

Security Force Assistance Quarterly



The 2024 National Defense Authorization Act: Implications for Security Cooperation

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U.S. Army Service Members from Task Force Tomahawk and Combined Joint Task Force - Horn of Africa receive instructions on different combative techniques from a Le Centre D'entraînement Au Combat De Djibouti instructor before the Soldiers practice and train during French Desert Commando Course in Djibouti, Nov. 29, 2023. Since 2015, the French Forces stationed in Djibouti have invited U.S. service members with CJTF-HOA to participate in the course. (U.S. Army photo by Sgt. Haden Tolbert)

Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance (JCISFA) Mission:

JCISFA supports the integration of Security Force Assistance (SFA) activities into the current and future Joint Force to support Globally Integrated Operations. JCISFA enables the development of SFA doctrine, training, and education of the Joint Force to conduct partner nation capacity-building. JCISFA supports SFA-related strategy formulation, policy and guidance development and support to joint exercises.

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SFA Quarterly 30th Ed., MAR 2024

From the Director's Desk

Greetings from the Joint Staff, it's my pleasure to introduce the 30th edition of JCISFA's Quarterly SFA Newsletter.

Per our SOP, this edition reflects our network of diverse SFA authors by publishing content to address observations, insights, and lessons from both contemporary, and historic SFA activities.

We open with an analysis of the latest National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) and its implications for the security cooperation enterprise. The author thoroughly reviews changes to security cooperation authorities and programs, updates to institutional and administrative aspects of the security cooperation workforce, and the monetary importance of Assessments, Monitoring, and Evaluations (AM&E) that appears on the horizon.

Two JCISFA members provide historical case studies of the pivotal role of security cooperation in past conflicts. The first assesses security cooperation that enabled U.S. independence over 200 years ago, while the second reviews U.S. efforts to train and equip Free French forces during World War II. Both authors demonstrate the immutable nature of several SFA fundamentals and highlight best practices for modern planners.

Next, a senior member of U.S. Army Security Force Assistance Command (SFAC) explores the role of advisors during the opening days of the Korean War. The author seeks to encourage thought about the possibility of shifting from crisis to conflict and prevent planners from being caught in the 'complacency of competition.' The best practices, observations, and recommendations highlighted should be part of every advisor's toolkit.

Finally, a JCISFA analyst partners with members of 4th Security Force Assistance Brigade (4 SFAB) to highlight best practices in training medical advisors for unique operational requirements, and efforts to build capacity in ally and partner military medical services through the DoD's only Significant Security Cooperation Initiative (SSCI) focused on Global Health Engagements (GHE).

As always, we welcome your feedback on this and future editions, and invite you to join us virtually to discuss these articles and more during our Quarterly SFA Forum on 26 March.

JOSEPH E. (Ed) WILLIAMS
Colonel, U.S. Army
Director

The purpose of this quarterly newsletter is to inform the SFA Community of Interest (CoI), highlight the greater CoI efforts, and foster CoI interoperability. Sharing JCISFA's efforts will help inform the CoI of the many ways JCISFA can be leveraged.

In addition to Chairman's Joint Lessons Learned Information System (JLLIS), this newsletter serves as a forum for the CoI to submit Observations and Recommendations or other articles of interest regarding their respective SFA efforts. As a service to the Joint Force, this newsletter promotes dialogue among the SFA CoI that is dispersed across various countries, Interagency, Joint and Service organizations.

Again, this SFA newsletter encourages dialogue. It is part of an ongoing effort to more effectively "Communicate, Cooperate, and Coordinate" across the Joint Force with all SFA stakeholders. Please let us know if you would like to submit an article or if there are any topics of interest for future editions.

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Draft article preferences: 1000—2000 words and written for public release



The Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Mitscher (DDG 57), right, provides a warm welcome to the French tall ship replica, the Hermione, in the vicinity of the Battle of Virginia Capes off the East Coast of the United States. The original Hermione brought French General Marquis de Lafayette to America in 1780 to inform General Washington of France's alliance and impending support of the American Revolutionary War. The symbolic return of the Hermione will pay homage to Lafayette and the Franco-American alliance that brought victory at the Battle of Yorktown in 1781. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist Chief James C. Davis)

Security Force Assistance in The American Revolutionary War Part 1 Equipping the Americans

by LTC Rodney Rudolph, JCISFA Lessons Learned Integration and Analysis Chief

Like Ukraine in its war with Russia, the United States needed assistance from foreign military powers during the American War of Independence from Great Britain.

The American Revolutionary War which began at Lexington and Concord (1775) eventually brought France, Spain, the Netherlands, and the Mysore Kingdom in India into the war against Great Britain. The assistance America required included military weapons, munitions, and supplies along with experienced military advisors skilled in engineering and large-scale combat operations; especially during the first three years of the war when only Americans engaged in direct combat against the British. Security Force Assistance provided the military material that built the capability and capacity of the Continental Army.

Sources of Military Material

As tensions between Great Britain and the American Colonies grew over taxation, the colonies began to realize they might need to resort to armed conflict to defend their rights. Since there was no large-scale manufacturing in the American colonies at this time, they needed to acquire muskets, cannon, lead, and most importantly gunpowder. The first source of military material was Great Britain itself. The American Colonies began buying increased amounts of muskets, lead, and gunpowder from the British, but finally in 1774 the British Government imposed an embargo on muskets and gunpowder.¹ The British believed that denying the American Colonies weapons and gunpowder would prevent a conflict, instead it started the war. In that age, gunpowder

SFA in The American Revolution Continued...

was the life blood of a military. Cannons could burn up large amounts of gunpowder in a single battle and leave an Army vulnerable to attack the next day.² Since there was no production of gunpowder in the colonies at this time, taking away gunpowder from the Colonies to deny them the ability to put up a fight made sense. At first the British began removing Royal gunpowder (Gunpowder purchased by the British Government) stored in colonial magazines and securing it under British control. This began a series of raids between the British and the Colonists where cannon, muskets, and



Members of the Saratoga Battle Chapter of the Sons of the Revolution pose for a photo, with their cannon, prior to the dedication of a memorial stone for Private Oliver Barrett at the Saratoga National Cemetery on October 19, 2022. Barrett volunteered as a Minuteman and died serving under the 10th Massachusetts Regiment in the Battle of Saratoga on October 7, 1777, at 51 years of age. Barrett lies in an unmarked grave on the Saratoga Battlefield and was honored with a memorial stone at the ceremony. (U.S. Army National Guard photo by SSG Matthew Gunther)

gunpowder were taken from each other. The British would find weapons and military equipment missing from forts, armories, and store houses. Four months prior to Lexington and Concord, New Hampshire colonists got into longboats, rowed over to Fort William and Mary in Portsmouth Harbor, detained the small garrison (6 British Soldiers and their families) and confiscated all the gunpowder and military stores in the fort (December 1774).³ Few people know that the first shots fired in the American Revolution were at Portsmouth, New Hampshire. On 19 April 1775, a botched British raid on colonial military stores in Concord, Massachusetts would ignite the war. Since stealing arms and munitions from the British could only take

you so far, the American Colonies had to find sources from other Countries. During the first three years of the war, 90% of the weapons, supplies, and gunpowder the Americans used came from abroad.⁴

Before the war, American sailors voyaged to Spain, Holland, and France to exchange their trade goods for supplies of weapons and gunpowder. The Marblehead Regiment from Massachusetts began the war with Spanish muskets purchased with fish they caught off the Grand banks and sold in Spain.⁵ These countries wanted to support the American cause but not get drawn into a conflict with Britain. Because of the constant threat of the British Navy stopping ships on the high seas, they realized that it was better to use the neutral ports of Spanish Cuba, Dutch Saint Eustatius, and French Martinique in the West Indies as an exchange point. Swift American sloops and schooners could run the British blockades, enter the neutral West Indies ports, trade for military supplies, and return to one of the hundreds of American ports along the coast to unload their cargo.⁶ Once the war began, a tighter British blockade, increased demands from the Continental Army and Militia, reduction in farm labor, and the Continental Congress' inability to levy taxes, severely reduced the amount of trade goods to exchange for weapons and supplies.⁷ Eventually, America began manufacturing its own military weapons, supplies, and gunpowder, but this never replaced the need for military material from foreign nations. America sent diplomats to Europe, especially France, to lobby for the vital Security Force Assistance needed to win our War for Independence.

The Unsung Heroes of Security Force Assistance in the American Revolution

Silas Deane (1737-1789), a member of the Continental Congress, was sent to Paris in March of 1776 on a secret mission to negotiate with the French for arms and munitions along with technical advisors supporting the American cause. France did not want to be drawn into the war prematurely, so all this was done in secret to give the French plausible deniability. Deane met with a wealthy Frenchman, Pierre Augustin De Beaumarchais (1732-1799), who was famous for writing The Barber of Seville.

Beaumarchais set up a phony trading company named Roderique Hortalez & Company which received financing from France and Spain. Hortalez & Company sent two thousand tons of supplies to America in eight ships until it went bankrupt.⁸ Benjamin Franklin arrived in Paris in December 1776 and overshadowed all of Deane's achievements. While Franklin received all the credit for what went right, Deane got the blame for what went wrong. The 200 brass cannons, 20,000 cannon balls, tons of gunpowder, and muskets that Deane and Beaumarchais sent to America proved critical in the battles of Bennington, and especially Saratoga. There British General Burgoyne's entire Army was forced to surrender convincing France to sign an alliance with America, finally entering the war against the British. In 1778, Deane returned to America to face charges of embezzlement and disloyalty.⁹ Like Benedict Arnold, Deane became disillusioned with the revolution and went into a self-imposed exile in England. Deane died at sea in 1789 while returning to America. The United States Congress felt the cannon, muskets, and supplies that the Beaumarchais' Hortalez & Company sent to America during the war were gifts from the French and there was no requirement to pay. Beaumarchais died in 1799 and not until 1837, after numerous court battles, would his family finally receive a payment of \$150,000, only one-tenth of what was originally owed to them.¹⁰ Nevertheless, the Security Force Assistance efforts of Deane and Beaumarchais equipped the American soldiers who won the Battle of Saratoga. That victory was the catalyst for America winning independence.

France (1778), Spain (1779), Netherlands (1780)

France entered the war in 1778 and soon after began sending the French Army and Navy to fight in America. Spain entered the war in 1779 as an ally to the French because Spain did not formally recognize American Independence until 1795. Bernardo de Galvez, the Spanish Governor of Louisiana, who had been sending military supplies to Americans fighting in the western theater like George Rogers Clark, now began capturing British outposts along the Mississippi River and Florida Coast. In 1780 the

Spanish took Mobile and in 1781 they forced the surrender of Pensacola securing western Florida for Spain. In 1780, Britain declared war on the Netherlands to stop the flow of supplies from the Dutch Island of Saint Eustatius which started the Fourth Anglo-Dutch War that would last until 1784.¹¹ France's war debt reached 1 billion French livres, nearly half a trillion dollars today, but France claimed victory over the British and avenged their loss in the Seven Years' War (1756-1763).¹²



Revolutionary War reenactors pay tribute during a funeral service honoring 13 American and British Revolutionary War soldiers at Bethesda Presbyterian Church, Camden, S.C., Apr. 22, 2023. Honoring the fallen soldiers over two centuries later was a joint effort, consisting of coordination between U.S. Army, U.S. Air Force, U.S. Navy, foreign military and civilian agencies over the course of three days. (U.S. Air Force photo by Airman 1st Class Erin Stanley)

Conclusions From Part 1: Equipping The Americans

America achieved its independence through an international coalition aligned against a common adversary. The Security Force Assistance that France, Spain, and the Netherlands provided proved critical to the American Colonies. The Continental Army showed that they had the will to fight and win battles, but in the end the constant flow of military weapons, materials, supplies, and money won the war against Britain. Throughout the war the Continental Army experienced shortages of food, clothing and at times gunpowder, but there was never a shortage of cannon or muskets. This coalition of allies and partners would open new fronts and transform the

American Revolution from a regional conflict into a global war that spread British forces thin throughout the world eventually diminishing their political will to continue and forcing peace negotiations. The United States should remember its past when there is a need to provide Security Force Assistance to other Nations, like Ukraine.

Next Time In Part 2: Advising The Americans

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Reenactors march in the funeral cortege procession honoring 13 American and British Revolutionary War soldiers, whose remains were recently discovered, in Camden, South Carolina, April 22, 2023. The procession went from the Kershaw-Cornwallis House in historic Camden to the Bethesda Presbyterian Church approximately a mile away for the funeral service. (U.S. Army National Guard photo by Sgt. 1st Class Margaret Taylor)



Two smiling French soldiers fill the hands of American soldiers with candy, in Rouffach, France, after the closing of the Colmar pocket. (U.S. Army Office of the Chief Signal Officer, 1945)

Note: The Moroccans are from the 1st Tirailleurs Regiment while the Americans may belong to the 999th Field Artillery Battalion.

Assessing Security Cooperation with WWII Free French Forces

by Clayne T. Bradley, JS J5 JCISFA Operations Research Analyst

During World War II, the German built Gustav Line in Italy saw bitter fighting throughout the Winter of 1943 – 1944.

Horrific battles around Monte Casino bled American and Polish Divisions of men and equipment. Then in the Spring, during the 5th major allied assault on the Gustav line the Germans finally gave way and retreated, because Moroccan mountain battalions with the Free French, moving through rugged terrain, broke through on the right of the line and outflanked the Germans.¹ The German defenses collapsed, three weeks later Rome fell to the Allies concluding the bloodiest battle of the Italian Campaign.² The key to this victory was an intense, 18-month security cooperation effort supporting the Free French Expeditionary Corps. Assessing the

many starting points and monitoring progress throughout this massive train and equip effort was no easy task, but proved instrumental to its success. Evaluating the end results helped to build the Free French Corps into an entire French Army.

Knowing Where to Start - Baseline

When Franklin D. Roosevelt signed a memorandum with French General Henri Giraud in late 1942 to train and equip up to 11 Free French - African divisions he handed the U.S. Military a challenge.³ With the French Army expected to number over 250,000 men and women, the Americans started a massive Security Force Assistance effort. At the time, Rommel's Africa Corps and the Italian Army

Assessing SC with WWII Free French Continued...

held strong in Tunisia where French Tunisians, Algerians and Moroccans conducted a fierce fighting retreat attempting to buy time for the Americans and British to arrive.⁵ Light infantry divisions designed for policing in African Countries did not match up well against modern German tank and mechanized Infantry formations. Nevertheless, the French African units proved willing to fight with what they had regardless of the mismatch. The United States needed to provide Security Force Assistance to change this mismatch before French morale faltered.⁶ First however, the Americans and French needed to know where to start.



French Soldiers stand with U.S. Soldiers awaiting the commencement of the award ceremony during the Expert Infantryman Badge (EIB), Expert Soldier Badge (ESB) and Expert Field Medical Badge (EFMB), E3B at Vilseck, Germany Nov. 10, 2023. E3B is EIB, ESB and EFMB combined and tests candidates' physical and mental abilities while executing critical individual tasks and training improving the armed force's ability to respond more effectively and efficiently to increase readiness.
(U.S. Army Reserve photo by Sgt 1st. class Abel M. Aungst)

In World War II that meant an inspection of the units was performed first. Called baseline assessments today, the initial inspections of French divisions revealed the extent of the challenge. While the officers and senior sergeants spoke fluent French, most soldiers spoke various Arabic dialects. Their equipment was often old with minimal artillery, tanks, trucks, radios, and other technical equipment. Rarely did Free French units have enough educated personnel. Meanwhile one division set of equipment was already sailing toward North Africa. The inspections also revealed some strengths like the light machine gun expertise the French units used to support rapid infantry attacks,

a specialty of the French. With a proper baseline, the Franco-Americans now had something to monitor and evaluate against to determine progress. Lacking a baseline (e.g., like a starting point in a footrace), there is little value in monitoring progress or evaluating one's finish as even running backwards can look like progress.

Knowing Where To Go - Operational Environment Assessments Drive Design Choices

Next, they needed to select a training and equipping model that conformed to best practices. Since militaries have been around for thousands of years, there was no need to start from scratch but agreeing on which model to use proved troublesome. The French wanted a reverse of the World War I model wherein the French provided most of the support units while America provided the fighting forces. In World War II, the French wanted to concentrate on providing mostly fighting forces because much of their industry and educated population lived under German control. However, the Americans wanted the French to provide both, so the French could conduct independent operations on their own. The problem wasn't in finding a design model, the problem came in reconciling two good models: the French proposal and the American one. They never solved this problem. Inspections soon revealed the impossibility of the original model to equip three armored and eight infantry Free French divisions able to operate independently without American support units (e.g., transportation, maintenance, supply, and even heavy artillery battalions). While the Americans won the design debate on paper, in the end the French model prevailed due to reality.⁷ Reality meant that the U.S. 5th Army in Italy didn't prepare the necessary supplies to support, and they started to run thin during combat.⁸ Even shrinking the eleven-division goal to eight didn't provide the French enough technical support troops necessary for modern war. The French fought hard and contributed to the Allied victories but were never able to conduct operations independent of American support. At the end of the war two years later there were still not enough French soldiers with the mechanical aptitude and experience to support the vast maintenance, supply,

Assessing SC with WWII Free French Continued...

and transportation requirements of a mechanized Army.⁹ It takes time and recruits with the necessary language and mathematics skills to build such expertise. Consequently, America provided almost all Corps Artillery and Anti-Air units to the French even late in the War.¹⁰ Without the proper understanding of the operational environment they chose the wrong model. Luckily, the monitoring effort partially made up for this.

Monitoring - Liaising and Identifying Shortfalls

Once the German and Italian Forces surrendered in Africa the Security Force Assistance effort picked up speed. French Algerian and Moroccan Divisions could take a break from combat to reorganize and train. Combined Franco-American inspection teams monitored the progress sending constant reports to the French High Command and Allied theater Command.¹¹ This combined monitoring effort kept both partners on the same page if not pointed in the same direction. At one point the Americans proposed more monitoring inspections of the on-going training but the French pointed out that more inspections wouldn't solve the problems. American Liaisons already kept their higher headquarters apprised of the French Divisions' shortfalls. Additional equipment and training were the actual requirements. Indeed, once shortfalls are known more frequent monitoring doesn't close the gap. That requires more or different organize, train, equip, build, and advise (OTEBA) activities.¹² Franco-American inspection teams changed focus to what was needed by sending a French and American subject matter expert in each area of instruction. After observing, they reported what training and equipment was essential to their respective commands.¹³ The American and French teams got along well together and made sure their higher ups knew the issues. A best practice emerged wherein they developed a common operating picture that met the information needs of both sides.

Evaluating - Deployment Inspections

Called evaluating today, French teams conducted inspections of French Expeditionary Corps units

shipping out for combat in Italy and later Southern France.¹⁴ The Americans observed at a close distance. These precombat inspections revealed both strengths and weaknesses. They also informed the Army soon to command these units what shortfalls to expect. While this didn't solve the many support unit problems it did ensure General Mark Clark commanding the U.S. 5th Army knew what to expect.¹⁵ It also ensured that combat forces met a French standard even if it wasn't the American standard. The evaluations made something else clear, have a plan B. The French Expeditionary Corps in Italy and later the French First Army fighting in Alsace-Lorraine on the French-German border were never able to conduct operations independent of American technical, supply, artillery, and air support. However, the French First Army did pin down the German 19th Army with constant attacks throughout the Winter of 1944-1945 as the Battle of the Bulge raged to the North in Belgium. Then, the Americans augmented the French First Army with four additional U.S. divisions to finally crush that German Army in the Colmar pocket.¹⁶



U.S. Army Maj. Gen. Charles Costanza, the commanding general for the 3rd Infantry Division, salutes during a ceremony at Colmar, France, April 26, 2023. The city of Colmar celebrated the 3rd ID by building a memorial for 1st Lt. Audie Murphy for his heroic actions during World War II. (U.S. Army photo by Sgt. Dre Stout)

Baselining, Monitoring, Evaluating, Disseminating

The initial inspection, on-going inspections, and pre-combat inspection model is different from the current security cooperation assessment, monitoring, and evaluation model in two major ways. First, the feedback loop. Rather than a line, today's post-

Assessing SC with WWII Free French Continued...

industrial era models are circles. Called 'cycles' in the military they help practitioners learn from previous efforts and make necessary changes for the next. The Franco-American effort did this as divisions passed through the massive train and equip effort. There just wasn't a formalized step. Today almost all modern models derive from Dr. Deming's work with the Japanese in the 1950s. Various models expand one of Deming's model's four steps into more or combine some.¹⁷ Unfortunately, the current SC model has three steps in its name, but five steps in the model itself.¹⁸ This can result in baselining and learning challenges preventing starting and closing the loop as intended in the original 1950s versions. Subsequent SC model updates try to emphasize learning before the next go around.¹⁹ Examples of how we fail to learn and enact change is seen in World War II and today.

If equipment and training is highly technical, don't expect it to be any easier in the military than it is in the civilian world. Technical training schools in everything from software to piloting aircraft often see high washout rates. Often, they take years to complete on both the civilian and military side. If a student washout rate isn't obvious then the training might not be robust enough to solve real world problems. If mechanics are hard to come by on the civilian side, then there should be little expectation they'll be readily available on the military side. In World War II, the Americans never accepted that the new recruits drawn mostly from North Africa didn't have the proper backgrounds to easily become specialists in French support battalions.

Don't seek perfection in the design phase, especially when few U.S. units get it right. Recognize partner nation contributions, and don't expect partners and Allies to do things our way. Conduct baselining, monitoring, and evaluation in combined teams to make sure everyone is on the same page. In short, be a partner. If that isn't possible then perhaps there really isn't a partnership.

The second difference is integration. Because inspections weren't considered stand-alone activities World War II, baselining, monitoring and evaluating was far more integrated into security

cooperation planning and implementation. Today it is sometimes seen as its own process rather than an integrated part of the security cooperation planning and implementation cycle. To fully re-integrate into a single security cooperation model²⁰ might take a rework such as in the figure below.



The supported Security Cooperation Planning and implementation piece is on the outside. The supporting Baselining, Monitoring, Evaluating, and Disseminating part is depicted inside. Integrated together they form a complete Security Cooperation model. Operational Environment assessments inform the design process and are not baselining.

Separating operational environment and baseline assessments is a start. They are not the same. Baselining provides a starting point to monitor and evaluate against while operational environment assessments help avoid choosing the wrong train and equip model. One is more of a starting point for monitoring and evaluation while the other provides the big picture necessary for correct design. Better operational environment assessments might have helped the Americans avoid 'mirror imagining' by understanding why the French were not like the Americans (e.g., the recruits' education level).

Monitoring with partnered teams like Franco-Americans did in World War II avoided surprises and made sure both partners could talk amicably about problems even if it did not solve the underlying design

Assessing SC with WWII Free French Continued...

problem. In the end this monitoring enabled the Americans to prepare and provide many support units for the French even if the security cooperation design said those were a French responsibility.

The French partner had primary responsibility for the evaluations to avoid any ill feelings.²¹ The Americans observed from the side and gave their higher headquarters an accurate picture. This helped headquarters work out solutions for French divisions in combat while learning and acting to avoid similar issues before the next deploying division arrived.



U.S. Army Maj. Gen. Charles Costanza, the commanding general for the 3rd Infantry Division, and French Army Brig. Gen. Jean-Pierre Fague, the 3rd ID's Commanding General for Readiness, talks to role players dressed as World War II era Dogface Soldiers at Colmar, France, April 26, 2023. (U.S. Army photo by Sgt. Dre Stout)

In Conclusion

Past security cooperation methods often saw today's challenges at a greater scale, but with more resources. However, some gaps just couldn't be closed in a year or two. Indeed, today the peace time U.S. military struggles to find qualified recruits to fill its ranks like the French did in World War II.²² Security Cooperation AM&E is less integrated today than in the past when inspections were considered part of normal military life. Nevertheless, better integrating the security cooperation planning and implementation cycle model with SC AM&E is more of a look toward the past than something new. We just need to bring the unnamed 'learn' step of the feedback loop to the forefront.

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President Joe Biden hosts a meeting with Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) leaders for the U.S.-Pacific Islands Forum Summit, 25 September 2023. (Photo still from video courtesy of the White House Communications Agency)

The 2024 National Defense Authorization Act: Implications for Security Cooperation

by MAJ Jacob A. Elders, JS J5 Joint Center for International Security Cooperation

On 22 December 2023, President Biden signed the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2024 into law.

The new NDAA takes a balanced approach to the SC enterprise by both building on previously authorized Security Cooperation (SC) programs and activities, while also seeking oversight and accountability of their efficacy. While most SC programs and activities were reauthorized, there are notable decreases in the authorized funding relative to Fiscal Year (FY) 2023.

Below are excerpts from the NDAA relevant to the SC community.

Oversight and Accountability

Sec. 1228 limits availability of Defense-wide O&M funds and International SC Program (ISCP) funds until the Secretary of Defense (SecDef) submits SC strategies for each Geographic Combatant Command (CCMD) to Congress as directed in the FY22 NDAA.

Sec. 1243 directs DoD to submit quarterly reports to Congress on all security assistance and military contributions given to Ukraine by allied and partner nations in absolute and relative terms, disaggregated

by country, since January 2022. There is potential for this to create friction or produce incomplete reports, as some nations providing materiel support to Ukraine did/do so through back-channels to maintain anonymity for geopolitical reasons.

SC Authorities Changes

Sec. 1202 authorizes USAFRICOM and USSOUTHCOM to use Combatant Commander (CCDR) Initiative Funds for incremental expenses related to SC programs and activities.

Sec. 1203 amends Title 10, Ch. 16, §333 (Authority to Build Capacity) by increasing the cost threshold of small-scale military construction in support of §333 programs from \$1.5 million to \$2 million.

Sec. 1203 also authorizes SecDef to treat equipment procured for §333 programs that either has not been transferred to the partner nation, or has been returned by the partner nation, as DoD stocks. This may have significant implications for DoD stocks and joint force readiness depending on the specifics of certain ongoing §333 programs.

The 2024 National Defense Authorization Act Continued...

Strategic Competition

The NDAA removes China's designation as a developing nation, recognizing it as a strategic competitor and focusing several DoD efforts on building U.S. presence and partnerships in the Indo-Pacific region.

Sec. 1088 directs DoD to develop an implementation plan for the Joint Concept for Competing (published 2023), including efforts to coordinate and synchronize DoD activities with interagency and foreign partners for the purpose of integrated campaigning.

Training and Education

Sec. 1204 directs SecDef to promulgate a charter for Defense Security Cooperation University (DSCU). It also recognizes DSCU as a government-operated federal laboratory under 15 U.S.C. 3710a, which authorizes DSCU to enter into cooperative research and development agreements with interagency partners, state and local governments, and private and non-profit foundations and organizations including universities, and to issue grants for such research.

Sec. 1204 also directs the establishment of a Foreign Military Sales (FMS) Center of Excellence (CoE) to conduct research on, and promote best practices for, timely and effective FMS and ensure FMS workforce training.

No further action was taken to direct the location of the John McCain Irregular Warfare Functional Center (IWFC) authorized in the FY21 NDAA. The IWFC is currently operated in an interim capacity by DSCU. However, given that DSCU will become an officially chartered DoD entity, the IWFC may remain within DSCU and employ its new authorities as a federal laboratory to conduct cooperative research on irregular warfare. This may also be the case if DSCU becomes the FMS CoE.

SC Workforce Management and Administration

Sec. 1204 overhauls the SC Workforce (SCW) to address identified knowledge and capability gaps in

the SCW, including the establishment of professional career paths for SCW personnel which is reflected in DSCA's revised SCW Certification 2.0 program. The SCW 2.0 certification is tailored to competency needs based on functional area roles of SCW personnel.

New SCW functional areas include:

- Building Partner Capacity / DoD Train and Equip
- Advise, Train and Education
- State Partnership Programs
- Assessment, Monitoring and Evaluation (AM&E)

More information on SCW Certification 2.0 is available here:

<https://www.dscu.edu/certification2>

European Theater

Sec. 1241 extends the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative (USAI) through December 2026. This year's NDAA authorizes \$300 million for USAI, marking a return to initial funding levels from the FY16 NDAA that initially authorized the USAI.



A U.S. Special Operations Command Europe joint terminal attack controller coordinates simulated close air support with U.S. Air Force F-16 Fighting Falcons from 31st Fighter Wing, Aviano AB, Italy, alongside Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) JTACS in a bilateral training event in BiH, Jan. 8, 2024. This bilateral training is an example of advanced military-to-military cooperation that contributes to peace and security in the Western Balkans and throughout Europe. (U.S. Army photo by Sgt. Alejandro Lucero)

The 2024 National Defense Authorization Act Continued...

Pacific Theater

Sec. 1301 provides the sense of Congress that SecDef should continue efforts to strengthen U.S. defense alliances and partnerships in the Indo-Pacific region to further expand America's network of allies and partners that grants a comparative advantage to the U.S. in strategic competition with China.

Sec. 1307 provides the sense of Congress on U.S.-Taiwan relations, citing Taiwan Relations Act of 1979, and supports continued institutional capacity building for Taiwan through training, equipping, combined exercises, and enhanced cooperative defense planning.

Sec. 1302 extends USINDOPACOM's Pacific Deterrence Initiative (PDI) and authorizes \$9.7 billion for FY24. One of PDI's fund categories specifically focuses on "Building the Defense and Security Capabilities, Capacity, and Cooperation of Allies and Partners."



JACKSONVILLE, Fla. (Sept. 6, 2023) Royal New Zealand Service Members, who are training at Patrol and Reconnaissance Squadron (VP) 30 as part of the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) Program, pose in front of a P-8A Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft on the VP-30 flight line. P-30's mission is to provide P-8A Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft and MQ-4C UAS specific training to pilots, Naval flight officers, and enlisted aircrew prior to reporting to the fleet. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Curtis D. Spencer)

Sec. 1309 directs SecDef, in consultation with appropriate officials of Taiwan, to establish a comprehensive training, advising, and institutional capacity building program for Taiwan's military forces using existing SC authorities in Title 10 U.S.C.

Sec. 1315 extends and modifies a pilot program to improve cyber cooperation with certain foreign military partners in Southeast Asia. Covered friendly foreign militaries include Vietnam, Thailand, Indonesia, Philippines, and Malaysia.

Sec. 1317 directs SecDef to submit a report to Congress on ways the U.S. can enhance its SC efforts with Japan.



Personnel from the United States, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Mongolia, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan work together Aug. 12, 2023, during Exercise Regional Cooperation 23 at the Helena Aviation Readiness Center in Helena, Montana. RC23 is an annual, multi-national U.S. Central Command-sponsored exercise conducted by U.S. forces in partnership with Central and South Asia nations. The exercise aims to strengthen relationships between participating nations, as well as increase the capacity and capability to work together. (U.S. Army National Guard photo by Sgt. 1st Class Terra C. Gatti)

Middle East and Central Asia

Sec. 1263 extends authority to support vetted Syrian groups countering ISIS in Syria and authorizes \$242 million for associated SC activities.

Sec. 1266 directs SecDef to develop and implement a plan to train and equip Iraqi and Kurdish Peshmerga forces to defend against air, missile, and unmanned systems attacks based on results and recommendations from reports directed in last year's NDAA.

Sec. 1207 adds Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan to countries authorized to receive support for border security operations. The specific

The 2024 National Defense Authorization Act Continued...

focus of this effort is to increase and sustain these nations' security along borders shared with Afghanistan.

Tech Exportability and Foreign Military Sales

Sec. 1306 directs the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (SecNav) for Research, Development and Acquisition (RD&A) to conduct a study on the feasibility and advisability of accelerating the provision of Harpoon missile systems under existing FMS cases. The section limits funds available to the SecNav RD&A to 85% of annual appropriations until this report is submitted to Congress.

Sec. 873 authorizes Geographic CCMDs to hire two acquisition or contracting officers using Defense Acquisition Workforce Development Account funds to advise the CCMD on FMS systems and processes and facilitate the effective implementation of such processes.

Sec. 873 also directs DoD and Services to develop a list of systems that would benefit from investment for

exportability features to support SC objectives through FMS, which aims to reduce hurdles of non-exportability of certain defense articles to partner nations due to technical design and classification. Sec. 1210 authorizes DoD to provide mission training through distributed simulation, including related hardware and software, to friendly foreign nations to enhance interoperability and integration between U.S. and friendly foreign militaries.

In Conclusion

Overall, this year's NDAA strikes a balance between authorizing funds for ongoing SC programs and activities and oversight of cost and efficacy of prior programs. The vast changes to the institutional side of the SCW suggest continued congressional interest in the DoD enhancing its SC activities and capabilities. By leveraging its "power of the purse," Congress is seeking oversight of SC programs to ensure both effectiveness and efficiency. This trend suggests that AM&E may become increasingly crucial to CCMDs as they propose SC programs and activities or request reauthorization of legacy ones.



The Romanian Army's 74th Patriot Regiment conducted the country's first PATRIOT missile system live-fire exercise at the Capu Midia test firing range in Romania Nov. 15-16, 2023. Romania received the first of seven PATRIOT systems in 2020 through a foreign military sales case executed by the U.S. Army Security Assistance Command. (Courtesy photo)



A U.S. Army advisor with 5th Security Force Assistance Brigade (SFAB) assists members of the Republic of Korea Army on squad battle drills training in Paju, South Korea, July 25, 2022. (U.S. Army photo by Sgt. Keion Jackson)

41 Days in Korea: From Competition to Conflict for the U.S. Military Advisory Group

by LTC Garrett M. Searle, U.S. Army

In the early morning hours of June 25th, 1950, with the sky darkened by clouds and rain hanging over the Imjin River valley and obscuring the Taebak range to the east, the full force of the North Korean People's Army (NKPA) surged south across the 38th Parallel. Leading with artillery and armor provided by the Soviet Union, the NKPA attacked along seven axes of advance, following major roadways south. They concentrated their armored forces in the center, on the lines of communication that led through Uijongbu and straight into the heart of Seoul. The invasion achieved both strategic and tactical surprise, catching the Republic of Korea Army (ROKA) and their American advisors largely unprepared and inadequately equipped to repel the attack.¹ For the next 41 days, the combined ROKA and American force scrambled to prevent total defeat and the loss of the nation to communism.

The rapid transition from a state of competition to one of large-scale combat in Korea serves as a

compelling case study for today's Army, and particularly for the current military advisor force that may find itself in a similar position on the modern battlefield.² The actions and impact of the U.S. Military Advisory Group to the Republic of Korea, known as KMAG, during the first six weeks of the war provide a set of useful lessons to demonstrate what military advisors should expect to be doing and what impact they can have if properly positioned, equipped, and empowered. In the transition from competition to conflict resulting from enemy aggression, advisors will gain an understanding of the evolving situation and relay that information to the joint force; they will provide advice to their partners as they react; they will use their organic communication capability to integrate joint fires in support of their partners; they will serve as a two-way intelligence conduit between U.S. and partner sensors and decision-makers; and they will play a key role in preparing for and receiving military forces from the U.S. and other supporting nations. All these functions were executed in some form by KMAG in the opening days of the Korean War, and their successes (and

failures) had a significant impact on the trajectory of the conflict. This article will first describe KMAG activities in the first six weeks of the conflict and then make recommendations to guide preparation for similar contingencies in the modern operating environment.

Day 1: 25 June 1950 - The NKPA invades South Korea. Communist forces consisted of roughly 10 divisions (~135,000 men), including a brigade of Russian-built T-34 tanks. The South Koreans had an army of about 95,000, but with no armor and critical shortages in artillery and anti-tank capability.³

At the time of the invasion there were very few KMAG advisors physically present with South Korean forces stationed along the 38th parallel. Surprise was a major factor in the initial success of the NKPA and the rapid destruction and withdrawal

of the ROK forces. That condition also applied to KMAG, who were not well-postured to provide effective support to the ROK Army when the invasion started. In his official history of the war, Appleman describes a single Army Captain as the only American present on the border on Sunday morning, June 25th, 1950. The story presents a compelling scene, with the young advisor lying in his darkened bedroom trying to determine if the sounds he hears are guns or the weather. The answer comes soon enough when rounds start impacting around his house. From there his story follows a common theme in the beginning hours of the war, with advisors working to stay alive, find each other, link up with their Korean partners, and figure out what the hell is going on.⁴

On 25 June 1950, the KMAG Chief of Staff, Colonel W.H. Sterling Wright, was in temporary command while the group awaited the arrival of a new commanding general from the U.S.⁶ However,




Figure 1. Map depicts North Korean invasion routes. The concentration of NKPA armored forces can be seen in the center, north of the South Korean capital of Seoul. KMAG advisors were embedded with each of the ROKA division headquarters and the ROK Army headquarters in Seoul.⁵ (Map courtesy of the Defense Mapping Agency Hydrographic/Topographic Cntr, D. Holmes, Jr)

according to Fehrenbach, “no orders had been issued to KMAG to cover the situation developing on Sunday morning,” so there was confusion about how they should react.⁷ To keep from being overrun and captured, the advisor team on the Ongjin Peninsula was evacuated by L-5 liaison planes almost immediately. The ROK 17th Regiment was also evacuated by ship shortly after, ceding the peninsula to the NKPA.

Additional guidance came quickly, however, as the invasion reinvigorated U.S. resolve to support their beleaguered ally. The Secretary of State told General MacArthur that he wanted KMAG liaison officers to “remain with their units as long as these were effective in combat.”⁸ COL Wright and his staff in Seoul spent the first 72 hours of the war trying to stay in contact with the ROK Army headquarters and keep them in Seoul, where they could effectively command and control the defense of the city.

There is evidence that proactive work by advisors before and during the initial fighting helped prevent the immediate collapse of ROKA units. The ROKA 6th Division, for example, was well-prepared and in a position to fight northeast of Seoul on the morning of June 25th. Their principal advisor, LTC Thomas McPhail, was positioned with the division headquarters at the time of the initial attacks and moved to the fighting later that morning to supervise the movement of the division reserve into the line.⁹ Their strong defense, which incorporated a number of counterattacks, forced the NKPA to call on reserves of artillery and armor for reinforcement. Although the 6th Division ultimately had to withdraw due to the collapse of the ROK defense to their west, their efforts had delayed NKPA forward momentum for three days despite the same resource shortfalls that plagued the entire army.¹⁰

The destruction of ROK defenses and counter-attacking forces in the Uijongbu corridor doomed the capital city, which the ROK Army Headquarters abandoned on the night of June 28th. At that time COL Wright had accountability of an advisor group


of roughly 63 officers and enlisted men in the Seoul area.¹¹ A portion of this element was maneuvering south through the panicking city when they were shocked by a massive explosion in front of them. The South Koreans prematurely destroyed the only remaining bridge over the Han River, killing five to eight hundred ROK soldiers and civilians that were packed onto the structure as they desperately tried to escape.¹²

Day 4: 28 June 1950 - Seoul falls to the NKPA. *Large portions of the ROKA and their advisors were stranded north of the destroyed bridges over the Han River. KMAG advisors made a grueling overnight escape from the city on foot. The ROKA was almost completely destroyed, reduced to a disorganized rabble of roughly 22,000 men.*



KMAG advisors escape Seoul on foot after a harried nighttime crossing of the Han River.¹³ (U.S. Army photo)

With U.S. resolve renewed by the communist invasion, Gen. MacArthur moved swiftly to provide whatever support he could from the large American presence in Japan. Initially this consisted mostly of air support from the Far Eastern Air Force (FEAF), which began providing support to the ROKA defense at about the same time Seoul fell to the NKPA. The general state of confusion in the South Korean forces and limited communications contact between advisors meant that this support was mostly ineffective and, at times, counterproductive. U.S. planes attacked columns of retreating ROKA units desperately trying to escape the rout in Seoul, confusing them with NKPA units moving in the same direction.¹⁴



In the south, farther from the front lines, KMAG advisors played an important role in reconstituting devastated ROKA units and preparing for the reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (RSOI) of inbound U.S. and United Nations forces. In the absence of orders, the senior advisor to the ROKA 3rd Division in Teagu, LTC Rollins Emmerich, established a KMAG rear command post in Pusan on June 28th.¹⁵ From there he was able to make contact by telephone with Far East Command headquarters in Tokyo. With no knowledge of the status of the KMAG command in Seoul, LTC Emmerich began organizing the activities of advisors and other volunteers he had in Pusan.¹⁶ This established a forward and rear structure with COL Wright in command of an advisor group south of Seoul and LTC Emmerich in charge of a rear-area command at Pusan. Within a matter of days, these two elements were in communication with one-another and could coordinate support for both ROKA and inbound U.S. Army units.

In the forward area, COL Wright focused on reorganizing retreating masses of South Korean troops into fighting elements that could be sent back to the front lines. He also used this contact with the withdrawing forces to obtain more up-to-date information on the location and disposition of advancing NKPA units.¹⁷ However, the limitations on communication between the two primary KMAG elements and, more importantly, between KMAG and Tokyo, meant this intelligence had limited value for inbound U.S. forces. This likely contributed to the continued overconfidence of the U.S. Army up to the moment of first contact with the NKPA at Osan on 5 July.

In the first few days of July, elements of the 24th Infantry Division (ID) began arriving by air from Japan. When the commander of the U.S. Army's 24th ID, MG William F. Dean, flew in on July 3rd, he assumed command of all U.S. Army forces in Korea, including KMAG. Almost immediately, he incorporated a number of KMAG advisors into a make-shift headquarters staff.¹⁸ This was done due to the slow pace of movement of 24th ID staff as well as the benefit of incorporating local knowledge into the staff in Korea.

In Pusan, LTC Emmerich and his element were busy with several actions to prepare for the arrival of reinforcements from Japan. First, they organized parties of Korean conscripts to repair the Pusan airstrip and unload ships at the port. They also obtained replacement vehicles for those that were abandoned by KMAG in Seoul and moved them, along with displaced KMAG personnel, by train to COL Wright's position in Taejon. Finally, as conventional Army forces began to arrive from Japan, they briefed unit commanders and staffs on the situation and coordinated transportation north to the battle area.¹⁹ It is impossible to measure the impact of these RSOI support activities, mostly done without orders, but it is likely that they contributed significantly to the successful defense of Pusan.

Day 11: 5 July 1950 - Task Force Smith destroyed by NKPA armored forces. *The first contact between U.S. Army ground combat units and the NKPA was a total disaster: the two reinforced companies of Task Force Smith were quickly overrun by a formation of T-34 tanks and supporting infantry.*²⁰

While the U.S. Army was being humbled during its initial contacts with the NKPA, the advisors of KMAG continued their effort to prevent the collapse of the remaining ROKA units. Together with the growing U.S. contingent, they began to fight a series of delaying actions as the lines compressed south and east



The Jukmiryeong U.N. Forces First Battle Memorial in Osan, South Korea, was the site of the 69th Task Force Smith Memorial Ceremony held July 3, 2019. The ceremony commemorated the first battle in Korea involving United Nations forces, which occurred July 5, 1950. During the battle approximately 180 out of 540 U.S. Troops were either killed, imprisoned or missing in action. (U.S. Army photo by Private Second Class Jun-Woong Sung)

toward Pusan. ROKA units, with their attached advisors, generally moved into the more rugged terrain to the east, where they were less likely to encounter enemy armor. American advisors served as a link between these formations and the maturing American command structure, allowing U.S. commanders to direct the maneuver of ROKA units as a component of the defense and delaying actions.²¹



Soldiers from 2nd Battalion, 1st Infantry Regiment, 2nd Stryker Brigade Combat Team, 2nd Infantry Division/ROK U.S. Combined Division, prepared to train alongside their ROK Army counterparts in the 21st Infantry Division at the KCTC, March 15, 2023. The unforgiving mountainous terrain and realistic training environment provides the opportunity to further strengthen interoperability amongst the allied nations to ensure we are prepared to Fight Tonight. (U.S. Army photos by Maj. Ed Alvarado, 2nd Infantry Division Public Affairs)

In mid-July, COL Wright sent KMAG advisors forward to Kumch'on to help the ROKA establish a forward command post close to where their forces were coalescing. He and LTC Emmerich also established additional forward headquarters in Taegu and Taejon to assist American units as they moved into the defense, building out a skeleton of what would eventually be the Pusan Perimeter.²²

The ROKA forward headquarters withdrew several times in late July as the lines compressed toward Pusan, eventually collocating with the main American command post in Taegu.

During this period, KMAG advisors were also busy establishing replacement training centers (RTC) to fill the ranks of ROKA units with available volunteers. In July and August, the advisors formed four of these RTCs with oversight from a handful of KMAG officers and NCOs. These centers were soon churning out 500-1000 new recruits on a daily basis to man foxholes

on the front lines. In one account, a KMAG advisor named CPT Frank Lucas single-handedly drafted, organized, and trained a battalion of roughly 1,000 South Koreans from the town of Taegu in a period of about five days. Their 'training' consisted of each soldier firing nine rounds from their issued rifles. Less than a week after their activation, this unit, called the ROK 26th Regiment, entered combat in the eastern sector of the Pusan Perimeter.²³

Day 41: 4 August 1950 - All United Nations Forces have withdrawn into the Pusan Perimeter. *This area was roughly defined by the arc of the Naktong River, defended by a force of roughly eight divisions (five ROK and three American).*²⁴

After 41 days of fighting, the Pusan Perimeter was stabilized but not fully secured. Bitter fighting continued through August and September as the North Korean forces probed for weakness along the Naktong River. As the situation leveled-out, KMAG began the difficult task of reorganizing and rebuilding the ROK Army, a job that would occupy the advisory group for the remainder of the war—it would take years to reconstitute what had been destroyed in three days' time.

Despite their apparent lack of preparedness for the conflict, KMAG clearly played a critical role in the first six weeks of the war. Their efforts to staunch the hemorrhaging of ROK Army formations kept many of these units in the fight, even if it required the advisors to take a more directive approach than their mandate would allow in more ideal circumstances.²⁵ Military advisor support to a beleaguered partner in the early, defensive stages of a conflict still features prominently in U.S. Army doctrine.²⁶ Analysis of KMAG actions in the early days of the war results in a number of observations and recommendations about the role of military advisors in a rapid transition from competition to conflict.

Observations and recommendations

1. Advisors need orders or plans detailing actions to be taken in the event of a sudden change in the operating environment or enemy disposition. KMAG had no such instructions and it resulted in widespread



confusion and ineffectiveness in the opening hours/days of the conflict. In situations where such a scenario is likely or even possible, advisor teams and their higher headquarters should conduct a tabletop exercise to rehearse actions and develop contingency plans. In most cases it is unlikely that advisors will have written orders to this effect, but commanders remain responsible for ensuring that their teams are prepared for the worst-case scenario.

2. Accurate assessments of partner capability and readiness are critical to prepare for transition. The U.S. Army's assessments of the ROKA prior to the war were grossly inflated. According to Tabb: "on 20 June 1949, during a visit of senior military leadership to Korea, Roberts reported to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Omar Bradley and Army Chief of Staff, General J. Lawton Collins that the ROKA was 'the best doggone shooting army outside of the United States.'"²⁷ The inaccuracy of this assessment is particularly galling due to the strategic choices made by the U.S. not to provide the kinds of weapons and support needed to build an army actually capable of defending the fledgling nation. Incentive structures in the military do not generally support accurate assessments; a problem that has persisted and was evidenced repeatedly during the U.S. Army's recent experience in Iraq and Afghanistan. That problem is beyond the scope of this paper, but the Korean example is a good reminder of the mandate to paint an accurate picture of partner capability to support operational and strategic decision-making.

3. Adaptability is crucial for military advisors in a period of rapid transition. Despite the chaos of the early days of the conflict, members of KMAG remained relevant to their partners and to the U.S. command in large part due to their flexibility and resilience. Many continued to provide sound advice and direction to their ROKA counterparts and serve as a link to American command and control. Usually in the absence of orders, they took the initiative to provide support where needed to both Korean and U.S. forces, serving as the crucial connective tissue during the disorder that characterized the first six weeks of the war.

4. Good connectivity between military advisors and joint fires and intelligence capabilities could be the difference between success and failure. In the Korean War example, the KMAG liaisons did not have a communications link between themselves and the FEAF air support, leading to the errant application of this capability. This is an area where modern communications systems might make a dramatic difference—helping alleviate an adversary's overmatch by enabling more effective artillery or air support. Concentrations of effective air support against advancing armored formations would certainly have slowed the NKPA push southward.



A U.S. Army advisor assigned to 1st Security Force Assistance Brigade communicates by radio at Fort Irwin, Calif., 15 August 2023. U.S. Army advisors conducted training alongside role players and actual partners to prepare to assess, support, liaise, and advise during large-scale combat operations. (U.S. Army photo by Maj. Jason Elmore)

5. Advisors and other pre-positioned forces will play a crucial role in the RSOI for inbound U.S. and allied ground combat formations. The rapid progress of North Korean forces and the virtual disintegration of the ROK Army made this task particularly important. Military advisors already on the ground prior to the onset of hostilities will be best positioned to provide useful information to incoming forces about possible staging bases, port facilities, interior lines of communication, and the current situation at the front lines.

Conclusion

Ultimately, the war in Korea was resolved, after three years of violent struggle, with little changed from the *status quo antebellum*. That result, while



disappointing considering the blood and treasure lost, was only possible because of the rapid response of American forces to prevent the total destruction of the ROK Army in the opening days of the war. The presence and adaptability of a relatively small group of American military advisors had an outsized impact on the ultimate salvation of a nation that now boasts the 12th largest economy in the world. While we endeavor to avoid this scale of conflict in the future, authoritarian regimes with revanchist ideas still have a vote, and our military advisors must be prepared for a rapid shift from competition to conflict. In that scenario, as they did in Korea, they will surely play a critical role in support of our beleaguered partners and allies.

The Author

Lieutenant Colonel Garrett Searle, U.S. Army, is a Civil Affairs officer serving on staff at the Security Force Assistance Command. He previously served in company command and staff positions in both the 95th Civil Affairs Brigade and the 2d Security Force Assistance Brigade. He holds an MS from the Naval Postgraduate School.

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3. Robert K. Sawyer, *Military Advisors in Korea: K MAG in Peace and War* (Washington, D.C.: United States Army Center of Military History, 1962), 105-107. The South Koreans’ lack of

armor and heavy artillery resulted primarily from fiscal and policy decisions in Washington that would have disastrous consequences. In January 1950, the U.S. Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, had publicly acknowledged that U.S. policy drew a security cordon line in the Far East that did not incorporate Taiwan or Korea. From that point, North Korea, with assistance from the Soviet Union, embarked on a rapid expansion of its armed forces.

4. Appleman, *South to the Naktong*, 23.
5. U.S. Army Center for Military History map. Originally published in Appleman, *South to the Naktong*, 20.
6. In fact, on that fateful Sunday morning, COL Wright was sitting with his family in a church pew in Japan, where he had travelled to see his family off to the United States. His tour in Korea was extended due to the leadership transition, but he was sending his family back on the original schedule. Famously, a messenger entered the service and whispered in the Colonel’s ear: “You had better get back to Korea.” M.L. Cavanaugh, “In Search of Seamless Interoperability In Korea: The First Year of the R.O.K-U.S. Combined Division,” *War on the Rocks*, June 24, 2016, <https://warontherocks.com/2016/06/in-search-of-seamless-interoperability-in-korea-the-first-year-of-the-r-o-k-u-s-combined-division/>.
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25. Sawyer, *Military Advisors in Korea*, 140.
26. Department of the Army. Field Manual 3-0, Operations. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Publishing Office, 2022, 6-13.
27. John D. Tabb, “The Korean Military Advisory Group (K MAG): A Model for Success?” (U.S. Army Command and General Staff College: SAMS Monograph, 2009), 27. The K MAG assessments were also falsely optimistic, with the K MAG commander stating in 1950 that an attack by the “inferior ground forces of North Korea” would only lead to a “bloody nose” for the South Koreans. See Christopher J. Ricci, “Korean Military Advisory Group: Insights for future Security Force Assistance Efforts” (Masters Thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2011), 25-26.



4th SFAB medical advisors, alongside partners from Belgium, Germany, Netherlands, attended the International Military Medical Observer Trainer (IMMOT) course 26-29 June 2023 in Brussels, Belgium. IMMOT aims to foster collaboration that enhances the capabilities and interoperability of military medical personnel from partner nations to improve medical support during combined military operations. (Photo Courtesy of 4 SFAB PAO)

Medical Advising in Europe

by MAJ Jeff A. Johnson, Medical Advisor Team leader and CPT Nicole M. Fuss, Brigade Nurse/Medical Plans & Operations, 4th Security Force Assistance Brigade

Medical Advisors of the multi-functional Advisor Teams in the Security Force Assistance Brigades (SFABs) fill a variety of roles beyond the medical field and what is normally required at the same rank outside of the SFAB community. These roles include advising and training allies and partners in planning, operations, and sustainment at the joint and multinational levels, including with partners from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO, particularly for the 4th SFAB which is regionally aligned to Europe). The 4th SFAB proactively assumes advisor-training roles with many European allies and partners. This role assumption also drives proactively seeking training (and cross-training) opportunities beyond the norm. This combination of extraordinary training and training-advisor missions makes SFAB advisors able to add more value to the Army for the remainder of their careers. Some roles and preparatory actions are common to both non-commissioned officers (NCOs) and officers. Thus, what follows are many excerpts, generally broken down by first NCOs then officers, as to how 4th SFAB Medical Advisors have ‘cracked the code’ to more adequately prepare for

diverse advisor roles. As the medical field is universal, these excerpts can inspire learning and positive change across the SFABs and joint medical advisor community.

NCO-Centric Roles and Preparation

The 4th SFAB significantly improved their medical operations and planning advising in Europe by training sergeant (SGT) and staff sergeant (SSG) Medical Advisors on medical planning, sending advisors to medical planning courses, and cross training medical advisors at logistics courses to make them multi-functional sustainment advisors. SGT and SSG Medical Advisors do not usually receive training on medical operations and planning prior to arriving at the SFAB. The Medical Basic, Advanced, and Senior leader course curricula lack medical operations and planning classes. This is problematic because there are key principles to consider when developing the sustainment plan and integrating it into the maneuver plan. Many of the Medical Advisors have served with an expeditionary Role 1 (unit level care) or Role 2 (advanced treatment) Medical Treatment Facility (MTF) prior to serving in 4th SFAB, but few have been

involved in planning how the Role 1 or Role 2 MTFs are employed and integrated into maneuver plans.



CPT Fuss, Medical Advisor Team, OF-1 Kronental, G1, & OF-2 Baumanis, G4, do COA analysis for the Latvian MI Brigade during SILVER ARROW 22. (Photo Courtesy of 4 SFAB PAO)

These NCO Medical Advisors are typically the only medical Soldier on a team and Foreign Partners expect them to advise on medical planning and operations. Security Forces Assistance Command (SFAC) 350-1 (Training) Individual Training Tasks require all Medical Advisors to be able to develop a Medical Common Operating Picture (MEDCOP) in an area of operations and conduct mission analysis as part of the Military Decision-Making Process. SFAC 350-1 Collective Training Tasks require all Medical Advisors to be capable of advising Foreign Partners on sustainment (including medical) support to offensive and wide-area security operations and develop a concept of sustainment in support of expeditionary operations. In addition to these required tasks, many partners in Europe request assistance in developing Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) for Medical Evacuation (MEDEVAC) and Role 1 and Role 2 employment.



SSG Caro, LCAT 4610, and SSG Phomvongsa, MCAT 4330, conducted the initial assessment of the GDF 16th CSS BN Medical Company. (Photo Courtesy of 4 SFAB PAO)

In 2022-23, 4th SFAB Medical Advisors advised Foreign Partners at the battalion, brigade, and division level on a wide range of medical operations

and planning. SSG Caro, the Medical Advisor for Logistics Company Advisor Team 4610, and SSG Phomvongsa, the Medical Advisor for Maneuver Company Advisor Team 4330, advised the Georgian Defense Force. They validated the Georgian Defense Forces' MEDCOP, developed a mass casualty event SOP, and assessed the medical company for the 16th Combat Service Support Battalion. SGT Dragicevich, the Medical Advisor for Maneuver Advisor Team 4222, coordinated the first Georgian Brigade and later Division medical synchronization meeting.

SSG Foster, the Medical Advisor for Maneuver Company Advisor Team 4230, planned medical training events that culminated in a multi-national mass casualty exercise during the Bulgarian Battle Group certification exercise PLATINUM LION. She developed the medical training plan, briefed it at the Bulgarian Battalion training meeting for approval by the Commander, and executed the training alongside the United Kingdom's C Company "Irish Rangers", 42nd Mechanized Infantry Battalion, and a U.S. Infantry Company from Fort Carson, Colorado. These



SSG Foster, a Medical Advisor in MCAT 4230, with the United Kingdom's C Company Irish Rangers, 42nd Mechanized Infantry Battalion (BGR), and a United States Infantry Company (B Co 1-8 Infantry) during PLATINUM LION. (Photo Courtesy of 4 SFAB PAO)

Medical Advisors teach foreign partner medical personnel who have typically only served in a hospital how to conduct medical planning and operations. This teaching, coaching, and mentoring of foreign partner medical personnel, especially during exercises, creates a foundation of medical planning and operations that SFAB Medical Advisors in the future will continue to develop.

Officer-Centric Roles and Preparation

The 70H (Health Services Plans, Operations, Intelligence Security and Training) in a SFAB is the senior medical planning and operations trainer in the brigade and works closely with the Brigade Surgeon to plan and execute training. They are dual-slotted as the Brigade Medical Operations Officer and the Medical Advisor Team Leader in the Sustainment Advisor Battalion. They conduct a semi-annual two-week medical Specialized Skills Assessment Program for each force package as well as monthly single-day training events for all Medical Advisors through the SFAB's 'Medic University.' These programs provide exposure to trauma training, prolonged casualty care, and medical operations and planning classes in preparation for future employments across the European Theater. The 4th SFAB coordinates for a bi-annual Joint Medical Operations Course-Basic (JMOC -B) at Fort Carson to introduce Medical Advisors to medical planning at the joint and operational levels.

The Medical Advisor Team Leader is responsible for ensuring Medical Officers in the 4th SFAB receive medical planning and operations experience through schooling and mentorship. Prior to employment with advisor teams in 2022, CPT Fuss, the 4th SFAB Brigade Nurse, attended the Health Services Plans, Operations, Intelligence Security and Training Course at Fort Sam Houston, Texas to better prepare for medical advising in Europe. She also worked closely with the Medical Advisor Team Leader on pre-deployment medical planning. The Brigade Surgeon,



CPT Fuss attended the Health Services Plans, Ops, Intelligence Security and Training Course. (Photo Courtesy of 4 SFAB PAO)

Brigade Physician's Assistant, and Sustainment Battalion Surgeon attended the JMOC-B to increase their joint and operational medical planning and advising capabilities. 4th SFAB Medical Advisors have also attended the MEDEVAC course with NATO's

Military Medicine Center of Excellence, the NATO Joint Medical Planners Course at the NATO School Oberammergau and the NATO Special Operations Medical Planning and Support Course – Task Group at the NATO Special Operations University.

SFAB Medical Officers attending medical planning and operations courses supplement their medical treatment skills with operational planning skills. MAJ Hachinsky, the 6th Sustainment Advisor Battalion Surgeon, stated that the JMOC-B helped him to think at the operational and strategic levels, whereas most of his prior training had been at the tactical level. CPT Fuss stated that the Health Services Plans, Operations, Intelligence, Security, and Training Course introduced her to Corps level planning for maneuvering medical units in support of Large-Scale Combat Operations since most of her experience had been with a Field Hospital.



MAJ Johnson, Medical Advisor, and the NATO Advisor Liaison Team advise the Kosovo Security Forces at Defender Europe 2023. (Photo Courtesy of 4 SFAB PAO)

The 4th SFAB has increased the Medical Advisors' capabilities by cross training them at logistics courses. Medical operations in Europe are closely linked to logistics operations, and often the medical planner is a logistics officer assigned to the S4 (Sustainment) section of the staff. The Medical Advisor Team Leader attended the Support Operations Course Phase 1 and 2 to better understand how U.S. Army logistical operations work and how to integrate them with medical operations. He led a Sustainment Advisor Team made up of both Logistics and Medical Advisors to advise the Kosovo Security Forces on both logistics and medical

planning and operations during DEFENDER EUROPE 23. CPT Schonewolf, the Brigade Environmental Science Officer, and CPT Brown, the Medical Logistics Officer, attended the NATO Logistics Functional Area Services course to learn how NATO logistics operations work and how to integrate them with medical operations. CPT Brown led the Logistics Element that augmented the Field Artillery Battalion Advisor Team in late 2022 to early 2023.

An example of how all of this preparation culminated with an ally was CPT Fuss's participation in the NATO exercise SILVER ARROW 22. She guided the Latvian Mechanized Infantry Brigade G4 team through a six-hour course of action analysis,, facilitated the Latvian G4's development of the Concept of Medical Support and influenced how the Latvian brigade incorporates medical support into future maneuver exercise plans and SOPs. CPT Fuss's training on operational and tactical planning prepared her for her role as 4th SFAB's Brigade Nurse, and uniquely qualified her to serve in the role of Medical Operations Officer and Senior Medical Advisor for the Latvian Army during their largest exercise of the year.



CPT Nicole Fuss assisted the Latvian Mechanized Infantry Brigade G4 with course of action analysis and developing the concept of medical support for the national exercise SILVER ARROW. (Photo Courtesy of 4 SFAB PAO)

During this two-week long exercise, SILVER ARROW brought 17 NATO allied armed forces units with over 4000 military personnel and 1000 vehicles together to develop relationships and capitalize allied and partner nation capabilities. SILVER ARROW being conducted in Europe demonstrates a strong U.S. commitment to the collective security of NATO and dedication to enduring peace and stability in the region. SILVER ARROW 2022 is a long-planned exercise in line with NATO's role as a defensive Alliance for more than 70 years, protecting one billion people in allied territory. (SILVER ARROW description by Sgt. Lianne Hirano, 117th Mobile Public Affairs Detachment)

Wrap-Up

Medical Advising in Europe has shown the need for medical planning and operations training for Medical NCOs and officers who do not typically conduct medical planning and operations. The 4th SFAB enabled these Medical Advisors to add value by training NCO Medical Advisors on medical planning, sending medical officers to medical planning courses, and cross-training medical advisors at logistics courses. Not only did this preparatory training set conditions for their operational successes, the Medical Advisors who received this training and experience as multi-functional sustainment advisors returned to the joint force as more competent and confident military medical professionals after their time with the SFAB.



CPT Nicole Fuss, Medical Advisor Team, advised the Role 1 exercise Polish Military Doctor 2022 in Łódź, Poland. (Photo Courtesy of 4 SFAB PAO)

Role 1 is the first medical aid station Soldiers receive care at in a tactical environment. A Role 2 medical facility provides medical treatment, advanced trauma management, and emergency medical treatment to include damage control surgery, emergency surgery, and continuation of care started in a Role 1 medical facility. (Explanation courtesy of PAO)

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CPT Brown, Medical Advisor Team, attended the 15th War and Disaster Medicine Conference and 29th Multinational Military Medical Exchange in Tartu, Estonia. (Photo Courtesy of 4 SFAB PAO)

Baltic Military Medicine Significant Security Cooperation Initiative


Strengthening Partnerships in Healthcare for Enhanced Security

by Elizabeth (E.B.) Baker, U.S. Army Europe-Africa Global Health Engagements Coordinator and Mr. Jeffrey S. King, Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance Military Analyst

Security Force Assistance (SFA), as part of Security Cooperation (SC), achieves desirable effects when it supports combatant command (CCMD) campaign objectives. SFA and SC achieve optimal effects when they also bolster collective coalition readiness that includes interoperability and strengthened relations from the tactical through institutional levels. While developing ally and partner lethal power is often a top priority, developing ‘soft power’ might, in fact, best strengthen partnerships and enhance security across the competition continuum. The military medical field is a great example of leveraging SC to develop such soft power. Global health engagements (GHE) meet ally and partner universal needs for example disaster relief situations that improve readiness and foster legitimacy among a nation’s populace. U.S. European Command (EUCOM) is wisely using GHE to achieve these objectives in a joint service and multi-national effort. In fact, at least five State Partnership Programs are actively involved in GHE efforts through the U.S. Army and Air Force, the majority

of which is delegated to U.S. Army Europe-Africa (USAREUR-AF). The following exemplifies how GHE, tailored to Baltic ally needs, is being recognized and institutionalized through these participants’ groundbreaking efforts at various U.S. Government levels.

In a landmark move towards fostering international collaboration in the field of military medicine, the USAREUR-AF GHE team has assumed the role of Program Manager for the Baltic Military Medicine Significant Security Cooperation Initiative (Balt Mil Med SSCI) for the fiscal years 2024-2028. With an estimated budget of \$40 million, this initiative stands out as the only approved SSCI with a medical focus in the Department of Defense (DoD). This SSCI underscores U.S. commitment to not only fostering international partnerships but also bolstering the medical capabilities and capacity of ally and partner nations. The Baltic Military Medicine SSCI, with its multi-year training and equipping programs, embodies the U.S. commitment.



Empowering Partners Through Multiyear Programs

This initiative will play a pivotal role in enhancing military medical preparedness and response capabilities applicable to disaster scenarios and conflicts. USAREUR-AF supports these comprehensive efforts through a range of activities, including Medical Subject Matter Expert Exchanges, tabletop exercises, workshops, and active participation in U.S. and NATO exercises. The scope of USAREUR-AF's engagement spans from point-of-injury care, to damage control, resuscitation, and surgery. The emphasis on comprehensive training and equipping programs reflects a holistic approach to military medical readiness.

This approach not only contributes to the advancement of ally and partner nation forces' medical capabilities, but also promotes burden-sharing among NATO allies. By creating interoperable medical capabilities, this SSCI aims to ensure coalition and U.S. forces receive effective medical care in operations across the entire competition continuum.

Baltic Engagement: Tailored Approaches for Each Nation

The Baltic Military Medicine SSCI tailors its approach for each Baltic country, recognizing their unique needs and strengths:

Estonia: USAREUR-AF will provide expertise on medical planning, logistics, Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) and Incident Response. The appropriation will equip Estonian Defense Forces with trauma manikins and medical simulation equipment, akin to the Army's Medical Simulation Training Center. Estonia's prior investments in modernizing deployable medical units align with the SSCI's objectives.

Lithuania: Lithuania will receive trauma manikins and medical simulation equipment, as well as training program development for Mass Casualty Management and evacuation through the SSCI. Additionally, the U.S. will supply medical equipment to support Lithuania's modernization efforts for its deployable medical units.

Latvia: USAREUR-AF has worked collaboratively with Latvia's Ministries of Defense, Health, and Education to develop a comprehensive curriculum for the Fundamentals of Military Medicine Course to be taught to all medical students. The SSCI will further provide mobile training teams to Latvia, facilitating the development of training programs in key areas, including damage control resuscitation and surgery, advanced trauma life support, CBRN and Incident Response, and tactical combat casualty care.

Joint / Multi-Echelon Coordination & Collaboration

The success of the Balt Mil Med SSCI relies on seamless coordination among various entities, including:

- USEUCOM Command Surgeon and SC Division
- USAREUR-AF G5 International Operations Div
- Defense Security Cooperation Agency
- U.S. Army Security Assistance Command
- U.S. Army Medical Materiel Agency
- Secretary of the Air Force/International Affairs
- Defense Institute of Medical Operations

Additionally, U.S. forces assigned to USEUCOM (e.g., 4th Security Force Assistance Brigade) play a pivotal role in providing Medical Subject Matter Experts to many of the GHE events in support of this SSCI.

Way Ahead

The Balt Mil Med SSCI represents a significant stride towards international collaboration in military medicine. With USAREUR-AF GHEs at the forefront, this initiative is set to enhance the medical capabilities of these Baltic nations while fostering enhanced interoperability and standardization among allies and partners within the NATO framework. As this SSCI unfolds, it stands as a testament to our enduring commitment to global health security and shared defense objectives.

The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any other agency of the Federal Government.





Air Advisor Courses

The USAF continues to offer quality Air Advisor courses to support Security Force Assistance efforts. The AA Initial Qualification course just received Joint accreditation and the Air Advisor A-Course is available at a site of your choosing!

These courses aim deliver not only core knowledge and skills, but fieldcraft skills as well. Contact the schoolhouse below for further information.

Facilities: Building 2610, 10 Classrooms (234+ seats), 5 CCTV enabled scenario rooms, and a 143 seat auditorium. Building 2610-A ARMAG facility (Student weapon/ammo storage)

CORE KNOWLEDGE & SKILLS
Mission Specific Info, COIN/SFA Theory, Strategic Guidance, Air Advisor Roles & Responsibilities (TTPs), Joint-Coalition-NGO/IGO & Interagency Partnerships, Security Cooperation, Foreign Disclosure, Area Study, Title Sourcing/Funding, General Mission Planning, Assessments/Teaching, Capstone Exercise

- Courses**
- Air Advisor A-Course**
 - 5 Days
 - Deliverable by MTT
 - Air Advisor Initial Qualification Course (Joint Credit)**
 - 20 days
 - Academic and Fieldcraft classes
 - Awards Air Advisor Special Duty Identifier
 - Joint Accredited
 - Mission Commander/Team Sergeant Course**
 - 5 days
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 - Senior Leadership Course**
 - 3 days
 - Targeted for O-6/GS-15/E-9 in Air Advisor / Security Cooperation leadership roles

Region & Culture Studies
Covers 5 GCCs/30+ Nations, Region/Country Specific, Intro to Culture & Worldview, Religious Familiarization, Region and Partner Nation Specific Information, Relating to Counterparts, Cross-Cultural Communication/ Negotiations, Social Skills, Customs and Appropriate Behavior, Immersive Scenario Exercise

Contact Phone Numbers-
Commercial : 210-652-6574
DSN: 312-487-6574
E-Mail : aetc.a3xp.schedulingworkflow@us.af.mil

Fieldcraft Skills
High-Threat Driving, Advanced Weapons, Tactical Casualty Care, Tactics/Urban Operations, Self Protection, Active Shooter & Insider Threat Techniques, Land Navigation, Tactical Communication, C-IED, Self Protection (Combatives), Personnel Recovery, Area Familiarization



NATO SFA Centre of Excellence Seminars, Courses and Publications

NATO SFA Centre of Excellence has courses available. [Link to NATO SFA Courses \(click here\)](#)

ETOC Code: MCP-CM-26905 Security Force Assistance Advisor Enhancement Seminar

The aim of this seminar is to enhance interpersonal knowledge, skills, and techniques required to engage counterparts, build rapport, and gain mutual trust in order to effectively conduct advising activities across various operating environments and cultural contexts. The seats available are 25 and the deadline for registration is the 5th of April 2024. Applicants should be NATO and Partner SFA Advisors with NATO SFA ADL 362 and NATO Operators Course or National equivalent training. Contact natosfacoe@nsfacoe.org

ETOC Code: MCP-CM-36713 Institutional Adviser Course

The aim of the course is to contribute to sustained and standardized professional development of Allied and Partner military and civilian personnel to conduct stability activities. Advanced tenets of institutional advising are integrated into the course education curriculum. Multinational personnel serving as Institutional Advisers will be more capable to provide advice supporting the sustainable development of a counterpart's national security force. The course builds upon individual advisor skills by providing the students with concepts and tools to assess a partner's institutional capabilities, compare them with environmental factors, and construct a plan to resolve identified issues within the local context of the partner's culture and situation. The Institutional Adviser Course is limited to 15 students and is next being offered 4-8 November 2024.





JCISFA

Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance

Joint Staff | Army | Navy | Marines | Air Force | Space Force

JCISFA Community has SFA courses available through Joint Knowledge Online (JKO). [Link to JCISFA SFA Courses \(click here\)](#)

Available SFA JKO courses:

J3OP-US1336 Advising Foreign Security Forces 101 (1 hour) [No prerequisites]

Introduces Security Cooperation foreign advisors to concepts, definitions, and fundamentals required for the art regardless of which organization or level the advisor is operating. The Security Cooperation advisor may originate from Department of Defense (DoD) or non-DoD organizations; therefore, this course is designed to develop any individual, of any rank, filling the role as a foreign advisor, to support U.S. interests through assisting Partner Nations in the development, sustainment, and employment of the security enterprise.

J3OP-US1398 SFA Considerations When Campaign Planning (2 hours) [No prerequisites]

This course offers ways to implement Security Force Assistance as part of campaign planning, execution, and assessment. This course is tailored for key leaders and operators within organizations that plan and execute Security Cooperation at the operational level. These organizations include Combatant Commands (CCMD), Security Cooperation Organizations (SCOs), Service Component Commands (SCCs), and Joint Task Force (JTF) Headquarters equivalents.

J3OP-US1399: Building Allied and Partner Security Institutions - Advanced (2 hours) [No prerequisites]

The overarching focus of this course is building allied and partner defense institutions through Security Force Assistance (SFA) with an emphasis on foreign security force functions, core processes, and SFA developmental tasks. This curriculum offers a learning objective that provides mid-to-senior level officers abilities to analyze the Operating and Generating Functions of a Foreign Security Force. For example, the course design supports mid-to-senior officers in the grades or ranks of senior O3s, O4s, and junior O5s. However, any officer or civilian within the Department of Defense (DoD) can benefit from material offered within the course. Enabling lesson objectives provide material depth and specificity appropriate for respective Professional Military Education at the mid-to-senior levels. The course provides a cornerstone to follow-on learning at the senior and executive levels.





Foreign Area Officer Corner

Seventh FLEET Navy FAO Team Engages Italian Navy in Cross - Area of Responsibility Planning and Army Africa FAO Forum

U.S. Sixth Fleet, U.S. Seventh Fleet, and Italian Fleet Command Conduct Planning

By CDR Dan Justice, USN FAO & U.S. Sixth Fleet LNO to Rome, Italy

LCDR Sean Croghan from Commander, 7th Fleet's (C7F) Theater Security Cooperation team, coordinated a bilateral engagement for C7F led by RDML(Sel) Nguyen to the Italian Fleet Command HQs to conduct planning with Italian VADM Aurellio De Carolis and his team. The meeting objective was to initiate coordination between C7F and the Italian Navy to support the Italian Navy's aircraft carrier CAVOUR Strike Group's summer 2024 deployment to INDOPACOM. C7F FAOs are working to support allied CSG deployments to the C7F AOR and closely aligning efforts during their time in the AOR. Our NATO Ally's deployment into the Indo-Pacific tactically demonstrates our allied commitment to the Rules Based International Order and freedom of navigation.



Army Sub-Sharan Africa FAOs from across the world met at Caserma Ederle in Vicenza, Italy for the first Army Africa Foreign Area Officer Forum from 12-13 December 2023.



SFA Communities Online

To communicate with our SFA community, we provide ways to submit a request for information (RFI) or to collaborate through various JCISFA information sites.

You may use an RFI, not only to request more information about Security Force Assistance, but also to provide feedback and recommendations on content or suggest topics for future editions of the Quarterly SFA Newsletter or the Quarterly SFA Forum.



For email, go to our website through the Joint Staff (<https://www.jcs.mil/Directorates/J7-Joint-Force-Development/JCISFA>) and click the email link at the bottom. Via the web, use any of our social media sites or through the Chairman's Joint Lessons Learned Information System (JLLIS).



JCISFA's presence on social media platforms, Facebook and Twitter, allows you to stay in touch with the latest JCISFA news. "Like" our Facebook page at <https://www.facebook.com/JCISFA> and follow us on Twitter at <https://twitter.com/JCISFA>.



To join our Community of Interest on Microsoft Teams, open Teams, select the "Teams" button on the left, and type "JSJCISFA Col" in the "Join or create a team" field at the bottom. Someone from JCISFA will add you to the members.



<https://www.jllis.mil/>



<https://www.milsuite.mil/>

Protected Internet Exchange (PiX)

<https://pixtoday.net>