions, opened new lines of communication, improved the conditions of journalists and opened opportunities for family reunions and travel. However, in March 1976, the USSR started deploying SS 20 missiles with a range of 5,000 km, able to hit any point in Western Europe. The Cold War was back, and in 1983 the US started to deploy similar intermediate-range missiles in Europe - negotiations between the two blocs did not resume until 1985.

7. The Collapse of Socialism

The collapse of socialism in Eastern Europe led to the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Warsaw Pact and the COMECON in 1991. Liberal Democracy seemed to have prevailed forever and many thought that peace had become eternal. NATO immediately stretched out its hands to former adversaries and built up new multilateral structures. In 1994, NATO launched the Partnership for Peace Program aiming at creating trust and intensifying cooperation, joined by the Russian Federation and other Post-Soviet States. In 1995, the World Trade Organisation was founded, aiming at increasing global prosperity through free trade based on internationally accepted rules. The West, especially the US, gave Russia massive financial support to stabilize its economy. The Baltic countries, which had been occupied by the USSR for decades, and the other East European countries, which had been under Soviet control, pushed for EU and NATO membership. However, both the EU and NATO wanted to ensure that this would not lead to a new East-West conflict, hence the process was slowed down. Multilateral cooperation, through a new security partnership between NATO and Russia, was the goal. After months of negotiations, in 1997, the NATO-Russia Founding act was signed - a commitment to build together a lasting and inclusive peace in the Euro-Atlantic area by cooperation and consultation. For the same reason, in 1998, Russia was admitted to the G7 Group (which then became the G8), an intergovernmental forum consisting of the US, the UK, France, Japan, Germany, Canada, Italy and (as a "non-enumerated member") the EU, for discussing and coordinating solutions to major global problems. The following year, the G 20 group was founded - a forum with the same objective, composed of 19 countries with strong economies ((Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa,

South Korea, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States (Spain being a permanent guest) and the European Union.

8. The Decline of Multilateralism

Strengthening multilateralism was the objective, but while the new venues at least partially served their purpose, the next decade would also be one full of tensions, wars, and a decline of multilateralism.

In 1999 the Russian Federation invaded Chechnya, thus breaking the Russia-Chechnya Peace Treaty signed in 1997 - in which both sides had agreed to "forever reject" the use of threat or force in resolving disputed issues.

In the US, after the al-Qaida terrorist attack on September 11 2001, the Bush administration made clear that under certain circumstances, the US would act unilaterally: "While the US will constantly strive to enlist the support of the international community, we will not hesitate to act alone if necessary to exercise our right of self-defence by acting perceptively against such terrorists, to prevent them from doing harm against our people and our country" (US Security Strategy 2002).

In March 2003, the US started an invasion of Iraq. Formally it was a "United-States led Coalition" consisting of the US, the UK, Australia and Poland, Italy and Spain, based on a unilateral decision taken by the United States. On 28th July 2002, the British Prime Minister, in a letter to the US President, had issued a blank check to the US, assuring them of the UK´s support. The US administration was convinced that Iraq was behind the al-Qaeda attack on September 11, 2001, which was not substantiated by any facts. Saddam Hussein was probably one of the most brutal dictators the world has ever seen but the allegations that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction, and therefore posed a risk to the US and its allies, was wrong. This led to severe tensions within NATO as Germany and France explicitly opposed the war that would follow and lead to the fall of Saddam Hussein. However, NATO had no role in the decision to invade Iraq or to conduct the campaign.

In April 2008 Russia launched a full-scale land, air and sea invasion of Georgia, on false allegations that it was committing a "genocide", when in fact the conflict had been provoked by Russian-backed separatists. In February 2014, Russia invaded and later annexed Crimea, violently flagrating Article 2 of the UN Convention, the Helsinki Final Act and the Budapest memorandum. In September 2015, after multilateral negotiations between Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Germany and France, the Minsk Agreement achieved a ceasefire. It only lasted for a couple of years, as on 22nd February 2022, Russia assaulted Ukraine.

Not only military conflicts led to the deterioration of multilateralism. The 2008 financial crisis led to frustration with globalization and the 2015 migration crisis gave populists (and their parties) in Europe, but also in the US, a boost as they claimed that only national governments would be able to "win back control" of the situation.

On 23rd June 2016, a referendum was held in the UK asking the people whether the country should remain in the European Union or leave it: 51.89% of the votes were cast in favour of a "BREXIT", which took place on 31st January 2020.

On 20th January 2017, Donald Trump was sworn in as the 58th President of the United States. His predecessor, Barack Obama, had launched two multilateral initiatives: the Open Government Initiative and the Global Counterterrorism Forum. Trump promised "to reinforce old alliances and form new ones", but he also spoke about a "new vision, …, it's going to be only America first". Trump withdrew the US from the Paris Climate Agreement, the Trans-Pacific Partnership, from UNESCO (funding had already been stopped by the Obama administration in 2011), the nuclear accord with Iran, and the UN Human Rights Council.

9. Can and will Multilateralism prevail?

These are just some examples for the decline of multilateralism. So, is the era of multilateralism irrevocably over? Or will multilateralism prevail?

A few facts and assessments:

The architecture of multilateralism which was built up after World War II is still intact, its most important pillar being the United Nations. The self-assessment of its work is not without self-criticism: "The United Nations had had its moments of disappointment. Our

world is not yet the world that our founders envisaged 75 years ago. It is plagued by growing inequality, poverty, hunger, armed conflicts, terrorism, insecurity, climate change and pandemics. People in different corners of the world are forced to make dangerous journey in search of refuge and safety. The least developed countries are falling behind, and we still have not achieved complete decolonization." (Resolution adopted by the UN General Assembly 21 September 2020).

But it is also proud of its achievements: "Even in times of great global challenges and tensions, our Organization has catalysed decolonization, promoted freedom, shaped norms for international development and worked to eradicate disease. The United Nations has helped to mitigate dozens of conflicts, saved hundreds of thousands of lives through humanitarian action and provided millions of children with the education that every child deserves. It has worked to promote and protect all human rights and fundamental freedoms for all, including the equal rights of women and men." (same document)

The UN member countries do not only debate and discuss but also agree on common objectives and on strategies to achieve them.

One of the most important examples for the beneficial work of the United Nations is the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change which was adopted in 1992 and started a global process to mitigate climate change. Without this global approach the world would probably have maneuvered itself into a catastrophic situation. The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development adopted by the UN General Assembly in 2015 sets clear goals and targets in areas of critical importance for humanity and the planet: 17 Sustainable Development Goals and 169 targets. The Paris Agreement on Climate Change adopted by 196 parties the same year is in force. Its central aim is to strengthen the global response to the threat of climate change by keeping, within this century, a global temperature rise well below 2°C (above pre-industrial levels) and to pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase even further to 1.5 °C. The implementation of the Agreement is lagging behind but for this the United Nations cannot be blamed. A new milestone to protect marine biodiversity and tackle the climate emergency is the UN Treaty on Oceans adopted in June 2023.

It is self-explaining that it is impossible to address a global problem like climate change unilaterally or by bilateral agreements. In this context the United States' new commitment to multilateralism cannot be overestimated. In January 2021 the US officially rejoined the

Paris agreement. In October 2021 the US also rejoined the UN Human Rights Council and in 2023 UNESCO.

In a Declaration on the commemoration of the seventy-fifth anniversary of the UN, adopted by its General Assembly, the member countries agreed on a "Common Agenda" built on 12 commitments: Leave no one behind, protect our Planet, Promote Peace & Prevent Conflicts, Abide by International Law & Ensure Justice, Place Women and Girls at the Centre, Build Trust, Improve Digital Cooperation, Upgrade the United Nations, Ensure Sustainable Financing, Boost partnerships, Listen to & Work with Youth, Be Prepared (for future Challenges and Crises). These challenges are interconnected and can only be addressed by reinvigorated multilateralism.

It is true that the United Nations could not stop Russia from assaulting Ukraine. But it is also a fact that the vast majority of UN member countries does not accept violations of the UN Charter and other binding international law. On 2nd March 2022, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution deploring Russia´s invasion of Ukraine, demanding a full withdrawal of Russian troops and a reversal of its decision to recognise the self-declared "People´s Republics of Donetsk and Luhansk". 141 countries voted in favour, 5 against, 35 abstained. On 7th April, the UN General Assembly suspended Russia´s membership of the UN Human Rights Council. On 12th October 2022, the UN General Assembly demanded that Russia "immediately, completely and unconditionally withdraw" from Ukraine "as it is violating its territorial integrity and sovereignty". 143 countries voted for, 5 against, 35 abstained. Russia ignored these resolutions. But these resolutions show that the vast majority of the international community defends international law.

Was BREXIT a success? One key argument of the Brexiteers during the campaign was that the UK would be able to strike better trade deals with other countries than the EU did. Since BREXIT, the UK has signed trade deals with Japan, Australia, New Zealand, Norway, Liechtenstein and Iceland. The UK-Japan FTA entered into force in February 2019, and the UK Government´s impact assessment was very optimistic. The reality, however, is that trade between the two countries has been in decline since 2019. The UK-Australia trade agreement has not yet been brought into force. The UK government's

impact assessment of the UK-Australia and the UK-NZ FTA show that they will have a relatively small impact on the British economy. With regard to the UK-Norway- Iceland- Liechtenstein FTA, a UK government impact analysis estimates that, based on 2017-2019 trade flows, under the new agreement duty free access on UK exports to Norway could increase to 97.6 from 96.4 %, while duty free access on UK imports from Norway could increase to 99.7 % from 99.5%. A big deal. The UK has also signed "rollover" trade agreements with other countries (copy-pasted from agreements that the EU has with these countries) which bring no additional benefit to the UK. The most important trade agreement, however, is the one signed by the EU and the UK. A study published by the Economic & Social Research comes to the following assessment: "Research released today (19 October 2022) by the ESRI shows reductions in UK to EU goods trade by 16 % and trade from the EU to UK by 20 % relative to the scenario in which Brexit had not occurred." Another "key argument" for Brexit was that the UK should transfer 350 million pounds to its National Health Service, rather than to the EU. This money never arrived there, instead the NHS is shorter of staff and money than before.

It is therefore not a big surprise that according to a recent opinion poll 55 % of the British now think it was wrong to leave the European Union, only 33 % think it was right. Currently all British parties are reluctant to embrace the issue but that could change after the next general election. The EU is well-advised to prepare respective negotiations. The UK is not only a partner but an indispensable member of the European Union.

10. The is no alternative to multilateralism

Unilateralism does not work. Bilateralism cannot solve global problems. Multilateralism is complex but can solve problems. But paying lip service to multilateralism is not enough.

The G20 must remain a viable instrument to mitigate conflicts and agree on common objectives. Under President Trump, the United States clashed with most other members of the group on trade, climate, and a series of other issues. President Biden promised a return to multilateral cooperation but Russia´s aggression against Ukraine makes it increasingly difficult to agree on common solutions. At the most recent G 20 summit in India in September 2023 it was still possible to agree on a final declaration but only

because Western countries made substantial concessions to Russia. However, as the accession of the African Union shows the G20 forum did not lose its attractivity and importance as an important global network.

The Group of Seven (G7) is an intergovernmental forum consisting of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States, the European Union being a non-enumerated member. It originates from an ad hoc gathering of finance ministers in 1973, had its first summit in 1975 (as a Group of Five, Canada joined it in 1976) and became the Group of Eight in 1997 when Russia joined it. After the annexation of Crimea Russia has been indefinitely suspended and since then the group shares values of pluralism, democracy and the respect for and of human rights. However, during the Trump presidency the United States clashed with the other members countries on many issues and it was no longer possible to find common answers for many common (global) challenges. Again the Biden administration adopts a more constructive attitude. And this is a condition if the G7 countries and the European Union want to compete with other powers succesfully.

In this context of course China plays the most important role. China calls itself a "champion of multilateralism". It has built up a framework of multinational institutions, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, the Boao Forum for Asia, the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures, to give a few examples. In all these organizations, it is by far the strongest economic power and while they are formally multilateral, they are in fact CHINA-centred. For the West China is a systemic rival but not only because of massive economic interdependencies and global challenges like climate change that cannot be met without a permanent dialogue with China and sometimes partnership with China must never stop.

China is also a founding member of the BRICS Forum, Russia, India, Brazil and South Africa currently being the other members. It had ist first summit in 2009 (then called BRIC because South Africa was only admitted in 2010). But the China-India border conflict and the fact that Brazil condemned the Russian aggression against Ukraine show that this is not a homogeneous group. However, for many countries the association has developed some attractiveness and they have expressed interest in joining it. On 1st

January 2024 Argentina, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates will become members upon invitation of the current ones. This will increase the heterogeneity of this association. Being by far the strongest and most powerful member, China, is ambitious to develop the network into an alliance but further enlargement will make it even more heterogeneous. The idea of a common currency does (currently) not seem to be realistic due to the heterogeneity of the group. It must also not be overlooked that countries like Indonesia which once showed interest in the group have become reluctant to join it while the economic benefits are not clear and apparent and the country (a leading NAM member) presumably does not want its good economic and political cooperation with the West.

The Belt and Road Initiative and the China-CCEC Cooperation (14+1, before Lithiuania, Estonia and Latvia left 17+1) are, however no multinational projects. China negotiates and signs bi-lateral treaties and agreements with the respective member countries.

All these initiatives show that China does not only have long-term global ambitions but has already set up and is developing the instruments deemed necessary to be succesful.

Russia has a much smaller population, its economy is much weaker, it has much less to offer to third countries but it is a nuclear power, it tries to win allies not only in its vicinity but also on other continents but it has also never hesitated to act unilaterally and will continue to do so.

In the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), Russia is by far the strongest and only nuclear power. But tensions within the CSTO have recently grown as Russia did not clearly side with Armenia in ist conflict with Azebaidjan. And Russia's aggression against Ukraine has also led to tensions with Kazakhstan.

Russia is also the by far biggest member country of the Euroasian Economic Union, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyztan and Armenia being the others. But this does not mean only advantages for the latter ones, since it prevents them from agreeing on trade agreements with third countries or the European Union. This is one of the reasons why countries like Tajikistan and Uzbekistan are reluctant to join it.

11. The consequences for NATO and EU

What are the consequences for NATO and EU? First of all, both stand for the same values: freedom, democracy, the rule of law and the respect for human rights. They are natural allies and they face common challenges. Therefore, on 8 July 2016, the EU and NATO signed a Joint Declaration with a view to giving new impetus and substance for the EU-NATO strategic partnership. Since then, further agreements have been signed to deepen this partnership. The key guiding principles of their cooperation are openness, transparency, inclusiveness, and reciprocity, in full respect of the decision-making autonomy and procedures of both organisations.

The EU and NATO must be attractive partners for third countries, they must be the true champions of multilateralism. Their internal decision-making process is multilateral. The European Union is a success story, it has secured peace in Europe and generated prosperity for its member countries. It has grown from 6 to 28 countries (27 after Brexit) and several countries are in the waiting line for accession. It also has numerous association and trade agreements with third countries. NATO has grown from 12 to 30 member countries, not including Sweden and Finland which applied for membership after Russia´s aggression against Ukraine. Both countries have been admitted. In the NATO treaty signed in 1949, its member countries committed to the peaceful settlement of disputes and emphasized that NATO will refrain from "the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations". NATO is a defensive security alliance, this has been affirmed again and again, last in NATO´s Strategic Concept 2022. In this document NATO also states that authoritarian actors are "at the forefront of a deliberate effort to undermine multilateral norms and institutions".

In contrast NATO has sustained its commitment to multinational cooperation by various instruments. For decades NATO has used its Defence Institution and Capacity Building infrastructure to foster peace and security by making partners more capable, more secure and better prepared to respond to crisis at home and abroad and has continously developed its doctrines, concepts and policies in this context. At its summit in Wales in September 2014 NATO adopted the Defence and Security Capacity Building (DCB) Initiative which reinforces its commitment to partners and helps protect stability by providing support to

countries requesting assistance from NATO. DCB helps partners improve their defence and related security capacities, as well as their resilience. Types of support include strategic advice on defence and security sector reform and institution building, advice in specialised areas such as logistics or cyber defence and/or development of local forces through education and training.[2] In its Strategic Concept 2022 NATO affirms its commitment to Security Capacity Building: "We will increase our efforts to anticipate and prevent crises and conflicts. Prevention is a sustainable way to contribute to stability and Allied security. We will enhance support for our partners, including to help build their capacity to counter terrorism and address shared security challenges. We will scale up the size and scope of our security and capacity-building assistance to vulnerable partners in our neighbourhood and beyond, to strengthen their preparedness and resilience and boost their capabilities to counter malign interference, prevent destabilisation and counter aggresssion" (Paragraph 38)[3].

NATO also remains committed to providing Security Force Assistance (SFA) to partner countries that require it in order to make them more secure and resilient. SFA is defined as „unified action to generate, employ, and sustain local, host nation, or regional security forces of a legitimate authority:" It involves organizing, training, equipping, and advising the security forces of partner countries. This requires political decision based on sound analysis and assessment. And it requires profound expertise. Therefore following a proposal of the Italian Minister of Defence in 2016 NATO started to set up the NATO Security Force Assistance Centre of Excellence, a multinational entity with Italy, Albania and Slovenia as Sponsoring Nations, and Austria as contributing participant. It aims at promoting stability and reconstruction efforts for any crisis scenaria and becoming a SFA focal point for the Alliance. But not only NATO provides Security Force Assistance, also the European Union does within the framework of its Common Security and Defence Policy.

The European Union has started with six member countries but because it safeguarded peace and generated economic growth and prosperity it became more and more attractive and grew to 28 members. The UK left it but several countries are in the waiting line, not only in the Western Balkans, and the EU has association and free trade agreements with

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[2] www.nato.int | NATO - Topic: Partnership tools
[3] www.act.nato.in

numerous countries. It must remain a reliable and trustworthy partner for third countries all over the world.

Western countries have often been frustrated with the United Nations and its special organizations because they were not able to build majorities. But the overwhelming condemnation of Russia´s aggression against the Ukraine shows that this is possible. Western countries must ask themselves whether they have always stroke the right note when negotiating with third countries. Western countries are often accused of arrogance born out of colonial and imperial history. Such accusations must be taken seriously. The West has an interest in working multilateral structures. They will only work by partnership at eye-level. Close relations between the US and EU and its member countries at eye-level are a precondition for that. In this context the next presidential election in the US will be crucial.

Russia has accused the West of trying to replace effective multilateralism by a „rules based" international order in which the rules have not been agreed on by the international community but been invented by „the West". That is mere propaganda. The rules the international order is based on consists of agreements that have been negotiatated and ratified not only by Western countries. Of course they are legally binding for the signatory states. That includes the UN Charter, treaties and conventions, UN Security Council resolutions, international humanitarian law, and the rules and standards agreed to under the auspices of the World Trade Organization and numerous international standrad-setting organizations.

Multilateralism will not always be successful, if a big country is determined to violate the international order it is difficult to stop it.

But only multilateralism can prevent wars and secure peace. If we also want it to lead to more democracy and freedom, more respect for the rule of law and human rights we must also fight poverty and inequality among nations.

And we need more joint efforts to mitigate climate change and not less, more joint efforts for sustainable developments and not less. We need more multilateral cooperation and dialogue.

The importance of multilateralism in International Cooperation

Francesco ALIMENA

Abstract

The purpose of the present essay is to analyze the importance of multilateral cooperation at a historical moment characterized by geopolitical-economic instability and insecurity. Hence the decision that led NATO to publish last June 30 in Madrid the "New Strategic Concept," a key document for the Alliance as it reaffirms NATO's values and purposes by providing a collective assessment of the security environment. In addition, the document guides NATO's strategic adaptation and guides its future political and military development.

First, the document specifies that to ensure and defend territorial security, Atlantic values and the democratic way of life, NATO will have to work jointly with its allies. A decision, that made by the Alliance, dictated by the need to respond to new challenges on the international scene to ensure the collective defense of the allies as the main purpose.

Ample space is devoted in the narrative to the war moved by the Russian Federation against Ukraine announced on February 24, 2022, which has disrupted peace in the world and on the European continent by going on to cause a major alteration of our security environment.

As reported in the analysis, the adoption of shared rules, norms, practices and values is of paramount importance in arriving at rational management of international affairs and peaceful resolution of conflicts that tend to multiply in a multipolar framework. In light of the current geopolitical framework, multilateralism is a necessity dictated by the increasing complexity and interdependence of the contemporary world.

Keywords

1. Introduction

The radical transformations in the international chessboard, characterized by the return of competition among the major players in geopolitics, the emergence of new regional powers, the new prominence of China, and the beginning of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, underway since Feb. 24, 2022, have caused a profound climate of geopolitical instability.

Against this backdrop, NATO, to respond to these new challenges on the international stage, and to ensure the collective defense of the allies as its main purpose (Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty), presented in Madrid last June 30 the new Strategic Concept: a document intended to guide NATO's military policy for the next 10 years. The Madrid Concept is the Alliance's eighth Strategic Concept since its founding in 1949, the fourth to be made public, following those of Rome (1991), Washington (1999) and Lisbon (2010).

In addition to the function described above, NATO's Strategic Concept is characterized by three core tasks: deterrence and defense, crisis prevention and management, and cooperative security. These missions are complementary to ensure the collective defense and security of all member countries.

With the presentation of the New Strategic Concept, NATO wanted to compact the front, putting aside differences between some members of the Alliance, and revitalizing multilateral cooperation at a historical moment characterized by instability and insecurity.

The document presented in Madrid opens with a premise on the common Western values of freedom, rule of law, peace and prosperity. To ensure and defend territorial security, Atlantic values and the democratic way of life, NATO will have to work together with its allies.

In the incipit of the Strategic Concept, NATO presents an overview of the current geopolitical landscape. The document states the following:

"The Euro-Atlantic area is not at peace. Euro-Atlantic security is undermined by strategic competition and pervasive instability. The Russian Federation poses the most significant and direct threat to the security of allies. Terrorism is an asymmetric threat to the security of our citizens and to international peace and prosperity. The PRC's stated ambitions and coercive policies challenge our interests, our security and our values. We

also face global and interconnected threats and challenges such as climate change, emerging and disruptive technologies, and the erosion of the arms control, disarmament, and non proliferation architecture".

This background gives us a comprehensive overview of the current issues facing NATO in the coming years.

A first change assumed by NATO has been the shift in its posture from "*Enhanced Forward Presence*" to " *Forward Defense*". This change in strategy includes increased deployment of U.S.-, Canadian- and European-sourced troops and strategic weaponry along NATO's entire eastern flank, with eight battle groups deployed in Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and Slovakia. This decision was made by NATO's Supreme Command on March 16, 2022, after the Russian invasion of Ukraine began. A move that brought a 40,000-strong contingent under NATO's direct command in the countries that are part of the Atlantic Organization's eastern flank. Added to this is the U.S. decision to send an additional 100,000 troops to Europe to increase territorial security and defensive capabilities.

In the strategy document, the Russian Federation is referred to as "*the most significant and direct threat to the security of the Allies and to peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area*" because of its attempt to expand its sphere of influence and direct control through coercion, subversion, aggression and annexation. A strategy, that adopted by the Russian Federation, aimed at pursuing its own political objectives through the use of force, which undermines the security and stability of the rules-based international order. Moreover, Moscow's continued military integration with Minsk is another element that poses a challenge and threat to the Alliance's security and interests.

The Russian Federation's war against Ukraine, announced on February 24, 2022, has disrupted the peace and severely altered our security environment. The brutal and illegal invasion, repeated and ongoing violations of international humanitarian law, heinous attacks and atrocities committed on the battlefield have caused and will continue to cause untold suffering and destruction.

While the Minsk Accords (signed on September 5, 2014 by the Trilateral Contact Group on Ukraine, composed of representatives of Ukraine, Russia, the Donetsk People's Republic (DNR) and the Lugansk People's Republic (LNR) to end the war in eastern Ukraine) have a distant memory, diplomacy has been tasked since day one of the invasion

with finding a concrete solution that can end the conflict. But reality tells a different story, and the negotiations that the whole world is calling for are becoming farther away by the day.

Secretary General Stoltenberg wanted to reiterate in Madrid that NATO's will is clear: "*We want to live in a world where sovereignty, territorial integrity, human rights and international law are respected and where each country can choose its own path, free from aggression, coercion or subversion. We work with all those who share these goals. We stand together as allies to defend our freedom and contribute to a more peaceful world*".

NATO will have to respond in a united and responsible manner to current threats to ensure stability and predictability in the Euro-Atlantic area. A response that will have to take place multilaterally and through effective international cooperation.

2. Multilateralism: An Overview

The second half of the last century saw the emergence and consolidation of a new way of shaping relations and interactions between nation-states. Born during the Second World War, this unprecedented practice in international relations was the response with which states sought to manage a global geopolitical scenario characterised by increasing complexity. Politically, the years after World War II until 1991 were marked by the opposition between the Western liberal-capitalist bloc and the Eastern communist bloc. On the economic front, however, the period beginning with post-war reconstruction marked a strongcommercial interdependence between the nations. This means that, as the 1929 crisis had already shown, economic trends are no longer limited to a single country but acquire a global scope.

In this scenario, we can consider multilateralism as a specific phenomenon of the 20th century, which took its first steps with the failed experience of the League of Nations, andwhich has developed with mixed fortunes throughout the 20th century up to the present day. Understood synthetically as a method for the shared management of major international political *issues*, multilateralism can be considered as a method that differs from both unilateralism and bilateralism. The multilateral approach requires that international issues be addressed, defined and resolved as jointly as possible. In this sense, it represents an attempt to manage the growing complexity of political and

economic systems that transcend the national borders of states and can generate potentially destructive conflicts. Robert O. Keohane, for example, defines multilateralism in this way:

"*practice of coordinating national policies in groups of three or more states, through ad hoc arrangements or by means of institutions*".

The coordination of national policies, the involvement of three or more political actors,and the achievement of shared international agreements through the mediation of established institutional organisations are the three elements that characterise the definition proposed by Keohane.

John Gerard Ruggie takes up and extends the concept proposed by Keohane. Accordingto Ruggie, multilateral organisations, in order to be truly multilateral, must be based on a system of rules of conduct valid for all members, on the principle of indivisibility of behaviour and on widespread reciprocity.

Referring to multilateral relations as a model of governance, Miles Kahler emphasises,in particular, the characteristics of inclusiveness and openness (towards third parties) that differentiate it substantially from a system of bilateral relations. Kahler writes in this regard:

Post war multilateralism also expressed an impulse to universality (John Ruggie's "generalized organizing principles") that implied relatively low barriers to participation in these arrangements. A ticket of admission was always required [...] Nevertheless, the price of that ticket wasnot set so high that less powerful or less wealthy states could not hope to participate.

Kehler's view presupposes another feature of multilateralism: the fact that the participation of political actors in this particular system of international relations takes place on a voluntary basis.

There is substantial agreement in the literature on the conceptual elements that can helpdefine multilateralism. On the question of the effectiveness of multilateral relations, however, there are divergent views.

Part of the doctrine, what Kahler calls the 'realist' doctrine, argues that the multilateral approach cannot stand up to the principle of national sovereignty.

This means that the defence of national interests can be pursued more effectively

and efficiently through a system of bilateral relations. In fact, unlike multilateralism (which, as mentioned, is a voluntary and therefore open model), bilateralism does not provide for binding obligations. Therefore, according to the supporters of the 'realist' doctrine, in practice, multilateral cooperation is limited to *issues* less relevant than the national interests that would be pursued by resorting to the instrument of bilateral relations.

A second critical approach to multilateralism is the liberal one. According to the advocates of this approach, the plurality of parties that are called upon to manage the *issues* and the bureaucratisation of international relations, which are channelled into apparatuses – such as international organisations - are factors of weakness that limit the effectiveness of the multilateral approach.

Both the 'realist' and 'liberal' approaches reflect a part of reality but underestimate a very important factor: the interdependence of the contemporary world.

If it is correct to maintain that the national interest continues to shape and direct the action of states, and that the bureaucratisation of international relations can represent a limit to their effectiveness, it should not be forgotten, however, that multilateral organisations make it possible to deal with global *issues* that states alone are unable to manage individually.

This is because the principle of national sovereignty represents a limitation in the management of major transnational issues.

These *issues* are mainly related to three areas of activity. Keohane argues in this regard:

The first concerns the opportunity to engage in collective trade negotiations, so as to reduce costs and achieve greater benefits. In many areas, starting with the energy sector, it is in the interest   of states not to proceed in isolation, but to form organisations with a common purpose. A second, and by no means negligible, element is that of credibility. National governments often find themselves unable to keep the commitments they have made, for example, during election campaigns. Collaboration with other states can be an important incentive to achieve agreed objectives. Finally, the third area concerns the collection and sharing of an impressive amount of information, which no government would ever be able to collect on its own. What the public often dismisses as excessive bureaucracy is in fact one of the unnoticed benefits of cooperation.

Keohane's remarks leave open the question of the structure, *modus operandi* and power relations within some multilateral organisations (e.g. the UN), which are still anchored to outdated balances. Nico Frandi observes in this regard:

The international context as a whole has changed its skin, with the progressive collapse of various stable systems of alliances and coalitions, with the rise of new and not necessarily state actors, with increased fluidity and changeability that makes coalitions and power groups much less static and above all detached from old and no longer unchanged ideological logics.

What has not changed is the globalisation of international *issues*, following a process that began at the beginning of the 20th century. On the contrary, it can be said that the acceleration of the phenomena of technological innovation and the transformation of the productive structure reinforces the global nature of the *issues*, requiring a collective commitment from the nation-states.

The historical experience of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries shows that the lack of such a collective commitment was one of the main causes of the great tragedies of the last century.

3. NATO and Multilateralism

Established as a regional multilateral organization at the end of World War II, NATO now counts, after Finland joined the Alliance on April 4, 2023 - 31 member states. A structure, strengthened after the start of the Russian invasion of Ukraine capable of dealing with any type of challenge ranging from armed confrontation, peacekeeping, disaster response to name a few, becoming a true guarantor of high standards of multilateral security cooperation. A role, a mission that NATO carries on with two other multilateral organizations that came into being after the end of World War II namely the United Nations and the European Union.

The one with the United Nations, it is a close cooperation that dates back to 1949 when the Atlantic Alliance's Founding Treaty was signed. The first sentence of the North Atlantic Treaty's preamble says: "*The States party to the present Treaty reaffirm their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments. They say they are determined to*

safeguard the freedom of their peoples, their common heritage and civilization, founded on the principles of democracy, individual freedoms and the primacy of law. They aspire to promote prosperity and stability in the North Atlantic region. They are determined to unite their efforts in a collective defense and for the preservation of peace and security. Therefore, they adhere to this North Atlantic Treaty".

In 1999, NATO welcomed three new members: the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. This was the first stage of NATO's expansion, which has seen the addition of 12 members to NATO over the course of 10 years, bringing with Finland's current accession to 31 members of the Alliance. The penultimate to join was North Macedonia in 2020.

Expansion is an important factor, synonymous with security, contributing to NATO's evolution and adaptability. By choosing to adopt NATO's standards and principles, new Alliance members benefit from greater assurance of the security of their borders. The Alliance, in turn, has benefited from their valuable contributions to operations and exercises, as well as their wealth of experience and knowledge.

"The more stable the neighbours are, the more secure the Alliance member countries feel".

Overall, NATO works with a network of 41 partners in Central Europe, Eastern Europe, Central Asia and beyond. Other partners include countries in the Middle East and North Africa, such as Iraq, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait and Tunisia.

Several countries in the east, such as Georgia, Moldova are active NATO partners. The Atlantic Alliance's training and defense capacity-building efforts in these countries have increased the logistical and military capabilities of these nations in order to defend their independence, their borders, and to better deal with external threats by strengthening their institutions and fighting corruption and terrorism.

Other strategic partners of the Atlantic Alliance include Japan, Australia, South Korea and New Zealand.

Also increasing strongly is NATO's support for partners in the Middle East and North Africa including Tunisia, Algeria and Jordan, with a number of programs aimed at strengthening defensive capabilities.

The one between NATO and the European Union, this is a cooperation between two major regional multilateral organizations to meet new challenges in hybrid, cyber and capacity building to expand and strengthen cooperation.

This is because the unison organization, does not have the necessary and adequate tools and resources to effectively deal with all the challenges we face, both military and non-military. By acting together, more distant goals can be achieved.

This is precisely why NATO, leveraging its network of partners in Europe and beyond, is seeking to project greater stability in collective defense both to the south and east thereby going further as a guarantor of peace and prosperity on both sides of the Atlantic. Role, which it has fulfilled excellently for nearly 70 years.

It must be highlighted, however, that the cooperative status between NATO and the European Union has not always been straightforward due to multiple disagreements, especially on the issue of European Defense with the creation of a European Army, which was clamoured for by French President Emmanuel Macron. With the advent of the war in Ukraine, NATO and the European Union have found a perfect alignment of interests, demonstrated both on the issue of sanctions against Russia and the issue of sending arms to defend Ukraine's borders. It will be crucial to understand whether the NATO-EU approach will tilt or strengthen in the coming months, in view of further challenges on energy, inflation and recession. Hence the importance of acting multilaterally and cooperating internationally through strategic partnerships that will enable NATO to protect its resilience and sustain the rules-based international order.

In a climate of geopolitical uncertainty, NATO remains a unique, essential and indispensable transatlantic forum to consult, coordinate and act on all issues related to the security of allies.

4. Conclusions

Although the multilateral system is currently in trouble, in our view the potential crisis factors mentioned in the preceding pages show how necessary, perhaps even indispensable, this system is for the globalized world.

This is the only way to achieve rational management of international affairs and peaceful resolution of conflicts that tend to multiply in a multipolar framework. From this perspective, we believe that multilateralism is a necessity also dictated by the growing complexity and interdependence of the contemporary world.

The events of recent years, such as the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan and the war on Europe's doorstep, confirm the importance of multilateral practice today.

Beyond the suspicions that the multilateral system has generated about its efficiency, the health emergency related to the COVID 19 pandemic was the clearest demonstration of the vulnerability of the individual nation-state in dealing with, managing and resolving crisis situations that transcend national borders.

The pandemic, which is still far from being resolved, has shown that not even the most virtuous country can say it is safe from a pandemic if its law enforcement efforts are not embedded in a broader framework of interstate cooperation. The same could be said of other issues of transnational importance, such as migration management or environmental emergencies.

In Madrid, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg addressed the issue of the environmental emergency, describing it as a significant "*challenge of our time, with a profound impact on allied security. It is a crisis and a threat multiplier. It can exacerbate conflict, fragility and geopolitical competition. Rising temperatures cause rising sea levels, wildfires and more frequent and extreme weather events, disrupting our societies, undermining our security and endangering the lives and livelihoods of our citizens*".

On the other hand, even with all the limitations we have mentioned, the multilateral approach has nevertheless helped to preserve some stability, mitigating the most heated conflict situations and probably preventing them from exceeding the alert level. In our opinion, the multilateral system has not yet exhausted this function and role, but the evolution of the contemporary economic-political system makes it increasingly relevant.

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DEFENCE AREA

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NATO Strategic Concept and Security Force Assistance:
challenges and opportunities in the maritime domain

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Giorgio LAZIO

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Abstract

The Maritime domain has been a permanent focus for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization since its inception. The Strategic Concept adopted in Madrid in 2022 mentions maritime security explicitly in one paragraph, but its relevance remains paramount and implied throughout the whole document. Looking to the next 15 years, scenarios emerge where hybrid threats, technological confrontation, competition for access to natural resources, exploitation of the Cyber domain and the need for environmental sustainability will be in close correlation. The investment in naval and naval-air platforms, developed primarily for high-end tasks in defence and deterrence, is a force multiplier as it sustains the broader, multiform and strategic perimeter of maritime security. Naval forces offer significant opportunities in the prevention of conflicts and in the development of regional security and stability. They can play a pivotal role in favoring a climate of mutual trust through confidence-building and capacity-building measures. Along with the development of maritime capabilities of the Partners, capacity-building entails both enhancing the exchange of information and the development of a growing interoperability, thus sustaining the full extent of the NATO Strategic Concept.

Reference

Excerpts from the NATO STRATEGIC CONCEPT 2022:

Maritime security is key to our peace and prosperity. We will strengthen our posture and situational awareness to deter and defend against all threats in the maritime domain, uphold freedom of navigation, secure maritime trade routes and protect our main lines of communications (Paragraph 23)

We will increase our efforts to anticipate and prevent crises and conflicts. Prevention is a sustainable way to contribute to stability and Allied security. We will enhance support for our partners, including to help build their capacity to counter terrorism and address shared security challenges. We will scale up the size and scope of our security and capacity-building assistance to vulnerable partners in our neighbourhood and beyond, to strengthen their preparedness and resilience and boost their capabilities to counter malign interference, prevent destabilisation and counter aggression (Paragraph 38)

Keywords

1. NATO focus on the Maritime domain

The Maritime domain has been a permanent focus for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization since its inception. It is embedded in the acronym itself and features high in the transatlantic link. All seven of the previous NATO Strategic Concepts included maritime defence and security in their predicaments. The current Strategic Concept launched in Madrid in 2022 mentions maritime explicitly in one paragraph, but its relevance remains implied throughout the whole document.

The maritime dimension includes merchant and military fleets, commercial networks (including underwater backbones since almost all Internet traffic runs through hundreds of thousands of miles of undersea cables), as well as shipbuilding, ports and dedicated infrastructures. More specifically, we can say that the military component, the fleet, is one of the enabling factors, but not the only one.

When we mention the NATO maritime capacity as a whole, we do not mean only the sum of single factors, such as geographical location and political, commercial, civil and military activities linked to the sea belonging and performed by the Allies. Obviously these are the ingredients, but the amalgam is given by the deep bond with the sea that permeates the Alliance, influencing NATO strategic choices, economic relations, culture and the development of defence and security capabilities. Seafaring is a dimension that involves all the disciplines connected with our well-being. Security comes first, since protecting our coasts, our operators who work at sea and through the sea, our marine infrastructures and the maritime lines of communication is paramount.

Free access to the global commons constitutes both a privileged means for economic-commercial flows and therefore for the affirmation of prosperity, and an element of friction between the member states in the affirmation of their interest. The sea in particular can be considered emblematic of this ambivalence: on the one hand it unites (just think of the commercial flows that insist on it, but also of the modern backbones of data flows that cross it), on the other, it represents an element of division, a liquid boundary between competing or at least different worlds.

Looking to the next 15 years, scenarios emerge where hybrid threats, technological confrontation, competition for access to natural resources, exploitation of the cyber domain and the need for environmental sustainability will be in close correlation. For my job - as Principal Military Assistant to the Chairman of the NATO Military Committee from 2008 to 2011 - I took part in the NATO-wide brainstorming in preparation of the Strategic Concept adopted by the Alliance in Lisbon in 2010. This preparation included the "Multiple Futures" study conducted by the Allied Command for Transformation (ACT) in 2009. The document contained a logical and sequential analysis of what forms the world could take in 2030, based on the risks that could already be glimpsed then and their probability of occurrence, and on the related implications for the Alliance. One of the hypothesized scenarios foreshadowed a new multi-polarity that sees more and more regional actors expanding

towards other continents in the awareness that whoever controls the raw resources will control the world. All this would happen in the backdrop of a world affected by climate change, social imbalances and even greater differences highlighted by globalization. This landscape is actually taking shape these days, with the People's Republic of China's (PRC) stated ambitions; military build-up and Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) challenging our interests, security and values, further complicated by the resurgence of (a threat that in 2009 was considered outdated) the Russian Federation, which resorts to armed conflict to resolve international disputes.

The seas and oceans will continue to represent a fundamental resource, but also the source of crises and threats ranging from conflicts of various kinds, to traditional crises from organized crime - including maritime piracy - to trafficking in human beings, arms and drugs, irregular migration, smuggling, terrorism/eco-terrorism and intentional illegal activities targeting ships, cargo, crews and passengers, port equipment and critical maritime and energy infrastructure, including cyber attacks. Even the legitimate exploitation of marine resources, strongly conditioned by the growing phenomena of "territorialization" of large portions of the High Seas - which determines the reduction of freedom of navigation in vast areas - is a potential source of conflict between the coastal countries. The High Seas - essential for free trade and energy - are shrinking, while disputes over maritime borders are increasing in many regional areas, as a result of peripheral strategies implemented by many States.

Protection of NATO maritime borders, security of maritime communication routes, the marine environment itself and all the activities connected to it, require continuous commitment by the Allies. This responsibility, in practice, falls preeminently on the Allied Navies. This requires each Ally to plan for a credible, effective, adequately sized maritime tool-box equipped with all necessary capabilities to guarantee the discharge of this responsibility, according to the apportionment agreed in the NATO Defence Planning Process.

The two events of sabotage to the Nord Stream 1 and 2 gas pipelines in the Baltic Sea, on 26 September 2022, highlighted quite effectively the importance of protection of undersea energy infrastructure and have accelerated the related plans. In this vein, there have been a number of recent moves from NATO in connection with the EU to address these risks. On 11 January 2023, the EU and NATO announced a joint Task Force on Resilience and Critical Infrastructures Protection and later, on 15 February, NATO established an Undersea Infrastructure Coordination Cell at the Alliance HQ[1]. Accordingly, many NATO Nations have elaborated a national Seabed Strategy. Italy is going to inaugurate on 9 June 2023 a "National Underwater Cluster": conceived as a multi-ministerial entity under the leadership of the Italian Navy, it will bring together industries, universities and research institutions, both military and civilian. The NATO Centre for Maritime Research and

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[1] euro-sd.com | Seabed Warfare: NATO and EU Member State Responses

Experimentation (CMRE) is co-located with the Italian national Centre for Naval Support and Experimentation (CSSN) and they cooperate in multiple projects, while the Italian Navy provides management and manning of the two NATO's research vessels: Alliance and Leonardo.

Common perception still associates the prevalence of data traffic with satellites. Reality is that the bottom of the sea hosts a dense network of cables which ensures almost the whole data exchange on a global scale, essential for information and economic development and for the World Wide Web and telephone connections among all continents. Not many people are aware that 97% of digital telecommunications run through the modern marine backbones of data flows. There are 487 undersea cables lying on the seabed, for a total of over 1 million miles, essential for effectively managing the communication needs of the modern digital economy and society. It is a system that today is of vital importance not only for NATO but for the whole mankind and, as such, in need of great attention and protection in consideration of the concrete security risk affecting such networks. Let us think, for example, of the unauthorized tapping into data for espionage purposes, of the physical cutting of cables, but also of accidental damage: the consequences on all the services provided through the network - from economy, to transport, health, information, energy, security – would be extremely serious.

Therefore, the maritime security capacity we are seeking is manifold. t should have anti-missile defense capabilities to intercept hyper-sonic and ballistic missiles, so as to ensure the protection of the territory and the population against the risks associated with the threat proliferation. It should also develop direct energy weapons for use above the surface, both non-lethal and lethal when necessary. In the underwater environment, we would need capabilities to operate persistently without depth limits, both to protect critical infrastructures - with specific reference to data backbones and energy flow pipelines - and in contrast to the multifaceted underwater threat, with growing attention to the unmanned capabilities. It is important to plan for a fleet of autonomous underwater vehicles characterized by modularity, resilience and persistence in the underwater environment, interoperability and innovative communication capabilities by exploiting the electromagnetic, acoustic and optical domains. Ships, submarines and aircraft will continue to evolve as strategic "hubs", easily deployable and able to exploit the peculiarities of the maritime environment to the advantage of NATO. They will have to locally generate critical mass and relevant effects, wherever required, performing functions of launch, recovery and central logistics for maritime vehicles with diversified payloads. At the same time, they will have to be able to act as "in-theatre" operations centres, with the ability to merge the acquired data and play the role of decision-making and integration centre in the context of an operation that can span multiple domains simultaneously.

The use of naval and naval-air platforms, developed primarily for high-end tasks in deterrence and defence, should be understood as extended to the broader, multiform and strategic perimeter of

the maritime security, a perimeter in which the constabulary role stands out. These precious assets would be employed frequently in capacity-building assistance of Partner nations as well, determining a trend towards a convergence of the concepts of defense and security, homeland security and international security.

We could define this convergence as "advanced maritime security": a geostrategic concept with an operational declination that is not geographically bound, but projected wherever NATO security is at stake. This includes a range of "all-round" maritime security activities which, in addition to the strictly military aspects of the operational domain, embrace the broad perimeter of capacity-building, international cooperation, naval diplomacy, support for industry and maritime surveillance beyond the external limit of NATO maritime area of responsibility. The willingness of maritime actors to share information and awareness to strengthen NATO knowledge superiority - usually defined as Maritime Situational Awareness (MSA) - remains a real power factor.

A pivotal role will continue to be played by the Standing Naval Forces (SNF), which are under the control of NATO Allied Maritime Command (MARCOM) which responds to Allied Command Operations. They are comprised of the Standing NATO Maritime Groups 1 and 2 and Standing NATO Mine Countermeasures Groups 1 and 2.[2] This multinational, integrated force is continuously available to perform tasks ranging from participating to exercises to conducting NATO missions. These forces are part of the maritime component of the NATO Response Force. In my mandate as MARCOM Chief of Staff (2013 – 2016) I directed the Operations Staff into supporting many different capacity-building initiatives by ships under NATO control, either as SNFs or committed to Operation OCEAN SHIELD along the Somali coastline.

2. Security Force Assistance (SFA) in the maritime domain – a case study

Operation OCEAN SHIELD was approved by the North Atlantic Council on 17 August 2009 and ended on 15 December 2016. It represents a significant case study in "capacity-building assistance to vulnerable partners in our neighborhood and beyond, to strengthen their preparedness and resilience and boost their capabilities to counter malign interference, prevent destabilization and counter aggression" as declined in the current NATO Strategic Concept. The mission was based on two previous operations also launched by NATO in the Gulf of Aden and off the Horn of Africa and, initially, was focused exclusively on Counter-Piracy (CP) operations at sea. For example, NATO naval units conducted surveillance missions with on-board helicopters to track and identify ships in the area of operations, helping to prevent and deter armed actions by pirates. NATO had also complied

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[2] www.c6f.navy.mil | Forward Deployed Naval Forces-Europe Destroyers Operate with NATO Allies at Sea > U.S. Naval Forces Europe and Africa / U.S. Sixth Fleet >

with the UN request to escort the logistics ships of the "United Nations Support Office for AMISOM" (UNSOA) in the most dangerous waters up to the entrance to Mogadishu.

NATO recognized early-on that addressing the challenge of piracy also required a long-term approach, focused on regional capacity-building, in order to enable the littoral countries of the western Indian Ocean to address the problem of piracy and other maritime security challenges by themselves in the long run. To achieve this, the Participating Nations channeled their efforts through both bilateral relations and international frameworks.

Over time, the operation had adapted to changes in pirate behavior. For example, in the March 2012 Strategic Assessment, the need was affirmed to hit the land support bases of the pirates, destroying in advance the suspected "skiffs", to insert tracking devices in a "covert" way on mother ships of pirates and the use of force to strike or destroy vessels under pirate control on land, was permitted. But capacity-building had a role at least as relevant as attacks ashore because it was aimed at winning Somali hearts and minds and foster Somali institutions' willingness and effective capacity to handle the pirates' challenge.

The SHared Awareness and Deconfliction (SHADE) mechanism, paired with the capacity-building measures, enhance the international effort by coordinating the actions by all participants. SHADE meetings were established in 2009 to provide a tactical-level, non-political forum in which all military elements engaged in CP operations in the Gulf of Aden and off the Horn of Africa could discuss successes and challenges, share best practices, and coordinate forthcoming activities. The 18th meeting in January 2011 was attended by representatives of 32 countries and numerous organizations. SHADE meetings were held in Bahrain, normally on a monthly basis, with every country engaged in CP activities being eligible to chair or co-chair a meeting.

Another key factor for success was the conviction at all levels that every entity involved in CP had an important part to play, and that the effort each entity contributed was worthy. Whether considering differences in mission approach, levels of effort, capabilities, political will, legal limitations, or various other seemingly significant factors, NATO personnel displayed tremendous respect for every effort. One of the more significant examples of this professionalism is the full respect consistently rendered to each of the independent deployers, regardless of the capabilities of any country or the manner in which that country decided to use those capabilities.

NATO support to maritime capacity-building was aimed at strengthening maritime policing competences and Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) in Somalia and the western Indian Ocean Countries. This was done through the training of coast guards, navies and maritime police, as well as contributing to cooperation and information-sharing between regional States and conducting joint training exercises.

All participating NATO naval units were encouraged to offer assistance in the training of any local force demonstrating a desire to acquire the ability to combat piracy. This turning point led to the development of specific training programs to be held mainly on-board naval units (to avoid security problems ashore), embarking Somali personnel to be trained on dedicated days. Furthermore, and most importantly, the naval units carried out Key Leader Engagements (KLE) on board to prepare for these events, inviting institutional leaders or village elders to identify and evaluate Somali personnel for training. On these occasions, depending on the ability of the resident on board, the various naval units and on the interest aroused in Somali institutions, first aid courses were carried out on board by medical detachments of the participating units, and even sexual education sessions for young Somali women were organized by female ship officers.

Countries belonging to both NATO and the EU directed their efforts and resources through various channels. One framework had been the EU civilian maritime security mission, EUCAP Nestor, once the mission was launched in 2012. Through EUCAP Nestor, participating countries were able to contribute to several initiatives promoting regional cooperation in maritime security and capacity-building. The Nestor mission specifically focused on strengthening the sea-going maritime capacities of Djibouti, Kenya, Tanzania and Seychelles, as well as the rule of law sector, initially by supporting the development of a coastal police force in the Somali regions of Puntland and Somaliland. Activities here included expert advice on legal, policy and operational matters concerning maritime security; coast guard training to develop their ability to enforce the law on the sea; and procuring equipment. The Nestor mission also cooperated with the naval forces on capacity-building, most notably EU operation ATALANTA and NATO Operation OCEAN SHIELD, where NATO warships carried out capacity-building exercises with coast guards and maritime police when calling at regional ports.

The same countries also used other international frameworks to contribute to regional maritime capacity-building. Maritime experts were embedded in the African Union (AU) in support of the implementation of the first African Integrated Maritime Strategy (AU 2012), which aimed to assist AU member countries' capacity to implement and strengthen maritime security governance. The NATO focus on capacity-building underlined a core strategic goal of having a comprehensive approach to its crisis management efforts, whereby military and civilian policy instruments were combined to create a balanced and wide-ranging intervention. However, the EU CP mission had a broader mandate than NATO's purely military mission and it was naturally more extensive.

All seafaring NATO nations should build on their experiences from the Gulf of Aden and use their position to continue playing a significant role in international maritime security governance. As we have seen, the international response to Somali piracy also represented a new international governance model: SHADE was a forum driven by common interests and constituted the model for

similar mechanisms like SHADE-MED in EUNAVFORMED operation IRINI. It had no formal structures, budgets or rules and was open to a diverse constellation of actors. This allowed innovative and flexible solutions to emerge for complex problems.

Active participation in international maritime governance provides goodwill and protection for any state; it encourages multilateralism and the continued cohesion of international relations; it promotes internationalist norms such as human rights and the rule of law; and it allows economies of scale, when states pool resources and expertise. Continuing positive working relations in international fora is thus imperative in matters of maritime security, as the success of interventions relies on effective collaboration between multiple actors.

Long-term capacity-building of regional maritime security capabilities are crucial for any region's ability to govern its own waters. Such a focus is pivotal because capacity-building efforts are a way of moving far beyond merely treating the symptoms, namely reacting to maritime crime through military patrols, to promoting more lasting stability.

The current lull in Somali piracy has made states prioritize their scarce resources on other, more immediate security threats. This includes those threats that are considered to stem from illegal migration to Europe. Accordingly, indications are that resources spent on maritime capacity-building in East Africa are likely to further decrease in the medium term. Other security threats notwithstanding, there is a need for continued engagement in regional states affected by maritime crime to maintain the positive results of the international CP efforts. Future engagements should be long-term and address the structural level of getting littoral states to deal with maritime security by using a comprehensive approach. This includes in particular:

- Supporting the rule of law both at sea and on land by focusing on the further training of maritime forces, police, coast guards and the judiciary;

- Strengthening regional cooperation and information-sharing by supporting regional initiatives, as well as promoting common training exercises;

- Combating maritime crime in a sustainable manner by training regional personnel across legal institutions to ensure the prevention of maritime crime and the detection of its organizers.

3. Conclusion

The sea, and in particular the straits and choke points that delimit them, will continue to constitute a crucial theater in the context of strategic competition. Some of the most important infrastructures for the transport of energy and data run on the bottom of the sea. The complexity of the maritime security environment and the rapid technological evolution require state-of-the-art naval capabilities,

including special forces and cyber enablers. To produce significant effects, these capabilities will have to be measured with respect to the technologies of possible opponents, integrated, interconnected and eco-sustainable. Dynamic adaptation to innovation is essential to be competitive in a scenario that will see growing technological competition, where the ability to perceive changes rapidly will have to go hand-in-hand with the ability to implement suitable measures to effectively exploit the opportunities that technological innovation makes available.

Naval forces offer significant opportunities in the prevention of conflicts and in the development of regional security and stability, through the construction of a climate of mutual trust with confidence-building measures. Along with the development of maritime capabilities of the Partners, capacity-building entails both enhancing the exchange of information and the development of a growing interoperability.

Resources are scarce and capacity-building efforts achieve best success in a prolonged effort. Therefore, there is the need to scan, and keep under constant review, the security landscape in all maritime regions of NATO interest in order to detect at an early stage where to prioritize these scarce resources. This horizon scanning should necessarily be shared with the EU and any other Organization or Partner with the potential capacity and interest to pull this effort, maximizing the probabilities of success.

NATO's strategic concept for 2022: Crisis and conflict prevention with multi-domain and cultural diplomacy approach

Michele PAVAN

Abstract

A recurring question, which was often attempted to be answered, was: "Would it be possible to prevent crises and conflicts by monitoring the state of severity, even remotely?" In most cases, the answer turned out to be negative because of various critical issues and, probably, sectoral analyses that were not conducive to an in-depth study on a large scale.

The purpose of this paper is not to teach how to prevent crises but to provide the reader with an overview of the current and future challenges and opportunities facing NATO.

NATO's new strategic concept was presented in Madrid in June 2022, in a time when new instruments to tackle geopolitical instability were most needed. The war in Ukraine advanced by the Russian Federation; the growing instability in Africa and Latin America; the socio-cultural and economic penetration of China into the European, African, and South American contexts; and a crisis in the supply of raw materials and energy resources. The new Strategic Concept pursues three basic tasks: deterrence and defense, crisis prevention and management, and cooperative security.

In this paper we share some thoughts on paragraph 38 of the NATO Strategic Concept: *"We will increase our efforts to anticipate and prevent crises and conflicts. Prevention is a sustainable way to contribute to stability and Allied security. We will enhance support for our partners, including to help build their capacity to counter terrorism and address shared security challenges. We will scale up the size and scope of our security and capacity-building assistance to vulnerable partners in our neighborhood and beyond, to strengthen their preparedness and resilience and boost their capabilities to counter malign interference, prevent destabilization and counter aggression."* There is a need of a new and complementary approach to the traditional deterrence and defense framework. We notice a growing importance of cultural diplomacy and international cooperation for mutual understanding, the promotion of dialogue initiatives and information exchange, as well as an opening for economic development activities important both in the crisis prevention, *peace-keeping* and management phases and in the *peace-building* phases thereafter.

Among these factors it is important to emphasize the progressive nullification, of the internal and external threat and security distinction. Threats such as the use of drones, cyber, terrorism, but at the same time globalization and communication technologies nullify the

internal and external distinction necessitating an integration, on multiple levels, between defense, law enforcement and the different decision-making bodies, united in prevention activities with a multi-domain approach. In this first paper, we focus on the factors of crisis prevention with the promise of dealing in more detail with the integration of internal and external prevention, which is necessary for Alliance countries.

Keywords

1. Crisis management: what factors affect crises

The concept of deterrence and defense is well known, especially for the Alliance, which, having developed most during the Cold War period, has dealt with all phases of response to threats, even the most complicated ones, up to the present day, including terrorism. Crisis prevention and management and cooperative security, on the contrary, need in-depth and continuous studies to adapt the understanding of phenomena to the geopolitical situation and to refine the prevention methods. Crisis management is the most complex phase. Preventing vertical escalation (i.e., escalation of violence) or horizontal escalation (territorial spread) is even more so. Crisis prevention is based on three types of intervention: *confidence-building[1], security-building measures[2]*, and preventive *peacekeeping*. However, all three types of intervention have at their basis the need to understand the socio-cultural and economic phenomena of the area being targeted.

It is necessary to dwell on crisis transformation which requires long-term actions and processes that help change the characteristics of a crisis by acting on the structural and cultural causes. The term "management" refers to both the ongoing process and the completed process. In this sense, it includes conflict prevention activities.

Diana Francis[3] developed a diagram describing the stages and processes of crisis transformations, which also includes the resolution, recomposition, and management of conflicts in the final stages. The stages are to be considered dynamic and, therefore, constantly evolving.

The diagram (Figure 1) describes the different stages of conflict, with oval shapes, and the processes, with rectangles, that can be helpful in transforming conflict. The order of the phases is hardly respected since there is no precise sequence. Phases and processes are never clearly separated and distinct. For each type of actor there are different processes.

The diagram represents the typical situation of oppressed groups, unable to respond in the face of structural violence (hidden or latent conflict). A process of reflection and "conscientization" begins, leading to the formation of a group committed to the change effort.

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[1] Maiese M., Confidence Building Measures, September 2003
https://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/confidence-building-measures and UNODA
https://disarmament.unoda.org/cbms/#:~:text=Confidence%2Dbuilding%20measures%20(CBMs),of%20civiliza
tion%2C%20on%20all%20continents.
Confidence-building, in international politics, is a form of intervention based on dialogue and making agreements to resolve crises without involving the use of force.
[2] UN: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/132363: *Security-building measures* are concerned with conflict prevention by strengthening trust between the Parties such as the exchange of military information and control of unconventional weapons.
[3] Francis D., *People, Peace and Power: Conflict transformation in Action*, London 2002.

As soon as the visibility and power of this group increases, it is perceived as a threat by those in power. Thus begins a phase of confrontation. A phase that can be characterized by repressive measures on the newly formed group, even if it has chosen to act in a nonviolent manner.

Crisis transformation can be seen as a catalytic process, addressing multiple social categories and can be both structural and contextual.

Context transformation is concerned with changes that occur in the same context in which the conflict develops and that can radically alter each party's perception of the situation, as well as their motivations.

Structural transformation concerns the actors, their problems, goals and irreconcilable relationships, or the society, economy, or state in which the conflict is rooted. Asymmetrical conflicts cannot be transformed, for example, without first changing the underlying imbalance and negative relationships. Because these changes are slow and gradual, internal and external actors can sustain them for a long time.

Part of the actors may change their goals or alter their overall approach to conflict. Changes in leadership are often central to conflict transformation. Changes in the situation of supporters and advocates of the respective political leaders are also included. This introduces different case histories of perspectives since, those within a group, to make a change in the party's position, often attempt to take an important role in the peace process and may have more influence than an outside actor.

Figure 1[4]

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
[4] Francis D., *People, Peace and Power: Conflict transformation in Action*, London 2002, pp. 49ff.

Problems characterize the reformulation of positions that the parties consider central to the conflict but also how the parties change their positions to reach a compromise or solution. Individual changes by those with decision-making power at critical moments can be crucial.

Context transformation usually occurs at the global or regional level. Structural transformation usually takes place at the state/society level. Actor and problem transformation takes place at the level of conflict parties and elites. Personal transformation, on the other hand, requires individual expertise.

The types of transformation can also be related to the different segments of the conflict. Context, structural and problem transformation effects the context and contradictions at the core of the conflict. Transformation of actors and personal mainly affects habits and memory, behavior and relationships. These, in turn, are of course related.

Contextual and structural changes tend to take place over the long term; the other types of transformation occur more rapidly, as part of the dynamics of the outbreak of conflict. The sequence varies for each crisis context.

In conflict transformation many forms of interdependence must be considered. Ethnic, regional, religious conflicts involve a wide and intricate network of parties and actors. Thus, the transformation of long-lasting social or political conflicts must take place at the various levels of society, and also involving a wide range of actors. A summary that encapsulates endless steps for both prevention and crisis management. If this is thought to be the model for developing a crisis or conflict, with what it entails for management, however, it still fails to answer the question, "how is it possible to prevent crises?"

The approach, so far focused on political-economic aspects, perhaps requires more attention to socio-cultural and environmental processes.

During the Arab Spring protests, for example, which in some cases escalated into full-fledged civil wars, one can see interventions by different actors that can be framed in two classes: top leadership in support of or against the grassroots leadership. The protests also featured intermediate leadership with local leaders, armed groups, and tribal-religious groups. These groups have been influenced by external factors fighting groups from neighboring countries that have managed to take root in society by taking advantage of the crisis context.

Assuming that all levels of leadership are critical to conflict prevention, as demonstrated by the diagram above, the intervention and development of interactions between them is complicated. For top and middle leadership, one can develop intermediary actions between parties, policy measures, and contribute to interfaith and interethnic dialogue. For grassroots leadership, the activity is more complex because it is mostly characterized by activities to

support the population such as forms of education, humanitarian assistance, economic strengthening, infrastructure rehabilitation through an informal approach and support from civil society, traditional authorities, political, judicial, regional institutions and multilateral bodies.

The latter would be the best strategy to establish a process of dialogue and interaction between different social dimensions, stimulating vertical and horizontal *capacity building*.

The potential exploiters of crisis contexts are the more unstable, less predictable actors such as combatants, arms and drug traffickers, and smugglers in the case of Europe, the Americas, Africa and the Middle East, and in the case of Africa and the Middle East are added in particular, jihadist groups with a strong attachment to values of a political terrorism or religious fanaticism dating back to very old conflicts and cleavages.

If one traces the history of events in the countries of North Africa, for example, in recent years and compares them with the crises that erupted in the second half of the last century, it is possible to identify illegitimate governments, lack of political participation, almost total absence of economic and social opportunities, lack of access to natural resources and poor *governance as* common causes. Access to basic necessities such as water, timber, and land for cultivation is highly dependent on environmental conditions. It cannot be ruled out that environmental degradation and subsequent impoverishment will lead entire groups or societies to start armed conflict or rebel. Environmental degradation is a fact that contributes to a worsening quality of life and, therefore, to an increase in the likelihood of conflict.

From analyses conducted and given for certain in this paper, therefore, it can be ascertained that poverty and not lack of democracy is one of the main factors of instability for peace.

It is necessary, however, to dwell on the term peace, as there are two types of peace: *negative peace* and *positive peace*[5] . In the first case, it is an absence of violence and an acceptance of unbalanced relations, that is, conditions of inequality and lack of access to resources. In the second case, on the other hand, it is a context in which people contribute to the transformation of the society in which they live through a process of population *empowerment*[6] .

It is, in addition, useful to analyze the cultural-historical causes, that is, those arising from long-standing social lacerations or facts that characterize the country for a long time such

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[5] Tommasoli, M., *Participatory development. Social analysis and planning logics*, Carocci, 2001.
[6] Tommasoli, M., *Participatory development. Social analysis and planning logics*, Carocci, 2001.

as may be the lack of security, the proliferation of small arms, the lack of respect for human rights, according to the culture of belonging, or even an unstable situation of conflict occurring in neighboring countries. The most contentious issue here is the ethnic-cultural and religious issue. In fact, countries have often been divided by size or interests dating back to colonial times, certainly not by an identity-based view of the people. If ethnic difference were a cause of war, armed conflicts should involve states characterized by a large number of ethnic groups, but this is not the case. In fact, usually, the higher the number of ethnic groups, the longer the long-term stay increases the level of tolerance among members of different ethnic groups or religions in the same country. The integration process, however, does not always develop, and should conflict occur, the ethnic-religious factor is easily instrumentalized for political and economic objectives.

Social-historical conditions provide a complete picture of the causes by reporting a connection between political-economic causes and all facets of social, demographic and environmental causes that inevitably are one consequence of the other.

Finally, unforeseeable causes can be identified. Single events that result in the outbreak of a conflict or the beginning of an uprising, which are almost impossible to predict. Often these are events that can be traced directly to the causes just mentioned; they may be: new elections, the assassination of a leader, a coup, a severe drought, a collapse in purchasing power due to a collapse of the local currency derived from external shocks, a sudden increase in unemployment as a result of external factors, hydro-geological disruption, or simply a striking factor symbolizing an uprising.

If there are unforeseeable causes, then, can the impossibility of preventing crises be taken for granted? The answer would still require many pages to analyze each point in detail, but, the unforeseeable causes are what can be learned to manage according to the pattern previously indicated, preventing all other factors well in advance. In fact, *cooperative security* and *cultural diplomacy are* referred to here.

Paul Collier, one of the greatest scholars of conflict economics, summed up his thesis by stating that civil war and economic development are inversely proportional, that is, where economic development occurs it is not possible for civil war to go away and viceversa[7].What is meant by "economic development"? If a state increases its economy, does it speculatively mean that it increases its welfare? There is a need, in fact, to integrate the economic

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[7] Collier P., Hoeffler A., Greed *and Greviance in Civil Wars,* Working Paper, Centre for the Study of African Economics, Oxford, 2002.

development figure with social factors, concerning the cultural environment, even though, the probability of a country being involved in a war, statistically, decreases rapidly as average per capita income increases as Paul Collier has shown. Wealthier societies are more institutionalized, with rules governing the distribution of and access to positions of power, capital and wealth. There are greater obstacles for those who may seek to engage in revolt; in fact, they are incentivized to take legal avenues. In contrast, poorer countries tend toward war, especially civil war, causing great destruction with huge economic costs.

Economic inequality, or the distribution of wealth, is often related to political violence. The analyses conducted use linear regression tools to determine the probability of greater or lesser influence of socio-economic factors on the outbreak of crises. There are, however, numerous problems related to the quality of statistical data, especially those on the distribution of wealth in crisis countries and the loss of the historical and social context of each conflict[8]. Scholar Edward Muller has indicated that inequality in income distribution *income inequality*[9] has a progressive negative impact on the quality of democracy, and extreme inequality leads, inevitably, to intense class conflict, which is incompatible with a stable democracy.

According to Schock, the role of political regime is an intermediate variable in the relationship between economic inequality and political violence[10]. If regimes are only partially democratic or are semi-democratic, thus with a hybrid nature, the crisis is more likely to become violent.

Liberal internationalist thought[11] states that countries that trade intensively with each other, deriving mutual benefit and prosperity, tend not to go to war with each other. However, even a "mistake" in international economics, when internalized by actors, can become a decisive factor leading to war. Liberal-internationalist thinking is the thinking that led to the birth of the European Community in the early 1950s and later the European Union. Scholar

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[8] Cramer C., *Economic inequalities and civil wars*, in Maria C. Ercolessi, I signori della guerra, L'Ancora del Mediterraneo, Naples 2002.

[9] Muller E. and Seligson M. "Inequality and Insurgency," *in American Political Science Review*, Vol. 81, No. 2, 1987, pp. 425-452,; and in Muller E. "Income Inequality and Democratization: Reply to Bollen and Jackman," in American Sociological Review, 1995, Vol.60, No. 6, pp. 990-996.

[10] Schock K. "A Conjunctual Model of Political Conflict," *in Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 40, No. 1, 1996, pp. 98-133 in Gutiérrez Sanin F. "Inequidad y violencia política: una precisión sobre cuentas y cuentos" *en Análisis político*, No. 43, 2001, Bogotá.

[11] Benjamin Constant was the first to state *the more the commercial tendency dominates, the more the warlike tendency must weaken* in De l'Esprit de conquete, 1814. Later other authors reworked various theories such as David Miltrany who proposed a functionalist theory of integration according to which transnational ties between countries should lead to peace. Ernst Haas developed the so-called neofunctionalist theory of international integration inspired by cooperation among European countries. Not least, Robert Keohan and Joseph Nye also advocated the complex interdependence between states that implies a friendly and cooperative relationship between them.

Humphreys has identified eight parallel mechanisms useful in understanding the cross-correlation between the economy and the socio-political environment[12] . Trade in illicit resources, such as opium, tends to favor non-state, usually para-military, rebel groups with no international constraints to abide by. However, in contexts where a thriving illicit economy revolves around a prohibited resource, institutions also typically benefit through ties to armed groups, forms of money laundering, widespread corruption and patronage networks.

Statistically, it is observed that where insurgent groups can fund themselves with illegal resources, wars last longer. For example, the opium economy in Afghanistan provides much funding to local governors and the Taliban, as well as, to terrorist cells, including Al-Qā ʿ ida[13].

The government's institutional capacity to manage natural resources is decisive in ensuring sound economic development.

Changes in international commodity prices incentivize competition for the commercialization of natural resources, contributing to an increased likelihood of the outbreak of conflicts or the prolongation of existing ones in already highly complex contexts.

The implications for preventive policies in the economic sphere are well known.Preventive economic policies must take into account the links between economic development and conflict. The greatest results for crisis prevention purposes are achieved by focusing investments on the development of the poorest countries, thinning economic inequality, particularly horizontal inequality, especially in countries with economically dominant minorities. These are investments that require little disbursement of cash liquidity; in fact, it is sufficient to enable greater regional integration by introducing political systems that offer institutional guarantees of broader political representation and effective systems of wealth redistribution.

Political factors are regarded as the expression of social factors in top leadership by representing their criticality and control. As such, social factors are parameters of interaction between demographic and economic factors. The dramatic worsening of the socio-economic framework observed in countries, especially in the last decade, has in fact been accompanied

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[12]Humphreys M., *Economics and Violent Conflict*, Macartan Humphreys, Harvard University, 2003, p. 4-5.

[13]Al-Qā ʿ ida is a Sunni Islamist paramilitary terrorist movement that emerged during the war in Afghanistan in 1988 with ideals traceable to Islamic fundamentalism. Osā ma bin Muhammad bin ʿ Awaḍ bin Lā den led the terrorist organization until May 2, 2011 when he was killed during U.S. military operation conducted by DEVGRU special forces in Abbottabad; he was succeeded by Ayman Muḥ ammad Rabī ʿ al-Ẓ awā hirī . The organization lays its ideological foundations on Jihā dism and takfirism. Al-Qā ʿ ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Al-Qā ʿ ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) the al-Nuṣ ra Front and Al-Shabaab are part organizations of Al-Qā ʿ ida.

by an equally unsustainable political situation, marked by a progressive strengthening of authoritarianism, hardening of repression and closure of spaces for political expression, albeit with different modalities and intensity from country to country. The strong social oppression associated with rising demographics, high unemployment rates and the expansion of digitization, discussed below, leads to the emergence at the political level of waves of movements not framed in traditional civil society organizations. New forms of youth activism have challenged regimes outside of university campuses, using new technologies, such as Facebook and Twitter, websites and blogs, extensively to organize mobilizations, share opinions, circulate audio-visual material on police violations, and criticize ruling governments[14] .

It is these hitherto unexamined factors that for the first time have decisively influenced the outbreak of armed conflicts and rebellion movements. In North Africa, for example, it was mainly social contestation that increased significantly as an expression of the worsening living conditions and economic situation discussed earlier.

The use of social media has made it possible to quickly mobilize and organize protests, and to disseminate real-time footage and updates on demonstrations, developing consensus by making them popular abroad. New trends in the digitization of communications and information have decisive implications in crisis prevention as they amplify the effects of protests, but more importantly, they are tools of strong unpredictability. The important technological trends of digitization and information and communication technologies are very diverse due to different levels of both interstate and intrastate development. Most innovations are influenced by external actors, often accompanied by little knowledge outside the relevant context.

Demographic, economic and sociological factors often cause very violent conflicts due to the quest for better standards of living. Added to these, however, in most conflicts that have emerged in history, are factors defined as ethno-religious. Societies, often, are still characterized by pronounced ethnic-tribal fragmentation struggling to separate private and collective interests. These are factors mostly instrumentalized to have greater cohesion during protest but also as a justification for intervention used by parts of society, which seize the opportunity to overthrow the regimes in place to achieve power or portions of economic gains.

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[14]For more information see Goll E. and Zwiers J., "Technological Trends in the MENA Region: The Cases of Digitalization and Information and Communications Technology," *in MENARA Papers*, No. 23, 2018, IAI, Rome.

In Africa and the Middle East, and in other recent wars, with the outside influence of actors claiming to profess one religious faith rather than another, one often hears of terrorism. It is necessary, however, to distinguish between political terrorism and religious fanaticism. In the first case there are premeditated violent actions with different ends such as the independence of the homeland, dominated by a foreign state, the suppression of a tyrant, the revenge of a humiliation suffered, the redemption from an ancient servitude, the total transformation of the social order[15] . In the second case, on the other hand, there is no specific goal; for every religious fanatic, there are no limits. Many young people who experience high unemployment and are subject to heightened frustration can be easily influenced by growing religious fanaticism.

When terrorism draws its origins in a centuries-old conflict between two souls of the same religious belief as in the Islamic case between Sunnis and Shiites everything becomes much more complicated. In fact, in the history of Islamism the ancient contrast goes back to the descendants of Muhammad.

For example, the Libyan case, although in some ways very similar to Syria, is more complex because of the tribal distribution throughout the state. The insurgents involved in the 2011 crisis are largely composed of Senussite Islamists[16] , but also numerous are the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and Algerian, Jordanian, Moroccan, and Tunisian jihā dists. The rebels are part of the marked religious fanaticism while the Libyan insurgents, i.e., the civilian population are part of an entrenched tribal-religious traditionalism characteristic of the different tribes that make up Libya. This distinction is important because the insurgents are not just from Libya, but rather are fighters from all over the Middle East and North Africa. It is a factor that denotes the religious instrumentalization of social and economic factors for the purpose of gaining political control to assume more power. The rebels are not ordinary civilians, but a para-military group that has become a full-fledged armed force. They are jihā dists, mujā hidī n[17] and suicide bombers. The political and social nature of the anti-Gaddafi uprising makes it possible to understand the high influence of religious, ethnic, and tribal factors in a crisis prevention context. This very area ranks second in the world for the presence of jihā dist fighters and suicide bombers. From a study conducted by two analysts at the West Point

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[15]Romano S., The Atlas *of World Crises,* Rizzoli, 2018, Milan, Italy, pp. 109-110.
[16]Senussians are those belonging to the ṭ arī qa (Islamic brotherhood) of the Sanū siyya founded by Muhammad ibn ʿ Alī al-Sanū sī in Mecca in 1837.
[17]The mujā hidī n are the fighters engaged in jihā d.

military academy[18] , 20 percent of fighters originate from Libya, followed by Syria, Yemen and Algeria with percentages around 8 percent and finally Morocco and Jordan with respective percentages of 6.1 percent and 1.9 percent[19] . Such a high presence of fighters is determined by the presence of religious schools of Senussiya Islamism[20] . The Senussiya is a militant mystical missionary brotherhood of Sunni Islam of the Malikite school[21] . Its goal was to attract local tribes to the cause by quickly establishing a vast territorial state in which all public and private life was conducted in accordance with the precepts of Islam. The Senussiya doctrine was established in a context where the tribes were nomads and semi-nomads of Arab descent who promised solidarity and support. Analyzing the area from the perspective of an ethno-religious context uncovers a more recently formed religious and tribal conflict dating back to the 1960s that pitted the tribes in the area against the government in Tripoli. The area is still characterized by the religious fervor of its inhabitants. The Benghazi rebel council, established during the conflict, inevitably consists of small local fiefdoms under the command of tribal leaders or the rebels. The ethnic base of the area appears to be the 'Abaidat tribe. The most realistic scenario to explain the area's armed conflicts from an ethnic-religious point of view, leaving aside the economic and social aspects, seems to be a coup d'état that draws its origins from the armed conflict of the 1960s to reestablish Islamic law based on ethnic-religious traditions.

Globalization, environmental problems, and social instability due to poverty factors and marked inequality have increased security threats, giving way to the recent trend represented by the strong influence of insurgent groups with different affiliations and ideologies, such as Al-Qā ʿ ida, Al Shabaab, and Boko Haram.

Security threats extend from illicit trafficking to terrorism and civil conflicts. The main illicit trades in the region are drug trafficking and human trafficking. In the former case, the Sahel is an important artery of the cocaine route from Latin America to Europe[22] , while in the latter case it is difficult to determine the number of trafficked people among those migrating

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[18]Felter J. And Fishman B., *Al Qa'ida's Foreign Fighter in Iraq: A First Look at the Sinjar Records*, in Harmony Project, Combating Terrorism Center, Department of Social Sciences, US Military Academy, West Point, NY.
[19]Felter J. And Fishman B., *Al Qa'ida's Foreign Fighter in Iraq: A First Look at the Sinjar Records*, in Harmony Project, Combating Terrorism Center, Department of Social Sciences, pp. 8-9.
[20]Sensini P. (2017), *Libya. From Italian colony to global colony,* Jaca Book, International News, Milan, pp. 96-97.
[21]The Malikite school is the school that identifies with the religious teachings of religious theologian Mā lik ibn Anas ibn Malik ibn ʿ Ā mr al-Asbahi.
[22]UNODC - United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, *World Drug Report 2018,* available at the official website https://dataunodc.un.org

along the central Mediterranean route, however from the latest studies, one in four migrants is a woman or a child[23] .

One of the characteristics of crises over the past decade is the emergence of new forms of mobilization that have seen alliances or the merger of local separatist forces and jihadist movements that assert allegiance to a global struggle. In retrospect, such alarming alliances seem rather opportunistic, but it should be noted that at a deeper social level they interact with the micro-dynamics of armed mobilization. Social groups at the local level may turn to militia organizations for the use of force[24] . To do so, they may use the language and ideological discourses typical of jihadism and African separatism or nationalism to pursue goals that are localized and socially embedded. This contributes to very volatile patterns of alliances that tend to pursue inconsistent national strategies. The local micro-dimension of the conflict as, for example, in the Democratic Republic of Congo is extremely complex and unpredictable[25] . Jihadist organizations since the Malian crisis in 2012 have demonstrated their ability to exploit tribal tensions in the country to seize territory and destabilize the area.

Migration is an equally important factor in the stability of the area. Often the focus is on African migration to Europe, the Middle East and North America, but most African migration occurs on the continent itself. People cross Africa in search of economic opportunity, fleeing conflict or leaving areas affected by climate change. Contemporary African international migration flows therefore remain largely intra-regional in nature. The main destination countries are South Africa, Côte d'Ivoire, Nigeria, Kenya and Ethiopia[26] . Overall, people living in high- or middle-income countries tend to migrate outside the continent, while people living in poorer countries tend to migrate within the same region.

This also includes environmental factors, which until a few decades ago would have marginally characterized the emergence of a crisis due to both the few relationships between socioeconomic and climatic factors and the long phases of climate change. Industrial development has strongly influenced climate change, which is an environmental stressor with

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[23]OCHA - United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, *Reports 2018* available on official website https://www.unocha.org/media-centre/humanitarian-reports

[24]Guichaoua, Yvan, *Circumstantial Alliances and Loose Loyalties in Rebellion Making: The Case of Tuareg Insurgency in Northern Niger (2007-2009)*, A Micro Level Analysis of Violent Conflict Research Working Paper 20, December 2009

[25]See for more information the Democratic Republic of Congo fact sheet available on the official CIA *Central Intelligence Agency* website, *The World Factbook,* (2018) https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/resources/the-world-factbook/

[26]IOM - International Organization for Migration, The UN Migration Agency, *World Migration Report 2018,* available on the official website https://publications.iom.int and see for more information the databases and country-by-country fact sheets available on the official website of the CIA *Central Intelligence Agency*, *The World Factbook,* (2018) https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/resources/the-world-factbook/

very severe consequences. For example, the rise in temperature, up to +1.5 degrees Celsius, over the past three decades has sixfold increased drought episodes in the Maghreb, Africa and the Middle East[27] . Water resources are steadily declining, and water scarcity is already critical in many areas. Climate change affects the health of populations affected by changes in the geographic distribution of disease vectors, water and air quality. With these changes, the expansion of infectious diseases is rampant, and in the case of poor water and air quality, agricultural production is also affected with strong repercussions, not only on health, but also on economic factors and the country's financial capacity. Climate change becomes a threat to national and international security.

2. Conclusions

Poverty, economic recession, and non-diversified economic structure are factors that have characterized crises around the world. Demographic factors i.e., the increase in population, particularly that of youth has accentuated poverty and the need for economic gain for livelihood and development. Accelerated climate change has accentuated the effects of the economic crisis by slowing down the primary economic activity, agriculture, and has demonstrated the need for control of resources, water and mining. The social factors are very complex, as one cannot identify accurate data without associating them with economic or demographic spheres. Certainly, the lack of infrastructural development and thus the paucity of interventions in the social sphere can be traced to a trigger for the crisis, but it must be contextualized on a case-by-case basis. Migration certainly had a major influence in exacerbating demographic and economic factors. Belonging to tribal-religious groups, on the other hand, cannot be called a generalized trigger, as only in some cases, where there were previous religious conflicts, has such occurred. In other contexts, it has been a tragically instrumentalized factor for the achievement of political-economic ends.

The cases given as examples during the general discussion of factors useful in preventing crises, although referring to contexts in Africa and the Middle East, are perfectly replicable in Latin America, Europe and Asia. Having come this far in the reading one will ask, why this examination of factors for crisis management and prevention? According to the Strategic Concept, these are the factors necessary for NATO to understand that deterrence and defense, as understood so far, is too restrictive because being needs to be expanded to include

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[27]For more information see the UNEP *United Nations Environment Programme* reports available at the official website https://www.unenvironment.org/.

cultural approaches and international cooperation. All the factors previously outlined, when analyzed, allow for a multicultural approach and international cooperation at different levels that is very important. China has accomplished this economically in recent years, extending its influence in Africa and Latin America, sometimes with poor results and sometimes with excellent results.

Cultural diplomacy and international cooperation are to be understood as methods of soft power, which are useful in generating economic development between countries, a mutual understanding that leads to a de-escalation of relations the stronger the cultural bond and understanding of each other's aspects. In particular, international cooperation, on the basis of cultural diplomacy activities, fosters a cooperative development of different leaderships that enables the Alliance to understand both socio-economic, political and cultural factors, and to act in the area of crisis prevention by strengthening defensive and deterrence capacity. Such actions are useful in both preventive and post-conflict reconstruction as part of *peace-building* efforts. Cultural diplomacy and international cooperation activities are to be carried out mainly among academic, industrial and private entities such as international nongovernmental organizations, assisted by an integrated system that invokes the action of a country system.

Cultural diplomacy and international cooperation offer significant opportunities in conflict prevention and the development of regional security and stability through building trust, friendship and mutual understanding with relationship-building measures for societies. Along with the economic development of countries, the development of mutual acquaintance involves both the improvement of information exchange and the development of increasing stability. Resources are scarce and capacity-building efforts achieve the best success in a sustained effort. Therefore, there is a need to examine and keep a constant eye on socio-cultural developments and to systematize the enormous amount of information by acting on the possibility of making oneself known without prejudice, in the interest of NATO in order to identify at an early stage where to prioritize stabilizing interventions, which, to a much lesser extent than in the present context will be military in nature. This horizon scanning should necessarily be shared with the EU and any other organization or partner with the potential capacity and interest to pursue this effort, maximizing the likelihood of success.

Defence Capacity Building, SFA and the 2022 NATO Strategic Concept

George N. TZOGOPOULOS

Abstract

The management of crises in the post-Cold War era is multifaceted. Acknowledging the complexity of the matter in the 21st century, NATO started to elaborate on the necessity to formulate and apply a holistic policy. The 2006 Riga Summit Declaration mentioned first that 'experience in Afghanistan and Kosovo demonstrates that today's challenges require a Comprehensive Approach by the international community involving a wide spectrum of civil and military instruments, while fully respecting mandates and autonomy of decisions of all actors, and provides precedents for this approach.'[28] At the Bucharest Summit in April 2008, Allied leaders endorsed an action plan for the development and implementation of NATO's contribution to a Comprehensive Approach, and two years later, in Lisbon, they decided to enhance NATO's role toward this direction and improve its ability to deliver stabilization and reconstruction effects.[29]

The 2010 Strategic Concept referred thus to the need to develop the capability to train and develop local forces in crisis zones, so that local authorities would be able, as quickly as possible, to maintain security without international assistance.[30] Within this context, the concepts of Defense Capacity Building and Security Assistance Force (SFA) have become highly relevant, and multinational entities and schools such as the SFA Centre of Excellence in Rome have emerged (since 2019) as pillars for the implementation of the Alliance's comprehensive policy in this field. Obviously, new geopolitical conditions incited by Russia's war against Ukraine have led NATO to prioritize deterrence and defence. This does not mean that other policies are ignored. Hence, the 2022 Strategic Concept spelled out existing threats and challenges but did not ignore the theme of crisis prevention and management.

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[28]Riga Summit Declaration, available at: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_37920.htm?mode=pressrelease, 29 November 2006.

[29]Lisbon Summit Declaration, available at: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_68828.htm, 20 November 2010.

[30]Strategic Concept 2010, available at: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_68580.htm , 19 November 2010

Keywords

Defense Capacity Building, SFA and the 2022 NATO Strategic Concept

- Comprehensive Approach
- Defense Capacity Building
- Security Sector Reform
- Military Assistance
- Stability Policing
- Prevent Destabilization
- Counter Aggression
- Misinformation
- Disinformation

1. Defence Capacity Building

Defense Capacity Building is not a new concept in International Relations. Generally speaking, it is a multidimensional process of allocating resources in assistance of other nations to build their defense capacity, local forces and infrastructure. The process is not considered a foreign policy mission but a critical component of national defense to shape an enduring partner capability on the grounds of unique programs.[31] In 2004, for instance, NATO Allies and partners adopted the Partnership Action Plan on Defense Institution Building.[32] More importantly, at the Wales Summit in September 2014, the Alliance launched the Defense and Related Security Capacity Building (DCB) Initiative to institutionalize its ability to stabilize nations in crisis without deploying large forces. Its DCB efforts prioritize institutional-level functional area development with partner nation defense ministries and general/joint staffs, to include resource management, logistics, and strategic planning.[33] The support is tailored made and has been provided to countries such as Georgia, Iraq, Jordan, Moldova and Tunisia. In 2015, the DCB Trust Fund was established to offer financial support and resources to implement the DCB Initiative. Allies and partners contribute on a voluntary basis, and since its establishment the Fund has facilitated several projects.

NATO closely collaborates with international organizations in effort to contribute to DCB. In 2020, for instance, it launched an initiative to strengthen the UN Regional Service Centre in Entebbe, Uganda by providing peacekeeper training in key areas, like countering improvised explosive devices, medical care, communications and performance evaluation. In particular, the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) has collaborated with NATO to employ experienced Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) operators to reinforce its teams.[34] Two years later, in 2022, NATO created a Communications and Information (NCI) Academy in Entebbe to assist UN peacekeeping personnel.[35]

The Alliance also works closely with the EU. From a European perspective, funding can be given to NATO's Building Integrity Trust Fund which complements DCB for those

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[31] James Q. Roberts, 'Building the Capabilities and Capacity of Partners: Is This Defense Business?' *Prism*, vol. 4, no 2, 2013, pp. 66-75.

[32] Partnership Action Plan on Defense Institution Building (PAP-DIB), available at: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_21014.htm?selectedLocale=en, 7 June 2004.

[33] Wales Summit Declaration, available at: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_112964.htm, 5 September 2014.

[34] UN website, 'UNMAS Trains Explosive Ordnance Disposal Trainers at RSCE,' available at: https://rsce.unmissions.org/unmas-trains-explosive-ordnance-disposal-trainers-rsce, 2 November 2022.

[35] NATO Communications and Information Agency website, 'NCI Academy Kicks off UN Defense Capacity Building Project,' available at: https://www.ncia.nato.int/about-us/newsroom/nci-academy-kicks-off-un-defence-capacity-building-project.html, 8 November 2022.

partner countries that are eligible for both Alliance's activities. Co-operation certainly goes beyond DCB itself. The 2016 Joint Declaration, signed by President of the European Council Donald Tusk and of the European Commission Jean Claude Juncker, as well as by Secretary General of NATO Jens Stoltenberg, stipulated for the two sides to build the defense and security capacity and foster the resilience of their partners in the East and South in a complementary way.[36] Synergies, for instance, have been witnessed in Afghanistan, Iraq and Kosovo. In Afghanistan, the NATO-led Resolute Support Mission worked together with the EU's Rule of Law Mission (EUPOL). In Iraq, NATO's training and capacity-building has been undertaken in close cooperation with the EU's stabilization support in the country. And in Kosovo the NATO peacekeeping force (KFOR) has joined forces in the field with the EU's Rule of Law Mission in the country (EULEX). The January 2023 NATO-EU Joint Declaration reiterated the need of the capacity-building of partners.[37]

2. Security Force Assistance (SFA)

As it also the case with Defense Capacity Building, Security Force Assistance (SFA) is not a new concept in International Relations. On the whole, SFA constitutes an aspect of remote warfare and aims at developing the security forces of partners, sharing best practice, assisting in security sector reform, and overall contributing to conflict resolution.[38] The American 2006 *Quadrennial Defense Review* spelled out that the US must train partner forces rather than just provide security for them.[39] The US subsequently created the Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance. The use of SFA is perceived as a cost-efficient foreign policy tool because the training and equipping of security forces in third countries can possibly fulfil security objectivities set by the provider in the medium and long-term.

From the prism of NATO, SFA is integral to the success of its broader strategy to reinforce the capacity of non-NATO nations and is included in general strategies such the DCB Initiative. Specifically, the 2016 Allied Joint Publication (AJP) 3.16, titled *Allied Joint Doctrine for SFA* gives direction and guidance on this subject – as part of the Alliance's contribution to a Comprehensive Approach. This Doctrine explicitly names proposed activities

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[36] Joint Declaration, available at: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_133163.htm, 8 July 2016.

[37] Joint Declaration, available at: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2023/01/10/eu-nato-joint-declaration-10-january-2023/, 10 January 2023.

[38] Malte Riemann and Norma Rossi, 'Remote Warfare as Security of Being: Reading Security Force Assistance as An Ontological Security Routine,' *Defense Studies*, 2021, vol. 21, no 4, pp. 489-507

[39] Derek C. Jenkins, 'Distinguishing Between Security Force Assistance & Foreign Internal Defense: Determining A Doctrine Road-Ahead,' *Small Wars Journal*, available at: https://www.nsfacoe.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/2.-The-U.S.-Military-Should-Turn-to-Remote-Enabled-Advising-DOWNLOAD-1.pdf, 2008.

such as security sector reform, stabilization and reconstruction, military assistance, counter-insurgency, stability policing, and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration.[40] NATO SFA activities require approval by the North Atlantic Council and need to promote the rule of law including human rights protection and the non-recruitment of children in armed conflict. Further to this, the gender perspective is constantly taken into account. Also, they go together with strategic communication considerations in the hope to promote transparency, overcome cultural discrepancies, forge confidence within the local population and be widely accepted. The ambition is for host nations to undertake the ownership of the process. Strategic patience is therefore required.

The concept of SFA has seen a strong evolution in recent years. Although its focus is principally military, its efficiency can be empowered within a comprehensive framework. Against this backdrop, the Centre of Excellence in Rome has practically functioned as a hub of expertise since 2019 – after an initial proposal was made by the Italian Ministry of Defense in 2016. Having Italy, Slovenia and Albania as sponsoring nations, the Centre evaluates different SFA interpretations, concentrates on lessons learned in operational theatres, elaborates on the standardization of capacities and provides training for military and civilian personnel. It simultaneously promotes interoperability and information sharing among Allies and NATO partners.[41] The Rome Centre of Excellence also internationalizes its role by establishing education partnerships with other schools, civilian and military organizations, and by facilitating the organization of seminars about SFA in other places.[42] In view of Italian Chief of Defense, General Enzo Vecciarelli, the Center is part of a larger effort to sustain all three NATO core tasks, namely collective defense, crisis management and cooperative security, and will support the Alliance in designing strategies and projecting stability.[43]

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[40]NATO Standard AJP-3.16 Allied Joint Doctrine for Security Force Assistance (SFA), available at: https://www.esercito.difesa.it/en/organization/The-Chief-of-General-Staff-of-the-Army/Training-Specialization-and-Doctrine-Command/Infantry-School/Documents/Doctrine-SFA/AJP-3-16-A-Allied-Joint-Doctrine-for-Security-Force-Assistance-SFA-Ed-maggio2016.pdf, May 2016.

[41]Concept of the NATO Security Force Assistance Centre of Excellence, available at: https://www.esercito.difesa.it/en/organization/The-Chief-of-General-Staff-of-the-Army/Training-Specialization-and-Doctrine-Command/Infantry-School/Documents/Doctrine-SFA/Concept-of-the-NATO-SFA-COE-as-of-2-May-2017.pdf, 2 May 2017.

[42]Allied Joint Force Command Brunsumm website, 'Second Security Force Assistance Seminar Conducted at JFC Brunsumm,' available at: https://jfcbs.nato.int/page5964943/2019/second-security-force-assistance-seminar-conducted-at-jfc-brunssum, 12 December 2019.

[43]Italian Ministry of Defense website, 'NATO SFA COE Opening Ceremony Celebration,' available at: https://www.difesa.it/EN/SMD/News/Pagine/NATO_SFA_COE_opening_ceremony_celebration.aspx, 26 March 2019.

3. The New NATO Strategic Concept

The withdrawal of American troops from Afghanistan in August 2021 generated a lively debate about limits of success for capacity building activities – either in the field of defense or beyond. Within this context, lessons learned can possibly lead to the designation of more efficient policies.[44] A few months later, in February 2022, the beginning of Russia's war against Ukraine naturally shifted the discussion to measures needed to be taken in defense of Ukraine and in support of Allies. New realities were echoed on the 2022 Strategic Concept published on the occasion of the June Madrid Summit. Tasks and approaches for the next decade have been spelled out, while deterrence and defence have been prioritized. The new military posture, principally exhibited in the Eastern Flank, will also find NATO determined to engage in 'high-intensity, multi-domain warfighting against nuclear-armed peer-competitors.'[45]

A careful analysis of the 2022 Strategic Concept demonstrates the clear interests of the Alliance in response to Russia's war against Ukraine, and other developments such as China's rise in the international system. Still, 'Crisis Prevention and Management' was encompassed in the document and an interest to draw lessons from Afghanistan was expressed. NATO member states have therefore remained committed to 'ensure the resources, capabilities, training and command and control arrangements to deploy and sustain military and civilian crisis management, stabilization and counter-terrorism operations.' In so doing, they will continue to ensure military interoperability with partners and will increase endeavors to anticipate and prevent crises and conflicts. As paragraph 38 mentions, Allies "will enhance support for partners including to help build their capacity to counter terrorism and address shared security challenges." The end will be "to strengthen their preparedness and resilience and boost their capabilities to counter malign interference, prevent destabilization and counter aggression."[46]

4. Conclusion

The world is changing and NATO is adjusting its policies. A subsequent and necessary mission of the Alliance is to strike a balance between the emphasis it places on responding to Russia's war against Ukraine and the realization and improvement of pre-decided policies such as DCB and SFA in the framework of crisis prevention and management. While the former has emerged

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[44]Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) website, *What We Need to Learn: Lessons from Twenty Years Afghanistan Reconstruction*, available at: https://www.sigar.mil/pdf/lessonslearned/SIGAR-21-46-LL.pdf, August 2021.
[45]NATO 2022 Strategic Concept, available at:
https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2022/6/pdf/290622-strategic-concept.pdf, 29 June 2022.
[46]Ibid.

as an urgent priority, the latter has not lost its relevance. By contrast, it might be added to the toolbox in the hands of Allied leaders and decision-makers and assist with the fulfilment of NATO's core tasks. In the final account, education and training lay the foundations to project stability. Every entity or school operating in this spirit, such as SFA Rome Centre of Excellence, provides valuable expertise, which is a sine-qua non parameter in the era of cyber-chaos, misinformation and disinformation

Responsive Access to Space as part of the NATO Strategic Concept

By Axel RINGESIEN, Thomas HASLINGER, Francesco ALIMENA

Abstract

The new NATO Strategic Concept

Adopted at the Madrid Summit in June 2022, the new NATO Strategic Concept outlined a new direction for the Atlantic Alliance to pursue in the medium term. The outbreak of war in Ukraine provided a powerful catalyst for allies to reconsider NATO's own strategic role and identity, its core missions and its approach towards Russia and the People's Republic of China.

NATO's new strategic approach, focused on defence and deterrence, has caused a marked change in the Alliance's security architecture, especially on the eastern flank of Europe. The enlargement of the Alliance with the accession of Finland as the 31st member and the possible entry of new actors into the Atlantic club allow us to understand that we are in a historical period characterised by strong geopolitical changes. As stated in the Strategic Concept "*authoritarian actors challenge our interests, values and democratic way of life. They are investing in sophisticated conventional, nuclear and missile capabilities, with little transparency or regard for international norms and commitments. Strategic competitors test our resilience and seek to exploit the openness, interconnectedness and digitalisation of our nations. They interfere in our democratic processes and institutions and target the security of our citizens through hybrid tactics, both directly and through proxies. They conduct malicious activities in cyberspace and space, promote disinformation campaigns, instrumentalise migration, manipulate energy supplies and employ economic coercion. These actors are also at the forefront of a deliberate effort to undermine multilateral norms and institutions and promote authoritarian models of governance ...The deepening strategic partnership between the People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation and their mutually reinforcing attempts to undercut the rules-based international order run counter to our values and interests*".

To that end, NATO's big test, with the publication of the New Strategic Concept, will be the defence of its borders, which will have to take place through a mobile, collective, interoperable with the United States and strategically autonomous unit. Other objectives include strengthening the strategic military structure in Europe capable of acting as a powerful *'first responder'* in the event of emergencies requiring military intervention on European soil through air, sea, land, space and cyber assets.

As stated in the Strategic Concept, 'strategic competitors and potential adversaries are investing in technologies that could limit our access and freedom to operate in space, degrade our space capabilities, affect our civil and military infrastructure, compromise our defence and harm our security".

To this end, in an environment of strategic competition, NATO will strengthen its awareness and global reach to deter, defend, challenge and deny in all domains and in all directions, in line with the Alliance's 360-degree approach.

In conclusion, quoting Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg's words about the Strategic Concept, 'our vision is clear: we want to live in a world where sovereignty, territorial integrity, human rights and international law are respected and where each country can choose its own path, free from aggression, coercion or subversion. We work with all those who share these goals. We stand together as allies to defend our freedom and contribute to a more peaceful world'.

Keywords

1. Germany´s new National Security Strategy

Not only the Strategic Concept, but also Germany's new National Security Strategy, emphasise the importance of space for security. Published by the German government on 14 June 2023, the present plan is unprecedented in the history of the country since the Second World War.

The federal government has chosen the 'integrated security' approach for the strategy document, which consists of taking into account all external threats to the country's security and providing appropriate responses to them. In that way, Berlin intends to respond to the challenges of an increasingly unstable world order.

The aim of the security strategy is to ensure that all assets and instruments are interlinked and work together to strengthen Germany's security against external threats. To that end, all relevant political sectors and actors are to be included. These range from national and alliance defence to the protection of technical infrastructure, from cyber and space security to the security of raw materials, energy and food. The 70-page document also discusses civil defence and disaster control, development policy, protection from foreign influence and espionage, climate crisis and pandemic management. Federal, state and local governments, business, science, civil society and citizens are to be involved. Germany is aware of the growing military, economic and social risks it faces. This is the message of the Federal Government at the presentation of its integrated security strategy.

According to Chancellor Olaf Scholz, the new National Security Strategy is the compass for finding solutions to the problems. The goal of the plan is clear: *"to maintain the security of our citizens and make our contribution to the security of Europe"*. The concept was first presented by the governing coalition two years ago, but gained new momentum after the invasion of Ukraine by the Russian Federation.

Chancellor Scholz added: *"Despite all the changes, the central task of the state remains to guarantee the security of its citizens without compromise, because without security there is no freedom, stability and prosperity"*.

A secure and capable Europe and a strong NATO also mean that the capabilities of the allies must be interoperable and able to work together. The document states that *"the supreme task of German security policy is to ensure that we can continue to live in peace, freedom and security at the heart of Europe"*.

To this end, Germany is fully committed to NATO and the EU and has been strengthening the Bundeswehr by investing an average of two per cent of its economic output in defence for years. The free and democratic basic order must be defended against illegitimate influences and dependence on raw materials and energy must be reduced by diversifying supply relations. Regarding the specific role of the Bundeswehr within the framework of the new security strategy, the document clarifies: *"The Bundeswehr's main mission is national and alliance defence; all tasks are subordinate to this mission. The Federal Government will maintain the necessary military capabilities for this purpose and will quickly close capability gaps'. In addition, the Bundeswehr will also in future have to take on missions abroad in the field of 'international crisis management"*.

Overall, the Federal Government intends to make the Bundeswehr *"one of the most capable conventional armed forces in Europe'* in the coming years, which is *'able to react and act quickly and permanently"*.

To finance this ambition, the Federal Government intends to invest heavily in defence capability. To this end, the NATO target of 2 per cent is to be achieved on a multi-year average, initially with the help of the Bundeswehr's special means. During the conference for the presentation of Germany's new National Security Strategy, Finance Minister Christian Linder announced that the NATO target will be reached already in the next financial year with the help of the defence budget and special means. In addition to the financial resources required to make the Bundeswehr operationally ready, however, the federal government's claim to a growing military presence in the alliance area will also require additional resources. On the one hand, to contribute to the protection of the allies, on the other hand, to present itself as a partner to the allies.

The document cites the expansion of cyber and space capabilities as concrete projects in which to increase the Bundeswehr's performance, *"so that it can make a significant contribution to deterrence and defence in NATO"*.

2. NATO 's approach to space

Space is essential to the Alliance's deterrence and defence. Space underpins NATO's ability to navigate and track forces, to have robust communications, to detect missile launches and to ensure effective command and control. More than half of active satellites orbiting the Earth belong to NATO members or companies based on their territory.

NATO Allies increasingly rely on space for various national security tasks, as well as military operations around the globe. Space data, products and services are a critical enabler and directly support other operational domains. The evolution in the uses of space and rapid advances in space technology have created new opportunities, but also new risks, vulnerabilities and potential threats. While space can be used for peaceful purposes, it can also be used for aggression. In addition, satellites can be hacked, jammed or weaponised, and anti-satellite weapons could cripple communications and affect the Alliance's ability to operate. Some countries, including Russia and China, have developed and tested a wide range of counter-space technologies that could restrict Allies' access to, and freedom to operate in space. Various risks to space systems are increasing and can harm Allies' security and commercial interests.

NATO's 2022 Strategic Concept reiterates the concerns that Allies have previously expressed about increasing threats in space, highlighting that "strategic competitors and potential adversaries are investing in technologies that could restrict our access and freedom to operate in space, degrade our space capabilities, target our civilian and military infrastructure, impair our defence and harm our security."

NATO is an important forum for Allies to share information, increase interoperability and coordinate actions. The Alliance is not aiming to develop space capabilities of its own and will continue to rely on national space assets. NATO's approach to space will remain fully in line with international law. NATO has no intention to put weapons in space.

3. Germany´s approach to military space

The German Air Force has been using the Center for Air Operations to monitor its space assets, coordinate systems, and recommend evasion routes for commercial satellite operators since 2009. After the NATO alliance's 2019 declaration of outer space as a new operational domain, the Luftwaffe established the Air and Space Operation Center in 2020.[1]

On July 13th 2021 the new German Space Command was launched at the German Center for Air and Space Operations in Uedem, North Rhine-Westphalia region, near the Dutch border. [2]

Together with national and international partners, the Bundeswehr ensures that Germany has unrestricted access to space. The German Space Command is responsible for coordinating the military use of space. Ensuring the security of outer space is a task for the whole of government. Furthermore, it coordinates the use of space by planning and conducting space operations in coordination with the other branches and organizational areas of the Bundeswehr - Army, Navy, and Cyber and Information Space - in order to protect space-based capabilities of the Bundeswehr and to limit adversary use of space. [3]

The German Space Command is supported by the RSC³, the Responsive Space Cluster Competence Center a division of the German Aerospace Center (DLR). The RSC³ works as technology incubator, consultant and project management office for related projects, initiated by the European Defense Fund (EDF). Several industry associations offer platforms for discussions between governmental organizations and companies of different branches. A highlight is the New Space Initiative of the German Industry Association (BDI). Here, representatives of all industry branches develop strategies and roadmaps to foster sustainable business in the strategic and fast growing new space ecosystem. For this purpose, an undenied access to space and the protection of vital space assets is an unconditional prerequisite.

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[1] https://www.overtdefense.com/2021/07/15/germany-creates-space-command-center/#:~:text=The%20German%20Air%20Force%20has%20been%20using%20the,the%20Air%20and%20Space%20Operation%20Center%20in%202020.
[2] https://www.bundeswehr.de/de/organisation/luftwaffe/organisation-/weltraumkommando-der-bundeswehr
[3] https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2023-06/REACTS-Factsheet_EDF22.pdf

4. Responsive Access to Space

From a security and defence perspective, space is critical for NATO, including the following capabilities:

- **positioning, navigation and timing**, which enables precision strikes, tracking of forces or search and rescue missions;

- **early warning**, which helps to ensure force protection and provides vital information on missile launches;

- **environmental monitoring**, which enables meteorological forecasting and mission planning;

- **secure satellite communications**, which are essential for missions to enable consultation, command and control;

- **intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance**, which are crucial for situational awareness, planning and decision-making.

In case of a military conflict or war it might be necessary to replace or expand these capabilities by deploying relevant space systems rapidly (within hours or days) into the low earth orbit (LEO).

The continuing miniaturisation of space systems, plus an increasing number of commercial launch providers for high-performance small satellites, offers a wide range of possibilities for implementing Responsive Space cost-effectively with partners from the private sector. From a military point of view, however, cooperation between MoDs and commercial launch providers would result in a number of operational disadvantages that can only be compensated for by introducing and using military launch systems.

When cooperating with commercial launch providers, especially in light of the short response time mentioned above, there is always a potential conflict between the economic interests of the launch provider and the military mission.

Construction work for new space ports operated by commercial providers is going on all over the world. On their own soil, governments normally have access (if necessary under duress) to the relevant infrastructure in the event of tension or conflict. At the same time, however, a spaceport would be a preferred and difficult-to-defend target – especially if one takes into account a large scale conventional or nuclear attack.

For the launch of satellites into polar or sun synchronous orbits, a spaceport close to one of the poles is the most preferred launch site. But for certain applications (positioning, navigation and timing) satellite constellations must be placed in orbits forming a grid. This means that launches must be carried out in short succession from different and globally distributed launch sites. For such a scenario, the according MoD would have to conclude complex civil-military utilization contracts with commercial providers of foreign launch capacities and set up global logistics. Consequently, the military would have to keep space systems in stock and ready for operation at several locations worldwide, or have the possibility to transport them quickly if required. Furthermore, unrestricted access to commercial extraterritorial launch capacities cannot be guaranteed under all circumstances.

5. Responsive Space Air Launch

Air Launch means the launching of a carrier rocket for small satellites from a flying platform. From an operational point of view, the realisation of Responsive Space Air Launch with military launch systems (aircraft + launcher) would offer several significant advantages over the use of commercial launch facilities.

Fig. 1:
Eject of a launcher over the tail ramp of a military transport aircraft.

Stabilization parachutes are used to avoid a collision between the launcher and the aircraft during the eject phase.

Fig. 2: After eject, the stabilization parachutes are released from the launch vehicle. Then there is a short glide phase.

As soon as there is a sufficiently large safety distance between the aircraft and the launcher, the first stage of the launcher is ignited.

Short wings serve to increase aerodynamic lift during the first phase of flight within the atmosphere.

The advantages of Responsive Space Air Launch are:

- Global deployment can be realised by air refuelable platforms (e.g. A400M).

- A large number of globally distributed military airfields of allied or friendly states can be used as a base of operations.

- This makes it possible to launch satellites into all orbits of the Low-Earth orbit.

- At the same time, global deployment minimises the risk of enemy reconnaissance and impact.

- Access to the systems is guaranteed at all times.

- There are no potential conflicts between economic interests and military mission.

- There is no use of private extraterritorial territory necessary.

In 2021, Bayern-Chemie (100% subsidiary of MBDA) initiated a first concept study which showed that a launch rocket can be launched from a military transport aircraft in flight and bring a significant payload into low earth orbits.

In 2022, the European Defence Fund (EDF) initiated the tender "Responsive Space Systems" to assess capability gaps and develop potential solutions.

Bayern-Chemie contributed its´ Responsive Space Air Launch concept study to the proposal of the Responsive European Architecture for Space (REACTS) consortia.

REACTS aims to provide European Member States with a new disruptive and collaborative defence capability: a resilient and scalable Network of Responsive Space Systems (RSS), fully interoperable, able to launch satellites and commence data delivery within a timeframe of 72 hours. The project will define a holistic architecture based on the End-user needs, develop a concept of operations (CONOPS), create the roadmap for each technical and governing segment of RSS network of Systems, provide an analysis and description for RSS

interface standards, design a software-based configuration and simulate the achievable responsiveness.

In June 2023, the EDF announced that REACTS will be contracted.

6. Conclusion and Recommendations

Besides the space activities sponsored by the EDF, via contributions of the according European states, the CapTech Space was started by the European Defence Agency (EDA) in January 2023. It is composed of more than 350 experts coming from participating Member States (pMS), industry, SMEs, RTOs and academia. CapTech Space will continue the work of the Ad-Hoc Working Group Space, initiated in 2021, to address challenges in space defence.

In parallel NATO started the following initiatives

- The Defence Innovation Accelerator North Atlantic (DIANA)

- The NATO Innovation Network

- The NATO Innovation HUB

- The NATO Innovation Fund

Meanwhile many NATO members have implemented national space commands defining necessary capabilities and address gaps to be filled.

But not all NATO member states are part of the EU and vice versa.

But NATO is the only organization that can guarantee Europe's security and sovereignty.

Regarding space there should be an initiative by NATO with the following scope:

- Inventory on the priorities and capabilities of each member state.

- Definition of space capabilities needed by the alliance.

- Alignment of the development and procurement of technology, systems and services.

"Forgotten Wars"? How much and how the European media report 8 conflicts in the world

By Francesco BRUNO and Andrea FRANCHINI

Abstract

Through the present contribution, we wanted to analyze and deepen through data, information and graphs, the so-called "forgotten wars," conflicts to which the media do not focus more attention by turning their gaze to only a partial overview of the overall scenario. In the present context, we also wanted to focus on some of the content published in the sources analyzed in 2022, deemed relevant as it focused on building security and defense capabilities in accordance with the new challenges posed by the beginning of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. In this context, attention was paid to the articles that contained within them the following three concepts:

- "*Assistance to security forces*";

- "*Construction of defense capabilities*";

- "*Development of security capabilities*".

Our IT company, in order to perform this analysis, relied on the New Intelligence technique in which through its sophisticated and innovative proprietary Media Monitoring platforms, it allows us to critically measure the presence and dissemination of a topic in the media.

In the discussion, eight global conflict areas were considered. Starting with Iraq, through Lebanon, Libya, Mali, Niger, Syria, Somalia and Yemen.

For each area above, the number of articles produced, and the attention given by each country's major newspapers was analyzed. Specifically, the newspapers selected in the analysis are the following:

Italy (Corriere della Sera, La Repubblica, La Stampa); Germany (Die Welt, Süddeutsche Zeitung, Frankfurter Allgemeine); the United Kingdom (The Guardian, The Times, The Daily Telegraph); France (Le Monde, Le Figaro, Les Échos); and Spain (El Pais, El Mundo, La Vanguardia).

In the present analysis, ample space is also devoted to the outbreak in 2022 of the conflict in Ukraine, which from a "blitzkrieg" has taken on larger perspectives, coming to represent the clash between East and West.

A clash that brought, in the phase of the amount of information produced in 2022, a huge disproportion between the news published by the various news outlets on the conflict that began in February compared to that on the "forgotten wars." It can be said that the clash between Ukraine and Russia has completely monopolized European information.

"Ein 8. Mai wie kein anderer" is part of the concluding analyses of the paper. The title, which came out on May 9, 2022 in the German newspaper Sueddeutsche Zeitung, echoes a televised speech in which German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, on the 77th anniversary of the end of World War II, presented the new political approach that Germany would adopt from that moment on: joint action with the Allies, determination not to participate in the war, defense capacity building, and sanctions against Russia.

Keywords

1. Introduction and Methodology

The year 2022 will undoubtedly be remembered as the year in which the conflict between **Russia** and **Ukraine** erupted, which, if in the intentions of Russian President Vladimir Putin was to conform as a short-lived 'special military operation', soon turned into a war of much broader perspectives in which local antagonisms now mirror the global confrontation between the East and the West of the world.

The war in Ukraine, bringing bombs, fighting and deaths to the heart of Europe, catalysed the attention of the world's media with tones and stories that, at least in the old continent, **most people were no longer used to**. Conflicts around the world, however, have certainly not diminished or even ceased in 2022.

According to data from *ACLED*, a project that collects data on crisis situations around the world, there were more than **133,000** conflict events last year, including clashes, battles, violence on civilians, explosions, and riots. These events resulted in almost **145 thousand deaths** in 2022.

In a global context, as we have seen, dense with conflictual events, it is natural for the media to focus attention on only a partial picture of the overall scenario. But how does the media choose the objects of its stories? Which events were given most prominence in the pages of European newspapers in 2022? Are there 'forgotten wars'? It is to these questions that **Volocom** wanted to answer with its **News Intelligence analysis**, a technique that, through its sophisticated and innovative proprietary Media Monitoring platforms, allows us to critically measure the presence and diffusion of a topic (but also of a public figure, entity, company and so on) in the media. Specifically, eight conflict areas of the world were considered here:

- Iraq
- Lebanon
- Libya
- Mali
- Niger
- Syria
- Somalia
- Yemen

For each of them, through keyword research within Volocom's news palimpsest (which every day acquires **4 million articles** from over **200,000 sources** worldwide), the number of

articles produced in three of the main daily newspapers in **Italy, Germany, England, France and Spain** were analysed. The analysis of the publication peaks will also help to reconstruct the main events that took place in 2022 in the above-mentioned areas, thus grasping on which of them the main newspapers of each country focused their attention. In particular, the selected newspapers are the following:

Italy: *Corriere della Sera, La Repubblica, La Stampa*
Germany: *Die Welt, Süddeutsche Zeitung, Frankfurter Allgemeine*
United Kingdom: *The Guardian, The Times, The Daily Telegraph*
France: *Le Monde, Le Figaro, Les Échos*
Spain: *El Pais, El Mundo, La Vanguardia*

2. An overview

Let us begin by looking at the total number of articles published in 2022 on the sources considered for each of the conflict zones analysed.

Number of articles (2022)	
Syria	5.543
Iraq	4.593
Libya	2.263
Mali	2.139
Lebanon	1.893
Yemen	1.209
Somalia	691
Niger	607

We immediately note that **Syria** remains the area **most talked** about in the European media. With **5,543** articles produced, it is the area that receives the most attention, closely followed by **Iraq** (**4,593** articles) and, further away, **Libya** (**2,263**), **Mali** (**2,139**) and **Lebanon (1,893**). We can therefore divide the conflict areas into **3 groups**, according to the 'degree of attention' given to them:

1) **High attention**: Syria, Iraq (more than 4,000 articles per year, about 13 articles per day)

2) **Medium attention**: Libya, Mali, Lebanon (between 1,500 and 2,500 articles per year, about 6 articles per day)

3) **Low attention**: Yemen, Somalia, Niger (between 200 and 1,200 articles per year, about 2 articles per day)

This classification takes into account the average number of articles published in 2022 for each area, but there are huge differences within it. Suffice it to say that while an average of about **15 articles per day** are written for **Syria**, just over **one article per day** is published for **Niger**.

Furthermore, we note how the media's attention varies depending on the state to which they belong, often in relation to the latter's geographical, political or strategic interests. It is therefore not surprising that, if we look at the three Italian newspapers, **Iraq** is replaced in second place by **Libya**, while **Mali** loses one position in favour of **Lebanon**. Similarly, articles in the French press deal more often with **Mali, Lebanon and Niger** than the European average.

If we compare the numbers we have just analysed with the amount of information produced in 2022 on **Ukraine**, we realise the disproportion between the news about the conflict that began in February compared to those about the 'forgotten wars'. In 2022, there were as many as **64,963 articles** about Ukraine in the sources taken into account. The entire sum of the articles produced in the same year on the eight other analysed conflicts is **18,938**. As was to be expected, it is therefore clear that the clash between Ukraine and Russia has completely monopolised European information: for every article about a 'forgotten war', almost four articles about Ukraine came out every day. On Ukraine we therefore have four more news items every day than we receive on 8 different and no less dramatic conflicts around the world.

In percentage terms, out of the total number of articles considered in 2022, **77 per cent** relate to Ukraine and the remaining **23 per cent** to the other eight conflict areas.

The trend in the quantity of articles produced in 2022 on Ukraine is clearly characterised by a sharp surge in March (the first month after the outbreak of war). As the months pass, the amount of articles gradually decreases, from almost **12,000** in March to not even **4,000** in August, a sign that the war, from an event that shakes up the world landscape even on the pages of newspapers, becomes a considered but no longer predominant theme in the news context. From August to the end of the year, in fact, articles on Ukraine remain at an average of **4,000**.

As anticipated, let us now look in detail at the quantity and distribution of articles published in 2022 on each of the conflict areas examined.

3. Syria

Syria in 2022 is the area most mentioned in the newspapers of the five European countries considered: no less than **5,543 articles** mention it. From the graph of the month-by-month trend in the amount of news, we notice a trend that we will find in all similar graphs of each area: the month in which the most articles are produced is March 2022. The reason lies in the outbreak of war in Ukraine at the end of February: such a disruptive event inevitably turned the media spotlight on conflict situations in general, leading journalistic writings to consider all unstable areas of the world in their arguments.

But what are the peak months for articles and what are they due to? We see them below:

- March 2022 (1,155 articles): the outbreak of war in Ukraine produces in journalistic analyses numerous mentions of the Syrian situation politically, strategically and in reference to the migrations that the conflict has caused

- April 2022 (693 articles): General Aleksandr Dvornikov, already head of the Russian military intervention in Syria, is put in charge of Russian operations in Ukraine

- February 2022 (490 articles): again, most of the articles focus on 24 February 2022, the date of the Russian troop invasion in Ukraine.

- June 2022 (441 articles): the role of mediator and interlocutor assumed by Erdogan in the conflict between Russia and Ukraine increases the production of articles about him and Turkey, which has always been involved in the Syrian conflict.

From the graphs, we notice that it is predominantly English and German newspapers that mention Syria in 2022. In particular, the newspaper with the most attention to the topic is *The Times*, followed by *Frankfurter Allgemeine* and *Le Monde*.

4. Iraq

In 2022, the second most mentioned area in the main European newspapers was **Iraq,** totaling **4,593 articles**. It is mainly the British press that produces journalistic content on this conflict. If we look at the main newspapers by number of mentions, we once again find *The Times*, followed by *The Guardian* and *The Daily Telegraph*.

Let us now look at the main peaks in 2022 and related events:

- March 2022 (702 articles): again Iraq is predominantly mentioned in articles and analyses referring to the conflict between Russia and Ukraine

- April 2022 (466 articles): again Iraq is predominantly mentioned in articles and analyses referring to the conflict between Russia and Ukraine

- February 2022 (427 articles): the peak of articles is all concentrated between the 25th and the 26th of February, showing that the political analysis following the Russian invasion of Ukraine involves reasoning referring to other conflicts, including Iraq

- July 2022 (388 articles): a BBC investigation brings to light war crimes committed by British special forces in Afghanistan. The occasion brings to light the findings of the International Criminal Court in 2020 about similar crimes committed by British troops in Iraq

As anticipated, English newspapers alone produce **37%** of the 2022 articles on Iraq, followed closely by Spain and Germany (**17%**). The most active newspapers, after the three British ones already mentioned, are the French *Le Monde* and the German *Frankfurter Allgemeine*.

5. Libya

The third largest conflict area in terms of the number of articles produced in 2022 was **Libya**, with **2,263 mentions**. It is the first North African territory in the ranking, thus shaping up as the most heavily covered area on the African continent by the European media considered. The annual trend of articles is characterized by the now customary peak in March 2022, but unlike Syria and Iraq, here we find other months in which the attention on this territory has risen. The trend graph shows less pronounced differences between the peaks in each month. It means that the media treat Libya more consistently. Let us see what the main peaks were in 2022:

- February 2022 (216 articles): the real peak of articles is concentrated after the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The global scenario of conflict between Russia and the West also involves the situation in Libya in newspaper analyses.

- March 2022 (315 articles): it is mainly the Italian press that determines the peak, between the refugee emergency and the search for new gas supplies, while the other newspapers focus on African reactions to the war between Russia and Ukraine

- April 2022 (240 articles): when referring to Libya in connection with the war between Russia and Ukraine, it is particularly recalled when in 2011 the North African state was suspended by the UN Human Rights Council after Gaddafi had violently quelled an anti-government demonstration

- November 2022 (227 articles): once again it is the Italian press that determines the peak. At the beginning of the month, Italy is accused of not having adequately rescued in 2013 a boat that later sank with 400 Syrians on board; in November, there is also a clash between France and Italy over the responsibility for the reception of migrants who constantly leave Libya, and the newspapers of both countries focus on this issue.

As mentioned, it is the Italian press that determines the high number of articles produced in 2022 on Libya (**36%**). The issue of migration, together with that of gas supplies, make this territory a constant point of confrontation with Italian policies and diplomacy. It is therefore not surprising that the top three most active newspapers are *La Repubblica*, *La Stampa* and *Corriere della Sera*. *The Times*, so far always at the top, is fourth in the number of articles produced, followed by the French *Le Monde*.

6. Mali

Fourth largest area in terms of the number of articles in 2022, **Mali** was mentioned in **2,139 articles**, making it the second largest African state in terms of media attention. As can be seen from the graph, the trend differs from the previously analysed territories. Although there is still a high number of articles following the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, the peaks are all concentrated in the first part of the year, with a preponderance in January and February 2022. We will now look at the main topics related to these peaks:

- February 2022 (300 articles): February is the month in which the French President Macron announced the end of the French army's 'Barkhane' anti-terrorist operation in Mali. The event has repercussions for the foreign policy of many European countries, such as Germany.

- January 2022 (270 items): January is characterised by turbulence in Africa. The coup d'état in Burkina Faso generates analysis and comments by the media (especially the French, who have a strong military presence in the territory) on the continent's scenario, including the situation in Mali

- April 2022 (229 articles): the debate on the yet-to-be-fixed date for new presidential elections in Mali is animated. In addition, France releases images allegedly depicting Russian mercenaries burying corpses in Mali, with the intention of blaming French troops.

- July 2022 (206 items): The French army, after leaving Mali, moves into Niger for a 'combat partnership'. On 24 July, jihadists from Katiba Macina attack the Kati military camp with two car bombs.

Surprisingly, it is not France (**28%**) whose media cover Mali the most, but England (**30%**). However, it should be pointed out that many of the English mentions do not concern the country's geopolitical situation, whereas the articles produced in France always focus on the territory from the point of view of the conflicts that take place there, given the country's numerous strategic interests in this area. The most active sources on the subject are *The Times*, *Le Monde* and *Frankfurter Allgemeine*.

7. Lebanon

Fifth in our ranking, there are **1,893 articles** about **Lebanon** in 2022, with a trend over the year characterised by peak months alternating with months with low citation production (especially at the beginning and end of the year). The usual peak of March 2022 is surpassed by three other months: May, August and October. Let us see specifically what they refer to:

- August 2022 (211 articles): on the 2nd of August, news is given of the departure of the first ship with a cargo of grain from Odessa (Ukraine) to Lebanon. This is the first shipment since the unblocking of the agreement for agricultural exports from Ukraine. The same month, several reports are published on the situation in Beirut two years after the explosion of the silos in the port (4 August 2020)

- May 2022 (197 articles): elections were held in Lebanon in May

- October 2022 (188 articles): in October, a historic agreement was signed between Lebanon and Israel (countries formally at war) on maritime borders and, consequently, on gas extraction

- March 2022 (172 articles): the war in Ukraine calls for a stance by Hezbollah, which declares that it did not send fighters to the Russian side. Another issue always in the spotlight is the management of Syrian refugees, present in large numbers in Lebanon.

With regard to Lebanon, as expected due to the historical ties with this country, the main focus comes from French newspapers (**28%**). This is followed by England (**24%**) and Germany (**18%**). Of the top three newspapers by number of mentions, two are French (*Le Monde* and *Le Figaro*). In second place is the English *The Times*.

8. Yemen

We defined **Yemen** as the first area where there is 'little attention' from the media (**1,209 articles**). As can be seen at first glance in the graph, there are relatively few articles about this country throughout 2022, with the exception of March 2022. This is a typical example of how the conflict between Russia and Ukraine has turned the newspaper spotlight on other wars going on in the world. In fact, it is the only month in which publications about Yemen exceed 150, remaining below that for the rest of the year. In addition to March, let us see what other months saw peaks in mentions:

- March 2022 (227 articles): Yemen is predominantly mentioned in articles about Saudi Arabia's role in the war in Ukraine. Saudi Arabia is in fact involved in the conflict against the Houthi rebels.

- January 2022 (131 articles): on the 18th of January, Houthi rebels launch a drone attack against the emirate of Abu Dhabi

- April 2022 (129 articles): the parties to the conflict agree to a two-month ceasefire

- May 2022 (113 articles): there is no particular fact to which the peak can be traced, linked to a series of mentions of different imprint (political analyses, articles referring to the war in Ukraine, domestic news...)

Once again, it is the British press that covers Yemen the most in 2022 (**32%**, about one in three articles). This is followed by Germany (**22%**) and France (**17%**). The UK thus emerges as one of the European states most attentive to conflict areas around the world. Of the top three newspapers by number of articles on Yemen, the first two are *The Times* and *The Guardian*, followed by the German *Frankfurter Allgemeine*.

9. Somalia

As the second least followed state in the European press, not even 100 articles per month were written about Somalia in 2022 in the newspapers surveyed (**691 articles** in 2022). The publication volumes are all between 50 and 75, with no major differences from month to month. The trend sees an increase in articles from March (immediately after the start of the conflict in Ukraine), peaking in July. The subsequent decline is followed by an increase until the end of the year. Given the smaller number of articles for this and subsequent conflict areas, we see the two main peaks:

- July 2022 (89 articles): in July it emerges that Olympic champion marathon runner Mo Farah, the most awarded athlete in modern British athletics and a native of Somalia, arrived in the UK illegally and that his real name is Hussein Abdi Kahin.

- May 2022 (78 articles): it is mainly the British press that determines the peak. In the UK, former education secretary Gavin Williamson, whose political influence at home is much reduced, becomes popular in Somaliland after supporting its campaign to be recognised as a sovereign state. The same month, British ministers reduce the foreign aid budget, from which Somalia also benefited.

Partly due to historical precedents and the existence of Somaliland in the African state, England is the European country that devotes the most attention to Somalia (**36%** of articles). It is followed by Germany (**23%**) and tied with Spain and Italy (**15%**). The most active newspapers are *The Times*, *The Guardian* and *Frankfurter Allgemeine*.

10. Niger

Even on **Niger** (the penultimate territory among those analysed by number of citations in 2022), no more than 90 articles are ever produced, with an average of around 60 articles per month (**607 articles** in 2022). Most articles are concentrated in the first half of the year. Let us look at the two main publication peaks:

- February 2022 (88 articles): as already seen with regard to Mali, with the conclusion of the French army's 'Barkhane' anti-terrorist operation in Mali, Niger becomes the heart of the French military reorganisation, as announced by Macron.

- April 2022 (70 articles): German Defence Minister Christine Lambrecht expressed scepticism about the continuation of missions in Mali, and Niger is mentioned as a possible next place of military focus.

France, due to the oft-mentioned shift of attention from Mali to Niger, is the country whose newspapers devote the most space to this African country (**31%**). It is followed by Germany (**24%**) and, tied, Spain and England (**16%**). The newspapers with the most issues on the subject are *Le Monde, Frankfurter Allgemeine* and *The Times*.

11. NATO, Security/Defence Capacity Building and the "Forgotten Wars"

Within the framework of the so-called 'forgotten wars', we wanted to focus on certain content published in the sources analysed in 2022, which were considered relevant because they focused on **building security and defence capacity**, especially considering the new challenges posed by the conflict between Ukraine and Russia. Specifically, we focused on articles that contained within them the concepts of:

- "*Security Force Assistance*"
- "*Defence Capacity Building*"
- "*Security Capacity Building*"

From a general overview of the whole of 2022, the German press in particular stands out as the one that devoted the most attention to the issues of NATO's **defence and security capability** in global contexts, especially in light of the current conflict between Russia and Ukraine. Among them, the article that appeared on 9 May 2022 in the German newspaper *Sueddeutsche Zeitung*, entitled *'Ein 8. Mai wie kein anderer'* ('An 8th of May like no other'), is worth mentioning. Reviewing German Chancellor Olaf Scholz's televised speech on the occasion of the 77th anniversary of the end of the Second World War, the article focuses on Scholz's ability to combine the memory of a historic day with a current crisis (the war between Russia and Ukraine). *"The chancellor went even further: he derived from the defeat then the obligation to take a stand against Russian aggression now,"* it reads. The first bombing of Iraq by the US on 20 March 2003 had made the then chancellor Schröder say: *"Dear fellow citizens, we tried to prevent the war. Until the last minute"*. 19 years later, Scholz's speech is aimed at not allowing a new war to involve the NATO countries. That is why the principles Scholz recalled in his speech were precisely joint action with the allies, the determination not to become a party to war, **defence capacity building** and sanctions against Russia.

On 26 October, it is once again the German press that focuses on defence capability in the daily news. In this case it is the *Die Welt* newspaper, which publishes an interview entitled *'This war has brought NATO back to its core mission'*. The speaker is **Julianne Smith**, US Ambassador to the Defence Alliance. Asked about the **security policy** of Germany and the NATO countries, she replies: *"What we have seen since the start of the war is a real shift in Germany's security policy. The shift has implications for the steps Germany is taking both to strengthen its **defence capacity** and to provide direct support to Ukraine and its armed forces"*. And it is precisely on defence capacity that Smith continues regarding the availability of ammunition in NATO countries: *"The diminishing stockpile is really an issue that we are*

discussing in NATO. Because with so many allies providing significant support to the Ukrainian armed forces, we find some countries are scraping every last bit of it together. [...] We have also engaged the private sector to advise us on how quickly the NATO alliance can determine what the real needs are in each country and how quickly we can develop transatlantic solutions that will allow us to send clear signals to industry to get production lines up and running as quickly as possible. This is an ongoing project, and the EU is also holding consultations on the issue of stockpiling".

With a passage that is also useful in identifying NATO's attitude and focus in territories that - at least in the media - we have described as 'forgotten', we conclude with a no less important quote from Smith: *"The alliance was originally founded with a focus on deterrence and national defence to protect NATO countries from Soviet attacks. And over time, NATO has adapted to new challenges and new threats, some in faraway places, some closer to home. This war has brought NATO back to its core mission. So a return to its historical role. And if you read the strategic concept presented this summer, you can see the strong emphasis on deterrence and national defence"*.

But even more clear about **Defence Capacity Building** is the 26 March article in the *Frankfurter Allgemeine*. The title *'Weapons suddenly good'* suggests that the focus, considering the conflict between Russia and Ukraine, is on the arsenal and ammunition available to the members of the Atlantic alliance. Indeed, with the war in Ukraine, some countries are reconsidering long-standing reservations about defence investments. Indeed, how does one reconcile the growing tendency of finance to focus on ESG investments when a sector that is on the upswing for contingent reasons - arms production - is both profitable and necessarily 'necessary'? The Swedish SEB Investment Management - for example, as the article states - has said that it will allow some of its funds to invest in companies that derive more than 5% of their revenues from the defence sector. But institutions and companies that do not allow investment in what is not sustainable also create financing problems for the delivery of weapons of war abroad, for example. Financing or guaranteeing arms exports to military authorities abroad is often only possible in EU or NATO countries. *"In reality, however, weapons are also supplied to the aggressors and cause a lot of human suffering,"* reads the *Frankfurter Allgemeine*. "*For example, BAE Systems, Thales and Rheinmetall - the biggest arms manufacturers in the UK, France and Germany - have supplied military equipment to Saudi Arabia since the start of the military intervention in Yemen in 2015. Human Rights Watch and other non-governmental organisations have accused Saudi-led coalition forces of indiscriminately killing civilians during the conflict.*

Finally, an article that appeared in the Italian *Corriere della Sera* on 25 August looks precisely at the **Security Force Assistance** initiatives deployed by NATO countries around the world, and reports the words of EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs Josep Borrell. The British have arranged for the Ukrainians to be trained through the work of the 11th **Security Force Assistance Brigade**. In August, for example, there was an urban combat course in a village in Kent. The aim of the project is to train 10,000 recruits and to achieve this, England has enlisted the help of various states such as Canada, Denmark, Finland, Sweden and New Zealand. It is precisely on this example that the European Union is invited to take a similar initiative. Specifically, Borrell suggested - as reported by *Corriere della Sera*: *"I don't understand why we train the Mozambique army and not the Ukrainian one"*.

To conclude this study, we wanted to measure the amount of articles in which NATO is mentioned alongside the presence of the 8 conflict areas. This insight is useful to understand whether NATO's focus on these areas finds space and is communicated in the pages of newspapers.

IRAQ

Out of 4,593 total articles, 687 contain references to NATO, or 15%.

SYRIA

Out of 5,543 total articles, 1,156 contain references to NATO, or 21%.

LIBYA

Out of 2,263 total articles, 425 contain references to NATO, or 19%.

MALI

Out of 2,139 total articles, 241 contain references to NATO, or 11%.

LEBANON

Of the total 1,893 articles, 146 contain references to NATO, or 8%.

YEMEN

Out of 1,209 total articles, 166 contain references to NATO, or 14%.

SOMALIA

Out of 691 total articles, 65 contain references to NATO, or 9 per cent.

NIGER

Out of 607 total articles, 65 contain references to NATO, or 11%.

In conclusion, the ranking of the territories in respect of which NATO is most often mentioned in the media is given below.

Syria	21%
Libya	19%
Iraq	15%
Yemen	14%
Niger	11%
Mali	11%
Somalia	9%
Lebanon	8%

Syria emerges as the conflict area in which NATO features most prominently in newspapers in relation to the total number of articles produced. This means that one out of every five articles about Syria contains the term NATO within it. The same can be said of **Libya**. **Iraq** comes in third place, with 15% of the mentions involving NATO. Looking at the last positions, NATO is mentioned less frequently in articles concerning **Lebanon** (8%), **Somalia** (9%), **Mali** and **Niger** (11%).

Biographical notes

Executive Commettee

Col. Massimo Di Pietro is an Italian Army Officer and currently serves as Director of the NATO SFA COE. During his professional career, he was deeply involved in NATO issues while serving at the Italian NATO Rapid Deployable Corps HQ, at the Italian Army General Staff HQ, at the Italian Joint Operations HQ and during his command of the 6th Bersaglieri Regiment. He was deployed to USCENTCOM (Tampa, Florida, USA) as Liaison Officer and served on NATO missions in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Afghanistan. After a degree in Politics and International Relations, he completed several master's degrees in international security and peacekeeping and specific courses at the NATO School in Oberammergau.

Lt. Col. Michele Sciannamea is an Italian Army Officer servings the NATO SFA COE's Doctrine Development & Standands Branch Head. During his professional carrer, he was deeply involved in Strategic level at the Italian Defence General Staff, 3rd Division - Military Policy and Planning International Relations Office Africa, Asia, America Bilateral Relations Section as Desk Officer, at the United Nation Mission Observer Group India Pakistan (UNMOGIP) as UN Military Observer, at the NCO Army School as Coy Commander and Battalion Commander, at the Kurdistan Training Coordination Center (KTCC) as J7 Plans Training, at the NATO ISAF in Afghanistan as Battle Italy/Spain S2 and S3 Section Chief, at the Operation "*Antica Babilonia*" in Iraq as Infantry Deputy Coy Commander, at the 66th Airmobile Infantry Regiment as Platoon and Coy Commander. After a degree in Politics and International Relations, he completed several master's degrees in international security and peacekeeping and specific courses at the NATO School in Oberammergau, particularly expert in Operational and Tactical Planning and NATO and national Doctrine issues.

Maj. Gianpaolo Pauciulo is an Italian Army Officer serving as the NATO SFA COE's Concept Development Section Chief. Before his current assignment, he served in the Folgore Brigade as a platoon leader and later, company commander. He was deployed on NATO ISAF operations in Afghanistan and in Iraq, where he experienced SFA activities in the field, holding the position of trainer, mentor and advisor. He has worked on the revision of the NATO SFA reference publication and contributed to the development of related NATO

publications and he is the author of several articles on the doctrinal perspective on SFA and on military capabilities for the grey zone of conflict and future leadership.

Francesco Alimena gained practical experience as an intern at the NATO Security Force Assistance Centre of Excellence and supported the development of the book 'Out Thinking on NATO Strategic Concept' as project coordinator. He currently holds a position in the Business Development & Strategies Department at Bayern-Chemie Gesellschaft für flugchemische Antriebe mbH. He is the President of Confassociazioni Young World, an International Branch of Confassociazioni (Confederation of Professional Associations). In the field of studies, he obtained two degrees with honours in Language Mediation from the SSML Gregorio VII University in Rome and in International Relations from the LUMSA University in Rome.

Angelica Gimbo is completing a MA's degree in International Security Studies jointly offered by the Scuola Superiore Sant'Anna and University of Trento, after obtaining with honors a BA's degree in Political Sciences and International Relations at LUISS Guido Carli. She carried out an internship at the NATO SFA COE, and currently is a trainee at the European Security and Defence College, in Brussels.

Alexandra Bailey is pursuing a BA and Master of Management Dual Degree at the University of British Columbia in Vancouver, Canada. She is majoring in Political Science, with a minor in Sociology. Alexandra is an alumna of the NATO Field School, which gave her the opportunity to travel across 6 NATO nations, visit the EEAS, SHAPE, multiple Allied Command Operations and NATO Headquarters. During this, she was awarded the title of "Best National Representative" in the Negotiation, Mediation and Decision-Making Exercise (NMDX) at the NATO Defense College**.**

Technical Experts

Luca Frusone (Frosinone, 1985) graduated in Law from Sapienza University with a thesis in Comparative Public Law on the American Constitution, he obtained a postgraduate specialization degree in "Strategic and Military Sciences" in University of Turin, participating in the 73rd IASD Course at the Centro Alti Studi della Difesa. In 2013, he was elected to Parliament and became a member of the IV Defense Committee in the Chamber of Deputies. He holds positions as a member of the Italian Delegation to the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, the Parliamentary Committee for the Implementation of the Schengen Agreement, Supervision of Europol's activities, and Immigration control and supervision. In the XVIII legislature, serves as a Parliament member and is reconfirmed in the IV Defense Committee. He's elected President of the Italian Delegation to the NATO Parliamentary Assembly for the next 5 years. He served as Vice-President of the Mediterranean and Middle East Special Group, of which he is also a rapporteur on the topic "Shared Migration Challenges: The Transatlantic Community and The Mena Region." With the 3rd IASD working group, he published a document titled "Study and analysis of the regulatory framework relating to the treatment of classified digital data about the interconnection of multilevel/multidomain networks" for Istituto di Ricerca e Analisi della Difesa.

Daniele Mancini (Rome, 1952) is Ambassador of Italy (ret.) and Professor at LUMSA University, Rome, at the Pontifical University "Urbaniana" and Lecturer at the University of Genova. He served for forty years under the Foreign Service, while earning a Master's degree (summa cum laude) in Political Sciences; the latter studies have been enriched through a Master course with honours and scholarship in International Relations. He has written extensively on the Middle East, Eastern Europe and Balkans, United States and Global issues.

Guido Lenzi is Ambassador of Italy (ret.), dedicated for decades to multilateral diplomacy, with particular reference to East-West relations, former Director of the European Security Institute in Paris, Permanent Representative to the OSCE in Vienna, and currently lecturer at the Alma Mater University of Bologna.

Benedetta Berti is Head of Policy Planning in the Office of the Secretary General at NATO. She is also Associate Researcher at the Centre for Security, Diplomacy and Strategy at Vrije

Universiteit Brussels, Visiting Professor at the College of Europe and a Senior Fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute. An Eisenhower Global Fellow and a TED Senior Fellow, in the past decade Benedetta has held research and teaching positions at West Point, The Institute for National Security Studies and Tel Aviv University, among others. Dr. Berti is the author of four books, including "Armed Political Organizations. From Conflict to Integration" (Johns Hopkins University Press, 2013). Her work and research have appeared, among others, in Foreign Policy, Foreign Affairs, the National Interest, the Wall Street Journal and The New York Times; as well as in Civil Wars, Democratization, Government & Opposition, Mediterranean Politics, the Middle East Journal, Parameters, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Terrorism and Political Violence. She holds a BA in Oriental Studies from the University of Bologna, and a MA and PhD in International Relations from The Fletcher School (Tufts University).

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